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Normativity
Edited by Federico L. G. Faroldi (Universita' degli Studi di Pavia)
About this topic
| Summary | Defining 'normativity' is itself a normative task, and no clear agreement has been reached on the matter. The normative has often been contrasted with the descriptive; sometimes the normative is thought to be made up of deontic (e.g. 'oughts') and evaluative (e.g. 'good') concepts. 'Normativity' may have at least two senses: first, a nomophoric sense, if one refers to implicit or explicit rules (of various kinds); second, an axiological sense, if one refers to values. Few have defined normativity explicitly; many are interested in the normativity of something else (meaning and content, semantics, aesthetics, moral claims, epistemic norms, context, the law) rather than in normativity itself. When they do, normativity is usually explained (or explained away) with reference to "having reasons". |
| Key works | The contemporary debate on normativity has various threads. A recent, fundamental work dealing directly with 'normativity' tout court is Thomson 2008. The normativity of morality and reason is investigated in Korsgaard 1996. For the normativity of meaning and content, one classical piece is surely Kripke 1982. Fundamental works for the normativity of the law are Kelsen 1967 and Kelsen 1990. |
| Introductions | For an overview of contemporary work on normativity, see Finlay 2010 |
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Related
Subcategories
Aesthetic Normativity* (139)
Epistemic Normativity* (4,071 | 317)
Moral Normativity* (867 | 243)
Normativity of Law* (167)
Normativity, Misc (381)
Contents
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- What the Tortoise Says about Statutory Interpretation: The Semantic Canons of Construction Do Not Tip the Balance.Amin Ebrahimi Afrouzi - 2022 - Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 42 (3): 869–892.Karl Llewellyn’s critique of the canons of statutory interpretation led to a decline in their use for several decades. His critique, however, faced sustained resistance from some corners of the academy and the judiciary. Although this resistance has had only a selective uptake, it animated a gradual revival of the canons and brought the state of scholarship to an impasse that is for the most part partisan. In this article, I examine the semantic canons from a deeper level and argue (...)
- (1 other version)Praxis as the unfolding of poiesis: Renewing the normativity of labor for critical theory.Ben Suriano - 2025 - Philosophy and Social Criticism 51 (3):381-409.If critical theory is to challenge capitalism’s corrosive commodification of labor and nature, then it should renew a sense of labor as a real bodily power with an internal telos, along the lines of an Aristotelian normativity of praxis. Recent thought however either rejects normativity altogether, or pits normative praxis against labor uncritically reduced to its commodification. Habermas’s work provides an exemplary case of the latter. While he rightly found the ‘production paradigm’ of normativity problematic, his acceptance of the reified (...)
- Social Normativity: No Mere Formality.Alex Horne - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.This paper defends two claims. First, I argue that you always have some reason to comply with the social norms applicable to your situation, no matter how immoral or ridiculous, provided you are in the social domain. This is not a baroque, technical fact about social norms: it is fundamental to understanding what they are, how they work, and how they can be a source of grave injustice. Second, I argue that this fact about social normativity requires re-thinking the distinction (...)
- A Corpus Study on the Normativity of Rationality.Kevin Reuter, Lucien Baumgartner & Michael Messerli - forthcoming - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy.In this paper, we address a key question that has been central to discussions on rationality: is the concept of rationality normative or merely descriptive? We present the findings of a corpus-linguistic study revealing that people commonly perceive the concept of rationality as normative.
- The Deontic, the Evaluative, and the Fitting.Selim Berker - 2022 - In Chris Howard & Rach Cosker-Rowland, Fittingness. OUP. pp. 23-57.The evaluative categories (goodness, badness, betterness, and the like) and the deontic categories (requiredness, permittedness, forbiddenness, and the like) are separate families of normative categories, each with its own distinctive logic, structure, and basis. The aim of this chapter is to argue that there is a third family of normative categories beyond these familiar two, with its own special logic, structure, and basis, namely the fitting. This family includes properties and relations picked out by terms such as ‘fitting’, ‘apt’, ‘merited’, (...)
