Owing to its benefits on various cognitive aspects, one’s emotions and wellbeing, meditation has drawn interest from several researchers and common public alike. We have different meditation practices associated with many cultures and traditions across the globe. Current literature suggests significant changes in the neural activity among the different practices of meditation, as each of these practices contributes to distinct physiological and psychological effects. Although this is the case, we want to find out if there is an underlying commonality among (...) all these different practices. So, we ask the following questions related to different practices of meditation, the traditional goal of meditation and its significance - What is the central purpose of meditation? Do traditions define the final goal of all the practices of meditation? Are the purpose and goal of these practices different or is there a common goal to be attained through all these distinct practices? Embracing the traditional perspective, through this paper, we want to emphasize, although these techniques and practices may appear different on the periphery, eventually, they seem to subject one to the same experience at the end; a natural meditative state (discussed in various spiritual traditions as the goal of meditation). In view of future studies on different meditation practices and also those exploring this subjective state, we offer some interesting ideas based on the traditional insights on meditation. In this context, we would also like to make a few comments on the way contemporary researchers view different practices of meditation. (shrink)

Sri Aurobindo: the future -- Sri Aurobindo's contribution to humanity -- Sri Aurobindo's realisations -- Spirit & significance of Indian culture -- Sri Aurobindo's revelations.

Order flows from consistent laws. Our understanding of our universe is changing, but Reality behind it is unchanged. Einstein's relativity amended Newtonian determinism, and was in turn amended by quantum mechanics. Einstein saw a harmonious advance in knowledge, and said, 'God does not play dice'; but Stephen Hawking later saw a radical departure, and said, 'God is a gambler.' This author, a keen student of philosophy with a moderate background of science, sees in these conflicting conclusions the inevitable distortion when (...) 'the relative' is projected on to 'the Absolute'. Therefore he says, 'Do not worry about God. He is not a visiting player like you and me, but the absolute owner of the casino. When He plays, His left hand picks up what His right hand loses. His status remains unaltered. We had better be looking out for ourselves.' The serious point made is that the Absolute includes and exceeds the time-space-causation frame of relativity, and these parameters cannot cross the border. The limitations must be clearly understood. 'Time' of physics is enought to study kinetic processes but not to locate the creative potential. That requires 'time' of our conscious awareness. But bio-science mistakes consciousness to be a product of brain-cells. In truth, consciousness is the energy, and brain is the equipment through which it manifests. Thus TIME is the Achilles' heel of physics, and MIND is the Achilles' heel of biology. The name of Reality is Total Consciousness. It is eternal. Death was never born, and life never died. (shrink)

The “problem of emotions,” that is, that many of them are both meaningful and corporeal, has yet to be resolved. Western thinkers, from Augustine to Descartes to Zajonc, have handled this problem by employing various forms of mind–body dualism. Some psychologists and neuroscientists since the 1970s have avoided it by talking about cognitive and emotional “processing,” using a terminology borrowed from computer science that nullifies the meaningful or intentional character of both thought and emotion. Outside the Western-influenced contexts, emotion and (...) thought are not seen as distinct kinds of things. Here a solution of sorts is proposed by thinking of emotional expression as a dynamic activity that declares and stirs emotions at the same time. As such, its dynamism may help historians to understand the dramatic changes and trends they investigate. (shrink)

The entry of an external object or the ‘third element’ into the dyad is generally taken as necessary for evidence of an understanding of others' attention, leading to an equating of the terms joint attention and awareness of attention. This chapter considers meta-theoretical and methodological reasons for psychology's disregard of mutual attention in this context and provides an alternative account of the emergence and development of attention awareness. Through the course of the first year human infants show a range of (...) emotional reactions to mutual attention and an increasingly complex range of attempts to regain it when it is absent or retain it when it is present. Prior to the onset of joint attention involving distal objects, mutual attentional engagements expand from an awareness of the self as an ‘object’ of others' attention to an awareness of the infant's own actions and expressions as ‘objects’. Providing the most direct experience of others' attention, mutual attention not only also reveals an awareness of attention but is the basis upon which further appropriate development of attention awareness can occur. (shrink)

