Journal of Applied Philosophy, EarlyView.

This article puts forward solutions to some of the ethical and legal dilemmas posed in the current discussion on how to program crash algorithms in autonomous or self-driving cars. The first part of the paper defines the scope of the problem in the criminal legal field, and the next section gives a critical analysis of the proposal to always prioritise the interest of the occupant of the vehicle in situations with conflict of interests. The principle of minimizing social damage as (...) a model for configuring self-driving cars is examined in the third section. Despite its apparent plausibility, within the framework of a liberal legal system that recognises humans as free agents who have rights and responsibilities, maximizing the function of social utility does not justify harmful interference into a person’s legal sphere. Therefore, in the fourth part, the author argues the need to program the crash algorithms of autonomous cars based on a deontological understanding of the system of justifications in criminal law. The solution to the dilemma lies in a prior analysis of the legal positions of all agents involved in the conflict, from a perspective of the principles of autonomy and solidarity as the core of the system of justifications. (shrink)

Among the advocates of expressive theories of punishment, there is a strong consensus that monetary fines cannot convey the message of censure that is required to punish serious crimes or crimes against the person. Money is considered an inappropriate symbol to express condemnation. In this article, I argue that this sentiment is correct, although not for the reasons suggested by advocates of expressivism. The monetary day-fine should not be understood as a simple deprivation of money, but as a punishment that (...) reduces the offender’s capacity to consume for a certain period of time. Conceived in this manner, I argue that it is perfectly suitable to convey censure. However, the practical impossibility of ensuring that the person who pays the fine is the same person who has been convicted of the offense seriously undermines the acceptability of the monetary fine as an instrument of censure. Minimizing the risk of the fine’s hard treatment being transferred to third parties is a necessary condition for the monetary fine to be considered a viable alternative to lengthy prison sentences. (shrink)

El autor propone una re/invención de la ciudadanía desde la educación popular. Señala que en estos tiempos la ciudadanía es el nuevo centro político y social, educativo, cultural y económico, pero que predomina una mirada desde un autoritarismo tecnocrático o de una perspectiva tecnocrática, más o menos mercantilista. El autor contrapone a esto una idea de comunidad libre basada en la reciprocidad de las relaciones no dinerarias, hacia la que se puede desde una práctica educativa liberadora.

Se aborda la tercera sección del «Canon» de la Crítica de la razón pura, dedicada a la distinción entre opinión, saber y creencia, para analizar el concepto de «creencia doctrinal» (doctrinaler Glaube), que no aparece explícitamente en ningún otro lugar del corpus kantiano. Se sostiene que este concepto, bajo el cual Kant subsume nuestra creencia en la existencia de Dios, está pensado para descartar el denominado ateísmo por defecto (o la presunción de ateísmo), que de otro modo obtendría la primacía (...) en la epistemología crítica. (shrink)

We give a historical overview of the development of almost 50 years of empirical research on the affordances in the past and in the present. Defined by James Jerome Gibson in the early development of the Ecological Approach to Perception and Action as the prime of perception and action, affordances have become a rich topic of investigation in the fields of human movement science and experimental psychology. The methodological origins of the empirical research performed on affordances can be traced back (...) to the mid 1980’s and the works of Warren (1984, 1988) and Michaels (1988). Most of the research in Ecological Psychology performed since has focused on the actualization of discretely defined actions, the perception of action boundaries, the calculation of pi-numbers, and the measurement of response times. The research efforts have resulted in advancements in the understanding of the dynamic nature of affordances, affordances in a social context and the importance of calibration for perception of affordances. Although affordances are seen as an instrumental part of the control of action most studies investigating affordances do not pay attention to the control of the action. We conclude that affordances are still primarily treated as a utility to select behaviour, which creates a conceptual barrier that hinders deeper understanding of affordances. A focus on action-boundaries has largely prevented advancement in other aspects of affordances, most notably an integrative understanding of the role of affordances in the control of action. (shrink)