- The future of normativity.Simon Kirchin (ed.) - 2025 - New York, NY: Oxford University Press.There has been a great deal written about normativity in recent years by philosophers, with a range of accounts developed and questions raised. Various normative notions (or seemingly normative notions) have all attracted a great deal of attention, notions such as reason, duty, ought, obligation, value, standard and norm, and the notion of fittingness. We find discussions of normativity, and perhaps the normative itself, in many domains of philosophical enquiry: ethics, aesthetics, epistemology, logic and more. Similarly, many figures from the (...)
- In Opposition to Alethic Views of Moral Responsibility.Robert Pál-Wallin - forthcoming - Southern Journal of Philosophy.A standard analysis of moral responsibility states that an agent A is morally responsible for ɸ-ing if and only if it is fitting to have – depending on the nature of ɸ – a negative or positive reactive emotion vis-à-vis A on account of A’s ɸ-ing. Proponents of Alethic views of moral responsibility maintain that the relevant notion of fittingness in the analysis should be understood in terms of accurate representation. The allure of understanding emotional fittingness as representational accuracy arguably (...)Remove from this listExport citation
Bookmark - Commitment Beyond Justification.Paul Katsafanas - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.Should our degree of commitment to a value, relationship, or goal be proportional to the degree of justification that we take the commitment to possess? Or are there reasons for maintaining wholehearted commitments even in cases where we have relatively weak justifications for those commitments? I argue in favor of the latter position: degree of commitment should sometimes diverge from degree of justification. To make this case, I introduce and critique what I call Locke’s Dictum: the claim that our degree (...)
- How to Do “Ought” with “Is”? A Cognitive Linguistics Approach to the Normativity of Legal Language.Mateusz Zeifert - 2025 - International Journal for the Semiotics of Law - Revue Internationale de Sémiotique Juridique 38 (1):73-98.The paper addresses the question how descriptive language is used to express legal norms. Sentences we find in legislative acts, i.e. statutes, constitutions and regulations, express legal norms. Linguistically speaking, there are various grammatical and lexical ways of expressing norms, such as imperative mood, modal verbs, deontic verbs, etc. However, norms may also be expressed by descriptive sentences, namely sentences in present or future tense and indicative (declarative) mood (i.e. _The minister determines the tax rate_). In many civil law countries (...)
- The Normative Insignificance of the Will.Jason Kay - forthcoming - Philosophical Studies:1-19.The fact that I am a committed gardener has some practical upshot or other. But what, exactly, is the upshot of the fact that I am committed to some project, person, or principle? According to a standard view, my commitment to gardening directly effects a change in the normative facts by giving me a further reason to garden. I argue that we should reject this view and its attendant psychological story involving a normatively significant will. According to the view I (...)
- Neutralidade metaética: seus pressupostos e sua superação.Gustavo Teles - 2020 - Dissertation, Universidade Federal de PelotasA metaética surgiu no início do Século XX com uma proposta distinta da ética normativa: explicar e clarificar os conceitos e enunciados em contextos morais. A ética normativa, por outro lado, ao invés de meramente explicar e clarificar os conceitos e enunciados morais, pretende dizer para um agente qual conduta é a correta e o que deve ser feito. Com o desenvolvimento da metaética contemporânea, foi postulado não só que a metaética é distinta, mas que é neutra em relação às (...)
- A Theory of Democratic Social Change and the Role of Disempowerment: Reconceptualization of the American Founding Documents .Angelina Inesia-Forde - 2023 - Asian Journal of Basic Science and Research 5 (3):50-72.Existing social disparities in the United States are inconsistent with Lincoln’s promise of democracy; therefore, there is a need for a critical conceptualization of the first principles that undergird American democracy and the genesis of democratic social change in America. This study aimed to construct a grounded theory that provides an understanding of the process of American democratic social change. The result was the construction of two frameworks: the demoralization process that triggers social change, and a formal grounded theory that (...)
