In the Book of Common Prayer’s Rite II version of the Eucharist, the congregation confesses, “we have sinned against you in thought, word, and deed”. According to this confession we wrong God not just by what we do and what we say, but also by what we think. The idea that we can wrong someone not just by what we do, but by what think or what we believe, is a natural one. It is the kind of wrong we feel (...) when those we love believe the worst about us. And it is one of the salient wrongs of racism and sexism. Yet it is puzzling to many philosophers how we could wrong one another by virtue of what we believe about them. This paper defends the idea that we can morally wrong one another by what we believe about them from two such puzzles. The first puzzle concerns whether we have the right sort of control over our beliefs for them to be subject to moral evaluation. And the second concerns whether moral wrongs would come into conflict with the distinctively epistemic standards that govern belief. Our answer to both puzzles is that the distinctively epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. This account of moral encroachment explains how epistemic norms governing belief are sensitive to the moral requirements governing belief. (shrink)

We care not only about how people treat us, but also what they believe of us. If I believe that you’re a bad tipper given your race, I’ve wronged you. But, what if you are a bad tipper? It is commonly argued that the way racist beliefs wrong is that the racist believer either misrepresents reality, organizes facts in a misleading way that distorts the truth, or engages in fallacious reasoning. In this paper, I present a case that challenges this (...) orthodoxy: the case of the supposedly rational racist. We live in a world that has been, and continues to be, structured by racist attitudes and institutions. As a result, the evidence might be stacked in favour of racist beliefs. But, if there are racist beliefs that reflect reality and are rationally justified, what could be wrong with them? Moreover, how do I wrong you by believing what I epistemically ought believe given the evidence? To address this challenge, we must recognize that there are not only epistemic norms governing belief, but moral ones as well. This view, however, is at odds with the assumption that moral obligation requires a kind of voluntary control that we lack with regard to our beliefs. This background assumption motivates many philosophers to try to explain away the appearance that beliefs can wrong by locating the wrong elsewhere, e.g., in an agent’s actions. Further, even accounts that accept the thesis that racist beliefs can wrong restrict the class of beliefs that wrong to beliefs that are either false or the result of hot irrationality, e.g., the racist belief is a result of ill-will. In this paper I argue that although the these accounts will capture many of the wrongs associated with racist beliefs, they will be only partial explanations because they cannot explain the wrong committed by the supposedly rational racist. The challenge posed by the supposedly rational racist concerns our epistemic practices in a non-ideal world. The world is an unjust place, and there may be many morally objectionable beliefs it justifies. To address this challenge, we must seriously consider the thesis people wrong others in virtue of what they believe about them, and not just in virtue of what they do. (shrink)

This paper addresses the questions of how we should interpret the autonomy of children and of how we should identify the treatment their autonomy demands of others. In examining this question, the paper casts doubt on two views of the nature and relevance of the autonomy of children. It criticises Joel Feinberg’s well-known view that the autonomy claims of children are reducible to the autonomy claims of the future adults the children will become. It also raises objections to Matthew Clayton’s (...) proposal that the treatment of children should be constrained not only by their future autonomy, but also by a particular component of their autonomy, namely, their independence. We believe Clayton’s proposal has the merit that it does not, unlike Feinberg’s proposal, restrict the basis of the autonomy-claims of children purely to the future autonomy they will enjoy as adults. Nevertheless, we do not believe that the concern with independence adequately captures the autonomy claims of children. After considering these alternative views, the paper proposes that the autonomy claims of children are in fact routed in their evolving capacities for autonomous decision-making. We argue that this proposal both fits with some common-sense ideas about how children ought to be treated, and upholds Clayton's radical proposal that parents should not enrol their children into their comprehensive views about the good life, including their religious views. (shrink)

This paper is about an overlooked aspect—the cognitive or epistemic aspect—of the moral demand we place on one another to be treated well. We care not only how people act towards us and what they say of us, but also what they believe of us. That we can feel hurt by what others believe of us suggests both that beliefs can wrong and that there is something we epistemically owe to each other. This proposal, however, surprises many theorists who claim (...) it lacks both intuitive and theoretical support. This paper argues that the proposal has intuitive support and is not at odds with much contemporary theorizing about what we owe to each other. (shrink)

