This issue of the Journal of Medical Ethics focusses on the ethical implications of recent scientific and medical advances: for humans, for animals and for the boundary between the two. In this month’s ‘Current controversy’, Julian Savulescu and Tsutomu Sawai consider the implications of recent research to transplant human brain organoids into the brains of infant rats, arguing that such technology has the potential to enhance the cognitive capacities of animals in ways which invites questions over their moral status.1 This (...) debate will only increase in intensity as more sophisticated brain organoids begin to be introduced, in the future, even, perhaps, to primates. The ‘Feature Article’, written by Rodger et al,2 and its commentaries similarly consider the ethical duties owed to animals in the conduct of medical research and treatment, although in the context of xenotransplantation, where organs from animals (in particular, pigs) are transplanted into humans in a bid to tackle organ shortages. While Rodger et al proposes that in order to be ethically defensible, xenotransplantation should use genetic ‘disenhancement’ so as to eliminate or minimise the pain and suffering experienced by animals, the commentaries raise a number of issues with this proposal, questioning whether this requires the author to accept the morally permissibility of xenotransplantation in the first place, as well as whether disenhancement might inadvertently discourage the development of more ethical ways to tackle organ shortages. Taken together, these papers raise significant questions, not just about …. (shrink)

Ewolucjonizm–kreacjonizm. Otwarta debata / Evolutionism–Creationism: An Open Debate.

This paper reviews some of the history of AIDS in order to put into perspective the claim that AIDS is or will be the pandemic plague of the twentieth century. It is concluded that AIDS shows a relatively stable and predictable pattern in the developed world, and that open and unbiased debate about AIDS is long overdue.

Debate between Dan Demetriou (Philosophy, Minnesota Morris) and Michael Huemer (Philosophy, Colorado), forthcoming in Problems in Applied Ethics: An Introduction to Contemporary Debates, Steven Cowan, ed. (Bloomsbury). The main essays are 5000 words or fewer; replies are 1500 words or fewer. This penultimate version is published here with permission from the editor.

The philosophical debate on the freedom of movement focuses almost exclusively on long-term migration, what I call, migration as settlement. The normative justifications defending border controls assume that the movement of people across political borders, independent of its purpose and the length of stay, refers to migration as settlement. “Global mobility,” “international movement,” and “immigration” are oftenused interchangeably. However, global mobility also refers to the movements of people across international borders for a short length of time such as travel, (...) short-term and circular migration. While most scholarly attention has focused on long-term migration, the vast majority of cross-border movement of people (approximately 85% of all cross-border movements in 2019) is short-term. The existing literature offers normative arguments for border controls, which are grounded on states’ right to self-determination, the freedom of (dis)association, the welfare state, the duty to compatriots, and brain drain. In this paper, I argue that these arguments do not justify excluding travelers, short-term and circular migrants from the territory. (shrink)

The border war between semantics and pragmatics has an early version in the dispute between Mates and Cavell. While Mates argues for a strict separation between semantic inferences and mere pragmatic regularities, Cavell argues for a “logic of ordinary language”, identifying the commitments following the act of saying something. This answer gives a clue to the contemporary debate between minimalists and contextualists: we may either think that pragmatic inferences are only effective after the proposition is grasped, or think that (...) it is part of the determination of what is said. However, Cavell has also another answer, that seems much less amenable to logical regimentation: we understand what an agent is committed to as we evaluate what is appropriate to do in a given situation. In this latter case, there is no logic to backtrack to the very determination of what is said: the agent is attuned to the complexity of her contexts of action, but it does not lead to a local adjustment of concepts. This is precisely what a semanticist does, according to Predelli: she is attuned to the complexity of human purposes, and represents this contextual sensitivity at points of evaluation of sentences, but does not build this complexity into his semantic system. Predelli is at odds both with minimalists and contextualists in this respect, and we can see the specificity of his position as we construe different maps of the theoretical landscape. A bit of historical perspective opens up new ways to see some current discussions. (shrink)

