The paper begins with a general introduction to the nature of human consciousness and outlines several different philosophical approaches. A critique of traditional reductionist and dualist positions is offered and it is suggested that consciousness should be viewed as an emergent property of physical systems. However, although consciousness has its origin in distributed brain processes it has macroscopic properties - most notably the `unitary sense of self', non-deterministic free will, and non-algorithmic `intuitive' processing - which can best be described by (...) quantum-mechanical principles. (shrink)

Recent incidences of fraud and the growing globalization of business have focused attention on the effect of culture on ethical decision making within organizations. Because fraud can be extremely costly and is more likely to be committed by employees than persons external to the organization, employees willing to report un-ethical acts are an important supplemental control tool. The current study provides evidence of the effects of culture (Canadian and Chinese) and the type of reporting (whistle-blowing and peer reporting) on reporting (...) unethical acts within organizations. Chinese and Canadian participants were asked to respond to scenarios describing unethical acts committed within organizations. Results indicate that Chinese are more likely to report the unethical acts of peers than Canadians. Chinese also appear more likely to report the unethical acts of peers than supervisors. The results also suggest that Graham’s model of principled organizational dissent may not be applicable to Chinese and perhaps other non-Western cultures. (shrink)

In recent years we have seen a dramatic shift, in several different areas of communication studies, from an information-theoretic to a dynamic systems paradigm. In an information processing system, communication, whether between cells, mammals, apes, or humans, is said to occur when one organism encodes information into a signal that is transmitted to another organism that decodes the signal. In a dynamic system, all of the elements are continuously interacting with and changing in respect to one another, and an aggregate (...) pattern emerges from this mutual co-action. Whereas the information-processing paradigm looks at communication as a linear, binary sequence of events, the dynamic systems paradigm looks at the relation between behaviors and how the whole configuration changes over time. One of the most dramatic examples of the significance of shifting from an information processing to a dynamic systems paradigm can be found in the debate over the interpretation of recent advances in ape language research (ALR). To some extent, many of the early ALR studies reinforced the stereotype that animal communication is functional and stimulus bound, precisely because they were based on an information-processing paradigm that promoted a static model of communicative development. But Savage-Rumbaugh's recent results with bonobos has introduced an entirely new dimension into this debate. Shifting the terms of the discussion from an information-processing to a dynamic systems paradigm not only highlights the striking differences between Savage-Rumbaugh's research and earlier ALR studies, but further, it sheds illuminating light on the factors that underpin the development of communication skills in great apes and humans, and the relationship between communicative development and the development of language. Key Words: apes; ape language research (ALR); brain development; co-regulation; communication; dynamic systems; language development; symbols. (shrink)

What sort of property did Locke take colors to be? He is sometimes portrayed as holding that colors are wholly subjective. More often he is thought to identify colors with dispositions—powers that bodies have to produce certain ideas in us. Many interpreters find two or more incompatible strands in his account of color, and so are led to distinguish an “official,” prevailing view from the conflicting remarks into which he occasionally lapses. Many who see him as officially holding that colors (...) are dispositions concede that some of his remarks imply that colors are in us rather than in objects. After raising some difficulties for these readings, I offer an alternative. I will argue that Locke takes colors to be relational, but not dispositional, properties of the objects around us. On his view, an object is red if and only if it is actually causing a certain sensation in some observer. (shrink)

Many philosophers suggest (1) that our emotional engagement with fiction involves participation in a game of make-believe, and (2) that what distinguishes an emotional game from a dispassionate game is the fact that the former activity alone involves sensations of physiological and visceral disturbances caused by our participation in the game. In this paper I argue that philosophers who accept (1) should reject (2). I then illustrate how this conclusion illuminates various puzzles in aesthetics and the philosophy of mind.