The necessity defense is barely accepted in contemporary Western case law. The courts, relying on the opinion held by the majority of legal scholars, have reduced its margin of application to practically zero, since in the framework of contemporary welfare states, there is almost always a “legal alternative.” The needy person who acts on their own behalf, regardless of whether they save an interest higher than the one they injure, does not show due deference to democratic legal solutions and procedural (...) channels. This article aims to contest this abrogative interpretation of the necessity defense and to outline the limits of its legitimate scope. Even in welfare states, there are actions in a necessity scenario that neither question the legal decisions of the democratically elected legislature nor make a mockery of established procedural channels. (shrink)

In this paper we state that, up to now, scholars have read the Husserliana—that is Husserl’s official texts—only partially. This statement must be considered within the History of phenomenology and, more precisely, with-in the history of Husserlian studies: from Heidegger to Jean-Luc Marion, including Levinas, Ingarden, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty and so on, Husserl’s texts have been read only partially. With the exception of some analysis proposed by Derrida—or, nowadays, by Natalie Depraz or Elianne Escoubas—, and as far as I know, all (...) the interpretations of Husserl’s texts have considered them just as a support to ex-pose theories or to describe phenomena, but not in themselves, that is, not as texts. Our aim here is then to propose a new perspective to to phenomenalize Husserliana as a text and focus precisely on Husserl’s praxis of writing. Here we will develop specially an analysis of one mode of writing used in Husserl’s praxis of writing and called: bildliche Rede. We will finally compare the results of our analysis to Heidegger’s and Jean-Luc Marion’s praxis of writing.Podem afirmar que, fins avui, els in-vestigadors han llegit la Husserliana —és a dir, els textos de Husserl publicats de manera ofici-al— només parcialment. Cal considerar aquesta afirmació en el marc de la Història de la feno-menologia i, més precisament, en el marc de la història del estudis husserlians: des de Heidegger fins a Jean-Luc Marion —més de cent any de fenomenologia—, els textos de Husserl han estat considerats només com a suport per a exposar teories o descriure fenòmens, però no s’han considerat en ells mateixos, és a dir, no com a textos. Posant en pràctica l’acció de “llegir fenomenologia” en un nou sentit fort del verb “llegir”, aquest article comença identificant els diferents modes de la praxis d’escriptura de Husserl. Després ens concentrarem en un d’aquests modes d’enunciació, anomenat “bildliche Rede”, per desenvolupar així una història de la figurativitat. Finalment, esbossa-rem una breu comparació dels resultats amb la praxis d’escriptura de Heidegger i Marion. (shrink)

Recently, the mechanistic framework of active inference has been put forward as a principled foundation to develop an overarching theory of consciousness which would help address conceptual disparities in the field (Wiese 2018 ; Hohwy and Seth 2020 ). For that promise to bear out, we argue that current proposals resting on the active inference scheme need refinement to become a process theory of consciousness. One way of improving a theory in mechanistic terms is to use formalisms such as computational (...) models that implement, attune and validate the conceptual notions put forward. Here, we examine how computational modelling approaches have been used to refine the theoretical proposals linking active inference and consciousness, with a focus on the extent and success to which they have been developed to accommodate different facets of consciousness and experimental paradigms, as well as how simulations and empirical data have been used to test and improve these computational models. While current attempts using this approach have shown promising results, we argue they remain preliminary in nature. To refine their predictive and structural validity, testing those models against empirical data is needed i.e., new and unobserved neural data. A remaining challenge for active inference to become a theory of consciousness is to generalize the model to accommodate the broad range of consciousness explananda; and in particular to account for the phenomenological aspects of experience. Notwithstanding these gaps, this approach has proven to be a valuable avenue for theory advancement and holds great potential for future research. (shrink)