Historical patterns of discrimination seem to present us with conflicts between what morality requires and what we epistemically ought to believe. I will argue that these cases lend support to the following nagging suspicion: that the epistemic standards governing belief are not independent of moral considerations. We can resolve these seeming conflicts by adopting a framework wherein standards of evidence for our beliefs to count as justified can shift according to the moral stakes. On this account, believing a paradigmatically racist (...) belief reflects a failure to not only attend to the epistemic risk of being wrong, but also a failure to attend to the distinctively moral risk of wronging others given what we believe. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue that morality might bear on belief in at least two conceptually distinct ways. The first is that morality might bear on belief by bearing on questions of justification. The claim that it does is the doctrine of moral encroachment. The second, is that morality might bear on belief given the central role belief plays in mediating and thereby constituting our relationships with one another. The claim that it does is the doctrine of doxastic wronging. Though (...) conceptually distinct, the two doctrines overlap in important ways. This paper provides clarification on the relationship between the two, providing reasons throughout that we should accept both. (shrink)

This article examines how a just society must address the needs of its imprudent members. I defend compulsory insurance as an answer to this question. It has been assumed that compulsory insurance can only be justified on paternalistic grounds. I argue that this assumption is incorrect, and defend non-paternalistic compulsory insurance. To display the merits of NPCI, I identify a trilemma that arises for views about how to address the needs of the imprudent, including libertarian and so-called ‘ luck -egalitarian’ (...) views. I then suggest that NPCI enables us to escape the trilemma. (shrink)

With a wealth of detail, this book traces the acceptance and rejection of Soren Kierkegaard's thought in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Engaging the reader with biographical sketches of Kierkegaard and his contemporaries, Habib Malik presents a fascinating historical narrative of the early reception of Kierkegaard's thought. At the center of this story is an exploration of how Kierkegaard's ideas moved from the relative obscurity of Copenhagen at the time of his death in 1855 to the center (...) of European intellectual culture in the mid-1920s. Receiving Soren Kierkegaard is the first serious attempt to chronicle the early "lost years" of Kierkegaard's intellectual legacy. It analyzes Kierkegaard's profound impact on the lives and thought of such figures as Orsted, Ibsen, Jacobsen, Brandes, Nietzsche, Dilthey, Unamuno, Joyce, Rilke, Kafka, Lukacs, and Kassner. (shrink)

We care what people think of us. The thesis that beliefs wrong, although compelling, can sound ridiculous. The norms that properly govern belief are plausibly epistemic norms such as truth, accuracy, and evidence. Moral and prudential norms seem to play no role in settling the question of whether to believe p, and they are irrelevant to answering the question of what you should believe. This leaves us with the question: can we wrong one another by virtue of what we believe (...) about each other? Can beliefs wrong? In this introduction, I present a brief summary of the articles that make up this special issue. The aim is to direct readers to open avenues for future research by highlighting questions and challenges that are far from being settled. These papers shouldn’t be taken as the last word on the subject. Rather, they mark the beginning of a serious exploration into a set of questions that concern the morality of belief, i.e., doxastic morality. (shrink)

This chapter is a survey of the ethics of belief. It begins with the debate as it first emerges in the foundational dispute between W. K. Clifford and William James. Then it surveys how the disagreements between Clifford and James have shaped the work of contemporary theorists, touching on topics such as pragmatism, whether we should believe against the evidence, pragmatic and moral encroachment, doxastic partiality, and doxastic wronging.