A number of developmental psychologists have argued for a theory they call the theory theory - a theory of cognitive development that suggests that infants and small children make sense of their world by constructing cognitive representations that have many of the attributes of scientific theories. In this paper I argue that there are indeed close parallels between the activities of children and scientists, but that these parallels will be better understood if one recognizes that both scientists and children are (...) not so much theorists as model builders. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to establish the logically necessary preconditions for the existence of self-awareness in an artificial or a natural agent. We examine the terms, agent, situated, embodied, embedded, and representation, as employed ubiquitously in cognitive science, attempting to clarify their meaning and the limits of their use. We discuss the minimal conditions for an agent’s environment constituting a ‘world’ and reject most, though not all, types of virtual world. We argue that to qualify as genuinely situated (...) an agent should function in real time within the dynamic world we inhabit, or some close simulacrum of it. We show that embodied agents will possess or evolve local co-ordinate systems, or points of view, locating, identifying and interacting with objects relative to their current position in space-time, and we discuss various types of embodiment, arguing that most current situated and embodied systems are too limited to be candidates for even the most minimal claim to self-identity. We argue that a truly autonomous agent has to be active in its participation with the world, able to synthesise and order its internal representations from its own point of view, and to do this effectively the agent will have to be embedded. To this end we propose a six point definition of embeddedness. Ultimately we argue for a philosophical-cum-cognitive science model of the self that satisfies essential elements of both sets of definitions of the term. (shrink)

This insightful explication of oriental philosophy meets a long felt need for a critical introduction to four systems of eastern thought—Confucianism, Taoism, Buddhism, and Hinduism—presented in familiar western terms. Students of comparative religion, eastern philosophy and civilization, and the philosophy of religion who have been trained in traditional western modes of thought often find the intuitive and aphorisic quality of eastern writing a major stumbling block to understanding. This is eastern philosophy presented to westerners by a westerner, a practical and (...) understandable guide for students and for others who wish to expand their understanding in this important area. (shrink)

While the issue of standards has received attention from analysts in science and technology studies, this attention has tended to focus on either units of measurement or compatibility standards. Much less attention has been devoted to equally important standards of practice. These are the procedural or process standards which govern how technologists go about designing and constructing artifacts. Such standards have a substantial documented history in the form of engineering codes of practice. As the embodiment of judgments rendered by a (...) particular community of technological practi tioners, these standards both reflect and shape the exercise of practitioner judgment. This article explores both these functions through examples drawn from structural and software engineering. These examples yield insights regarding both the role of formal procedural standards in technological practice and the unusual nature of software technology. (shrink)

One kind of philosopher takes it as a working hypothesis that belief/desire psychology (or, anyhow, some variety of prepositional attitude psychology) is ...

Proceedings of the first trans-disciplinary symposium on philosophy and medicin held at Galveston, Texas, May 9-11,1974.

My comments will focus on the problem of the fascist self.1 All three essays—correctly to my mind—imply that it holds the key to a better understanding of the nature of fascism. It is disturbing enough to study people so enamored with death. Fascism remakes the nineteenth-century bourgeois individual into a type of “reduced complexity” who cultivates the role of a conquering hero through sacrifice and murder. Even worse, Helmut Lethen provocatively suggests that fascists share this affection for typologizing human beings (...) with other modern avant-garde movements. I would push this argument further. Postmodern intellectuals share with fascism an affection for.. (shrink)

The concept of cheating is ubiquitous in ourmoral lives: It occurs in contexts as varied asbusiness, sports, taxpaying, education,marriage, politics, and the practice of law. Yet despite its seeming importance, it is aconcept that has been almost completely ignoredby moral theorists, usually regarded either asa morally neutral synonym for non-cooperativebehavior, or as a generalized, unreflectiveterm of moral disapprobation. This articleoffers a ``normative reconstruction'''' of theconcept of cheating by showing both whatvarious cases of cheating have in common, andhow cheating is related (...) to, and differs from,other morally wrongful acts, such as stealing,promise-breaking, deceiving, disobedience, anddisloyalty. A paradigmatic account of cheating is developed that entails two elements: First, the cheater must violate a prescriptive (rather thandescriptive), mandatory (rather than optional),regulative (rather than practice-defining), andconduct-governing (as opposed todecision-governing) rule. Second, the rulemust be fair and enforced even-handedly, andmust be violated with an intent to obtain anadvantage over some party with whom therule-breaker is in a cooperative, rule-governedrelationship. Along the way is a discussion ofpuzzling cases of ``judicial cheating,''''``strategic cheating,'''' cheating because``everyone else is doing it,'''' ``cheatingoneself,'''' ``altruistic cheating,'''' and ``ulteriormotive cheating.'''' The article then applies thecheating paradigm in the context of whitecollar criminal law, arguing that the conceptof cheating provides a better framework forexplaining the ``moral wrongfulness'''' thatunderlies and helps to define offenses such astax evasion and insider trading. (shrink)

