The coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic is altering dynamics in academia, and people juggling remote work and domestic demands – including childcare – have felt impacts on their productivity. Female authors have faced a decrease in paper submission rates since the beginning of the pandemic period. The reasons for this decline in women’s productivity need to be further investigated. Here, we analyzed the influence of gender, parenthood and race on academic productivity during the pandemic period based on a survey answered by (...) 3,345 Brazilian academics from various knowledge areas and research institutions. Productivity was assessed by the ability to submit papers as planned and to meet deadlines during the initial period of social isolation in Brazil. The findings revealed that male academics – especially those without children – are the least affected group, whereas Black women and mothers are the most impacted groups. These impacts are likely a consequence of the well-known unequal division of domestic labor between men and women, which has been exacerbated during the pandemic. Additionally, our results highlight that racism strongly persists in academia, especially against Black women. The pandemic will have long-term effects on the career progression of the most affected groups. The results presented here are crucial for the development of actions and policies that aim to avoid further deepening the gender gap in academia. (shrink)

This collection of essays expands the focus of historical studies of international public law in modernity to include the novel insight of the cosmopolitan imagination's past and present force. Featuring a line-up of leading international scholars it argues that Europe has recurrently implemented legal cosmopolitanism at home and exported it abroad.

Aunque el modelo de atención en salud ha evolucionado, aún suele desplazar la importancia de incluir la narrativa del paciente e intenta uniformar las necesidades de las personas enfermas. La medicina narrativa nos da la capacidad de interpretar y comunicar los relatos de nuestros pacientes, a través de la escucha activa, así como de valorar la complejidad del ser humano, a diferencia de la salud basada en la evidencia, donde las experiencias de un individuo son extrapolables a otros pacientes sin (...) importar su historia, con lo que se reduce gran parte de la narración a una clasificación objetiva en la ficha clínica, cuando lo correcto sería integrar el paradigma narrativo en la atención de personas enfermas. Creemos que enseñar competencias narrativas y saber científico a profesionales de odontología permitirá estrechar la relación clínica con los pacientes a partir de valores como la empatía y la compasión, mermando el sufrimiento ligado a lo objetivo de sus enfermedades. (shrink)

Este repertorio registra los artículos sobre Nietzsche que se encuentran en la Hemeroteca de la Biblioteca Central de la Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú. El listado abarca las publicaciones existentes hasta el primer semestre del 2003.

Williams (WS) and Down (DS) syndromes are neurodevelopmental disorders with distinct genetic origins and different spatial memory profiles. In real-world spatial memory tasks, where spatial information derived from all sensory modalities is available, individuals with DS demonstrate low-resolution spatial learning capacities consistent with their mental age, whereas individuals with WS are severely impaired. However, because WS is associated with severe visuo-constructive processing deficits, it is unclear whether their impairment is due to abnormal visual processing or whether it reflects an inability (...) to build a cognitive map. Here, we tested whether blindfolded individuals with WS or DS, and typically developing (TD) children with similar mental ages, could use path integration to perform an egocentric homing task and return to a starting point. We then evaluated whether they could take shortcuts and navigate along never-traveled trajectories between four objects while blindfolded, thus demonstrating the ability to build a cognitive map. In the homing task, 96% of TD children, 84% of participants with DS and 44% of participants with WS were able to use path integration to return to their starting point consistently. In the cognitive mapping task, 64% of TD children and 74% of participants with DS were able to take shortcuts and use never-traveled trajectories, the hallmark of cognitive mapping ability. In contrast, only one of eighteen participants with WS demonstrated the ability to build a cognitive map. These findings are consistent with the view that hippocampus-dependent spatial learning is severely impacted in WS, whereas it is relatively preserved in DS. (shrink)

The recent interest in wisdom in professional health care practice is explored in this article. Key features of wisdom are identified via consideration of certain classical, ancient and modern sources. Common themes are discussed in terms of their contribution to ‘clinical wisdom’ itself and this is reviewed against the nature of contemporary nursing education. The distinctive features of wisdom (recognition of contextual factors, the place of the person and timeliness) may enable their significance for practice to be promoted in more (...) coherent ways in nursing education. Wisdom as practical knowledge (phronesis) is offered as a complementary perspective within the educational preparation and practice of students of nursing. Certain limitations within contemporary UK nursing education are identified that may inhibit development of clinical wisdom. These are: the modularization of programmes in higher education institutions, the division of pastoral and academic support and the relationship between theory and practice. (shrink)

