There are experts in arithmetic, music, tennis, and fencing. But are there experts in morality? It is not surprising that there should be people like moral philosophers who are experts in moral theory, just as there are experts in tennis or music theory. But the question concerns whether there are analogues in morality of the expert tennis player or violinist. The unsophisticated answer might be that confessors, counselors, and perhaps even psychiatrists seem to qualify as moral experts in the relevant (...) sense. In turn, most conscientious confessors, counselors, and psychiatrists would deny that they themselves are experts in morality, even though they might claim expertise in divinity, marital advising, or treating emotional disorders. There are, moreover, persuasive philosophical arguments against the possibility of anyone’s being a moral expert, of which certain venerable reasonings of Socrates, Kant, and Ryle may be taken as representative. By examining several venerable arguments against the possibility of moral experts, we will, however, discover much to be said for the unsophisticated answer to the question. (shrink)

In this paper, a game-theoretical semantics is developed for the so-called alpha part of Charles S. Peirce's System of Existential Graphs of 1896. This alpha part is that portion of Peirce's graphs that corresponds to propositional logic. The paper both expounds a game-theoretical semantics for the graphs that seems close to Peirce's own intentions and proves for the alpha part of the graphs that this semantics is adequate.

Lines of identity in Peirce's existential graphs are logically complex structures that comprise both identity and existential quantification. Yet geometrically they are simple: linear continua that cannot have “furcations” or cross “cuts.” By contrast Peirce's “ligatures” are geometrically complex: they can both have furcations and cross cuts. Logically they involve not only identity and existential quantification but also negation. Moreover, Peirce makes clear that ligatures are composed of lines of identity by virtue of the fact that such lines can be (...) “connected” with one another and can “abut upon” one another at a cut. This paper shows in logical detail how ligatures are composed and how they relate to identity, existential quantification, and negation. In so doing, it makes use of Peirce's non-standard account of the linear continuum, according to which, when a linear continuum is separated into two parts, the parts are symmetric rather than asymmetric, and the one point at which separation occurs actually becomes two points, each of which is a Doppelgänger of the other. (shrink)

The inaugural collection in an exciting new exchange between philosophers and geographers, this volume provides interdisciplinary approaches to the environment as space, place, and idea. Never before have philosophers and geographers approached each other's subjects in such a strong spirit of mutual understanding. The result is a concrete exploration of the human-nature relationship that embraces strong normative approaches to environmental problems.

In 1910, only four years before his death, Peirce began an adumbration of a life's worth of major results concerning nondeductive logic—results that he had reached after more than forty-five years of extremely careful and detailed investigations2—as follows: "I must premiss that we, all of us, use this word ["probability"] with a degree of laxity which corrupts and rots our reasoning to a degree that very few of us are at all awake to."3 Peirce continued the adumbration by outlining his (...) mature theory, according to which, contrary to what is generally supposed, there is not just one measure of "falling short of certainty,"4 viz. probability. Rather, there are three utterly distinct and mutually incommensurable .. (shrink)