Deep brain stimulation (DBS) as investigational intervention for symptomatic relief from Alzheimer disease (AD) has generated big expectations. Our aim is to discuss the ethical justification of this research agenda by examining the underlying research rationale as well as potential methodological pitfalls. The shortcomings we address are of high ethical importance because only scientifically valid research has the potential to be ethical. We performed a systematic search on MEDLINE and EMBASE. We included 166 publications about DBS for AD into the (...) analysis of research rationale, risks and ethical aspects. Fifty-eight patients were reported in peer-reviewed journals with very mixed results. A grey literature search revealed hints for 75 yet to be published, potentially enrolled patients. The results of our systematic review indicate methodological shortcomings in the literature that are both scientific and ethical in nature. According to our analysis, research with human subjects was performed before decisive preclinical research was published examining the specific research question at stake. We also raise the concern that conclusions on the potential safety and efficacy have been reported in the literature that seem premature given the design of the feasibility studies from which they were drawn. In addition, some publications report that DBS for AD was performed without written informed consent from some patients, but from surrogates only. Furthermore, registered ongoing trials plan to enroll severely demented patients. We provide reasons that this would violate Art. 28 of the Declaration of Helsinki, because DBS for AD involves more than minimal risks and burdens, and because its efficacy and safety are not yet empirically established to be likely. Based on our empirical analysis, we argue that clinical research on interventions of risk class III (Food and Drug Administration and European Medicines Agency) should not be exploratory but grounded on sound, preclinically tested, and disease-specific a posteriori hypotheses. This also applies to DBS for dementia as long as therapeutic benefits are uncertain, and especially when research subjects with cognitive deficits are involved, who may foreseeably progress to full incapacity to provide informed consent during the required follow-up period. (shrink)

I briefly argue that some issues in the individualism-holism debate have been fairly clearly settled and other issues still plagued by unclarity. The main argument of the paper is that there are a set of clear empirical issues around the holism-individualism debate that are central problems in current social science research. Those include questions about when we can be holist and how individualist we can be in social explanation.

The actualism/possibilism debate in ethics is traditionally formulated in terms of whether true counterfactuals of freedom about the future (true subjunctive conditionals concerning what someone would freely do in the future if they were in certain circumstances) even partly determine an agent's present moral obligations. But the very assumption that there are true counterfactuals of freedom about the future conflicts with the idea that freedom requires a metaphysically open future. We develop probabilism as a solution to the actualism/possibilism (...) debate, a solution that accommodates an open future requirement for freedom. We argue that probabilism resolves the conflicting intuitions that arise between actualists and possibilists and maintains certain distinct advantages over actualism and possibilism. (shrink)

Global migration raises important ethical issues. One of the most significant is the question of whether liberal democratic societies have strong moral obligations to admit immigrants. Historically, most philosophers have argued that liberal states are morally free to restrict immigration at their discretion, with few exceptions. Recently, however, liberal egalitarians have begun to challenge this conventional view in two lines of argument. The first contends that immigration restrictions are inconsistent with basic liberal egalitarian values, including freedom and moral equality. The (...) second maintains that affluent, liberal democratic societies are morally obligated to admit immigrants as a partial response to global injustices, such as poverty and human rights violations. This article surveys the main philosophical arguments for these positions on immigration and discusses the critical responses to these arguments. (shrink)

The author argues that Günter Figal sheds novel light on language in his recent Objectivity: The Hermeneutical and Philosophy through a debate he appears to stage with the position Jacques Derrida develops in some of his early essays on deconstruction. Figal describes language as a form of showing and emphasizes the openness and flexibility of expression involved in determining significance. Yet, he rejects the idea he finds in Derrida that such flexibility should lead us to wholesale suspicion of the (...) capacity of language to fix significance. Whereas Derrida concludes that all attempts to fix significance through supplementation of our expressions can only end in the need for further supplementation, Figal stresses the dialectical mien of language that allows supplementation to yield genuinely determinate significances. (shrink)

In the recent debate on future contingents and the nature of the future, authors such as G. A. Boyd, W. L. Craig, and E. Hess have made use of various logical notions, such as the Aristotelian relations of contradiction and contrariety, and the ‘open future square of opposition.’ My aim in this paper is not to enter into this philosophical debate itself, but rather to highlight, at a more abstract methodological level, the important role that Aristotelian diagrams (...) can play in organizing and clarifying the debate. After providing a brief survey of the specific ways in which Boyd and Hess make use of Aristotelian relations and diagrams in the debate on the nature of the future, I argue that the position of open theism is best represented by means of a hexagon of opposition. Next, I show that on the classical theist account, this hexagon of opposition ‘collapses’ into a single pair of contradictory statements. This collapse from a hexagon into a pair has several aspects, which can all be seen as different manifestations of a single underlying change. (shrink)

The debate on alternative punishments appears to be stagnating. The impasse may be overcome if we consider humans from a different philosophical perspective. If we answer differently the question of who we are punishing, we open new possibilities regarding the question of how we punish. In particular, by applying the extended mind thesis we can arrive at interesting outcomes and reopen the debate on alternative punishments. According to this theory, external artifacts—such as smartphones—can be considered part of (...) our minds. In this article, I defend the thesis that restricting access to personal technologies that are a part of one's self should be considered a form of punishment. Thus, a human who is considered from an extended perspective can be punished in a new way. (shrink)