- (1 other version)Constitutivism's Plight: Inescapability, Normativity, and Relativism.Olof Leffler - forthcoming - The Philosophical Quarterly.Constitutivists often argue that agency is inescapable. This is supposed to, among other things, explain why norms that are constitutive of agency are forceful. But can some form of inescapability do that? I consider four types of inescapability—psychological, further factor, standpoint, and plight—and evaluate whether they manage to explain four necessary features of normative force: that it does not vary with desire change, that ought-implies-can and can-fail, and that we are criticizable for failing to live up to forceful norms. The (...)
- The linguistic dead zone of value-aligned agency, natural and artificial.Travis LaCroix - 2024 - Philosophical Studies:1-23.The value alignment problem for artificial intelligence (AI) asks how we can ensure that the “values”—i.e., objective functions—of artificial systems are aligned with the values of humanity. In this paper, I argue that linguistic communication is a necessary condition for robust value alignment. I discuss the consequences that the truth of this claim would have for research programmes that attempt to ensure value alignment for AI systems—or, more loftily, those programmes that seek to design robustly beneficial or ethical artificial agents.
- (Relative) Authority and Inter-legality.Gürkan Çapar - 2022 - Rivista di Filosofia Del Diritto 11 (1):43-58.The question of how to legitimize authority is generally addressed with reference to Raz’s service conception of authority. Yet, his functional explanation does not concern itself with how authoritative institutions are empowered at the outset. Even though Raz’s monistic account of authority is coupled with input legitimacy and pluralized with Waldron’s analysis of the inter-institutional allocation of authority, it does not assist us in inter-legal situations. As inter-legality is a theory oriented towards finding legitimate ways of legal intersection, this article (...)
- Epistemic normativity without epistemic teleology.Benjamin Kiesewetter - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):349-370.This article is concerned with a puzzle that arises from three initially plausible assumptions that form an inconsistent triad: (i) Epistemic reasons are normative reasons (normativism); (ii) reasons are normative only if conformity with them is good (the reasons/value‐link); (iii) conformity with epistemic reasons need not be good (the nihilist assumption). I start by defending the reasons/value‐link, arguing that normativists need to reject the nihilist assumption. I then argue that the most familiar view that denies the nihilist assumption—epistemic teleology—is untenable. (...)
- Unification without pragmatism.Keshav Singh - 2024 - Philosophical Issues 34 (1):234-252.Both actions and beliefs are subject to normative evaluation as rational or irrational. As such, we might expect there to be some general, unified story about what makes them rational. However, orthodox approaches suggest that the rationality of action is determined by practical considerations, while the rationality of belief is determined by properly epistemic considerations. This apparent disunity leads some, like Rinard (2019), to reject orthodox theories of the rationality of belief in favor of pragmatism. In this paper, I argue (...)
- Who is a Reasoner?Yair Levy - forthcoming - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy.This paper aims to make progress in understanding the nature of reasoning. Its primary goal is to spell out and defend a novel account of what reasoning might be, in terms of how reasoning contributes to settling (practical and theoretical) inquiries. Prior to spelling out this constructive proposal, however, the paper problematizes a very common picture of reasoning in an attempt to demonstrate the need for an alternative approach. The overarching argument of the paper is comprised of three stages. The (...)
- Enacted appreciation and the meta-normative structure of urgency.Elliot Porter - 2024 - Analysis 84 (3):523-533.Some considerations are urgent and others are not. Sometimes we invite criticism if we neglect the urgency of our situation, even if our action seems adequate to respond to it. Despite this significance, the literature does not offer a satisfactory analysis of the normative structure of urgency. I examine three views of urgency, drawn from philosophical and adjacent literature, which fail to explain the distinctive criticism we face when we neglect the urgency of our reasons. Instead I argue that urgent (...)
