Relational Reasons and the Criminal Law

In Leiter B. & Green L., Oxford Studies in Legal Philosophy, vol. 2. Oxford UP. pp. 175-208 (2013)
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Abstract

First paragraph: Some reasons for action are relational. I have a relational reason to Φ when I have reason to Φ in virtue of a relationship in which I stand, or a role that I fill; absent that relationship or that role I would not have that reason to Φ ; others who do not stand in that relationship or fill that role do not have that reason to Φ . I have a relational reason to feed this child -- that he is my child: absent that parental relationship, I might still have a reason to feed him, as might others who are not his parents -- for instance that he is starving; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to feed this child. I have a relational reason to respond to this person's philosophical queries -- that she is my student: absent that pedagogical relationship, I might still have reason to respond to her questions, as might others who are not her teachers -- for instance that it is good to help such seekers after philosophical insight; but absent that relationship, I would not have and others cannot have that specific relational reason to respond to her queries. I have relational reason to pay John £10 -- that I borrowed it from him and promised to repay him today: absent that promissory relationship I might still have, and others might have, reason to give him £10 -- for instance that he is impoverished and I am (or they are) rich; but absent that promissory relationship, neither I nor others could have that specific relational reason to give him £10

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R. A. Duff
University of Stirling

Citations of this work

A Moral Predicament in the Criminal Law.Gary Watson - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):168-188.
Theories of criminal law.Antony Duff - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Criminal Responsibility and the Emotions: If Fear and Anger Can Exculpate, Why Not Compassion?R. A. Duff - 2015 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 58 (2):189-220.

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