Through the thickets of recent debates, I take two facts as clear enough starting points. The first is that Heidegger’s participation in National Socialism, and especially his remarks and pronouncements after the war, were, and remain, horrifying. The second is that Heidegger remains of the essential philosophers of our century; Maurice Blanchot testifies for several generations when he refers to the “veritable intellectual shock” that the reading of Being and Time produced in him.5 And Emmanuel Levinas, not hesitating to express (...) his reservations about Heidegger, can nevertheless bring himself to say that a person “who undertakes to philosophize in the twentieth century cannot not have gone through Hiedegger’s philosophy, even to escape it.”6 In this century, perhaps only Ludwig Wittgenstein has had a comparable impact and influence on philosophy. I do not mean to deny that one can reject the over seventy volumes of Heidegger’s Gesamtausgabe as worthless, that one can, as with Wittgenstein, find that his work is obscure, indulgent, impossible to read, that nothing in it contributes to philosophy. But both Heidegger and Wittgenstein write in anticipation of this reaction, recognizing that their desires, differently articulated, to overcome philosophy will help to determine how their writing is received. Stanley Cavell’s characterization of Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations describes Heidegger as well:Philosophical Investigations, like the major modernist works of the past century at least, is, logically speaking, esoteric. That is, such works seek to split their audience into insiders and outsiders ; hence they create the particular unpleasantness of cults ; hence demand for their sincere reception the shock of conversion.7When combined with Heidegger’s political engagement, the particular unpleasantness of cults and indifference are more than joined. Thus it can seem as though one must either exculpate Heidegger, explain away his relation to Nazism as an aberration from the outside, or reject his thought entirely, declare that his books should no longer be read. In an attempt to begin to confront these issues, Critical Inquiry is publishing this symposium. 5. Maurice Blanchot, “Thinking the Apocalypse: A Letter from Maurice Blanchot to Catherine David,” trans. Paula Wissing, p. 479 of this issue.6. Emmanuel Levinas, Ethics and Infinity: Conversations with Philippe Nemo, trans. Richard A. Cohen , p. 42. See also the last line of Gadamer, “ ‘Back from Syracuse?’ “ p. 430.7. Stanley Cavell, The Claim of Reason: Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy , p. xvi; hereafter abbreviated CR. Arnold I. Davidson, a coeditor of Critical Inquiry, is associate professor of philosophy and member of the Committees on General Studies in the Humanities and on the Conceptual Foundations of Science at the University of Chicago. His most recent contribution to Critical Inquiry is “Sex and the Emergence of Sexuality”. (shrink)

This book follows up the developments inphenomenology discussed in Phenomenology andthe “Theological Turn”: The French Debate, attempting toestablish what potentialities in the phenomenologicalmethod exist at present.

The current debate about disagreement has as rivals those who take the steadfast view and those who affirm conciliationism. Those on the steadfast side maintain that resolute commitment to a belief is reasonable despite peer disagreement. Conciliationists say that peer disagreement necessarily undermines warrant for one’s belief. This article discusses the relevance of open‐mindedness to the matter of peer disagreement. It shows how both the steadfast and the conciliatory perspective are consistent with a robust and substantive display of (...) open‐mindedness. However, it also turns out that there are more ways to display open‐mindedness on the steadfast view than on the conciliatory view. (shrink)

"Open Democracy envisions what true government by mass leadership could look like."—Nathan Heller, New Yorker How a new model of democracy that opens up power to ordinary citizens could strengthen inclusiveness, responsiveness, and accountability in modern societies To the ancient Greeks, democracy meant gathering in public and debating laws set by a randomly selected assembly of several hundred citizens. To the Icelandic Vikings, democracy meant meeting every summer in a field to discuss issues until consensus was reached. Our contemporary (...) representative democracies are very different. Modern parliaments are gated and guarded, and it seems as if only certain people—with the right suit, accent, wealth, and connections—are welcome. Diagnosing what is wrong with representative government and aiming to recover some of the lost openness of ancient democracies, Open Democracy presents a new paradigm of democracy in which power is genuinely accessible to ordinary citizens. Hélène Landemore favors the ideal of “representing and being represented in turn” over direct-democracy approaches. Supporting a fresh nonelectoral understanding of democratic representation, Landemore recommends centering political institutions around the “open mini-public”—a large, jury-like body of randomly selected citizens gathered to define laws and policies for the polity, in connection with the larger public. She also defends five institutional principles as the foundations of an open democracy: participatory rights, deliberation, the majoritarian principle, democratic representation, and transparency. Open Democracy demonstrates that placing ordinary citizens, rather than elites, at the heart of democratic power is not only the true meaning of a government of, by, and for the people, but also feasible and, today more than ever, urgently needed. (shrink)