- Reflexivity, Agency and Normativity: A Reconstruction of Sartre’s Theory of (Self-)Consciousness.Di Huang - forthcoming - Études Phénoménologiques – Phenomenological Studies.This paper reconstructs Sartre’s account of the “circuit of ipseity” as an integral theory of the experiential, agentive and normative aspects of self-consciousness. At the core of this theory is a conception of human (self-)consciousness as lacking, and the correlation between lacking and ideal. In Section 1, I show how this theory manages to satisfy the apparently incompatible requirements generated by the idea of a pre-reflective cogito. Section 2 discusses practical self-consciousness, in particular the agent’s consciousness of herself as self-determined (...)
- Binding Oneself.Janis David Schaab - forthcoming - Ergo: An Open Access Journal of Philosophy.This article advances three claims about the bindingness of duties to oneself: (1) To defend duties to oneself, one had better show that they can bind, i.e., provide normative reason to comply. (2) To salvage the bindingness of duties to oneself, one had better construe them as owed to, and waivable by, one's present self. (3) Duties owed to, and waivable by, one's present self can nevertheless bind. In advancing these claims, I partly oppose views recently developed by Daniel Muñoz (...)
- Toleration of Evil and the Fragility of the Law.Jorge Sanchez-Perez - 2024 - Roczniki Filozoficzne 72 (3):259-275.Given the reality of legal orders collapsing or breaking, this paper argues that a good explanation is needed to understand this phenomenon. It adopts a Hartian account of positivism and considers law as part of a larger set of social facts and orders. The paper analyzes the relationship between evil moral commitments and the law. It concludes by showing that it might be more conducive to analyzing the loss of faith in a legal system as an explanation for its collapse (...)
- Can AI Rely on the Systematicity of Truth? The Challenge of Modelling Normative Domains.Matthieu Queloz - forthcoming - Philosophy and Technology.A key assumption fuelling optimism about the progress of large language models (LLMs) in accurately and comprehensively modelling the world is that the truth is systematic: true statements about the world form a whole that is not just consistent, in that it contains no contradictions, but coherent, in that the truths are inferentially interlinked. This holds out the prospect that LLMs might in principle rely on that systematicity to fill in gaps and correct inaccuracies in the training data: consistency and (...)
- Kant’s Account of Epistemic Normativity.Reza Hadisi - 2024 - Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 106 (3):576-610.According to a common interpretation, most explicitly defended by Onora O’Neill and Patricia Kitcher, Kant held that epistemic obligations normatively depend on moral obligations. That is, were a rational agent not bound by any moral obligation, then she would not be bound by any epistemic obligation either. By contrast, in this paper, I argue that, according to Kant, some epistemic obligations are normatively independent from moral obligations, and are indeed normatively absolute. This view, which I call epistemicism, has two parts. (...)
- Social role normativity: from individualism to institutionalism.Kevin Richardson - 2024 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 67 (8):2510-2520.In her book Social Goodness, Charlotte Witt gives an account of the normativity of social norms, crucially appealing to (and naming) social role normativity. Social role normativity is a distinctive kind of normativity that follows from social roles. For example, teachers ought to teach and students ought to do their homework. According to Witt's artisanal model of social role normativity, we should make sense of social role normativity by reference to artisanal roles, like being a carpenter. Just as carpenters have (...)
- Reasons for Action: Justification, Motivation, Explanation.Maria Alvarez & Jonathan Way - 2024 - Stanford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy.
- I sistemi-mondo e il processo di universalizzazione della forma- merce: percorsi tra Lukács e Wallerstein.G. Avellino - 2024 - Dissertation, University of Milan BicoccaThe aim of the paper is to briefly propose an analogy between Immanuel Wallerstein’s sociological concept of world-system and the process, described by Gyorgy Lukàcs in History and Class Consciousness, of the universalisation of commodity form within capitalist societies. The overall intention of the work is to actively interpret some specific topics analysed by Maria Turchetto within the module on Economy and society.
- Husserl and the normativity of logic. Di Huang - 2024 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 62 (2):211-230.In this article, I analyze the evolution of Husserl's view on the normativity of logic and the corresponding changes in his phenomenological analysis of judgment. Initially, in the Prolegomena, Husserl claimed that the laws of pure logic are ideal and acquire normative status only as a result of application. Later, however, he revised this position and claimed that the same laws are at once ideal and normative. Sections 1 and 2 present textual evidence for attributing such a change of position (...)