Carnival was brought to the New World by Spanish and Portuguese colonizers, and it has been preserved there up to our day, although in the meantime it has almost disappeared from the countries where it originated. One asks oneself if Carnival has kept its original characteristics over the years, or if it instead has been transformed, and if so, how. The ethnological and cultural variety present in Latin America leads us to think that there must have been an evolution over (...) the years, and that Carnival should show some signs of acculturation. It is the examination of these two points that will be the subject of our study. (shrink)

Essays on The Soul's Logical Life in the Work of Wolfgang Giegerich: Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority is the second collection of essays dedicated to the study and application of Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority - a new 'wave' within Analytical Psychology which pushes off from the work of C. G. Jung and James Hillman. Reflecting upon the notion of psychology developed by German psychoanalyst Wolfgang Giegerich, whose Hegelian turn sheds light on the notion of soul, or the (...) objective psyche, and its inner logic and 'thought', forming a radical new basis from which to ground a modern psychology with soul. The book explores the theme of "the soul's logical life" as it displays itself in various modern phenomena, from overwhelming anxiety, cryptocurrency, the dreams of Japanese college students, and contemporary psychoanalysis, to myth, music, social movements, and the question and relevance of truth in psychology and consciousness. The authors, comprising clinical psychologists, teachers, Jungian analysts, and international scholars, aim to reveal and convey the dialectical inner workings and speculative logic of the modern soul. Essays on The Soul's Logical Life in the Work of Wolfgang Giegerich: Psychology as the Discipline of Interiority will be essential reading for depth and clinical psychologists, Jungian psychoanalysts, and academics and students of post-Jungian studies, and for all those interested in what it means to think in the highly sophisticated and technological world of the twenty-first century. (shrink)

It has seemed to many philosophers—perhaps to most—that believing is not voluntary, that we cannot believe at will. It has seemed to many of these that this inability is not a merely contingent psychological limitation but rather is a deep fact about belief, perhaps a conceptual limitation. But it has been very difficult to say exactly why we cannot believe at will. I earlier offered an account of why we cannot believe at will. I argued that nothing could qualify both (...) as having been done “at will,” in the relevant sense, and as a belief. Thus, no believer could believe at will. If my arguments are correct, our inability to believe at will reveals no genuine lack in our powers of mind, any more than an inability to draw a square circle reveals a lack of artistic skill. My account has been recently criticized by Kieran Setiya, who has provided an account of his own. Here I revisit and defend my account, hopefully in a way that will both make my thought clearer and illumine some of the broader differences between Setiya’s approach and my own. I then briefly consider Setiya’s own argument, in part to further develop the contrast. (shrink)

The Building Ethical Leaders using an Integrated Ethics Framework (BELIEF) Program was introduced in 2006 at the Northern Illinois University College of Business. The Program was developed to support two learning objectives: (1) increase students’ awareness of ethical issues and (2) strengthen their decision-making abilities regarding these ethical issues. This article provides an overview of the development and integration of this Program. We also provide assessment data on our two learning objectives. The assessment measures improvement from 2005, before the implementation (...) of the program, to all of the post-year measures. Thus, the BELIEF Program appears to enhance our students’ ability to recognize issues and identify appropriate decision alternatives. We hope that the description of the components of BELIEF will aid other schools as they integrate ethics into their curriculum. (shrink)

Conscientious objections (CO) can be disruptive in a variety of ways and may disadvantage patients and colleagues who must step-in to assume care. Nevertheless, nurses have a right and responsibility to object to participation in interventions that would seriously harm their sense of integrity. This is an ethical problem of balancing risks and responsibilities related to patient care. Here we explore the problem and propose a nonlinear framework for exploring the authenticity of a claim of CO from the perspective of (...) the nurse and of those who must evaluate such claims. We synthesized the framework using Rest’s Four Component Model of moral reasoning along with tenets of the International Council of Nursing’s (ICN) Code of Ethics for Nurses and insights from relevant ethics and nursing ethics literature. The resulting framework facilitates evaluating potential consequences of a given CO for all involved. We propose that the framework can also serve as an aid for nurse educators as they prepare students for practice. Gaining clarity about the sense in which the concept of conscience provides a defensible foundation for objecting to legally, or otherwise ethically, permissible actions, in any given case is critical to arriving at an ethical and reasonable plan of action. (shrink)

I first pose a challenge which, it seems to me, any philosophical account of forgiveness must meet: the account must be articulate and it must allow for forgiveness that is uncompromising. I then examine an account of forgiveness which appears to meet this challenge. Upon closer examination we discover that this account actually fails to meet the challenge—but it fails in very instructive ways. The account takes two missteps which seem to be taken by almost everyone discussing forgiveness. At the (...) end, I sketch an alternative account of forgiveness, one that I think meets the challenge and avoids the missteps. (shrink)

A ideia que avançamos aqui é que Voltaire é de pleno direito o inventor ou um dos inventores privilegiados do conceito de "tempos modernos" ou de uma nova atitude do filósofo face ao presente, compreendido como acontecimento no sentido de ruptura com "a craca e a ferrugem dos séculos" que ainda continuam a pesar sobre os espíritos. Segue-se este paradoxo: o acontecimento da modernidade é ao mesmo tempo um presente efetivo e um simples "crepúsculo" para o advento das Luzes.