This paper attempts to open debate about the nature of and need for ethical review of health-related social science research. Drawing upon personal experience and anecdotal reports we describe some of the problems social scientists and ethics committee members may encounter when social science research is reviewed by Multicentre and Local Research Ethics Committees. We argue that the boundary between research methods and ethics is ambiguous and flexible, and that ethics therefore permeates research at all levels from the (...) construction of the research question to the ways in which data are collected and disseminated. We suggest that the dissatisfaction both sides may experience may be mitigated by more communication and a willingness to understand the others' definition of what counts as ethics and how research is organized and executed. We conclude that ethical review has great potential to strengthen research, and that we must work hard to avoid a situation in which ethical review is seen as just a bureaucratic exercise. (shrink)

This article reviews the Dutch societal debate on euthanasia/assisted suicide in dementia cases, specifically Alzheimer's disease. It discusses the ethical and practical dilemmas created by euthanasia requests in advance directives and the related inconsistencies in the Dutch legal regulations regarding euthanasia/assisted suicide. After an initial focus on euthanasia in advanced dementia, the actual debate concentrates on making euthanasia/assisted suicide possible in the very early stages of dementia. A review of the few known cases of assisted suicide of people (...) with so-called early dementia raises the question why requests for euthanasia/assisted suicide from patients in the early stage of Alzheimer's disease are virtually non-existent. In response to this question two explanations are offered. It is concluded that, in addition to a moral discussion on the limits of anticipatory choices, there is an urgent need to develop research into the patient's perspective with regard to medical treatment and care-giving in dementia, including end-of-life care. (shrink)

Several influential ethical guidelines and frameworks endorse the view that research with human participants is ethically acceptable only when it has “social value,” meaning that it generates knowledge which can be used to benefit society. For example, the Nuremberg Code requires that medical experiments on human beings “yield fruitful results for the good of society, unprocurable by other methods or means of study”. The Council for International Organizations of Medical Sciences guidelines hold that “health-related research with humans... must have social (...) value” or the “prospect of generating the knowledge and the means necessary to protect and promote people’s health” (CIOMS... (shrink)

Whatever its ultimate philosophical merits, it is often thought that the growing block theory presents an intuitive picture of reality that accords well with our pre-reflective or folk view of time, and of the past, present, and future. This is partly motivated by the idea that we find it intuitive that, in some sense, the future is open and the past closed, and that the growing block theory is particularly well suited to accommodate this being so. In this paper, (...) we empirically investigate three claims. First, that people's intuitive or pre-reflective sense that the future is open is at least partly captured by there being truth-gaps for future contingents: what we call alethic openness. Second, that people, perhaps tacitly, believe that the fact that the future is alethically open is a reason to endorse the growing block theory; and third, that part of what explains why people tend to naively represent our world as a growing block is that they represent the future as alethically open. We found evidence in support of the first two claims. We consider the implications of these findings for several debates in the philosophy of time. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 11, Issue 6, Page W1-W3, June 2011.

One way in which business ethics educators can introduce business ethics to their students is through the so-called “Friedman vs. Freeman debate”. However, a growing body of literature challenges the juxtaposition of the views of Friedman and Freeman—two authors commonly seen as archetypal proponents of the “shareholder model” and the “stakeholder model” of the firm, respectively. This article argues that it can still be valuable to introduce students to the doctrines of Friedman and Freeman—provided that it is done in (...) a way that neither overemphasizes the differences between these doctrines nor suggests that they exhaust the variety of viewpoints that exist on business ethics. We offer a pedagogical tool, in the form of a two-dimensional matrix, that can help educators do this, and discuss how the matrix can be used in the classroom to make students aware of the diversity of existing positions in business ethics. (shrink)

