Ambiguity occurs insofar as a reasoner lacks information about the relevant physical probabilities. There are objections to the application of standard Bayesian inductive logic and decision theory in contexts of significant ambiguity. A variety of alternative frameworks for reasoning under ambiguity have been proposed. Two of the most prominent are Imprecise Bayesianism and Dempster–Shafer theory. We compare these inductive logics with respect to the Ambiguity Dilemma, which is a problem that has been raised for Imprecise Bayesianism. We develop an agent-based (...) model comparison that isolates the difference between the two inductive logics in their updating methods. We find that Dempster–Shafer theory does not avoid the Ambiguity Dilemma. We discuss the implications of this result. (shrink)

How should we make decisions when we do not know the relevant physical probabilities? In these ambiguous situations, we cannot use our knowledge to determine expected utilities or payoffs. The traditional Bayesian answer is that we should create a probability distribution using some mix of subjective intuition and objective constraints. Imprecise Bayesians argue that this approach is inadequate for modelling ambiguity. Instead, they represent doxastic states using credal sets. Generally, insofar as we are more uncertain about the physical probability of (...) an event, there is more divergence in the credal set. Hence, their approach can represent these ambiguities via the extent of the divergence. Imprecise Bayesianism has mostly been advocated for its epistemological features. In this article, we examine its properties for decision-making. We develop a model for comparing standard and Imprecise Bayesianism by testing their performances in a classic decision problem. We find that the representational tools of Imprecise Bayesianism also cause it to underperform in our tests. This issue has been overlooked, because previous research on Imprecise Bayesianism has not utilised agent-based modelling to provide information about its performance in the short-run. Overall, we reveal the Ambiguity Dilemma for Imprecise Bayesianism: To what extent should one value representational power or decision-making performance? (shrink)

The debates between Bayesian, frequentist, and other methodologies of statistics have tended to focus on conceptual justifications, sociological arguments, or mathematical proofs of their long run properties. Both Bayesian statistics and frequentist (“classical”) statistics have strong cases on these grounds. In this article, we instead approach the debates in the “Statistics Wars” from a largely unexplored angle: simulations of different methodologies’ performance in the short to medium run. We conducted a large number of simulations using a straightforward decision problem based (...) around tossing a coin with unknown bias and then placing bets. In this simulation, we programmed four players, inspired by Bayesian statistics, frequentist statistics, Jon Williamson’s version of Objective Bayesianism, and a player who simply extrapolates from observed frequencies to general frequencies. The last player functions as a benchmark: a statistical methodology should at least outperform a crude form of induction. We focused on the performance of these methodologies in guiding the players towards good decisions. Unlike an earlier simulation study of this type, we found no systematic difference in performance between the Bayesian and frequentist players, provided the Bayesian used a flat prior and the frequentist used a low confidence level. Unlike that study, we were able to use Big Data methods to mitigate problems of random error in the simulation results. The Williamsonian player, who is a novel element of our study, also had no systematic differences in their performance, provided that they use a low confidence level. These players performed similarly even in the very short run, when players were making different decisions. Our study indicates that all three methodologies should be taken seriously by philosophers and practitioners of statistics. However, the frequentist and Williamsonian performed poorly when their confidence levels were high, and the Bayesian was surprisingly harmed by biased priors, providing some unexpected lessons for these methodologies when facing this type of decision problem. (shrink)

Contemporary debates about scientific institutions and practice feature many proposed reforms. Most of these require increased efforts from scientists. But how do scientists’ incentives for effort interact? How can scientific institutions encourage scientists to invest effort in research? We explore these questions using a game-theoretic model of publication markets. We employ a base game between authors and reviewers, before assessing some of its tendencies by means of analysis and simulations. We compare how the effort expenditures of these groups interact in (...) our model under a variety of settings, such as double-blind and open review systems. We make a number of findings, including that open review can increase the effort of authors in a range of circumstances and that these effects can manifest in a policy-relevant period of time. However, we find that open review’s impact on authors’ efforts is sensitive to the strength of several other influences. (shrink)