- Metaethics as Dead Politics? On Political Normativity and Justification.Ben Cross - 2024 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 27 (3):319-335.Many political realists endorse some notion of political normativity. They think that there are certain normative claims about politics that do not depend on moral premises. The most prominent moralist objections to political normativity have been metaethical: specifically, that political normativity is not genuinely normative; and that it is incapable of justifying normative claims. In this article, I criticize the latter metaethical objection. I argue that the objection presupposes a notion of ‘justification’ that renders it something that is no longer (...)
- Normativity, Autonomy, and Agency: A Critical Review of Three Essays on Agency in Nature, and a Modest Proposal for the Road Ahead.Lenny Moss - 2024 - Biological Theory 19 (2):73-83.Has the renewal of interest in the ostensible agency of living beings signaled an advance from a merely heuristic Kantian sense of purposiveness to an unequivocally, empirically grounded research program or are there as yet hidden tensions or contradictions in, for example, the organizational autonomy approach to natural agency? Can normativity be found to be immanent in nature but only beginning with the living cell or must a thoroughgoing naturalism find the seeds of normativity immanent throughout abiotic as well as (...)
- Možemo li braniti teoriju normativne pogreške?Joshua Taccolini - 2024 - European Journal of Analytic Philosophy 20 (1):131-154.Normativni teoretičari pogreške nastoje braniti teoriju pogreške koja kaže da normativni sudovi pripisuju normativna svojstva, a takva svojstva, uključujući razloge za vjerovanje, nikada nisu instancirana. Mnogi filozofi su iznijeli prigovore obrani teorije koja podrazumijeva da ne možemo imati razloga vjerovati u nju. Spencer Case prigovara da teoretičari pogreške jednostavno ne mogu izbjeći samopobijanje. S druge strane, Bart Streumer tvrdi da ne možemo vjerovati u normativnu teoriju pogreške, ali da to, pomalo iznenađujuće, pomaže njenim zagovornicima da je obrane od ovih prigovora. (...)
- Explanationism about Freedom and Orthonomy.David Heering - forthcoming - Journal of Philosophy.According to a popular idea, freedom is grounded in orthonomy – the ability to be responsive to normative demands. But how exactly must an agent’s action relate to their reasons in order for this orthonomous relationship to hold? In this paper, I propose a novel explanationist answer to this question. I argue that extant answers – causalism and modalism about orthonomy – fail because they fail to account for the fact that intuitions about freedom and orthonomy track facts about explanation. (...)
- How Not to Find Over-Imitation in Animals.Kristin Andrews & Jedediah W. P. Allen - 2024 - Human Development.While more species are being identified as cultural on a regular basis, stark differences between human and animal cultures remain. Humans are more richly cultural, with group-specific practices and social norms guiding almost every element of our lives. Furthermore, human culture is seen as cumulative, cooperative, and normative, in contrast to animal cultures. One hypothesis to explain these differences is grounded in the observation that human children across cultures appear to spontaneously over-imitate silly or causally irrelevant behaviors that they observe. (...)
- Epistemic Rationality and Epistemic Normativity, written by Bondy, P.Guido Tana - 2024 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis:1-11.
- Normativity, prudence and welfare.Michael Ridge - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (5):1213-1235.Most discussions of discourse about welfare and discourse about prudence are a “package deal” when it comes to their normativity—either both or neither are normative. In this paper I argue against this conventional “package deal” assumption. I argue that discourse about welfare is not normative in one useful sense of that term, but that prudential discourse is normative. My argument draws in part on ideas from Derek Parfit’s account of personal identity. I then offer a novel positive account of the (...)
