Recommender systems assist users in receiving preferred or relevant services and information. Using such technology could be instrumental in addressing the lack of relevance digital mental health apps have to the user, a leading cause of low engagement. However, the use of recommender systems for digital mental health apps, particularly those driven by personal data and artificial intelligence, presents a range of ethical considerations. This paper focuses on considerations particular to the juncture of recommender systems and digital mental health technologies. (...) While separate bodies of work have focused on these two areas, to our knowledge, the intersection presented in this paper has not yet been examined. This paper identifies and discusses a set of advantages and ethical concerns related to incorporating recommender systems into the digital mental health ecosystem. Advantages of incorporating recommender systems into DMH apps are identified as a reduction in choice overload, improvement to the digital therapeutic alliance, and increased access to personal data & self-management. Ethical challenges identified are lack of explainability, complexities pertaining to the privacy/personalization trade-off and recommendation quality, and the control of app usage history data. These novel considerations will provide a greater understanding of how DMH apps can effectively and ethically implement recommender systems. (shrink)

What is the proper role for Theory in literary study? An aid to reading? Or source of insight into the world beyond the text? Half-heartedly apologizing for the political-theoretical excesses of the past two decades, Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak and Jean-Michel Rabaté offer up more of the same, with Spivak in particular recycling the ideas of others so as to revive literature as a source of political "Othering." Noting the ways in which Theory silences the sounds of "Others," I argue Valentine (...) Cunningham's placing of Theory permits both texts and others to speak, and in so doing, teaches us to listen. (shrink)

This paper examines what agents should do when others fail to comply with their responsibilities to prevent dangerous climate change. It distinguishes between six different possible responses to noncompliance. These include what I term (1) 'target modification' (watering down the extent to which we seek to prevent climate change), (2) ‘responsibility reallocation’ (reassigning responsibilities to other duty bearers), (3) ‘burden shifting I’ (allowing duty bearers to implement policies which impose unjust burdens on others, (4) 'burden shifting II’ (allowing some to (...) protect peoples rights in ways which impose otherwise unjustified burdens on the duty bearers, (5) 'compromising moral ideals' (permitting agents to compromise non-justice ideals that they are otherwise bound by); and (6) ‘promoting compliance (implementing policies and creating institutions which reduce noncompliance). It concludes by outlining a methodological framework for evaluating these options, and by setting out my tentative and provisional evaluation of which responses are the least bad. (shrink)

Climate change is projected to have very severe impacts on future generations. Given this, any adequate response to it has to consider the nature of our obligations to future generations. This paper seeks to do that and to relate this to the way that inter-generational justice is often framed by economic analyses of climate change. To do this the paper considers three kinds of considerations that, it has been argued, should guide the kinds of actions that one generation should take (...) if it is to treat both current and future people equitably. In particular it examines the case for what has been termed pure time discounting, growth discounting and opportunity cost discounting; and it assesses their implications for climate policy. It argues that none of these support the claims of those who think they give us reason to delay aggressive mitigation policies. It also finds, however, that the second kind of argument can, in certain circumstances, provide support for passing on some of the costs of mitigation to future generations. (shrink)

In the 19th century, the history of philosophy becomes the history of a particular science. Modern philosophical historiography is an ambivalent project. On the one hand, we find an affirmative concept of Bildung through tradition and historical insight; on the other, there arises a critical reflection on historical education in the light of an emerging critique of modern culture. The book offers a comprehensive overview of the debate.

Nicht wenige Autoren in der politischen Ideengeschichte sind der Überzeugung, dass die Grundpfeiler des modernen Rechts- und Verfassungsdenkens nicht als das Erbe oder die kontinuierliche Weiterentwicklung der aristotelischen Tradition zu betrachten sind, sondern als Neuerungen, die sich gerade dem radikalen Bruch mit ihr verdanken. Die entscheidende Demarkationslinie zwischen antikem und modernem politischem Denken verlaufe dabei entlang der Idee der natürlichen Rechte des Individuums: Erst die politische Philosophie der Neuzeit und die auf ihr fußende Verfassungswirklichkeit verhelfe dem Menschen zu seinen ihm (...) angeborenen und unveräußerlichen Rechten. Die vorliegende Interpretation der aristotelischen Politik zeigt, dass das Kernanliegen der politischen Moderne, die Begründung und Durchsetzung der natürlichen Rechte des Individuums, jedoch als die Fortschreibung und Ausformulierung eines Grundgedankens von Aristoteles' politischer Philosophie begriffen werden sollte, nicht als radikaler Bruch mit ihr. (shrink)