Many of the earliest books, particularly those dating back to the 1900s and before, are now extremely scarce and increasingly expensive. We are republishing these classic works in affordable, high quality, modern editions, using the original text and artwork.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

On progress, education and future -- On ideologies and governments -- On religion, liberty, and freedom of speech -- On women and equality -- On America and democracy.

_dualism_ (consciousness lies outside knowable science), _emergence_ (consciousness arises as a novel property from complex computational dynamics in the brain), and some form of _panpsychism_, _pan-protopsychism, or pan-experientialism_ (essential features or precursors of consciousness are fundamental components of reality which are accessed by brain processes). In addition to 1) the problem of subjective experience, other related enigmatic features of consciousness persist, defying technological and philosophical inroads. These include 2) the “binding problem”—how disparate brain activities give rise to a unified sense (...) of “self” or unified conscious content. Temporal synchrony—brain-wide coherence of neural membrane electrical activities—is often assumed to accomplish binding, but _what_ is being synchronized? What is being coherently bound? Another enigmatic feature is 3) the transition from pre-conscious processes to consciousness itself. Most neuroscientists agree that consciousness is the “tip of an iceberg”, that the vast majority of brain activities is. (shrink)

Regulatory processes governing healthcare research have been very controversial within the academic and health sectors. We assume that it is generally accepted that there need to be institutional structures and systems to ensure researchers pursue ethical research in healthcare and that the chosen site can feasibly support the project in question. Having said that the efficiency and proportionality of ethics and research governance processes have frequently been called into question. This paper will examine some of the attempts made by the (...) National Institute for Health Research (NIHR) to streamline ethics approval as well as research and development processes. It will consider the extent to which the changes made by the NIHR have been successful, and then briefly consider the future direction of governance within healthcare research. (shrink)

It is argued that, based on Kant's descriptive metaphysics, one can prescribe the necessary metaphysical underpinnings for the possibility of conscious experience in an artificial system. This project is developed by giving an account of the a priori concepts of the understanding in such a system. A specification and implementation of the nomological conditions for a conscious system allows one to know a priori that any system possessing this structure will be conscious; thus enabling us to avoid possible false-indicators of (...) consciousness like that offered in a behaviouristic analysis. This is an alternative approach to the bottom-up or top-down approaches adopted by, for example CYC (Lenat and Feigenbaum 1992) and COG (Brooks 1994; Brooks and Stein 1993), neither of which, alone, or in some hybrid form, have proved productive. (shrink)

Philosophy is like a party that started over 2,500 years ago and is still going strong. When you take a philosophy class, you're invited to join this party; but walking into a party 2,500 years late can feel a little awkward. This book is meant to solve that problem. The best way to feel welcome is to focus on how funny philosophy is, simply because its ideals are so high that humans almost never manage to reach them. This book gives (...) three answers to the question "What is philosophy?" (1) Philosophy is a conversation that has been going on for over 2,500 years which has been full of comedy from the beginning and will continue to be funny forever if we do it right. (2) Philosophy is a very awkward business that has always been on the verge of going out of business. (3) Philosophy is something that makes almost everyone write very badly. In addition to this three-act comedy the book also contains two practical guides to being happy and successful in philosophy classes. (shrink)