- Are ants not only ‘social insects’, but also ‘nomic insects’? In search of clues of normativity in the ant world.Giuseppe Lorini, Donato Antonio Grasso & Andrea Loi - 2024 - Behaviour 161.Recently, various philosophers and ethologists have argued or hypothesised that, in addition to humans, there are also non-human animals that are capable of following rules and implementing normative behaviours. The investigation of animal normativity until now, however, has been almost exclusively focused on mammals and, in particular, non-human primates and cetaceans. In contrast, this work aims to extend this research to the world of invertebrates and, more specifically, to the world of eusocial insects. For the purpose of investigating whether there (...)
- Joint Attention: Normativity and Sensory Modalities.Antonio Scarafone - 2024 - Topoi 43 (2):283-294.Joint attention is typically conceptualized as a robust psychological phenomenon. In philosophy, this apparently innocuous assumption leads to the problem of accounting for the “openness” of joint attention. In psychology, it leads to the problem of justifying alternative operationalizations of joint attention, since there does not seem to be much which is psychologically uniform across different joint attentional engagements. Contrary to the received wisdom, I argue that joint attention is a social relationship which normatively regulates the attentional states of two (...)
- Meylan, Anne (2017). In support of the Knowledge-First conception of the normativity of justification. In: Carter, J Adam; Gordon, Emma C; Jarvis, Benjamin. Knowledge First: Approaches in Epistemology and Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 246-258.Anne Meylan, J. Adam Carter, Emma C. Gordon & Benjamin Jarvis (eds.) - 2017Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
- Artificially Geistige: A Hegelian Perspective on the Developing History of AI.A. Zachman - manuscriptModern philosophy can often appear to be mere cryptomnesia, redressed and resuited to fit the particular mouth from which it is espoused. This notion is but a sorrowful chimera binding the 21st-century mind to the confines of an eternal shadow, an eternal prison of doubt in the face of limitless potential. As a species, we are rapidly approaching the precipice of Yahweh's original position as instantiators of consciousness, as the I AM in relation to our artificial progeny. Could one fabricate (...)
- Rationality, Shmationality: Even Newer Shmagency Worries.Olof Leffler - 2024 - Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy 27 (2):371-404.Constitutivist approaches to the normativity of rationality have recently come into vogue. Unlike their moral counterparts, however, they have not been confronted with the shmagency objection. In this paper, I challenge them with two versions of the objection based on recent developments in the debate surrounding the normativity of morality. These are shmagency as modal escapability, which is based on taking sophisticated shmagents to be able to modally escape various norms, and shmagency as underdetermination, which is based on taking constitutive (...)
- How (Not) to Connect Ethics and Economics: Epistemological and Metaethical Problems for the Perfectly Competitive Market.Caspar Safarlou - 2021 - In Peter Róna, László Zsolnai & Agnieszka Wincewicz-Price, Words, Objects and Events in Economics: The Making of Economic Theory. Cham: Springer International Publishing. pp. 91-101.This paper addresses Joseph Heath’s attempt to derive moral obligations from the conditions that are specified by the model of the perfectly competitive market. Through his market failures approach to business ethics he argues that firms should behave as if they are operating in a perfectly competitive market. However, I argue that this derivation of moral obligations runs counter to the metaethical principle that moral actions need to be voluntarily chosen from a set of alternatives. To the extent that Milton (...)
- Practices and normativity: Philosophy of Science, Agency and Epistemic Normativity.Miguel Fonseca Martínez - 2024 - Cuadernos de Filosofía Latinoamericana 45 (130):246-262.The present work aims to present the notion of eidetic agency as a novel account for the understanding of an epistemic normativity based on practices. The eidetic agency (Fonseca, 2020) and (Fonseca, 2023) is a modality of material agency that, scaffolded and extensively, delegates epistemic agency to formal artifacts that become evident in the materiality of the signifiers of artificial languages. Such eidetic artifacts constitute an epistemic normativity that, although it is based on implicit practices and norms of scientific practices, (...)