Do imprecise beliefs lead to worse decisions under uncertainty? This BJPS Short Reads article provides an informal introduction to our use of agent-based modelling to investigate this question. We explain the strengths of imprecise probabilities for modelling evidential states. We explain how we used an agent-based model to investigate the relative performance of Imprecise Bayesian reasoners against a standard Bayesian who has precise credences. We found that the very features of Imprecise Bayesianism which give it representational strengths also cause relative (...) underperformance in this decision problem. We explain the practical relevance of this research to applications of Bayesian reasoning in areas like artificial intelligence. (shrink)

The article aims to assess whether the procedural innovations introduced by the reform of the civil procedure law of the Republic of Lithuania have brought changes in judges’ behaviour, which the reform intended to achieve. The study analyses the driving reason behind the reform of the civil procedure law, its objectives, and the ways the five innovations brought about by the reform changed the behaviour of the judges. The analysis of the legal sources and the empirical study show that some (...) of the innovations introduced by the Civil Procedure Code have not yet been properly assimilated and that the code, which has been in force for twenty years, is still not fully operational and understood. (shrink)

This book takes part in the current revival of social-scientific interest in the study of moralities by seeking to introduce as its foundation a cross-civilizational framework that makes it possible to subject all traditions seeking to induce socially responsible behavior, both religious and secular, to systematic investigation.

The present article aims to show the effects that the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation has on the law as a social institution. The law as a social institution is one of the key foundations for the social integration of modern society, which is why we may suggest a reasonable assumption that the role of the law in modern Western societies should be growing in significance. However, the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation is a consequence of the evolution (...) of modern Western civilisation and the main context of its further development that gives feedback to the very development process. The analysis of the crisis of the financial capital makes us question the previous assumption because the essence of the law as a social institution lies not in its legal regulation but in its self-regulation that should increase the society’s trust in different institutions, including the financial capital. The present research makes an attempt to answer the following questions: 1) what is the traditional role of the relationship between society and the law as a social institution? 2) what are the most important social consequences of the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation? 3) what is the significance of the legal culture under the circumstances of the coalescence of liberal democracy and globalisation? These questions have determined the structure of this paper. (shrink)

The present article explores the inner tensions of the legal culture in consumer society as a consequence of the interaction between democracy, liberalism and market economy under globalization. The interaction between democracy and modern political thought has given rise to liberal democratic society, moral and religious pluralism, and modern law. The interplay between liberal democracy and the market (“new liberalism”) has generated the idea of “instrumental reason”, whose penetration into many realms of life has transformed the structure of society and (...) democracy itself: consumer society and a dangerous tendency of social decline prevail. Under the expansion of globalization and social decline, instrumental law may not be enough to ensure the functioning of society. Consumer society does not understand modern law and thus renders it inefficient. (shrink)

On 21 June 2011 the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania adopted extensive and important amendments of the Code of Civil Procedure of the Republic of Lithuania. Most of them came into force on 1 October 2011.One of the important tasks that have been mentioned for the preparation of amendments was to ensure the implementation of the Constitutional Court’s doctrine of matters of civil procedure. This article analyses one of the changed aspect - the system of defence of public interest. (...) The doctrine of concept of public interest was formed by the resolutions of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court adopted on 16 January and 21 September 2006. That concept was quite confusing and could be interpreted widely as well as narrowly (such as protection of special key values in the Constitution). This paper analyses the manner in which the doctrine of the Constitutional Court has been implemented in the law of civil procedure. In addition, the article analyzes the history of the amendments in the Code of Civil Procedure relating to the protection of public interest. The author presents a situation proposed to the Working Group that prepared the draft amendments to the Code of Civil Procedure, and compares the proposals with the effective version of the Code of Civil Procedure. The same article analyses the way that the effective version of the Code of Civil Procedure forces to the protection of the public interest doctrine of the Constitutional Court. The author concludes that the current system is conducive to abuses when the state can envisage the existence of public interest in every dispute and intervene in its investigation. In addition, the court is transformed into an entity liable to defend public interest, while it should be an independent and impartial entity to administer justice. Let us hope that in judicial practice the concept of public interest will be interpreted very narrowly and the Code of Civil Procedure provides the right to collect evidence or apply interim protection measures and etc. will be seen as a political mistake and generally will not be applied (except when it comes to non dispositive cases). (shrink)