Although cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was initially used very selectively at the discretion of clinicians, the use of CPR rapidly expanded to the point that it was required to be performed on all patients having in‐hospital cardiac arrests, regardless of the underlying condition. This created problems with CPR being clearly inadvisable for many patients. Do Not Resuscitate (DNR) orders emerged as a means of providing a transparent process for making decisions in advance regarding resuscitation, initially by patients and later also by (...) clinicians. Under hospital policies in many countries, however, CPR remains the default position for all patients having cardiac arrest in the hospital if there is no DNR order in place, regardless of whether CPR is medically indicated or in the patient's best interests. “Slow Codes” are the delayed or token efforts to provide CPR when clinicians feel CPR is futile or inappropriate. After giving a historical overview of the development and the changing use of CPR, we argue that more attention needs to be given to the cause of slow codes, namely, policies requiring CPR to be performed as the default action while simultaneously lacking implementing interventions such as advance care planning as a routine policy. This is ethically and legally inappropriate, and hospital policies should be modified to allow clinicians to consider whether CPR is appropriate at the time of arrest. Such a change requires a stronger emphasis on early recognition of patients for whom CPR is not in their best interests and to improve hospital emergency planning. (shrink)

Agent causation presupposes that actions are behaviors under the causal control of the agent’s mental states, its beliefs and desires. Here the idea of conscious causation in causal explanations of actions is examined, specifically, actions said to be the result of conscious efforts. Causal–functionalist theories of consciousness purport to be naturalistic accounts of the causal efficacy of consciousness. Flanagan argues that his causal–functionalist theory of consciousness satisfies naturalistic constraints on causation and that his causal efficacy thesis is compatible with results (...) of Libet’s experiments on conscious causation. First, the notions of conscious effort and conscious causation are analyzed with respect to the project of naturalizing the mind, that is, the attempt to assimilate folk-psychological explanation to the causal model of explanation in the natural sciences. It is argued that a serious obstacle for any naturalist program is that mental states are individuated by their semantic content, not the mechanistic, physical properties of their neural state instantiations. In particular, it is argued that explanation by reference to mental state content yields not a causal but an interpretive or rationalizing account of action in which the question of causal efficacy is irrelevant. Then, Flanagan’s causal–functionalist theory of consciousness is critically assessed; specifically his interpretations of Libet’s negative experimental results on the causal efficacy of consciousness are diagnosed and disputed. It is contended that Flanagan misinterprets the results of Libet’s consciousness experiments and that his functionalist concept of consciousness fails to yield an adequate explanation of the alleged causal efficacy of consciousness. Finally, his thesis is countered with other experimental results that appear to favor an epiphenomenalist view over the causal efficacy account of consciousness. (shrink)

Volition and exertion play key roles in Reid’s philosophy, but his handling of them has been disputed. Some claim that he identifies volition and exertion, others that he is inconsistent or unclear about this. Some claim that he quietly slides between using ‘exertion’ in two or three different senses. I aim to clarify Reid’s notions of volition and exertion, and to defend him against the charges of inconsistency and ambiguity. I argue that from 1780 to 1792 he consistently distinguishes volition (...) and exertion. Throughout this period, he takes a volition to be a decision or intention to do something, and an exertion to be an attempt to do something. I maintain that ‘exertion’ is no more ambiguous for Reid than it is for any ordinary speaker of English. (shrink)

A thorough-going re-elaboration of modern experience via the senses.

This symposium contribution offers a reconsideration of a range of “vice crime” legislation from late nineteenth and early twentieth century American law, criminalizing matters such as prostitution, the use of opiates, illegal gambling, and polygamy. According to the standard account, the original justification for these offenses was purely moralistic and paternalistic ; and it was only later, in the late twentieth century, that those who supported such legislative initiatives sought to justify them in terms of their ability to prevent harms. (...) This piece argues that the rationale for these vice crimes laws was much more complicated than has traditionally been thought, encompassing not just moralistic justifications but also a wide range of harm-based rationales—similar to those that underlie modern, technocratic, “preventive justice” legislation involving matters such as anti-social behavior orders, sex offender registration, stop-and-frisk policing, and the fight against terrorism. (shrink)