Physician-researchers are bound by professional obligations stemming from both the role of the physician and the role of the researcher. Currently, the dominant models for understanding the relationship between physician-researchers' clinical duties and research duties fit into three categories: the similarity position, the difference position and the middle ground. The law may be said to offer a fourth.

Background Clinical Ethics Committees are well established at healthcare institutions in resource-rich countries. However, there is limited information on established CECs in resource poor countries, especially in Africa. This study aimed to establish baseline data regarding existing formal CECs in Africa to raise awareness of and to encourage the establishment of CECs or Clinical Ethics Consultation Services on the continent. Methods A descriptive study was undertaken using an online questionnaire via SunSurveys to survey healthcare professionals and bioethicists in Africa. Data (...) were subjected to descriptive analysis and Fischer's exact test was applied to determine associations. Texts from the open-ended questions were thematically analysed. Results In total 109 participants from 37 African countries completed the survey in December 2019. A significant association was found between participants’ bioethics qualification or training and involvement in clinical ethics. All participants were familiar with Research Ethics Committees, and initially conflated RECs with CECs. When CECs were explained in detail, approximately 85.3% reported that they had no formal CECs in their institutions. The constraints to developing CECs included lack of training, limited resources, and lack of awareness of CECs. However, the majority of participants were interested in establishing CECs. Participants listed assistance required in establishing CECs including funding, resources, capacity building and collaboration with other known CECs. The results do not reflect CECs established since the onset of COVID-19 in Africa. Conclusions This study provides a first look into CECs in Africa and found very few formal CECs on the continent indicating an urgent need for the establishment of CECs or CESs in Africa. While the majority of healthcare professionals and bioethicists are aware of ethical dilemmas in healthcare, the concept of formal CECs is foreign. This study served to raise awareness of CECs. Research ethics and RECs overshadow CECs in Africa because international funders from the global north support capacity development in research ethics and establish RECs to approve the research they fund in Africa. Raising awareness via educational opportunities, research and conferences about CECs and their role in improving the quality of health care in Africa is sorely needed. (shrink)

This book's importance is derived from three sources: careful conceptualization of teacher induction from historical, methodological, and international perspectives; systematic reviews of research literature relevant to various aspects of teacher induction including its social, cultural, and political contexts, program components and forms, and the range of its effects; substantial empirical studies on the important issues of teacher induction with different kinds of methodologies that exemplify future directions and approaches to the research in teacher induction.

The sixteen essays in Gender Struggles address a wide range of issues in gender struggles, from the more familiar ones that, for the last thirty years, have been the mainstay of feminist scholarship, such as motherhood, beauty, and sexual violence, to new topics inspired by post-industrialization and multiculturalism, such as the welfare state, cyberspace, hate speech, and queer politics, and finally to topics that traditionally have not been seen as appropriate subjects for philosophizing, such as adoption, care work, and the (...) home. (shrink)

In Book 2 of The Peloponnesian War, the ancient Greek historian Thucydides describes the Plague of Athens which killed an estimated 75,000 people in 430 BC, the second year of the war. Thucydides i...

In many ways set theory lies at the heart of modern mathematics, and it does powerful work both philosophical and mathematical – as a foundation for the subject. However, certain philosophical problems raise serious doubts about our acceptance of the axioms of set theory. In a detailed and original reassessment of these axioms, Sharon Berry uses a potentialist approach to develop a unified determinate conception of set-theoretic truth that vindicates many of our intuitive expectations regarding set theory. Berry further (...) defends her approach against a number of possible objections, and she shows how a notion of logical possibility that is useful in formulating Potentialist set theory connects in important ways with philosophy of language, metametaphysics and philosophy of science. Her book will appeal to readers with interests in the philosophy of set theory, modal logic, and the role of mathematics in the sciences. (shrink)

Face à sa finitude, l'homme est désemparé. Il aborde l'existence par la question du " pourquoi ". " Pourquoi m'a-t-on donné la vie si c'est pour la reprendre? " Il est envahi par la colère, la révolte... puis, il cherche un sens à sa mort et pose un au-delà salvateur, un lieu où tout peut continuer autrement... ou encore il envisage une réincarnation; bref, quelque chose qui n'est plus " la fin de la fin ". Mais quand l'homme se fait (...) philosophe, comment appréhende-t-il cette idée qui sera aussi sa réalité ultime? (shrink)

In 1614, the German astronomer Simon Mayr published his claim about the discovery of Jupiter’s satellites. In his treatise Mundus Jovialis, Mayr made his assertion in a convoluted but unequivocal manner, earning resentment from Galileo Galilei, who published his harsh protest in 1623 in Il Saggiatore. Though Galileo’s objections were fallacious in some respects, and though numerous scholars took to the field to prove Mayr’s claim, none ever really succeeded, and the historical evidence remains to Mayr’s detriment. On the basis (...) of such historical evidence, including comparisons between Mundus Jovialis and Mayr’s earlier works, Mayr’s independent discovery of the satellites can be ruled out. Indeed, it is very likely that he never observed them before 30 December 1610, nearly a year after Galileo. The lack of a corpus of Mayr’s observations and the inaccuracy of his tables are also puzzling. (shrink)