According to the general rule explaining apparent authority, if the behaviour of a principal gives reasonable grounds for the third party to think that the principal has appointed the other person to be his agent, contracts concluded by the third party in the principal’s name shall be binding on the principal, notwithstanding the fact that the agent was not authorised by the principal to conclude particular contracts. In the absence of evidence of apparent authority the agent shall have to redress (...) the damage incurred on a third party in cases where the third party was not aware, and was under no obligation to be aware, of circumstances that the person acted in other person’s name without their express authorisation or in excess of their authority. The principal shall be liable for actions of the apparent agent if the following three requirements are proven: words or conduct of the principal caused the impression of authority; third party could reasonably presume the existence of sufficient authority; third party acted in good faith. The third party’s legitimate expectations must be aligned with the principal’s will in order to apply the doctrine of apparent authority efficiently. (shrink)

Virtual bargaining theory suggests that social agents aim to resolve non-cooperative games by identifying the strategy profile which they would agree to play if they could openly bargain. The theory thus offers an explanation of how social agents resolve games with multiple Nash equilibria. One of the main questions pertaining to this theory is how the principles of the bargaining theory could be applied in the analysis of hypothetical bargaining in non-cooperative games. I propose a bargaining model based on the (...) benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution concept for non-cooperative games, broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie's ordinal egalitarian solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I provide formal characterizations of the ordinal and the cardinal versions of BES, discuss their application to n-player games, and compare model's theoretical predictions with the data available from several experiments involving `pie games'. (shrink)

Calibration inductive logics are based on accepting estimates of relative frequencies, which are used to generate imprecise probabilities. In turn, these imprecise probabilities are intended to guide beliefs and decisions — a process called “calibration”. Two prominent examples are Henry E. Kyburg's system of Evidential Probability and Jon Williamson's version of Objective Bayesianism. There are many unexplored questions about these logics. How well do they perform in the short-run? Under what circumstances do they do better or worse? What is their (...) performance relative to traditional Bayesianism? -/- In this article, we develop an agent-based model of a classic binomial decision problem, including players based on variations of Evidential Probability and Objective Bayesianism. We compare the performances of these players, including against a benchmark player who uses standard Bayesian inductive logic. We find that the calibrated players can match the performance of the Bayesian player, but only with particular acceptance thresholds and decision rules. Among other points, our discussion raises some challenges for characterising “cautious” reasoning using imprecise probabilities. Thus, we demonstrate a new way of systematically comparing imprecise probability systems, and we conclude that calibration inductive logics are surprisingly promising for making decisions. (shrink)

The paper deals with the paradox that rationality demands rational substantiation which can’t be given in principle. Thus it is argued that only intuition can prevail against skepticism and subjectivism. But intuition is "transcendent" to rationality and therefore its acceptance as the substantiation of rationality implies existence of transcendental reality. In itself it has infinite regress qua infinite reiteration of reality levels without any qualitative ontological alteration, therefore only infinite transcendence is able to ground a finite immanence.

The recent Lithuanian court practice shows discrepancies in cases dealing with partitioning of common partial divided property. Moreover, no doctrinal research has been concluded on the limits and conditions of the co-owners‘ right to demand that his share should be partitioned from the common partial ownership in Lithuania. Taking into account that proper implementation of co-ownership rights is based on common agreement of co-owners, when no agreement is reached between co-owners regarding the fact and the mode of partitioning, a question (...) arises on what conditions and to what extent the co-owner is free to implement his right to demand partitioning of his share from the common partial ownership. The research on historical developments of the partition law in different European countries shows that the co-owner’s right to partition is based on the idea of pluralistic conception of the modern property law objects. The authors of this article argue that this conception allows the co-owner to enjoy the right to dispose of his share in the common ownership as a separate object of civil turnover at his own volition and without the other co-owner’s consent. However, the right to partition is not absolute and is limited by the rights of the other co-owner to his share of the same property, so the right to partition may be implemented only following the proportionality and interest balance between the co-owners. (shrink)