The article proposes a novel approach to the much discussed question of which symmetries have ‘direct empirical significance’ and which do not. The approach is based on a development of a recently proposed framework by Hilary Greaves and David Wallace, who claim that, contrary to the standard folklore among philosophers of physics, ‘local’ symmetries may have direct empirical significance no less than ‘global’ ones. Partly vindicating the standard folklore, a result is derived here from a number of plausible assumptions, that (...) states that local symmetries can indeed have no direct empirical significance. Ways to interpret the result are considered and possible morals are outlined. 1 Introduction2 Greaves and Wallace on Interior versus Non-interior Symmetries3 Elaborating on the Greaves/Wallace Framework4 The Result5 Problems with ’t Hooft’s Beam Splitter6 Summary and Conclusion. (shrink)

In many cases, rivers, mountains, forests, and other so-called natural entities have value for us because they contribute to our well-being. According to the standard model of such value, they have instrumental or “service” value for us on account of their causal powers. That model tends, however, to come up short when applied to cases when nature contributes to our well-being by virtue of the religious, political, historical, personal, or mythic meanings it bears. To make sense of such cases, a (...) new model of nature’s value is needed, one that registers the fact that nature can have constitutive value for us on account of the role it plays in certain meaningful wholes, such as a person’s sense of who he or she is. (shrink)

A philosophical introduction to and interrogation of the work of Gilbert Simondon and its relation to contemporary media technology, communication and information.

Sustainability as a narrative has mainstreamed, but practice is stuck in the ‘valley of death,’ with exemplary business action to internalize social and environmental externalities remaining ad hoc and small scale. Civil regulation has had significant impacts, but appears unable to act as a driver of systemic change. Addressing change at the system level requires the evolution of corporate governance away from intensive towards an extensive accountability, embedded within a ‘public fiduciary.’ Such a shift in fiduciary arrangements is needed to (...) institutionalize and leverage the growing involvement of the state in economic and industrial practice through direct enterprise ownership, the increasing importance of sovereign wealth funds and national development banks, and the significance of public-private partnerships. This re-emergence of the role of the state in economic governance will underpin the next generation of corporate responsibility, framed largely by an international political economy led by major emerging economies. (shrink)

The paper has the following structure. In Section I, I introduce some important methodological preliminaries by asking: How should one reason about global environmental justice in general and global climate change in particular? Section II introduces the key normative argument; it argues that global climate change damages some fundamental human interests and results in a state of affairs in which the rights of many are unprotected: as such it is unjust. Section III addresses the complexities that arise from the fact (...) that some of the ill effects of global climate change will fall on the members of future generations. Section IV shows that some prevailing approaches are unable to deal satisfactorily with the challenges posed by global climate change. If the argument of this paper is correct, it follows that those who contribute to global climate change through high emissions are guilty of human rights violations and they should be condemned as such. (shrink)

Cap-and-trade systems for greenhouse gas emissions are an important part of the climate change policies of the EU, Japan, New Zealand, among others, as well as China and Australia. However, concerns have been raised on a variety of ethical grounds about the use of markets to reduce emissions. For example, some people worry that emissions trading allows the wealthy to evade their responsibilities. Others are concerned that it puts a price on the natural environment. Concerns have also been raised about (...) the distributional justice of emissions trading. Finally, some commentators have questioned the actual effectiveness of emissions trading in reducing emissions. This paper considers these three categories of objections – ethics, justice and effectiveness – through the lens of moral philosophy and economics. It is concluded that only the objections based on distributional justice can be sustained. This points to reform of the carbon market system, rather than its elimination. (shrink)

The authors challenge the reigning “causal power framework” as an explanation for whether a particular outcome was actually caused by a specific potential cause. They test a new measure of causal attribution in two experiments by embedding the measure within the Structure Induction model of Singular Causation (SISC, Stephan & Waldmann, 2016).