Philosophical inquiry strives to be the unencumbered exploration of ideas. That is, unlike scientific research which is subject to ethical oversight, it is commonly thought that it would either be inappropriate, or that it would undermine what philosophy fundamentally is, if philosophical research were subject to similar ethical oversight. Against this, I argue that philosophy is in need of a reckoning. Philosophical inquiry is a morally hazardous practice with its own risks. There are risks present in the methods we employ, (...) risks inherent in the content of the views under consideration, and risks to the subjects of our inquiry. Likely, there are more risks still. However, by starting with the identification of these three risks we can demonstrate not only why an ethics of practice is needed but also which avenues are the most promising for developing an ethics for philosophical practice. Although we might be in the business of asking questions, we do not absolve ourselves of responsibility for the risks that inquiry incurs. (shrink)

I Can we make promises to ourselves? This is a question that has not received much consideration in the large body of philosophical work on promising. And in what commentary there is, the answer is uniformly negative. I think this negativity is a mistake, and that the conventional view that we can't make reflexive promises is wrong. I also think that this has some important implications for promissory theory in general. In what follows, I will attempt to argue for the (...) first of these two claims, and to briefly outline my reasons for the second. (shrink)

This chapter asks two questions about the ethics of expectations: one about the nature of expectations, and one about the wrongs of expectations. On the first question, expectations involve a rich constellation of attitudes ranging from beliefs to also include imaginings, hopes, fears, and dreams. As a result, sometimes expectations act like predictions, like your expectation of rain tomorrow, sometimes prescriptions, like the expectation that your students will do the reading, sometimes like proleptic reasons like the hope that your mentee (...) will flourish, and sometimes expectations are peremptory in that they carry the force of moral law. Turning to the second question, given the multiple roles played by expectations it shouldn’t be surprising that there are also multiple ways expectations can be wrong to hold. Sometimes they wrong as beliefs do, e.g., doxastic wronging, and sometimes they result in alienation because of who holds that expectation of us. The upshot of this chapter is that getting clear on these potential ways expectations can wrong not only delivers an ethics of expectations that mirrors familiar discussions of the ethics of belief, but an ethics of expectations further opens the door for taking seriously an ethics of mental attitudes more generally. (shrink)

The strengthening of intolerance and religious movements of various mass organisations after the 1998 reform in Indonesia caused social friction. The Ministry of Religious offers religious moderation as an essential aspect of the plurality of spiritual life. What is the concept and practice of religious moderation for each mass organisation? This research is qualitatively descriptive, with a sociological approach to religion. The concept of religious moderation of mass organisastions is different; they claim to understand the principle of wasathiyyah so that (...) it becomes a view of life that accepts religious differences outside themselves. Religious moderation is in the form of religious views, attitudes, and behaviours that balance the interests of life, the world and the hereafter, personal with the public, and others. There are four indicators of religious moderation: nationalism, tolerance, non-violence, and local cultural accommodation. MTA understands religious moderation based on two principles: not being self-righteous, and do not blame other groups; FPI departs from its vision, religious moderation over the spirit of ‘amar ma’ruf nahi munkar; LUIS sees religious moderation based on the principles of Islam as a religion of rahmatan lil’alamin, the implications for the balance of the relationship between habl min Allah; habl min an-nass and habl min al-’alam; and MMI understands religious moderation based on three aspects: Islam is a religion that is syumul and rahmatan li’alamin; religious moderation related to sharia enforcement; and religious moderation means that fulfillment of maqashid asy-syariah includes ushul al-khamsah: hifdz al-din, hifdz an-nafs, hifdz al-mal, hifdz al-’aql, and hifdz an-nasb. (shrink)

In this paper I explore three challenges to the morality of belief. First, whether we have the necessary control over our beliefs to be held responsible for them, i.e., the challenge of doxastic involuntarism. Second, the question of whether belief is really the attitude that we care about in the cases used to motivate the morality of belief. Third, whether attitudes weaker than belief, such as credence, can wrong, I then end by turning to how answers to the previous challenges (...) suggest a way of extending the morality of belief to encompass a way of thinking of the moral mind more generally. (shrink)