In the data collection phase, the digital images are captured using sensors that often contaminated by noise (undesired random signal). In digital image processing task, enhancing the image quality and reducing the noise is a central process. Image denoising effectively preserves the image edges to a higher extend in the flat regions. Several adaptive filters (median filter, Gaussian filter, fuzzy filter, etc.) have been utilized to improve the smoothness of digital image, but these filters failed to preserve the image edges (...) while removing noise. In this paper, a modified fuzzy set filter has been proposed to eliminate noise for restoring the digital image. Usually in fuzzy set filter, sixteen fuzzy rules are generated to find the noisy pixels in the digital image. In modified fuzzy set filter, a set of twenty-four fuzzy rules are generated with additional four pixel locations for determining the noisy pixels in the digital image. The additional eight fuzzy rules ease the process of finding the image pixels,whether it required averaging or not. In this scenario, the input digital images were collected from the underwater photography fish dataset. The efficiency of the modified fuzzy set filter was evaluated by varying degrees of Gaussian noise (0.01, 0.03, and 0.1 levels of Gaussian noise). For performance evaluation, Structural Similarity (SSIM), Mean Structural Similarity (MSSIM), Mean Square Error (MSE), Normalized Mean Square Error (NMSE), Universal Image Quality Index (UIQI), Peak Signal to Noise Ratio (PSNR), and Visual Information Fidelity (VIF) were used. The experimental results showed that the modified fuzzy set filter improved PSNR value up to 2-3 dB, MSSIM up to 0.12-0.03, and NMSE value up to 0.38-0.1 compared to the traditional filtering techniques. (shrink)

In order to understand how infants come to understand others' intentions we need first to study how intentional engagements occur in early development. Engaging with intentions requires that they are, first of all, potentially available to perception and, second, that they are meaningful to the perceiver. I argue that in typical development it is in the infant's responses to others' infant-directed intentional actions that others' intentions first become meaningful. And that it is through the meaningful joining of intentions that understanding (...) continues to develop. I use three common arenas in the first year to illustrate this claim: infants' anticipatory adjustments to being picked up, infants' emerging compliance to others' directives, and infant teasing. Even by the age of two months infants adjust their postures appropriately, gazing at the adult's face as they approach with arms outstretched to pick them up. From the middle of the first year infants come to recognize the meanings of verbal directives and start to comply with them, being drawn further into the cultural worlds of their families. In the last quarter of the first year infants start to playfully tease and foil others' intentions in a variety of ways, actively redirecting the course of intentional engagements. Others' intentions are thus increasingly available to infants, allowing cooperation, challenge, and further elaboration. Joint intentional actions are best understood as the processes through which intention awareness develops rather than just as the products of such awareness. (shrink)

Joint attention to an external object at the end of the first year is typically believed to herald the infant's discovery of other people's attention. I will argue that mutual attention in the first months of life already involves an awareness of the directednesss of attention. The self is experienced as the first object of this directedness followed by gradually more distal 'objects'. this view explains early infant affective self-consciousness within mutual attention as emotionally meaningful, rather than as bearing only (...) a spurious similarity to that in the second and third years of life. Such engagements precede and must inform, rather than derive from, conceptual representations of self and other, and can be better described as self-other conscious affects. (shrink)

Research on this topic in Europe and North America has reached a new stage. Prior to 1970, historians told a story of progress in which modern individuals gradually gained mastery of emotions. After 1970 this older approach was put into doubt. Since 1990 research into the history of emotions has increasingly relied on a new methodology, based on the assumption that emotion is a domain of effort, and that it is possible to document variance between emotional standards, on the one (...) hand, and the greater or lesser success of individuals in conforming to them, on the other. Emotional standards are now assumed to display a history that is not progressive, but reflects distinctive features of each period. (shrink)

What if we began to speculate that intelligent things have an ethical agenda? Could we then imagine ways to move past the moral divide ‘human vs. nonhuman’ in those contexts, where things act on our behalf? Would this help us better address matters of agency and responsibility in the design and use of intelligent systems? In this article, we argue that if we fail to address intelligent things as objects that deserve moral consideration by their relations within a broad social (...) context, we will lack a grip on the distinct ethical rules governing our interaction with intelligent things, and how to design for it. We report insights from a workshop, where we take seriously the perspectives offered by intelligent things, by allowing unforeseen ethical situations to emerge in an improvisatory manner. By giving intelligent things an active role in interaction, our participants seemed to be activated by the artifacts, provoked to act and respond to things beyond the artifact itself—its direct functionality and user experience. The workshop helped to consider autonomous behavior not as a simplistic exercise of anthropomorphization, but within the more significant ecosystems of relations, practices and values of which intelligent things are a part. (shrink)

On spiritualism through studies in Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950, as a way for peace.

v. 1, pt. 1. Avatarhood and human evolution.