We sometimes seem to face fundamental moral uncertainty, i.e., uncertainty about what is morally good or morally right that cannot be reduced to ordinary descriptive uncertainty. This phenomenon raises a puzzle for noncognitivism, according to which moral judgments are desire-like attitudes as opposed to belief-like attitudes. Can a state of moral uncertainty really be a noncognitive state? So far, noncognitivists have not been able to offer a completely satisfactory account. Here, we argue that noncognitivists should exploit the formal analogy between (...) moral uncertainty and moral multi-objective decision problems. Our ‘multi-objective story’ enables noncognitivists to save our moral uncertainty thought and talk by explaining how the underlying phenomenon could be noncognitive. (shrink)

I will argue that making a certain assumption allows us to conceptualize more clearly our agency over our minds. The assumption is this: certain attitudes (most uncontroversially, belief and intention) embody their subject’s answer to some question or set of questions. I will first explain the assumption and then show that, given the assumption, we should expect to exercise agency over this class of attitudes in (at least) two distinct ways: by answering for ourselves the question they embody and by (...) acting upon them in ways designed to affect them according to our purposes—in roughly the way we exercise agency over most ordinary objects. (shrink)

Many assume that we can be responsible only what is voluntary. This leads to puzzlement about our responsibility for our beliefs, since beliefs seem not to be voluntary. I argue against the initial assumption, presenting an account of responsibility and of voluntariness according to which, not only is voluntariness not required for responsibility, but the feature which renders an attitude a fundamental object of responsibility (that the attitude embodies one’s take on the world and one’s place in it) also guarantees (...) that it could not be voluntary. It turns out, then, that, for failing to be voluntary, beliefs are a central example of the sort of thing for which we are most fundamentally responsible. (shrink)

Was heisst es, dass sich unsere geistigen Zustande auf eine Welt beziehen, deren Teil wir sind? Eine Analyse dieser Intentionalitat unserer geistigen Zustande muss sowohl die Rolle ihrer begrifflich-abstrakten als auch ihrer qualitativ-sinnlichen Aspekte genau bestimmen. In dieser Abhandlung wird der Versuch unternommen, eine Analyse des Verhaltnisses begrifflicher und nicht-begrifflicher Elemente im intentionalen Gegenstandsbezug durchzufuhren, und zwar auf der Basis einer systematischen Untersuchung von Kants Unterscheidung zwischen Sinnlichkeit und Verstand. Als Leitfaden dient die Auseinandersetzung, die Wilfrid Sellars uber einen langen (...) Zeitraum mit der theoretischen Philosophie Kants gefuhrt hat. Das hat zwei Grunde: Zum einen hat Sellars sich im Rahmen dieser Auseinandersetzung intensiv mit der kantischen Konzeption des Verhaltnisses von nicht-begrifflichen und begrifflichen Elementen in unserem intentionalen Weltbezug beschaftigt. Zum anderen war Kants Theorie fur Sellars keineswegs bloss von historischem Interesse, sondern hatte fur ihn bleibende systematische Bedeutung, da sein eigenes philosophisches System im Kern durch und durch kantisch ist. Sellars' Interpretation ist deshalb dazu geeignet, zwischen der exegetischen und der systematischen Perspektive zu vermitteln, deren Verbindung fur die Methodologie der vorliegenden Untersuchung charakteristisch ist.Die Auseinandersetzung mit diesen beiden Autoren soll dazu beitragen, die Frage nach der Beziehung von begrifflichen und sinnlichen Aspekten unserer Erfahrung zu klaren. Fur beide betrifft diese Frage den Kern der Problematik unseres Verhaltnisses zu einer unabhangig von uns existierenden Wirklichkeit. Ihre Beantwortung ist ein wesentlicher Bestandteil fur das Verstandnis unseres intentionalen Bezugs auf eine Welt, deren Teil wir sind. Dass eine kantische Konzeption des Verhaltnisses von Sinnlichkeit und Verstand eine systematisch uberzeugende Antwort auf diese Frage liefern kann, soll in dieser Untersuchung gezeigt werden. (shrink)

Although theoretically rigorous, the book is comprehensible to the beginning qualitative researcher.