Chaque fois que les hommes parlent du temps, ils le connotent d'une valorisation typiquement humaine : "Prendre du bon temps", "perdre son temps", "la fuite du temps". Cette expérience immédiate, affective et bouleversante favorise un discours quasi simpliste ou nostalgique sur ce temps considéré comme ce qui enferme le tragique ou le pathétique de la condition humaine, vouée à la finitude. Le paradoxe réside donc, en ce fait qu'il paraît complexe de dire l'essence du temps, d'autant que souvent chacun en (...) est réduit à n'en faire qu'une description mesurable, chronologique ou phénoménologique. Toutefois cette conception d'un temps essentiellement linéaire ne semble pas rendre compte de l'aspect cyclique ou rythmé de certaines manifestations (notamment naturelles), ni même des résurgences du passé par l'intermédiaire de la mémoire, ou encore des projets et des anticipations envisagés en prévention d'un "à-venir". L'embarras réside, spécifiquement, dans cette aporie à donner une consistance au temps typiquement humain face à la perfection ontologique d'une éternité : Ontologie qu'il importe de situer en l'homme par opposition à une entité extérieure rendue visible par l'instrument de mesure, mais qui ne peut coïncider avec l'intériorisation du temps intuitionné au coeur de l'être en plein étance. Ontologie à distinguer notamment d'un Etre suprême qui échappe à toute temporalité et présuppose son immuabilité et dont l'homme, dans son statut d'être livré au temps, est coupé. Au regard de cette complexité, nous pouvons réitérer la question : Qu'est-ce que le temps et comment le penser? Comment égrener une philosophie du temps comparable à la saisie de l'écoulement de grains de sable dans un sablier et palper au coeur même de la vie, dans son efflorescence la puissance de l'instant? L'ouvrage de Laurence Vanin fournit un ensemble d'éléments susceptibles d'orienter le lecteur vers des réponses... (shrink)

Contemporary realist theories of value claim to be compatible with natural science. In this paper, I call this claim into question by arguing that Darwinian considerations pose a dilemma for these theories. The main thrust of my argument is this. Evolutionary forces have played a tremendous role in shaping the content of human evaluative attitudes. The challenge for realist theories of value is to explain the relation between these evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes, on the one hand, and the (...) independent evaluative truths that realism posits, on the other. Realism, I argue, can give no satisfactory account of this relation. On the one hand, the realist may claim that there is no relation between evolutionary influences on our evaluative attitudes and independent evaluative truths. But this claim leads to the implausible skeptical result that most of our evaluative judgements are off track due to the distorting pressure of Darwinian forces. The realist’s other option is to claim that there is a relation between evolutionary influences and independent evaluative truths, namely that natural selection favored ancestors who were able to grasp those truths. But this account, I argue, is unacceptable on scientific grounds. Either way, then, realist theories of value prove unable to accommodate the fact that Darwinian forces have deeply influenced the content of human values. After responding to three objections, the third of which leads me to argue against a realist understanding of the disvalue of pain, I conclude by sketching how antirealism is able to sidestep the dilemma I have presented. Antirealist theories of value are able to offer an alternative account of the relation between evolutionary forces and evaluative facts —
an account that allows us to reconcile our understanding of evaluative truth with our understanding of the many non-rational causes that have played a role in shaping our evaluative judgements. (shrink)

Social inclusion/exclusion involves just/unjust social relations and social structures enabling or constraining opportunities for participation and health. In this paper, social inclusion/exclusion is explored as a dialectic. Three discourses – discourses on recognition, capabilities, and equality and citizenship – are identified within Canadian literature. Each discourse highlights a different view of the injustices leading to social exclusion and the conditions supporting inclusion and social justice. An Integrated Framework for Social Justice that incorporates the three discourses is developed and used to (...) critique the dominant focus on distributive justice within foundational Canadian nursing documents. We propose a broader conceptualization of social (in)justice that includes both relational and structural dimensions. Opportunities for multilevel interventions to promote social justice are identified. This framework is congruent with nursing's moral imperative to promote health equity and with the multiple roles played by nurses to promote social justice in everyday practice. (shrink)