- Arquetipos Morales: ética prehistoria-pe.Roberto Thomas Arruda - 2024 - São Paulo: Terra à Vista.Pe tradición filosófica umi enfoque moral rehegua oñemopyenda predominantemente umi concepto ha teoría metafísica ha teológica-pe. Umi concepto tradicional ética rehegua apytépe, ojehecharamovéva ha’e Teoría de Comando Divino (TCD). TCD he’iháicha, Ñandejára ome’ẽ pyenda moral yvypórape ojejapo guive ha umi revelación rupive. Péicha, pe moralidad ha divinidad ndojeseparái va’erãmo’ã pe civilización mombyryvéva guive. Ko'ã concepto oime sumergido peteî estructura teológica ha oasepta principalmente mayoría umi omoirûva mbohapy tradición abrahámica: judaísmo, cristianismo ha islam, oimehápe parte considerable población humana. Oñongatúvo jerovia ha (...)
- Shadows or Forgeries? Explaining Legal Normativity.Alma Diamond - 2024 - Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 37 (1):47-78.Legal norms serve as practical standards for individuals and officials. While this ‘normative aspect’ of law is widely acknowledged, its significance for theories of law remains contested. In this paper, I examine three views on the matter. First, that we should explain legal norms as reason-giving. Second, that we should explain legal discourse as being about reasons for action. Third, that we should explain law as capable of being reason-giving. I survey some challenges associated with each of these views. What (...)
- “Philosophy is its Own Time Comprehended in Thought”: On the NORMativity of Hegel’s Practical Philosophy.Andrew Buchwalter - 2022 - In Kaveh Boveiri, L’héritage de Hegel - Hegel’s Legacy. Les Presses de l’Université de Laval. pp. 37-52.$67.39 new (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this list Direct downloadExport citation Bookmark
- Uncosmetic Surgeries in An Age of Normativity.Gail Weiss - 2014 - In Kristin Zeiler & Lisa Folkmarson Käll, Feminist Phenomenology and Medicine. State University of New York Press. pp. 101-117.
- The ethical normativity of instinctive intentionality in Husserl"s later ethics. 안준상 - 2024 - Phenomenology and Contemporary Philosoph 100:39-71.본 논문은 에드문트 후설의 전기 윤리학과 후기 윤리학의 변모를 살펴보며, 특히 후기 윤리학을 특징짓는 사랑가치의 본능적 지향성에 주목한다. 이러한 과정에서 본 논문은 ‘본능과 충동’이 후설의 전기 윤리학에서와는 달리 후기 윤리학에서 그 윤리적 규범성을 부여 받게 되는 근본적인 이유를 추적하며, 그를 후설 그 자신의 지향성 개념에 대한 이해의 심화에서 찾고자 한다. 이를 통해 후설에게서 본능적 지향성은 초월론적 대상구성 그 자체를 가능하게 하는 초월론적 조건으로서 여타의 감각적인 충동들과 구별된다는 점이 밝혀진다. 또한 본능적 지향성은 그러한 구성작업에 의해 가능해지는 습성적 삶의 전개 양상을 규제하는 (...)
- Mimicry and normativity.Edward A. Lenzo & Shaun Gallagher - 2020 - In Christian Tewes & Giovanni Stanghellini, Time and Body: Phenomenological and Psychopathological Approaches. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.$129.24 used (collection) View on Amazon.comRemove from this listExport citation Bookmark 3 citations
- (1 other version)Does evolutionary psychology show that normativity is mind-dependent?Selim Berker - 2014 - In Justin D'Arms Daniel Jacobson, Moral Psychology and Human Agency: Essays on the New Science of Ethics. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
- Relaxing Normativity: Essays on Relaxed Approaches to Realism about Normativity.Paiman Karimi - 2023 - Dissertation, University of GothenburgThis thesis is concerned with a relaxed form of normative realism. Relaxed realists accept the existence of mind-independent normative truths, properties, and facts, but argue that normative truths do not have truthmakers and that normative properties and facts are not metaphysically robust. The thesis develops relaxed realism by responding to various objections and challenges. The first paper argues that relaxed realists can answer questions about normative language without their theory collapsing into one of the familiar theories in the literature or (...)Remove from this listExport citation Bookmark
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