The main result of this paper is that if $\kappa$ is not a weakly Mahlo cardinal, then the following two conditions are equivalent: 1. $\mathscr{P}(\kappa)/ \mathscr{J}$ is $\kappa^+$-complete. 2. $\mathscr{J}$ is a prenormal ideal. Our result is a generalization of an announcement made in [Z]. We say that $\mathscr{J}$ is selective iff for every $\mathscr{J}$-function $f: \kappa \rightarrow \kappa$ there is a set $X \in \mathscr{J}$ such that $f\mid(\kappa - X)$ is one-to-one. Our theorem provides a positive partial answer to (...) a question of B. Weglorz from [BTW, p. 90], viz.: is every selective ideal $\mathscr{J}$, with $\mathscr{P}(\kappa)/\mathscr{J} \kappa^+$-complete, isomorphic to a normal ideal? The theorem is also true for fine ideals on $\lbrack\lambda\rbrack^{<\kappa}$ for any $\kappa \leq \lambda$, i.e. if $\kappa$ is not a weakly Mahlo cardinal then the Boolean algebra $\mathscr{P} (\lbrack\lambda\rbrack^{<\kappa})/\mathscr{J}$ is $\lambda^+$-complete iff $\mathscr{J}$ is a prenormal ideal (in the sense of $\lbrack\lambda\rbrack^{<\kappa})$. (shrink)

In this first paperback edition, a new introduction by Tom Burke establishes the ongoing importance of Sleeper's analysis of the integrity of Dewey's work and ...

He then proceeds with an examination of the picture theory developed by Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Goodman, and concludes with an examination of Patricia Churchland, Ruth Millikan, Robert Cummins, and Mark Rollins. The use of the historical development of representationalism to pose a central problem in contemporary cognitive science is unique.

First paragraph: Some reasons for action are relational. I have a relational reason to Φ when I have reason to Φ in virtue of a relationship in which I stand, or a role that I fill; absent that relationship or that role I would not have that reason to Φ ; others who do not stand in that relationship or fill that role do not have that reason to Φ . I have a relational reason to feed this child -- (...) that he is my child: absent that parental relationship, I might still have a reason to feed him, as might others who are not his parents -- for instance that he is starving; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to feed this child. I have a relational reason to respond to this person's philosophical queries -- that she is my student: absent that pedagogical relationship, I might still have reason to respond to her questions, as might others who are not her teachers -- for instance that it is good to help such seekers after philosophical insight; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to respond to her queries. I have relational reason to pay John ￡10 -- that I borrowed it from him and promised to repay him today: absent that promissory relationship I might still have, and others might have, reason to give him ￡10 -- for instance that he is impoverished and I am (or they are) rich; but absent that promissory relationship, neither I nor others could have that specific relational reason to give him ￡10. (shrink)

The environmental movement continues to be a dynamic force for protection of the environment despite new organizations emerging from the “birthing” process of the formation of new groups via factions and schisms. I focus on two aspects of the evolution of the environmental movement: how do new organizations emerge from existing environmental groups via benevolent or divisive mechanisms; and, which organizations produce new organizations? I develop a family tree of the American environmental movement from 1955 – 2005 and identify the (...) mechanisms that result in the formation of new organizations from a sample of 48 environmental organizations. I use social network analysis to identify which environmental organizations were most likely to produce new groups and set the stage for future inquiries into how new environmental organizations reestablish and maintain connections with their progenitors. (shrink)

Opstellen eerder verschenen in het Nederlands Tijdschrift voor rechtsfilosofie en rechtstheorie en in andere periodieken.

This book is a new edition of a short but fascinating treatise by Galen on causal theory. This text survives only in a Latin translation of the fourteenth century, and it is this which appears here. The volume also contains the first translation of the treatise into any modern language, and the first philosophical commentary thereon. The commentary ranges widely in Galen's voluminous œuvre, and compares his views with those of other ancient theorists. The introduction deals in detail with Galen's (...) life and work, with the background both philosophical and medieval to his causal theory, and with the history of the text itself. (shrink)

This collection of essays by leading international philosophers considers central themes in the ethics of Danish philosopher Knud Ejler Løgstrup (1905–1981). Løgstrup was a Lutheran theologian much influenced by phenomenology and by strong currents in Danish culture, to which he himself made important contributions. The essays in What Is Ethically Demanded? K. E. Løgstrup’s Philosophy of Moral Life are divided into four sections. The first section deals predominantly with Løgstrup’s relation to Kant and, through Kant, the system of morality in (...) general. The second section focuses on how Løgstrup stands in connection with Kierkegaard, Heidegger, and Levinas. The third section considers issues in the development of Løgstrup’s ethics and how it relates to other aspects of his thought. The final section covers certain central themes in Løgstrup’s position, particularly his claims about trust and the unfulfillability of the ethical demand. The volume includes a previously untranslated early essay by Løgstrup, “The Anthropology of Kant’s Ethics,” which defines some of his basic ethical ideas in opposition to Kant’s. The book will appeal to philosophers and theologians with an interest in ethics and the history of philosophy. (shrink)