Feminist Epistemology and Philosophy of Science: An Introduction is structured around six questions and the answers to them that have been offered by feminist epistemologists and philosophers of science. By showing how these answers differ from those of traditional philosophical approaches, the book situates feminist work in relation to philosophy more generally. The questions are: Who knows? What do we have knowledge of? How do we know? What don't we know? Why does it matter? and How can we know better? (...) In addressing these questions, the book reviews feminist accounts of objectivity, agnotology, issues in social epistemology--including epistemic injustice--and considers how feminist epistemology and philosophy of science aim at better knowledge production. The audience for the book is upper division undergraduates, but it will be useful as a foundation for graduate students and other philosophers who are seeking a general understanding of feminist work in these areas. (shrink)

Can the use of focus groups be helpful to get to the roots of ethical issues in the accounting profession? The activities of one such group at Cranfield throws considerable light on the pressures to which individual accountants can be subjected. Professor Vyakarnam has recently been appointed to the Chair of Enterprise at Nottingham Trent University. Sri Srikanthan is Senior Lecturer in the Finance and Accounting Department at Cranfield University School of Management, where Sharon Fitzsimons is Research Officer in (...) the Economics Group. (shrink)

For the past 15 years, scholars in education have focused on Levinas’s work largely in terms of his understanding of alterity, of the self-Other relation, of ethics as ‘first philosophy’ and the significance these concepts have on rethinking educational theory and practice. What I do in this paper, by way of method, is to start from a slightly different place, from the assertion that there is indeed something ‘new’ to be explored in Levinas’s philosophy – both in terms of ideas (...) to be found within his work, and also in terms of the demands educational ideas and practices place on his work from without. That is, how does the actual, lived specificity of educational encounters occasion a different set of questions than one would otherwise pose if thinking only from within the discipline of philosophy, or from a purely theoretical point of view? In light of this, this paper explores Levinas’s ideas of sensibility, materiality, and embodiment. I see these not simply as supports for his ethical thought, but as the very core of incarnation without which his ethics makes no sense. I propose that these ideas are quintessentially pedagogical aspects of his thought – that is, they are always already rooted in a relational context of change and alteration of the subject. (shrink)

Although ‘warrant’ has been used to mean something like ‘justified to the degree required for knowledge’, it has recently come to mean something else. Alvin Plantinga has recently used the word ‘warrant’ to mean “that, whatever precisely it is, which makes the difference between knowledge and mere true belief.” So, in Plantinga’s sense of the word, warrant is the justification condition plus some other condition designed to rule out Gettier examples. In almost all cases, reliabilists, foundationalists, and coherentists have not (...) been giving theories about ‘warrant’ in Plantinga’s sense. They have been busy giving theories about justification. In his paper, “Warrant Entails Truth,” Trenton Merricks argues that warrant, in Plantinga’s sense, entails truth. In this paper, I will show that Merricks has not succeeded in showing that warrant entails truth. (shrink)

New biotechnologies have propelled the question of what it means to be human - or posthuman - to the forefront of societal and scientific consideration. This volume provides an accessible, critical overview of the main approaches in the debate on posthumanism, and argues that they do not adequately address the question of what it means to be human in an age of biotechnology. Not because they belong to rival political camps, but because they are grounded in a humanist ontology that (...) presupposes a radical separation between human subjects and technological objects. The volume offers a comprehensive mapping of posthumanist discourse divided into four broad approaches-two humanist-based approaches: dystopic and liberal posthumanism, and two non-humanist approaches: radical and methodological posthumanism. The author compares and contrasts these models via an exploration of key issues, from human enhancement, to eugenics, to new configurations of biopower, questioning what role technology plays in defining the boundaries of the human, the subject and nature for each. Building on the contributions and limitations of radical and methodological posthumanism, the author develops a novel perspective, mediated posthumanism, that brings together insights in the philosophy of technology, the sociology of biomedicine, and Michel Foucault's work on ethical subject constitution. In this framework, technology is neither a neutral tool nor a force that alienates humanity from itself, but something that is always already part of the experience of being human, and subjectivity is viewed as an emergent property that is constantly being shaped and transformed by its engagements with biotechnologies. Mediated posthumanism becomes a tool for identifying novel ethical modes of human experience that are richer and more multifaceted than current posthumanist perspectives allow for. The book will be essential reading for students and scholars working on ethics and technology, philosophy of technology, poststructuralism, technology and the body, and medical ethics. (shrink)