Vihvelin argues that Frankfurt-style cases should be divided into two kinds, according to when the trigger for the intention takes place: either prior to the agent's choice or after it. Most agree that only the former, which I call pre-decisional intervention, stands a chance of removing all of an agent's alternatives. Vihvelin notes that both sides in the dispute over whether there is a successful case of pre-decisional intervention assume that if there is a successful case, then it will be (...) a case where the agent has no alternative. Vihvelin thinks this is a mistake: agents subject to pre-decisional intervention still have alternatives, and the intricate discussion and development of ever more complex Frankfurt-style cases is beside the point. She argues for this by presenting a case, purportedly analogous to Frankfurt-style cases, where it is clear that there are alternatives available. Fischer has replied by disputing the analogy. In this paper I argue that Vihvelin is right to think the cases are analogous, but that both Fischer and Vihvelin are wrong to think that Vihvelin's parallel case is one where there are alternatives. Despite appearances, this is not the case, and I construct a Fischer-inspired argument to show this. (shrink)

The cluster account, one of the best attempts at art classification, is guilty of ahistoricism. While cluster theorists may be happy to limit themselves to accounting for what art is now rather than how the term was understood in the past, they cannot ignore the fact that people seem to apply different clusters when judging art from different times. This paper shows that while allowing for this kind of historical relativity may be necessary to save the account, doing so could (...) result in incorporating an essentially institutional component or making the theory extremely complex and virtually impossible to use. (shrink)

Employee attitudes to change are key predictors of organizational change success. In this article, change engagement is defined as the extent to which employees are enthusiastic about change, and willing to actively involve themselves in ongoing organizational change. A model is tested showing how change-related organizational resources influence change engagement, in part through their influence on change-related job resources. Confirmatory Factor Analysis and Structural Equations Modeling results yielded good fit to the data in two independent samples: 225 Australian working professionals, (...) and 201 employees from a Prolific sample. As proposed, change-related organizational resources were positively associated with higher order change-related job resources. Change-related job resources were positively associated with change engagement. In contrast to expectations, organizational resources were not directly associated with change engagement. Instead, change-related job resources fully mediated the relationship. Overall, the study provides empirical support for new measures of organizational change resources and employee change engagement. By drawing from well-established models in the change and engagement literatures, the study provides a promising research direction for those interested in further understanding positive employee attitudes to organizational change. Practical implications and future research opportunities are discussed. (shrink)

In this article we study how reported speech markers are used as procedural resources in a laboratory based parapsychology experiment to investigate forms of anomalous communication, such as extrasensory perception. In particular, we focus on how specific activities in a key part of the experiment are mediated by the use of `you said' formulations which project that whatever is said next is a paraphrase or a verbatim report of what the recipient had said earlier. We identify two uses of reported (...) speech markers. First, they are used in utterances that initiate some form of repair, such as correction or clarification. Second, they cluster in sequential locations that mark, after a temporary suspension, the resumption of key activities in the experiment. In this we hope to contribute to the study of the institutional properties of reported speech. We conclude by discussing the ways in which broader cultural understandings of the inferential force of `you said' formulations inform their use in this institutional setting, and reflecting on the significance of these findings for parapsychological investigation of anomalous communication in this setting. (shrink)

We consider the Stag Hunt in terms of Maynard Smith’s famous Haystack model. In the Stag Hunt, contrary to the Prisoner’s Dilemma, there is a cooperative equilibrium besides the equilibrium where every player defects. This implies that in the Haystack model, where a population is partitioned into groups, groups playing the cooperative equilibrium tend to grow faster than those at the non-cooperative equilibrium. We determine under what conditions this leads to the takeover of the population by cooperators. Moreover, we compare (...) our results to the case of an unstructured population and to the case of the Prisoner’s Dilemma. Finally, we point to some implications our findings have for three distinct ideas: Ken Binmore’s group selection argument in favor of the evolution of efficient social contracts, Sewall Wright’s Shifting Balance theory, and the equilibrium selection problem of game theory. (shrink)