In this book, Christian Barry and Sanjay G. Reddy propose ways in which the international trading system can support poor countries in promoting the well-being of their peoples.

Obligation as defined by Tomasello requires mutually capable parties, but one-sided caregiver relationships reveal its developmental and evolutionary precursors. Specifically, “coercive” emotions may prompt protective action by caregivers toward infant primates, and infants show distress toward caregivers when they appear to violate expectations in their relationships. We argue that these early social-relational expectations and emotions may form the base of obligation.

The entry of an external object or the ‘third element’ into the dyad is generally taken as necessary for evidence of an understanding of others' attention, leading to an equating of the terms joint attention and awareness of attention. This chapter considers meta-theoretical and methodological reasons for psychology's disregard of mutual attention in this context and provides an alternative account of the emergence and development of attention awareness. Through the course of the first year human infants show a range of (...) emotional reactions to mutual attention and an increasingly complex range of attempts to regain it when it is absent or retain it when it is present. Prior to the onset of joint attention involving distal objects, mutual attentional engagements expand from an awareness of the self as an ‘object’ of others' attention to an awareness of the infant's own actions and expressions as ‘objects’. Providing the most direct experience of others' attention, mutual attention not only also reveals an awareness of attention but is the basis upon which further appropriate development of attention awareness can occur. (shrink)

At the heart of the social intelligence hypothesis is the central role of ‘social living’. But living is messy and psychologists generally seek to avoid this mess in the interests of getting clean data and cleaner logical explanations. The study of deception as intelligent action is a good example of the dangers of such avoidance. We still do not have a full picture of the development of deceptive actions in human infants and toddlers or an explanation of why it emerges. (...) This paper applies Byrne & Whiten’s functional taxonomy of tactical deception to the social behaviour of human infants and toddlers using data from three previous studies. The data include a variety of acts, such as teasing, pretending, distracting and concealing, which are not typically considered in relation to human deception. This functional analysis shows the onset of non-verbal deceptive acts to be surprisingly early. Infants and toddlers seem to be able to communicate false information (about themselves, about shared meanings and about events) as early as true information. It is argued that the development of deception must be a fundamentally social and communicative process and that if we are to understand why deception emerges at all, the scientist needs to get ‘back to the rough ground’ as Wittgenstein called it and explore the messy social lives in which it develops. (shrink)

International monetary arrangements currently appear to have consequences that are incompatible with a global egalitarian conception of distributive justice. How can we create alternatives?

In spite of the remarkable progress made in the burgeoning field of social neuroscience, the neural mechanisms that underlie social encounters are only beginning to be studied and could —paradoxically— be seen as representing the ‘dark matter’ of social neuroscience. Recent conceptual and empirical developments consistently indicate the need for investigations, which allow the study of real-time social encounters in a truly interactive manner. This suggestion is based on the premise that social cognition is fundamentally different when we are in (...) interaction with others rather than merely observing them. In this article, we outline the theoretical conception of a second-person approach to other minds and review evidence from neuroimaging, psychophysiological studies and related fields to argue for the development of a second-person neuroscience, which will help neuroscience to really go social; this may also be relevant for our understanding of psychiatric disorders construed as disorders of social cognition. (shrink)

The word soul in the cell-soul pathway does not have a scientific definition but has been hypothesized to be an indefinite, non-structured, massless energy made up of electromagnetic radiations that is confined in the cytoskeletal network of a living cell. It is a coherent, imperceptible, uncontainable and recyclable support pathway, which uses energy to promulgate consciousness in the cell supporting its functions. The pathway currently provides a mechanistic explanation of the flow of consciousness within the body, but the intent of (...) this paper is to provide an arduous explanation of non-local consciousness or disembodiment observed in near-death experiences. The paper hypothetically subsets the cell-soul pathway with the presence of two forms of consciousness, consistent with a recently developed model by Reddy : bodily consciousness, which manages functions only at cellular level, and functional consciousness, which is present in the body but can get disembodied and perform non-locally; the two forms of consciousness represent the overall state of consciousness. The non-locality of subjective experiences observed in near-death cases can be related to the realm of quantum physics – quantum entanglement between the two forms of consciousness that can demonstrate the capability of storing information holographically within the void or vacuum with the ability to create memories beyond the limitations of the brain and body. (shrink)