Morality bears on what we should forget. Some aspects of our identity are meant to be forgotten and there is a distinctive harm that accompanies the permanence of some content about us, content that prompts a duty to forget. To make the case that forgetting is an integral part of our moral duties to others, the paper proceeds as follows. In §1, I make the case that forgetting is morally evaluable and I survey three kinds of forgetting: no-trace forgetting, archival (...) forgetting, and siloing. In §2, I turn to how we practice these forms of forgetting in our everyday lives and the goods these practices facilitate by drawing on examples ranging from the expunging of juvenile arrest records to the right to privacy. In §3, I turn to how my account can help us both recognize and address a heretofore neglected source of harm caused by technology and big data. In §4, I end by addressing the concern that we lack control over forgetting and thus can't be required to forget. I argue this challenge can be answered, but there’s a harder challenge that can’t. Forgetting is under threat. To address this challenge and preserve forgetting, we must change the world. (shrink)

It is no surprise that we should be careful when it comes to what we believe. Believing false things can be costly. The morality of belief, also known as doxastic wronging, takes things a step further by suggesting that certain beliefs can not only be costly, they can also wrong. This article surveys some accounts of how this could be so. That is, how beliefs wrong.

This paper provides a critical examination of the strongest defenses of the pure lifetime view, according to which justice requires taking only people's whole lives as relevant when assessing and establishing their distributive entitlements and obligations. The paper proposes that we reject a pure lifetime view and replace it with an alternative view, on which some time-specific considerations--that is to say, considerations about how people fare at specific points in time--have nonderivative weight in determining what our obligations are to them.

The problem of fake news and the spread of misinformation has garnered a lot of attention in recent years. The incentives and norms that give rise to the problem, however, are not unique to journalism. Insofar as academics and journalists are working towards the same goal, i.e., publication, they are both under pressures that pervert. This chapter has two aims. First, to integrate conversations in philosophy of science, epistemology, and metaphilosophy to draw out the publishing incentives that promote analogous problems (...) of fake news and misinformation in academic research communities more broadly. Second, to argue for a (partial) solution. This chapter argues that research communities benefit when authors believe what they argue for in print and it warns against attempts to loosen our publication norms to permit publishing without belief. (shrink)

A challenge we face in a world that has been shaped by, and continues to be shaped by, racist attitudes and institutions is that the evidence is often stacked in favor of racist beliefs. As a result, we may find ourselves facing the following conflict: what if the evidence we have supports something we morally shouldn’t believe? For example, it is morally wrong to assume, solely on the basis of someone’s skin color, that they’re a staff member. But, what if (...) you’re in a context where, because of historical patterns of discrimination, someone’s skin color is a very good indicator that they’re a staff member? When this sort of normative conflict looms, a conflict between moral considerations on the one hand and what you epistemically ought to believe given the evidence on the other, what should we do? It might be unfair to assume that they’re a staff member, but to ignore the evidence would mean risking inaccurate beliefs. Some, notably Tamar Gendler (2011), have suggested that we simply face a tragic irresolvable dilemma. In this chapter, I consider how these cases of conflict arise and I canvass the viability of suggested resolutions of the conflict. In the end, I argue that there’s actually no conflict here. Moral considerations can change how we epistemically should respond to the evidence. (shrink)

After the independence of Syria and Lebanon Protestant missionary work in the Middle East changed dramatically. The women missionaries who worked in the service of the ACO had to come to terms with new realities such as the social and political turmoil of decolonisation, missiological shifts, and partnership agreements with the local churches. Drawing on written memoirs and oral history sources, this article explores their female agency and leadership in a changing context. It also analyses the perception of these missionaries (...) by local agents. (shrink)

This paper examines the moral case for a right to religious accommodation, which requires that religious conduct be free of any serious burdens placed on it by the state. Two different types of normative argument for this right are outlined and rejected. The first appeals to religion as a ‘basic good’, and the second to religion as an ‘intense preference’. In place of these, I suggest that a third type of argument has greater prospects of success. Religious accommodation is justified (...) on the grounds that religious conduct is a ‘derivative good’— that is, it derives its value from its being necessary for something else, namely, the integrity of the religious person. (shrink)