Memes, of the kind found often on the internet, are an increasingly significant medium of expressive activity. I develop a theory of their ontological nature and, in parallel, an analysis of the concept meme. On my view, memes are abstract artifacts made out of norms for production of instances. The norms say things like ‘use a certain image; add text of a certain kind; the text should be delivered in two chunks, one at the top of the image, one at (...) the bottom, etc.’ Instances of these memes are created when users follow these norms and publish the results. The concept meme is analyzed in terms of the notion of memographic practice, a historically situated form of activity within which memes are created and their instances produced and made public. (shrink)

Unconscious stimuli can influence participants’ motor behavior but also more complex mental processes. Recent research has gradually extended the limits of effects of unconscious stimuli. One field of research where such limits have been proposed is spatial cueing, where exogenous automatic shifts of attention have been distinguished from endogenous controlled processes which govern voluntary shifts of attention. Previous evidence suggests unconscious effects on mechanisms of exogenous shifts of attention. Here, we applied a cue-priming paradigm to a spatial cueing task with (...) arbitrary cues by centrally presenting a masked symmetrical prime before every cue stimulus. We found priming effects on response times in target discrimination tasks with the typical dynamic of cue-priming effects indicating that central symmetrical stimuli which have been associated with endogenous orienting can modulate shifts of spatial attention even when they are masked. Prime–Cue Congruency effects of perceptual dissimilar prime and cue stimuli suggest that these effects cannot be entirely reduced to perceptual repetition priming of cue processing. In addition, priming effects did not differ between participants with good and poor prime recognition performance consistent with the view that unconscious stimulus features have access to processes of endogenous shifts of attention. (shrink)

Readings of Derrida’s work on law and justice have tended to stress the distinction between them. This stress is complicated by Derrida’s own claim that it is not ‘a true distinction’. In this essay I argue that ordinary experiences of the inadequacy of existing laws do indeed imply a claim about what would be more just, but that this claim only makes sense insofar as one can appeal to another more adequate law. Exploring how Derrida negotiates a subtle path between (...) classical Platonism and classical conventionalism about justice, the attempt is made to take seriously Derrida’s aim to affirm the idea of a ‘mystical’ foundation of the authority of laws by taking ‘the use of the word “mystical” in what I venture to call a rather Wittgensteinian direction’. (shrink)

The review article examines the relation of solidarity and cosmopolitanism in contemporary political philosophical and sociological debates. In some contexts solidarity and cosmopolitanism are closely related, in others they are understood to be incompatible. The main body of the report is divided into three parts displaying a tentative classification of the reviewed literature on the subject. The first part serves to outline a general account of solidarity, the communal obligations that follow from it, and its opposition to the moral arguments (...) grounding cosmopolitan obligations. The second part deals with the actual development and realization of solidarity and cosmopolitanism, as well as the tension between both within the European Union. The third part considers some arguments for the extension of solidarity relations beyond state or nation towards cosmopolitan affiliations, obligations and institutions. Finally, a reading of solidarity and cosmopolitanism is offered in which both are compatible with each other. (shrink)

[…] their mistake is not that they are only form, but that form is missing. (Hegel 1986, 239)1. As far as the ‘association of friends’ edition1 can be believed, Hegel makes this judgment about the...

This paper examines the process through which micro-businesses ‘go green’. It builds upon previous studies that have identified the different drivers of this greening process. However, rather than a static focus on specific drivers, the study articulates the evolution of environmental practices over time. The paper uses comparative case studies of six micro-businesses to build a composite sequence analysis that plots the greening process from its roots through to large-scale and ambitious ecological projects. The study identifies three distinct stages that (...) businesses pass through during this greening process. This has important implications for policy-makers and advisors as it was found that the support needed by the businesses changed as they passed through these different stages. In particular, it was found that appropriate support is currently lacking at certain key points of the businesses' greening development. The paper therefore adds to current understanding of small business ecological responsibility by showing how activities and drivers change with the level of engagement. Pointers are provided as to how support can be improved. (shrink)

In their article “Three Kinds of Decision-Making Capacity for Refusing Medical Interventions,” Navin et al. (2022) argue that we should recognize two forms of decision-making capacity (DMC) besides...