I hope to show that, although belief is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, "believing at will" is impossible; one cannot believe in the way one ordinarily acts. Further, the same is true of intention: although intention is subject to two quite robust forms of agency, the features of belief that render believing less than voluntary are present for intention, as well. It turns out, perhaps surprisingly, that you can no more intend at will than believe at will.

We begin by considering two common ways of conceiving critical metaphysics. According to the first (and polemical) conception, critical metaphysics analyzes nothing more than the form of thought and thereby misses the proper point of metaphysics, namely to investigate the form of reality. According to the second (and affirmative) conception, critical metaphysics starts from the supposed insight that the form of reality cannot be other than the form of thought and is thus not required to analyze anything but that form. (...) We argue that the first conception is too weak while the second is too strong. Then we sketch an alternative conception of critical metaphysics, a conception we find expressed both in Kant’s B-Deduction and in the way Barry Stroud has recently investigated the possibility of metaphysics. According to such a conception, a properly critical metaphysics needs to proceed in two steps: first, it needs to analyze the most general and necessary form of any thought that is about an objective reality at all; second, it needs to investigate how that form of thought relates to the reality it purports to represent. But unlike Kant, Stroud remains sceptical regarding the possibility of a satisfying transition from thought to reality in metaphysics. We argue that this dissatisfaction can be traced back to a notion of objectivity and reality in terms of complete mind-independence. Then we sketch an alternative notion of objectivity and reality in terms of distinctness from subjects and acts of thinking, and argue that it is that notion that allows Kant, with his Transcendental Idealism, to make the transition required for any satisfying metaphysics, namely that from the form of thought to reality. (shrink)

A good number of people currently thinking and writing about reasons identify a reason as a consideration that counts in favor of an action or attitude.1 I will argue that using this as our fundamental account of what a reason is generates a fairly deep and recalcitrant ambiguity; this account fails to distinguish between two quite different sets of considerations that count in favor of certain attitudes, only one of which are the “proper” or “appropriate” kind of reason for them. (...) This ambiguity has been the topic of recent discussion, under the head “the wrong kind of reasons problem.”2 I will suggest that confusion about “the wrong kind of reason” will be dispelled by changing our account of what a reason is. While I agree both that reasons are considerations and that certain.. (shrink)

Author of "Kubla Khan" and the epic "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner," Samuel Taylor Coleridge is remembered principally for his contributions as a romantic poet. This innovative reconsideration of Coleridge's thought and career not only demonstrates his importance as a philosopher but also recovers romanticism as both an aesthetic and a political movement. Pamela Edwards radically departs from classic theories of Coleridge's development and reads his writing within the framework of a constantly shifting political and social landscape. Drawing (...) on the ideology, rhetoric, and institutional theory at the turn of the late British Enlightenment, Edwards unearths the fundamental continuities in Coleridge's writing during the revolutionary period of 1794 to 1834, paying particular attention to the rhetoric of Coleridge's pamphlet and miscellaneous writings, the journalism of the Napoleonic years, his philosophical and ultimately political treatises within the contexts of his notebooks and letters, and his readings and intellectual friendships. What emerges is a clearer understanding of Coleridge's political philosophy and his contributions to the origins and ideology of British Liberalism. Coleridge's interest in history, nature, and law as inherently interconnected projects producing an ideal or scientific reading of society reveals a developed progressive social and cultural state theory anchored in individual conscience, moral autonomy, and a civic and participatory human agency. If the Statesman could understand and finally master this scientific view of the world, he would be able not only to adjust political and social institutions to comprehend the historical contingencies of the moment but to see through the problem of the moment to the dynamic of change itself. (shrink)

Zur Lehre vom Sein in der modernen Philosophie, von K. H. Haag.--Auf der Suche nach dem Sein, von J. P. Sartre.--Die Philosophie Heideggers, von G. Siewerth.--Die Frage nach Gott, von G. Siewerth.--Das Umgreifende, das das Sein selbst ist, von K. Jaspers.--Allgemeinheit und Individualität, von N. Hartmann.--Das individuum, von C. Nink.--Aktivität, von C. Nink.--Seinsfinalität, von C. Nink.--Sein, Nichtsein und Angst, von P. Tillich.--Mut und Transzendenz, von P. Tillich.--Philosophie und Theologie, von K. Barth.--Eine Auswahl aus "Adventures of ideas," von A. N. (...) Whitehead.--Das Problem der Freiheit, von J. Dewey.--Erscheinung und Wesen, von M. J. Saosjorow.--Abstraktes und Konkretes, von P. W. Kopnin. (shrink)