Most agree that when it comes to so-called 'first-order' normative ethics and political philosophy, constructivist views are a powerful family of positions. When it comes to metaethics, however, there is serious disagreement about what, if anything, constructivism has to contribute. In this paper I argue that constructivist views in ethics include not just a family of substantive normative positions, but also a distinct and highly attractive metaethical view. I argue that the widely accepted 'proceduralist characterization' of constructivism in ethics is (...) inadequate, and I propose what I call the 'practical standpoint characterization' in its place. I then offer a general taxonomy of constructivist positions in ethics. Since constructivism's standing as a family of substantive normative positions is relatively uncontested, I devote the remainder of the paper to addressing skeptics' worries about the distinctiveness of constructivism understood as a metaethical view. I compare and contrast constructivism with three other standard metaethical positions with which it is often confused or mistakenly thought to be compatible: realism; naturalist reductions in terms of an ideal response; and expressivism. In discussing the contrast with expressivism, I explain the sense in which, according to the constructivist, the distinction between substantive normative ethics and metaethics breaks down. I conclude by distinguishing between two importantly different debates about the mind-dependence of value. I argue that a failure to make this distinction is part of what explains why the possibility of constructivism as a metaethical view is often overlooked. (shrink)

In recent years, all major consumer technology corporations have moved into the domain of health research. This ‘Googlization of health research’ begs the question of how the common good will be served in this research. As critical data scholars contend, such phenomena must be situated within the political economy of digital capitalism in order to foreground the question of public interest and the common good. Here, trends like GHR are framed within a double, incommensurable logic, where private gain and economic (...) value are pitted against public good and societal value. While helpful for highlighting the exploitative potential of digital capitalism, this framing is limiting, insofar as it acknowledges only one conception of the common good. This article uses the analytical framework of modes of justification developed by Boltanksi and Thévenot to identify a plurality of orders of worth and conceptualizations of the common good at work in GHR. Not just the ‘civic’ and ‘market’ orders, but also an ‘industrial’, a ‘project’, and what I call a ‘vitalist’ order. Using promotional material of GHR initiatives and preliminary interviews with participants in GHR projects, I ask what moral orientations guide different actors in GHR. Engaging seriously with these different conceptions of the common good is paramount. First, in order to critically evaluate them and explicate what is at stake in the move towards GHR, and ultimately, in order to develop viable governance solutions that ensure strong ‘civic’ components. (shrink)

Walter Benjamin wrote extensively on children and childhood, though this aspect of his work has hitherto received scant attention despite continuing and growing interest in his thought. This article makes explicit the connection between his acute observations of childhood and his distinctive messianic philosophy. The twin aspects of redemption in Benjamin's writings: remembrance and now-time, as illustrated in Wim Wender's Wings of Desire, are explored in relation to the ‘task of childhood’. Benjamin asserts the emancipatory potential held within the development (...) of historical consciousness, and leads us to question how our understanding of childhood can foster this potential. (shrink)

William of Ockham was tried for heresy due to his assertion that certain qualities can exist independently of substances. Scholars have assumed he made thisstrange assertion in order to account for the Catholic doctrine of transubstantiation. I argue, however, that the assertion was philosophically rather than theologically motivated. Ockham develops a nominalist substance ontology, according to which most changes can be explained as the result of local motion. Knowledge and virtue are changes in human beings that cannot be so explained, (...) however, because they are not entirely passive processes. In fact, knowledge and virtue require free will, which could not be considered truly free if it were not an independently existing quality. In this paper, I explain Ockham’s nominalist substance ontology and show how it functions as the sine qua non foundation for his uncompromising commitment to metaphysical libertarianism. (shrink)

This work is designed to show that there is an implicit connection between Ockham's academic and political careers in his theory of conscience. ;Thomas Aquinas offers a theory of moral responsibility according to which the conscientious individual has knowledge of the rightness of her act which does not preclude her doing otherwise. His account of the will, however, proves that this state of affairs never obtains. Ockham's alternative presupposes that we freely choose our own ends. He is therefore entitled to (...) assert that conscience is the knowledge of one's own acts as right or wrong. ;The libertarian metaphysics underlying Ockham's ethics is tested by the problem of unfulfilled prophecy. Thomas Bradwardine argues that the Antichrist is free not to come because it is possible for God to undo the past. Thomas Buckingham argues for the possibility that the prophecy never meant that the Antichrist was going to come. Meanwhile, Ockham is left with the possibility that God lied. Ockhamist John of Mirecourt shows why this 'heretical' solution is the only way to save the faith. Ockham's theory of conscience provides a sound basis for interpreting his treatise on heresy. Heresy is disobedience, not to authority, but to the truth. Since the condemnation of heresy is itself a paradigm instance of this kind of perversity, freedom of speech prevails by default. Ockham's conception of a community united by this realization provides an answer to twentieth-century speech-regulation advocates. ;Ockham thought that it is through our obedience to the truth that Jesus's promise to be with his disciples 'always, to the end of the age' will be fulfilled. According to Walter Burley, 'I promise you a Christian' converts with 'A Christian is promised to you by me.' According to Ockham, in contrast, it is an opaque construction. This account of the logic of indefinite promises implies that no individual can claim to be one of the disciples to whom Jesus was referring. ;I hope to leave the reader in a better position to appreciate the sense in which the claim that Ockham's two careers are united by his nominalism may be considered correct. (shrink)