The author tries to explore several new amendments to the penal code of Lithuania, made by the Law on 2 December 2010. The first amendment concerns article 72 of the Penal code of Lithuania (confiscation of property). Prior to the year 2003, confiscation of property implied the right of the court to confiscate any property in possession of the sentenced person. However the Penal code of 2003 set up a new concept of confiscation: just proceeds of the crime or objects (...) intended to be used in committing a crime should be confiscated. However practice was very poor. New law aimed at boosting practice of confiscation, particularly from third persons, to whom usually the offender transfers property. Previous wording of the law provided for that the property should be confiscated from the third person just in case the person knew or could know that the property that he possesses is from a crime. The law of 2010 added new alternative conditions. (shrink)

In 1986 David Gauthier proposed an arbitration scheme for two player cardinal bargaining games based on interpersonal comparisons of players’ relative concessions. In Gauthier’s original arbitration scheme, players’ relative concessions are defined in terms of Raiffa-normalized cardinal utility gains, and so it cannot be directly applied to ordinal bargaining problems. In this paper I propose a relative benefit equilibrating bargaining solution for two and n-player ordinal and quasiconvex ordinal bargaining problems with finite sets of feasible basic agreements based on the (...) measure of players’ ordinal relative individual advantage gains. I provide an axiomatic characterization of this bargaining solution and discuss the conceptual relationship between RBEBS and ordinal egalitarian bargaining solution proposed by Conley and Wilkie. I show the relationship between the measurement procedure for ordinal relative individual advantage gains and the measurement procedure for players’ ordinal relative concessions, and argue that the proposed arbitration scheme for ordinal games can be interpreted as an ordinal version of Gauthier’s arbitration scheme. (shrink)

The heritage of civilizations in geopolitics is progressively used to consolidate the vision of a multipolar world and, thereby, to establish its important place in the arena of international affairs. Civilizational heritage and civilizational imagination become increasingly important geopolitical factors which begin to shape the relations between China, Russia, Turkey, the United States and the European Union. In global politics during the last decades, in one way or another, Samuel Huntington’s ideas of the interactions between civilizations and their development externalised (...) with the stress on the increase of civilizational conflicts. These ideas made great impact on political elites of main world powers. The author of this article—drawing attention to the importance of cultural and especially religious factors for civilizational processes and the interactions between civilizations, which were also raised by Huntington—examines the peculiarities of the Russian and Turkish civilizational and geopolitical discourses, and connects to those discourses the current geopolitics pursued by the political elites of these countries. The promotion of the current role of the civilization and its geopolitical legacy highlights the uniqueness of civilizations and creates an effort to strengthen the civilizational imagination and to use the civilizational imperial experience and its cultural heritage in current political events. The Russian discourse is characterised by the historical anti-Western and anti-European attitude of Eurasian Messianic civilizational distinctiveness, while the Turkish rhetoric is characterised by the elevation of the imperial Ottoman Islamic cultural and political heritage. Both the discourses are linked by an imperial mentality, orientation towards a multi-civilizational and multi-polar world as well as the demand to create a new world order in line with such an emerging worldview. The article also discusses some of the ideas prevailing in the European Union that underpin the policy of creating a post-national European cosmopolitan community. However, such discourse lacks a cultural, civilizational as well as religious heritage, which brings people together and can form a long-lasting sense of civilizational community. (shrink)

The author of the article analyzes the constitutional doctrine of the dismissal of a judge from office upon the expiration of the term of powers. The author discusses the guarantees of the independence of courts and judges, one of which is the guarantee of the inviolability of the length of powers of judges. The previously valid Law on Courts used to provide that the President of the Republic could appoint a person as a judge of a local court when such (...) an appointment is made for the first time, for a five-year term, and that upon the expiration of the five-year term, the President of the Republic could appoint such a person as a judge of a local court without examination or selection until the person reaches the age of 65. Under the Law on Courts valid at present, judges of all courts are appointed at once for the term until they reach 65 years of age. It is asserted in the article that the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania has not established the right of a person, who was for the first time appointed as a judge of a local court for a five-year term, to be appointed as a judge until he reaches 65 years of age. (shrink)