In this paper I consider fairness of blaming a wrongdoer. In particular, I consider the claim that blaming a wrongdoer can be unfair because blame has a certain characteristic force, a force which is not fairly imposed upon the wrongdoer unless certain conditions are met--unless, e.g., the wrongdoer could have done otherwise, or unless she is someone capable of having done right, or unless she is able to control her behavior by the light of moral reasons. While agreeing that blame (...) has a characteristic force, I am skeptical of this charge of unfairness. My skepticism concerns itself less with the particular conditions of fairness proposed than with the idea that blame can be rendered unfair by its characteristic force. If to blame a person were simply to perform certain intentional actions, then, as we will see, blame could be rendered unfair by its force. But to blame a person is not just to act in certain ways. It is, at least in large part, to make certain judgments or adopt certain attitudes. However, it is unclear how these attitudes or judgments carry "force"? and also unclear whether they can be rendered unfair by their force. Examining these issues, I will suggest that much of the force of blame is found in a set of judgments--most centrally, the judgment that one person failed to show proper regard for others. But, I will argue, once it is granted that such judgments are true, their characteristic force cannot render them unfair. (shrink)

[Revised translation of a manuscript originally published in German in Zeitschrift fur Naturforschung 54a, 2--10 (1999) and dedicated to Georg Sussmann on the occasion of his seventieth birthday.] We discuss an ontological model suggested by quantum physics, in which the notion of events is of central significance. The conventional objects are considered as causal links between events. Localization in space-time refers primarily to events, not to objects. The intrinsic indeterminacy forces us to consider both possibilities and facts, corresponding to the (...) distinction between future and past. In presently existing theories, the definition of individual events and their localization properties depends on asymptotic arguments adapted to prevailing situations. (shrink)

Philip Hefner calls for religion-and-science to shift attention from pure ideas to embodied ideas. He urges scholars to get back to the Baconian idea that science is intended to enhance life; in Hefner's wording, we must give attention to "science-as-enabler-for-changing/improving-the-world." I believe that this is the realm of overlap between all academic disciplines—what I call the pragmatic overlap. To make his argument Hefner mentions two forms of "conventional wisdom" that need to be rethought. First, he is worried that a "pressure (...) toward naturalism" prevents certain words (such as teleological and transcendence ) from having instructive meaning. Second, with this move toward naturalism Hefner believes we dismiss as archaic all valuable implications of traditional religious myths and symbols. He rightly highlights these exceedingly significant concerns. However, narrowing our focus to the implications of naturalism alone misses the root crisis. That crisis can be articulated as: "conventional wisdom" regarding nature is too unsophisticated to account for the phenomenon it depicts, and furthermore, this understanding of nature controls the methodological, metaphysical, and practical versions of naturalism acquiring societal acceptance. Accordingly, an alternative vision of nature is needed to transform our current "conventional wisdom" such that Hefner's worries are addressed. (shrink)

Pamela Moore; Experience and the Growth of Understanding: how does knowledge start?, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 14, Issue 2, 30 May 2006, Pages.

The proliferation of big data analytics in criminal justice suggests that there are positive frames and imaginaries legitimising them and depicting them as the panacea for efficient crime control. Criminological and criminal justice scholarship has paid insufficient attention to these frames and their accompanying narratives. To address the gap created by the lack of theoretical and empirical insight in this area, this article draws on a study that systematically reviewed and compared multidisciplinary academic abstracts on the data-driven tools now shaping (...) decision-making across several justice systems. Using insights distilled from the study, the article proposes three frames for understanding how the technologies are portrayed. Inherent in the frames are a set of narratives emphasising their ostensible status as vital crime control mechanisms. These narratives obfuscate the harms of data-driven technologies and evince idealistic imaginaries of their capabilities. The narratives are bolstered by unequal structural arrangements, specifically the unevenly distributed digital capital with which some are empowered to participate in technology development for criminal justice application and other forms of penal governance. In unravelling these issues, the article advances current understanding of the dynamics that sustain the depiction of data-driven technologies as prime crime prevention and law enforcement tools. (shrink)

In spite of the seemingly omnipresent corruption and Mafia activity plaguing modern Russia it is nevertheless possible, and desirable, to conduct business ethically there, as the author testifies. Pamela Woolley has recently completed a full time MBA at London Business School, prior to which her career was in international telecommunications. She has long been interested in Russia and worked in Moscow during the summer between her two years of study. The experience has prompted her to seek a more permanent (...) position in the region and was the impetus behind writing this article. She also wishes to thank Dr Jan Dauman of InterMatrix Group for his interest and contribution to the information gathered in the preparation of this article. (shrink)