The Wissenschaftslehre 1804-ii does not end with absolute knowledge in the 25th lecture, because this absolute knowledge is as sealed off from the common knowledge as the Absolute itself in the 15th lecture was. As matters stand in the 25th lecture the Wissenschaftslehre can neither meet its own claim to unify all knowledge in one system nor can the genesis of the absolute knowledge, which had to begin with common knowledge, be understood by means of the Wissenschaftslehre itself. The problem (...) in linking absolute knowledge and common knowledge is that, on the one hand, absolute knowledge is hermetically closed. Therefore, nothing and especially not common knowledge can derive or result from it. On the other hand, absolute knowledge is not supposed to depend on anything but the Absolute itself. Therefore, it cannot be understood adequately as a condition for common knowledge. Fichte’s solution to this problem is to differentiate between the genesis of absolute knowledge and absolute knowledge itself. Common knowledge is necessary only for the genesis of absolute knowledge. However, the validity of the common knowledge depends on the pursuit of the absolute knowledge. (shrink)

Fichte claims that it is a severe misinterpretation of his philosophy if one understands it as an absolutization of thinking or consciousness. Even more misguided is the assumption that this special thinking or consciousness can be achieved by abstracting from all empirical evidence. Nevertheless the term ‚pure knowledge‘ is of importance within the WL and it means precisely a formal knowledge which has been cleaned from all empirical contents. Therefore, Fichte’s claim shall be examined by contrasting the pure knowledge with (...) the absolute knowledge in the WL 1804-II. The hypothesis here followed is that no pure entity like the pure knowledge can be found at the head of the system of the WL 1804. The highest point within the realm of thought, meaning the first entity of knowledge, is in fact the absolute knowledge, which differs essentially from the pure knowledge. Fichte beteuert, dass es eine schwere Fehlinterpretation seiner Philosophie sei, wenn man sie als Verabsolutierung des Denkens oder des Bewusstseins verstünde. Dies gilt umso mehr, wenn angenommen wird, dass dieses Denken zudem lediglich aus der Abstraktion von allem Empirischen und auf Grund dieses vermeintlich reinigenden Abstraktionsprozesses entstanden ist. Dennoch spielt das reine Wissen eine zentrale Rolle in der WL. Entsprechend soll Fichtes Beteuerung runtergebrochen auf das Verhältnis von reinem Wissen und Absolutem Wissen in der zweiten Vorlesung zur Wissenschaftslehre aus dem Jahr 1804 überprüft werden. Die hier vertretene These lautet: Nicht eine reine Instanz, hier konkret: nicht das reine Wissen, ist das Höchste in der Wissenschaftslehre 1804. Das denkbar Höchste, bzw. die erste Instanz innerhalb des Wissens, ist vielmehr das Absolute Wissen. Und dieses ist – darauf kommt es an – wesentlich unterschieden von dem reinen Wissen. (shrink)

Online exam supervision technologies have recently generated significant controversy and concern. Their use is now booming due to growing demand for online courses and for off-campus assessment options amid COVID-19 lockdowns. Online proctoring technologies purport to effectively oversee students sitting online exams by using artificial intelligence systems supplemented by human invigilators. Such technologies have alarmed some students who see them as a “Big Brother-like” threat to liberty and privacy, and as potentially unfair and discriminatory. However, some universities and educators defend (...) their judicious use. Critical ethical appraisal of online proctoring technologies is overdue. This essay provides one of the first sustained moral philosophical analyses of these technologies, focusing on ethical notions of academic integrity, fairness, non-maleficence, transparency, privacy, autonomy, liberty, and trust. Most of these concepts are prominent in the new field of AI ethics, and all are relevant to education. The essay discusses these ethical issues. It also offers suggestions for educational institutions and educators interested in the technologies about the kinds of inquiries they need to make and the governance and review processes they might need to adopt to justify and remain accountable for using online proctoring technologies. The rapid and contentious rise of proctoring software provides a fruitful ethical case study of how AI is infiltrating all areas of life. The social impacts and moral consequences of this digital technology warrant ongoing scrutiny and study. (shrink)