After the Provisional Basic Law (Provisional Constitution) had been adopted on 11 March 1990, it soon became clear that it did not meet the new needs of the society and the state. It became clear that the new Constitution had to be drafted promptly. Its drafting was taking place at the time of heated discussions about various things, but especially about the structure of branches of state power, the empowerment thereof and their interrelations. The author of the article was a (...) member of the working group drafting the new Constitution. In his article, the author presents passages from the notes made by him about the sittings of the Provisional Commission for Drafting the Constitution and those of its working group. The notes disclose the variety of the views of the deputies and legal specialists and show the difficult way of emergence of the draft Constitution. This is confirmed by the time-line of drafting the Constitution. In 1990 and at the beginning of 1991, the first draft Constitutions were published, which had been drafted by the members of the societies of Lithuanian philosophers and lawyers, by the Lithuanian Democratic Labour Party, etc. Prior to the resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania of 7 November 1990, a group of deputies was formed for drafting an outline of the concept of the Constitution. On 22 October 1991, the Council of the Seimas of the Lithuanian Sąjūdis Movement made a statement “On the Restoration of the Institution of the President of the Republic”. On 5 November 1991, the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania adopted a Resolution “On the Development of the Lithuanian Constitutionalism”, whereas by its resolution of 10 December 1991 it formed the Provisional Commission for Drafting the Constitution. On 3 March 1992, the said Provisional Commission approved the draft Constitution that it prepared; it was submitted to the Supreme Council. Three members of the Provisional Commission had submitted alternatives to a number of articles of the Constitution. On 21 April 1992, the Supreme Council assented to the work done by the Provisional Commission and decided to publish the draft Constitution so that it could be discussed by the public. On 6 May 1992, the Lithuanian Sąjūdis Movement, the Democratic Party, the Christian Democratic Party, and the Lithuanian Nationalist Union formed a coalition for drafting an alternative draft Constitution; soon the press published the alternative draft Constitution prepared by the Sąjūdis Movement Coalition “For the Democratic Lithuania”. On 23 May 1992, the referendum on the restoration of the institution of the President of the Republic took place—that referendum did not approve the proposal. Thus, two alternative draft Constitutions appeared. The essential difference between those drafts was a different approach to the system of branches of state powers, their empowerment and their interrelation. The draft Constitution prepared by the Provisional Commission was based on the parliamentary republic form of governance, whereas in the draft prepared by the Sąjūdis Movement Coalition “For Democratic Lithuania” the model of half-presidential republic was dominant. In order to prepare a single draft Constitution, which could then be proposed for the referendum of the Nation, political and legal compromises were sought. For this purpose, the Group for the Adjustment of Constitutional Issues was formed. At the end of September and at the beginning of October 1992, one single (the so-called “compromise”) draft Constitution was prepared from the existing two alternative drafts. The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was adopted by the Nation in the referendum of 25 October 1992 and came into force on 2 November 1992. (shrink)

Under Article 63 of the Constitution, a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is one of the grounds for discontinuation of the powers of the Member of the Seimas. The Constitution does not reveal expressis verbis as to what is a gross violation of the law on election. The establishment of this is within the discretion of the legislator. While defining what a gross violation of the Law on Elections to the Seimas is, the legislator is (...) bound by the norms and principles of the Constitution. Although the Constitution does not define expressis verbis as to what a gross violation of the law on election is, the fact that, under Item 6 of Article 63 of the Constitution, the powers of a Member of the Seimas shall cease on this ground, implies at least several things: first, not every violation of the law on election can be regarded as a gross one, thus, if the law on election has not been grossly violated, it is not permitted on this ground to recognise that the Member of the Seimas lost his mandate, or that the powers of the Member of the Seimas ceased; second, only such violations may be regarded as gross ones, upon commission of which there appear reasonable doubts whether during the election the genuine will of the voters was expressed, whether their will was not distorted to the extent that the results of the election do not reflect the genuine will of the voters and the mandates of Members of the Seimas have been distributed unfairly. (shrink)