Rafey Habib's book offers a comprehensive study of Eliot's philosophical writings and attempts to assess their impact on both his early poetry through 'The Waste Land' and the central concepts of his literary criticsm. Habib presents the first scholalrly analysis of Eliot's difficult unpublished papers on Kant and Bergson and establishes the nature of Eliot's connections with major figures in the Western philosophical tradition, including Plato, Aristotle, Locke, Hume, Hegel, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Bradley and Russell. The Early T. S. (...) Eliot and Western Philosophy attempts to unravel the complex notions of irony underlying Eliot's poetry, arguing that these originate in his philosophical thinking and achieve persistent expression in his early aesthetics. This book offers close readings of Eliot's major poems and critical essays, shedding valuable light on his views on language, tradition, impersonality and emotion, and situating these in a broad aesthetic and philosophical context. (shrink)

You shouldn’t have done it. But you did. Against your better judgment you scrolled to the end of an article concerning the state of race relations in America and you are now reading the comments. Amongst the slurs, the get-rich-quick schemes, and the threats of physical violence, there is one comment that catches your eye. Spencer argues that although it might be “unpopular” or “politically incorrect” to say this, the evidence supports believing that the black diner in his section will (...) tip poorly. He insists that the facts don’t lie. The facts aren’t racist. In denying his claim and in believing otherwise, it is you who engages in wishful thinking. It is you who believes against the evidence. You, not Spencer, are epistemically irrational. -/- My dissertation gives an account of the moral-epistemic norms governing belief that will help us answer Spencer and the challenge he poses. We live in a society that has been shaped by racist attitudes and institutions. Given the effects of structural racism, Spencer’s belief could have considerable evidential support. Spencer notes that it might make him unpopular, but he cares about the truth and he is willing to believe the unpopular thing. But, Spencer’s belief seems racist. Spencer asks, however, how could his belief be racist if his beliefs reflect reality and are rationally justified? Moreover, how could he wrong anyone by believing what he epistemically ought to believe given the evidence? In answer, I argue that beliefs can wrong. (shrink)

In this paper we ask whether liberal egalitarians can endorse workfare policies that require that welfare recipients should work in return for their welfare benefits. In particular, we focus on the fairness-based case for workfare, which holds that people should be responsible for their own welfare since they would otherwise impose unfair costs on others. Two versions of the fairness-based case are considered: The first defends workfare on the grounds that it would form part of an unemployment insurance scheme that (...) individuals would endorse under certain hypothetical conditions that are salient for the purposes of determining just public policy. The second appeals to the notion of reciprocity in order to justify the requirement that people work for their benefits. We cast doubt on both of these arguments for workfare. Neither argument shows that the unconditional provision of welfare benefits is unjust; hence, the fairness case for workfare is inconclusive. (shrink)

If we’re the kind of people who care both about not being racist, and also about basing our beliefs on the evidence that we have, then the world presents us with a challenge. The world is pretty racist. It shouldn’t be surprising then that sometimes it seems as if the evidence is stacked in favour of some racist belief. For example, it’s racist to assume that someone’s a staff member on the basis of his skin colour. But what if it’s (...) the case that, because of historical patterns of discrimination, the members of staff with whom you interact are predominantly of one race? When the late John Hope Franklin, professor of history at Duke University in North Carolina, hosted a dinner party at his private club in Washington, DC in 1995, he was mistaken as a member of staff. Did the woman who did so do something wrong? Yes. It was indeed racist of her, even though Franklin was, since 1962, that club’s first black member. (shrink)

Permaculture design seeks to create sustainable communities, and over time has established itself as a transnational community of practice. Based on original interviews with permaculture practitioners from around the world, and drawing on the three core elements of communities of practice – shared domain, communality and shared practices – as our analytical framework, this paper makes three arguments. First, the shared domain of permaculture as a body of knowledge, a system of ethics and set of practical design principles creates an (...) overarching teleological regime that anchors the globally dispersed collective activities of permaculture practitioners. Second, communality in the international permaculture community is centred around the permaculture design course, national and international permaculture convergences, and organisations and demonstration sites that act as hubs for practitioner interaction, linked across national borders by social media networks. Third, shared practices in the permaculture community centre on relationship-building and local-level community organisation. (shrink)

