The world’s press may have lost interest in the ongoing enquiry into the deep‐rooted corruption in Italian business. But what exactly was going on, and what can be done to improve matters? The writers of this authoritative study are Faculty members of the prestigious Italian Business School, SDA Bocconi, Via F. Bocconi 8, 8‐20136 Milano, where Umberto Lago lectures in Strategy and Roberto Castoldi in Accounting. They both lecture on the Business Policy course at Bocconi University.

This article tries to point out a source of potential conflict in Charles Taylor’s theoretical perspective. There is an unsolved tension between the historical reconstruction of the genealogy of the modern identity and the theoretical claim that our moral reactions are the basis of an objective assessment of practices. My intention is to analyse this tension at three different levels of discourse: first, Taylor’s position as a liberal non-atomist thinker hinges upon his idea that our moral identity depends on our (...) free determination of our relation to good, which can be pursued only within the experience of a community. Second, this Hegelian trait of his perspective is also present in his meta-ethical theory, in which our moral reactions are said to be both instinctive and culturally mediate. In this case, it is not clear how an individual or a group can transcend this limited perspective, if any appeal to reason is inextricably tied to historical delimitations. Third, the principle that any culture in itself is to be considered equally valuable appears to be disputable in front of the objection that some cultures do violate what seem to be fundamental rights and therefore do not deserve equal consideration and are not to be preserved. (shrink)

In a recent piece, Jon Bebb (2023) has argued that we have no reason to believe, contrary to what is often assumed, that ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and a normative sense. I argue that his case rests on two false premisses, and that we have very good reasons to believe that ‘normal’ is, in fact, ambiguous in this way. As part of my argument, I will go on to suggest that if ‘normal’ is ambiguous between a statistical and (...) a normative sense, that is because of the deep but seldom recognised connection between regularities and rules. This suggestion, if correct, will in turn help us elucidate three familiar thoughts about normality. (shrink)

The first Italian edition (Vita e Pensiero, Milan 1996) has been thoroughly revised, corrected and updated, and is complemented by an index of the most ...

Frankenstein é um dos personagens mais populares da ficção. Nascido no romance de Mary Shelley, ele está completando 180 anos, mas já transcendeu as fronteiras da literatura. Há 65 anos, é encontrado nas telas cinematográficas, somando 117 aparições, perdendo apenas para o Conde Drácula, com 161, no gênero de filmes de terror. Este ensaio, atravessado por suas precariedades e limitações históricas, procurará respostas sobre o mito de Frankenstein. É importante investigar as significações desta experiência de alma, que lhe asseguram atualidade (...) e permanência às vésperas do terceiro milênio. Para tanto, serão usados os pressupostos da Psicanálise, compatibilizados com os do filósofo Louis Althusser. (shrink)

That emotions are especially valuable for our well-being has become a widely agreed upon claim. In this article, we argue that many of the ways in which the emotions are commonly considered to be prudentially valuable – hedonically, experientially, and adaptively – are not specific to the emotions: they are in fact shared by other affective reactions such as drives and sensory affects. This may suggest that emotions are not prudentially valuable in any distinctive manner. We challenge this suggestion by (...) arguing that, unlike other affective reactions, emotions provide unique contexts in which to refine our general sensibility to a wide variety of evaluative properties – and that in this sense they are prudentially valuable in a distinctive way. (shrink)

En este artículo presentamos una descripción de la crítica de Iván Illich a la sociedad industrial, específicamente en relación al problema de la energía y de la equidad. Especial atención es dada al concepto de convivencialidad y a sus posibles repercusiones para enfrentar los problemas energéticos. Una discusión en torno a la manera de Illich de criticar a la sociedad es presentada, en relación a lo que ha sido llamado un “humanismo crítico” y al problema de las necesidades individuales.

Reasons-first theorists claim that facts about reasons for attitudes are normatively primitive, and that all other normative facts ultimately reduce to facts about reasons. According to their view, for example, the fact that something is good ultimately reduces to facts about reasons to favour it. I argue that these theories face a challenging dilemma due to the normativity of arational lifeforms, for instance the fact that water is good for plants. If all normative facts are, ultimately, facts about reasons for (...) attitudes, then reasons-first theorists must either (a) show that these facts do reduce to facts about reasons, or (b) concede that they do not and, instead, show that this is not a problem for their view. Both options, however, are riddled with difficulties—or so I will try to argue. (shrink)

This book presents a new way to understand human-animal interactions. Offering a profound discussion of topics such as human identity, our relationship with animals and the environment, and our culture, the author channels the vibrant Italian traditions of humanism, materialism, and speculative philosophy. The research presents a dialogue between the humanities and the natural sciences. It challenges the separation and oppression of animals with a post-humanism steeped in the traditions of the Italian Renaissance. Readers discover a vision of the human (...) as a species informed by an intertwining with animals. The human being is not constructed by an onto-poetic process, but rather by close relati ons with otherness. The human system is increasingly unstable and, therefore, more hybrid. The argument it presents interests scholars, thinkers, and researchers. It also appeals to anyone who wants to delve into the deep animal-human bond and its philosophical, cultural, political instances. The author is a veterinarian, ethologist, and philosopher. He uses cognitive science, zooanthropology, and philosophy to engage in a series of empirical, theoretical, and practice-based engagements with animal life. In the process, he argues that animals are key to human identity and culture at all levels. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la teoría butleriana de los actos performativos y su crítica a las teorías substancialistas o esencialistas del género a la luz de la teoría leibniziana de la acción intencional con el objetivo de mostrar que no podemos disociar la performatividad de la intencionalidad ni, en consecuencia, de una comprensión práctica de la identidad personal. Para lograr este objetivo, realizo tres cosas: en primer lugar, un análisis de la teoría del género y la noción de “performatividad” de Butler (...) desde su crítica a las teorías naturalistas o esencialistas del género; en segundo, confronto su teoría de la performatividad con la teoría leibniziana de “acción intencional” y su noción de “agencia moral”; en tercer lugar, esbozo dos conclusiones: 1) solo podemos hablar de performatividad en términos de intencionalidad, y 2) hablar de actos performativos no implica disociar el género de nuestra identidad personal. (shrink)

This research aims to analyses Leibniz’ Monadologic Ontology and his theory of expression as opposed to those readings of Leibniz’ work that define monads as isolated entities that lack that all possible relation. The analysis will also show that, beyond his notion of Personal Identity, underlies a logic of Otherness able to dialogue with contemporary Personalism. This logic of otherness, if our reading of Leibniz is right, it is especially ostensible in the ‘spirits’, which expressive nature establish not only a (...) systematic bond with the totality of beings that integrate the world, but also a notion of Personal Identity. Such notion allows that otherness acquires a prescriptive character: to place us in other’s situation and thus understand their needs and, through this, acknowledge our place in the cosmos. In order to achieve this we will carry four tasks: first, we will analyze in depth the application of his theory of expression to Monadologic ontology and his notio completa. Second, we will appreciate what implicatures have both for the specific case of spirits, emphasizing the communitarian nature of these rational monads. Third, we will rebuild a Leibnizian theory of Personal Identity and finally, we will compare the results with the main Personalists’ body of thesis. (shrink)