Germany is joining a long list of European democracies that have modified or expressed a willingness to modify their citizenship laws to denationalize first and then prevent the return of or expel those citizens accused of having participated in terrorist activities abroad. The formal labelling of citizenship deprivation as an administrative measure outside the scope of criminal justice has prevented scholars of criminal law from undertaking a thorough scrutiny of its legitimacy. In this paper I seek to fill this gap. (...) Specifically, after demonstrating why deprivation of citizenship is a measure of a criminal nature, I argue against its legitimacy, either as a punishment or as a risk-based measure. Instead I propose that we should understand citizenship deprivation as a paradigmatic response from an illegitimate enemy criminal law. Notwithstanding the foregoing, I claim that states that choose to denationalize terrorists should do it within the framework of a process with the highest (criminal procedural) guarantees. (shrink)

O texto se propõe a examinar o procedimento desconstrutivo levado a cabo por Jacques Derrida com relação a aspectos da filosofia da linguagem em Edmund Husserl, através especialmente da investigação e crítica da natureza da significação.

Resumen: En este trabajo abordaré de manera crítica una lectura muy extendida de la filosofía temprana de Heidegger, según la cual el “significado” (Bedeutung) es un fenómeno ontológicamente dependiente de la existencia humana (Dasein). Con el fin de revertir esta lectura de implicancias subjetivistas, ofrezco una interpretación del abordaje heideggeriano del “signo” tal como aparece en el §17 de Ser y Tiempo. Dicho análisis revelará que (a) que la ubicuidad del fenómeno del signo está fundada en la universalidad de la (...) estructura conocida como “remisión” (Verweisung); y (b) el concepto heideggeriano de “remisión” proporciona una comprensión del fenómeno del significado y su relación con el mundo alternativa al sustancialismo. Abstract: In this paper, I will critically assess a very popular interpretation of Heidegger’s early thought, according to which meaning (Bedeutung) is conceived as ontologically dependent on human existence (Dasein). To criticize this subjectivist understanding of meaning, I will offer an interpretation of Heidegger’s analysis of signs in Being and Time (§17). This will reveal two main things: first, that the ubiquity of sign phenomena is founded on the universality of the structure known as reference (Verweisung); second, that Heidegger’s idea of reference offers a non-substantialist understanding of meaning and its relation to the world. (shrink)

Faced with the inaction of liberal democracies to effectively tackle global warming, many climate activists engage in forms of protests that involve committing minor criminal offences. They seek to shape official decisions on climate policies by resorting to civil disobedience. Some of these activists, rather than accepting punishment, have successfully claimed to be acting in a justified manner by invoking the necessity defence. The aim of this article is to show that, within the framework of representative democracies guided by the (...) rule of law, the climate necessity defence must be rejected, since such protests do not meet the ‘non-legal alternatives’ requirement. This does not mean, however, that protesters should be punished as common offenders. Their acceptance of responsibility and political motivation should be taken into account as a mitigating factor at sentencing. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In the 1960s, when Dr. Belding Scribner discovered how to accomplish the process of dialysis in a repeated way, he could not imagine that in solving such a problem others as or more difficult would appear. Given the technological progress and the impossibility of assisting all patients through the most modern methods, the medical doctor often finds himself faced with the moral dilemma of choosing which patient in the waiting list will receive the treatment. This same dilemma is amplified (...) in the case of organ transplants. Professionals, students, professors of the juridical and health fields, and the population in general, were interviewed as a means of documenting the moral concepts and opinions surrounding this problem. In the reality in which we find ourselves, it seems to us that deciding who lives, and the responsibility for all the events that culminate in such decisions, is still a subject left open to discussion. (shrink)

Objective of this text is to present some descriptive arguments in regard to the assertion that our affectivity constitutes is a socially structured reality. We start with the hypothesis according to which the affective life of the human being reaches its most specific goal through a process of constitution of desire in which my preferences are always defined according to the preferences of others. In order to demonstrate the conditioned character of our preferences, we shall consider ideas derived both from (...) the phenomenology of Michel Henry and Emmanuel Housset, but also from the mimetic anthropology developed by Paul Dumouchel in line with the anthropological thought of René Girard. We show that not only our own, but also the preferences of others are socially conditioned. The language of our affections belongs to the order of conditioned propositional acts, that is, of those who are not carriers of their own conditions of truth. Our emotional life is like an act of language, whose realization presupposes conditions that are no longer in the hands of the subject of the discourse. The text ends with a brief consideration of the ontological sense of the virtue of gratitude. (shrink)

An argument for an updated definition of 'human being'.