Do the various forms of literary theory - deconstruction, Marxism, new historicism, feminism, post-colonialism, and cultural/digital studies - have anything in common? If so, what are the fundamental principles of theory? What is its ideological orientation? Can it still be of use to us in understanding basic intellectual and ethical dilemmas of our time? These questions continue to perplex both students and teachers of literary theory. Habib finds the answers in theory's largely unacknowledged roots in the thought of German (...) philosopher Hegel. Hegel's insights continue to frame the very terms of theory to this day. Habib explains Hegel's complex ideas and how they have percolated through the intellectual history of the last century. This book will interest teachers and students of literature, literary theory and the history of ideas, illuminating how our modern world came into being, and how we can better understand the salient issues of our own time. (shrink)

"Hegel and the Foundations of Literary Theory: Do the various forms of literary theory - deconstruction, Marxism, new historicism, feminism, post-colonialism, and cultural/digital studies - have anything in common? If so, what are the fundamental principles of theory? What is its ideological orientation? Can it still be of use to us in understanding basic intellectual and ethical dilemmas of our time? These questions continue to perplex both students and teachers of literary theory. Habib finds the answers in theory's largely (...) unacknowledged roots in the thought of German philosopher Hegel. Hegel's insights continue to frame the very terms of theory to this day. Habib explains Hegel's complex ideas and how they have percolated through the intellectual history of the last century. This book will interest teachers and students of literature, literary theory and the history of ideas, illuminating how our modern world came into being, and how we can better understand the salient issues of our own time"--. (shrink)

This article develops the argument that the state must provide parental subsidies if, and to the extent that, individuals would, under certain specified hypothetical conditions, purchase ‘insurance cover’ that would provide the funds they need for adequate childrearing. I argue that most citizens would sign up to an insurance scheme, in which they receive a guarantee of a means-tested parental subsidy in return for an obligation to pay a progressive income tax to fund the scheme. This argument from insurance bolsters (...) the weaker case that proponents of parental subsidies might offer were they to rely exclusively on arguments from fair play and efficiency. (shrink)

If you’re familiar with Tolkien’s The Hobbit I don’t need to tell you that Mirkwood is a dangerous place. As bad as we might feel for Thorin and company as they try to navigate the forest and fall prey to its traps, we should feel worse for ourselves. Our world is also dangerous and difficult, but in a different way. Although it’s some comfort that the spiders of our world are smaller, it is easier to travel through Mirkwood than it (...) is to know what to believe. At least when it comes to navigating Mirkwood the directions are clear. (shrink)

In this comment, I reply to two objections John Tate raises against my discussion of the trajectory of Locke's ideas on toleration Tate maintains that I misunderstand the role of natural law and civil peace in Locke's thought. I defend my interpretation of the role of natural law and show that Tate is mistaken in his claim that Locke's concern to preserve civil peace conflicted with his separate concern to protect individual rights.

The right of a person, who is a victim of a criminal act, to access justice (court) according to the criminal legal order, is analyzed in this article. The right to appeal to a court is analyzed as a constituent part of the principle of accessibility to legal defence. Pre-eminently, the general constitutional fundamentals of the right towards legal defence are estimated. The provisions of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania, i.e. that the right towards legal defence of (...) the infringed rights is absolute, is analyzed while taking into consideration the attitude formed by the international courts, i.e. that the right to justice is not an absolute and can only be restricted by being ruled by the principle of proportionality and the other legal principles. (shrink)

The tendencies of the development of the Lithuanian criminal procedure within the recent twenty years, after Lithuania has regained its independence, are analyzed in the present article. The main factors which influence lawmaking in the sphere of criminal procedure as well as in the application of the criminal procedure norms are discussed. The constitutional imperatives and the human rights, fixed in international and the European Union agreements as the main factors determining the evolution of the law of criminal procedure are (...) reviewed. It is stated that earlier, while amending or supplementing the Code of Criminal Procedure, the utmost attention used to the drawn to the legal tradition of the state, whereas the legal norms of the modern criminal procedure must be subordinated to the principles fixed in the Constitution. After having briefly reviewed the main tendencies of the development of criminal procedure, i.e. the constitutionalization and internationalizationeuropeization, the following conclusion is drawn: the mentioned tendencies have been producing a significant impact on the evolution of the Lithuanian criminal procedure after the restoration of independence and accession to the international treaties. However, the systemic and critical viewpoint towards the impact of the European Union law on the national law of criminal procedure is still missing. (shrink)