Henry Sheffer’s 1908 Harvard Ph.D. thesis contains an interesting appendix on a central feature of the logical work of his thesis advisor, Josiah Royce. This is the claim in Royce’s 1905 article “The Relations of the Principles of Logic to the Foundations of Geometry” that an unsymmetric ordering relation can be defined on the single symmetric O-relation for which he gives postulates in that paper. Sheffer criticizes Royce’s specific definition from the point of view of the evolving twentieth century conception (...) of axiomatic method and also shows more generally that an unsymmetric1 order relation cannot be defined in the system of the 1905 paper based on the O-relation. In this article I wish to consider the nature.. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:32. BAYESIANISM AND ANALOGY IN HUME'S DIALOGUES Wesley Salmon has recently focussed attention on Hume's consideration of the argument from design for the existence of God in the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion, by construing it according to a Bayesian account of inductive inferences to causal hypotheses. Salmon argues that an interpretation of the argument from design, considered by Philo and Cleanthes in the Dialogues, as an appeal to analogy (...) is not a correct interpretation of Hume's argumentation. I would like here to argue that Salmon's account is too far afield of Hume's actual pattern of arguing to be taken as an accurate account of the discussion in the Dialogues. I would also like to characterize Hume's account of causal arguments in the Dialogues more closely, and to show how it is connected with his notion of resemblance. In doing so, I shall defend the thesis that an appeal to analogy is after all the fundamental form of argument that is considered in the Dialogues. I. Salmon argues that the discussion among the characters in the Dialogues, principally between Philo and Cleanthes, centers about the various probability terms entering into Bayes' s Theorem in the form: P(C/A&B).P(B/A) P(B/ASC) = ---------------------------------, P(C/ASB) -P(B/A) + PÍC/A&B) -P(B/A) where in the context of the Dialogues, "A" stands for any event of coming-into-being, "B" stands for any event that is a product of intelligence, and "C" stands for any event that 2 exhibits order or design. The various probabilities that enter into Bayes's Theorem can, then, be characterized in the present context more thoroughly. For example, P (B/A&C) is the probability that an event of coming-into-being which displays order is the product of intelligence. This 33. probability, if high, would tend to support the argument from design, and, if low, would tend to undermine it. In order to evaluate P(B/A&C) by using Bayes' s Theorem, we need to be in a position to find the following three probabilities: P(B/A): This is the probability that any event of coming-into-being is a product of intelligence. If we know its value, it is easy to calculate P(B/A), the probability that any event of coming-into-being is not a produce of intelligence. For P(B/A) = 1 - P(B/A). Both these probabilities are called the prior probabilities of the problem. P(C/A&B): This is the probability - which Salmon typically calls one of the two likelihoods of the problem - that an event of cominginto -being which is a produce of intelligence does exhibit order or design. P(C/A&B): This is the probability - which Salmon calls the other likelihood of the problem that an event of coming-into-being which is not a produce of intelligence exhibits order or design. Now Salmon is not merely arguing - though he is also arguing - that Bayes' s Theorem, with its constituent probabilities so understood, is relevant for evaluating the argument from design. He is arguing that Bayes' s Theorem is relevant for interpreting Hume's thoughts about the argument from design. Salmon admits that "Hume must have been unaware of Bayes" s Theorem." But he claims that Bayes' s Theorem is nevertheless relevant for interpreting Hume. He suggests a number of reasons for this. First, the argument considered by Philo and Cleanthes is weakened, he says, if it is 34. 4 represented as a mere appeal to analogy. Secondly, he says that the correct strategy for analyzing any causal hypothesis is Bayesian, and undoubtedly Philo and Cleanthes are debating about causal hypotheses. Thirdly, Philo and Cleanthes show by the end of the second dialogue that they are aware the argument is more complex than a simple appeal to analogy. Fourthly, with respect to the probabilities one needs to know in order to use Bayes' s Theorem in the relevant way, Hume's characters and especially Philo "devote considerable attention to each of the three types of probabilities in their discussion." Fifthly, Hume just does in fact recognize that the argument from design is "something deeper and more subtle than a simple appeal to D analogy." We can greatly... (shrink)

This second volume arising from the Frontiers in American Philosophy Conference held at Texas A&M University is "festive, celebrating the diversity of thought and influences in American philosophy," say its editors. In these thirty-six essays, there is no attempt to define an American ethos; in fact, the editors conclude that, even pragmatism, identified by Tocqueville as America's defining attribute, should not be described as a national philosophy. It is, as Gerard Deledalle notes in his essay, "the new universal philosophy, because (...) it is the philosophy of experience and democracy that is any nation's `manifest destiny.'" These articles, by thoughtful scholars from North America and several European nations, look forward through the developments presently shaping philosophical inquiry in the United States and backward to the origins and plurality of the American intellectual heritage. Not a parochial or narrow perspective, the focus on American philosophy sharpens the dialogue that clarifies and explicates American thought in the context of a world community. (shrink)

To push the edges of the known, to look at the accepted in novel ways, is indeed to stand at the frontiers of a field. In Frontiers in American Philosophy thirty-five contemporary scholars explore classical American thought in bold new ways. An extraordinary range of issues and thinkers is represented in these pages--from such core themes as metaphysics and social philosophy, which receive primary attention, to some consideration of American philosophers' technical accomplishments in mathematical logic and philosophical analysis. The authors (...) also offer new perspectives on the work of the leading American philosophers, including George Herbert Mead, William James, John Dewey, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Emma Goldman. Not surprisingly perhaps, a great deal of the discussion revolves, either directly or indirectly, around that great axis of intellectual issues commonly known as the "realism/idealism" controversy. It seems fitting that so much attention is devoted to the possibility of some sort of middle position between "external realism" and its antipode in some form of relativistic subjectivism. For, in the last analysis, such a middle position is for the American philosophers the core meaning of "pragmatism.”. (shrink)

This paper argues that several important tenets of the so-called "new theory of reference"--also known as the "historical-explanation theory" and as the "causal theory" of reference--were developed by william james as early as 1885 and that by 1895 they were elaborated by him in no less detail than contemporary theorists have so far done. these tenets include the central doctrine that reference is dependent on a causal or historical-explanatory chain connecting the act of referring with the entity referred to. james' (...) theory of reference is argued to be an aspect of his theory of truth. reference in james is argued to be an aspect of his pragmatic conception of the "workings" of true ideas. (shrink)

From three simple Peircean semeiotic principles, the general formula is derived for the number of definable sign-types from the number of semeiotic trichotomies to be used in defining the sign-types. If k is the number of such trichotomies, then [ ]/2 is the number of sign-types definable by appealing to them. The significance of the derivation lies in its setting constraints on particular detailed theories of sign-types.