El artículo que aquí se presenta intenta, de entrada, cuestionar y am-pliar la relación misma entre fenomenología y política. En contra de acercamientos temáticos, “naturalmente” legitimados, proponemos abordar dicha relación desde dos perspectivas complementarias: primero, establecemos la necesidad de poner en cuestión la “política interpretativa” que ha dominado en los estudios husserlia-nos y que consiste en excluir la praxis de escritura de los textos para concentrarse sencillamente en el contenido teórico de los mismos; seguidamente, establecemos lo que llamamos la “política (...) descriptiva” del texto husserliano, que consiste, a su vez, en determinar cómo se describe la evidencia y la verdad en el detalle mismo de tales textos.This paper attempts to both question and enlarge the very relation be-tween phenomenology and politics. Against standard readings of Husserl, “natu-rally” focused on thematic approaches, I suggest to approach the said relation from two complementary perspectives: firstly, by questioning the mainstream “interpre-tative policy” in Husserl studies neglecting the “praxis of writing” and focusing in-stead on the “theoretical content” of the texts; secondly, by establishing what I call the “descriptive policy” of Husserl’s texts determining how evidence ant truth are specifically described in those same texts. (shrink)

To become a unifying theory of brain function, predictive processing must accommodate its rich representational diversity. Gilead et al. claim such diversity requires a multi-process theory, and thus is out of reach for PP, which postulates a universal canonical computation. We contend this argument and instead propose that PP fails to account for the experiential level of representations.

Buena parte de la elegancia del concepto de selección natural reside en una falsa aparienciade sencillez, y a menudo se expresa metafóricamente. En este artículo reviso diferentesmetáforas de la selección natural con el fin de revelar algunas complejidades ocultas. Enrealidad, el concepto de selección natural es un concepto difícil estrechamente relacionadocon otros conceptos complejos, tales como el concepto de eficacia biológica y de adaptación.Una discusión sobre las metáforas de la selección natural es pertinente porque la imagenque ellas evocan puede obstaculizar (...) la investigación del proceso natural al cual se refieren. (shrink)

What role does “discursive consciousness” play in decision-making? How does it interact with “practical consciousness?” These two questions constitute two important gaps in strong practice theory that extend from Pierre Bourdieu's habitus to Stephen Vaisey's sociological dual-process model and beyond. The goal of this paper is to provide an empirical framework that expands the sociological dual-process model in order to fill these gaps using models from cognitive neuroscience. In particular, I use models of memory and moral judgment that highlight the (...) importance of executive functions and semantic memory. I outline each model as it pertains to the aforementioned gaps in strong practice theory. I then use the models from cognitive neuroscience to create an expanded dual-process model that addresses how and when conscious mental systems override and interact with subconscious mental systems in the use of cultural ends for decision-making. Finally, using this expanded model I address the sociological debate over the use of interview and survey data. My analysis reveals that surveys and interviews both elicit information encoded in declarative memory and differ primarily in the process of information retrieval that is required of respondents. (shrink)

In this article I argue that a high capacity for courage, in the sense of the strength of character that enables one to face distress, angst or psychological pain, is required of Hume’s ideal critics just as the other well-known five characteristics are. I also explore the implications of my proposal for several aspects of Hume’s aesthetics, including the one brought into relief by Shelley’s interpretation of Hume along the lines of distinguishing between the perceptual and affective stages in aesthetic (...) appreciation. (shrink)

Questão nos debates da doutrina e da jurisprudência, este livro trata da distinção entre princípios e regras. Para tanto, esmiúça os conceitos e os aspectos da garantia de sua aplicação e de sua efetividade.