Located in the Semnān area, the town of Šahmirzād and its neighboring villages are home to speakers of Šahmirzādi, a vernacular sharply differing from the other language types spoken in the Semnān area but closely related to the Mazandarani language spoken across the Alborz range to the north, along the Caspian coast. This article studies Šahmirzādi phonology, grammar, and vocabulary, with a look at cross-linguistic influence in the situation of language contact. The article concludes with a discussion of the possible (...) status of Šahmirzādi as a separate language within the Caspian family. (shrink)

This book provides a clear and nuanced appraisal of Hegel's treatment of Africa, India, and Islam, and of the implications of this treatment for postcolonial and global studies. Analyzing Hegel's master-slave dialectic and his views on Africa, India, and Islam, it situates these views not only within Hegel's historical scheme but also within a broader European philosophical context and the debates they have provoked within Hegel scholarship. Each chapter explores various in depth readings of Hegel by postcolonial critics, investigating both (...) the Eurocentric and potentially global nature of his dialectic. Ultimately, the book shows both where this profoundly influential thinker archetypally embodies certain Eurocentric traits that have characterized modernity and how, ironically, he himself gives us the tools for working towards a more global vision. Offering a concise introduction not only to an important dimension of Hegel's thought - his orientation towards "empire" - but also to the various issues raised by postcolonial theory and global studies, this book will be of use to philosophers as well as advanced students of literary and cultural theory alike. (shrink)

Straipsnyje siekiama identifikuoti ir moksliškai interpretuoti Lietuvos spausdintinėje ir internetinėje žiniasklaidoje vykstantį klimato kaitos diskursą. Remiantis autorių 2011–2012 m. atliktos žiniasklaidos tekstų turinio analizės duomenimis, analizuojama klimato kaitos diskurso tvarka, turinys bei pagrindiniai veikėjai. Rezultatai rodo, jog spausdintinėje žiniasklaidoje klimato kaitos diskurso tvarka rečiau sutrikdoma, o diskurso turinys labiau politizuotas nei internetinėje žiniasklaidoje. Tiek internetinėje, tiek spausdintinėje žiniasklaidoje politinio bei akademinio sektoriaus atstovai išryškėja kaip pagrindiniai veikėjai, pasižymintys diskursų įgalintu semantiniu dominavimu.

With dwindling support from governments toward universities, university–industry partnerships have increased. Ethical concerns over such partnerships have been documented, are particularly relevant when an institution receives money from a corporation whose products do harm and are intensified for academic public health institutions whose missions include promoting well-being. Academics in medicine and nutrition have often failed to recognize the potential conflicts of industry-sponsored research. It is unclear if research to date has explored attitudes of public health academics toward accepting such funds. (...) The objective of this research was to review systematically the attitudes of public health academics with respect to accepting funds from for-profit corporations. Four electronic databases were searched as well as the archives of the Chronicles of Higher Education. The search strategy was based on four main domains: for-profit organizations, funding, public health and academia. This search resulted in a total of 4017 articles reviewed. No articles were found that investigated the attitudes of public health academics toward accepting funds from industry. The lack of articles addressing public health academicians’ perspective toward accepting industry funds is striking. Research regarding this topic can guide development of policies that minimize the negative consequences of industry funding. (shrink)

Involving children in research studies requires obtaining parental permission. A school-based intervention to delay/prevent waterpipe use for 7th and 8th graders in Qatar was developed, and parental permission requested. Fifty three percent (2308/4314) of the parents returned permission forms; of those 19.5% of the total (840/4314) granted permission. This paper describes the challenges to obtaining parental permission. No research to date has described such challenges in the Arab world.