There are some problems in the implementation of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The legislator should make more efforts for implementing the concept of the provisions of the Constitution provided in the reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. The Statute of the Seimas should be supplemented with provisions obligating structural sub-units of the Seimas to carry out permanent and systemic analysis of reasoning parts of rulings of the Constitutional Court. It would allow timely to prepare proposals how to (...) amend still unchallenged legal regulation which, however, from the constitutional standpoint is doubtful. One should consider whether the norm of Item 4 of Paragraph 1 of Article 64 of the Law on the Constitutional Court, which allows one to challenge the compliance of a legal act with the Constitution on the grounds of the procedure for adoption regardless of any terms expired after the adoption of a law or other legal act, should be amended. It is to be presumed that the principles of legal certainty and legal security entrenched in the Constitution, as well as other constitutional provisions, imply a certain reasonable period of time within which the subjects provided for in the Constitution may apply to the Constitutional Court with a petition requesting to investigate whether a law or other legal act is not in conflict with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. This period of time should not be a long one, for example, half a year or a year since the official publishing of the law; this term should be a prescriptive one–after it has finished, it would not be allowed to challenge the compliance of a law or other legal act with the Constitution according to the procedure of their adoption. In order to speed up the consideration of cases at the Constitutional Court, one would have to change the procedure of consideration of cases in this Court in essence. (shrink)

Taxation of residential property is difficult to be implemented in many jurisdictions and in this respect Lithuania is not an exception. Many taxpayers do not comprehend why property should be levied by the government. Indeed, any owner of real estate would usually resist to any attempts to increase this tax burden. However, even when the threshold is once overstepped and a new unpopular statutory framework is introduced, the government still faces new dilemmas regarding the administration of this tax. Sometimes weak (...) tax administration but not the tax itself undermines the credibility of the public. Commercial premises as well as land have been continuously levied in the Republic of Lithuania since 1990. Thus, the taxes paid by enterprises and the land tax were not a big issue of public debate in Lithuania. The burden of this tax was not very significant in the light of all taxes paid by enterprises or land owners. The most problematic issue remains the taxation of residential property. (shrink)

This paper is dedicated to the analysis of the maximin principle, which is one of the key theoretical concepts of John Rawls’s theory of justice, and the problem that this principle creates for any attempt to provide a naturalistic interpretation of Rawls’s concept of fairness . Analysis shows that maximin principle is, in fact, incompatible with the Bayesian decision theory. This paper is intended to show that recent breakthroughs in evolutionary game theory could help to reconcile the maximin principle with (...) a certain naturally emerging and evolutionary stable pattern of human social behaviour.Keywords: Maximin principle, Nash bargaining game, Evolutionary Game Theory, Evolutionary Stable Strategy, learning rules. (shrink)

One of the conceptual limitations of the orthodox game theory is its inability to offer definitive theoretical predictions concerning the outcomes of noncooperative games with multiple rationalizable outcomes. This prompted the emergence of goal-directed theories of reasoning – the team reasoning theory and the theory of hypothetical bargaining. Both theories suggest that people resolve non-cooperative games by using a reasoning algorithm which allows them to identify mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games. The primary aim of this thesis is to enrich (...) the current debate on goaldirected reasoning theories by studying the extent to which the principles of the bargaining theory can be used to formally characterize the concept of mutual advantage in a way which is compatible with some of the conceptually compelling principles of orthodox game theory, such as individual rationality, incentive compatibility, and non-comparability of decision-makers’ personal payoffs. I discuss two formal characterizations of the concept of mutual advantage derived from the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories: A measure of mutual advantage developed in collaboration with Jurgis Karpus, which is broadly in line with the notion of mutual advantage suggested by Sugden, and the benefit-equilibrating bargaining solution function, which is broadly in line with the principles underlying Conley and Wilkie’s solution for Pareto optimal point selection problems with finite choice sets. I discuss the formal properties of each solution, as well as its theoretical predictions in a number of games. I also explore each solution concept’s compatibility with orthodox game theory. I also discuss the limitations of the aforementioned goal-directed reasoning theories. I argue that each theory offers a compelling explanation of how a certain type of decision-maker identifies the mutually advantageous solutions of non-cooperative games, but neither of them offers a definitive answer to the question of how people coordinate their actions in non-cooperative social interactions. (shrink)