What makes an intellectual virtue a virtue? A straightforward and influential answer to this question has been given by virtue-reliabilists: a trait is a virtue only insofar as it is truth-conducive. In this paper I shall contend that recent arguments advanced by Jack Kwong in defence of the reliabilist view are good as far as they go, in that they advance the debate by usefully clarifying ways in how best to understand the nature of open-mindedness. But I shall (...) argue that these considerations do not establish the desired conclusions that open-mindedness is truth-conducive. To establish these much stronger conclusions we would need an adequate reply to what I shall call Montmarquet’s objection. I argue that Linda Zagzebski’s reply to Montmarquet’s objection, to which Kwong defers, is inadequate. I conclude that it is contingent if open-mindedness is truth-conducive, and if a necessary tie to truth is what makes an intellectual virtue a virtue, then the status of open-mindedness as an intellectual virtue is jeopardised. We either need an adequate reliabilist response to Montmarquet’s objection, or else seek alternative accounts of what it is that makes a virtue a virtue. I conclude by briefly outlining some alternatives. (shrink)

How to embed reflexivity in public participation in techno-science and to open it up to the agency of publics are key concerns in current debates. There is a risk that engagements become limited to “laboratory experiments,” highly controlled and foreclosed by participation experts, particularly in upstream techno-sciences. In this paper, we propose a way to open up the “participation laboratory” by engaging localized, self-assembling publics in ways that respect and mobilize their ecologies of participation. Our innovative reflexive methodology (...) introduced participatory methods to public engagement with upstream techno-science, with the public contributing to both the content and format of the project. Reflecting on the project, we draw attention to the largely overlooked issue of temporalities of participation, and the co-production of futures and publics in participation methodologies. We argue that many public participation methodologies are underpinned by the open futures model, which imagines the future as a space of unrestrained creativity. We contrast that model with the lived futures model typical of localized publics, which respects latency of materials and processes but imposes limits on creativity. We argue that to continue being societally relevant and scientifically important, public participation methods should reconcile the open future of research with the lived futures of localized publics. (shrink)

Ethical debates over the use of mental health knowledge and practice at the Guantánamo Bay detention facility have mostly revolved around military clinicians sharing detainee medical information with interrogators, falsifying death certificates in interrogations, and disagreements over whether the Central Intelligence Agency’s “enhanced interrogation techniques” violated bioethical principles to do no harm. However, debates over the use of magnetic resonance imaging in the mental health evaluations of detainees have received little attention. This paper provides the first known analysis of such (...) debates over MRI use in the case of Abd al-Rahim al- Nashiri. Through a close reading of open-source legal documents such as defense motions, prosecution motions, judge rulings, and al-Nashiri’s mental health evaluation, debates over MRI use become interpretive contests over the very meanings of mental illness and the extent to which MRI results can verify whether he was tortured in CIA custody. Such work can revitalize interest in the neuroethics of national security. (shrink)

Open Science policies encourage researchers to disclose a wide range of outputs from their work, thus codifying openness as a specific set of research practices and guidelines that can be interpreted and applied consistently across disciplines and geographical settings. In this paper, we argue that this “one-size-fits-all” view of openness sidesteps key questions about the forms, implications, and goals of openness for research practice. We propose instead to interpret openness as a dynamic and highly situated mode of valuing the (...) research process and its outputs, which encompasses economic as well as scientific, cultural, political, ethical, and social considerations. This interpretation creates a critical space for moving beyond the economic definitions of value embedded in the contemporary biosciences landscape and Open Science policies, and examining the diversity of interests and commitments that affect research practices in the life sciences. To illustrate these claims, we use three case studies that highlight the challenges surrounding decisions about how––and how best––to make things open. These cases, drawn from ethnographic engagement with Open Science debates and semistructured interviews carried out with UK-based biologists and bioinformaticians between 2013 and 2014, show how the enactment of openness reveals judgments about what constitutes a legitimate intellectual contribution, for whom, and with what implications. (shrink)

'Open', 'informal', and 'humanistic' are words used to describe new styles of education which depart from ordinary or traditional education. Too often, however, these adjectives are used in a strongly polemical or self-justifying rather than analytical way. Often too, the grounds for accepting or rejecting open education are political or moral, instead of being based on a consideration of the nature of open education and its strength and weaknesses. This collection of essays is central to the (...) class='Hi'>debate on open education, analyzing the important concepts in the field. The contributions, all written by authorities on the philosophy of education, deal with problems of definition, knowledge, socialization, freedom, cultural perspective, and unique meanings and metaphors. (shrink)

The doctor-patient relationship is built on an implicit covenant of trust, yet it was not until the post-World War Two era that respect for patient autonomy emerged as an article of mainstream medical ethics. Unlike their medical forebears, physicians today are expected to furnish patients with adequate information about diagnoses, prognoses and treatments. Against these dicta there has been ongoing debate over whether placebos pose a threat to patient autonomy. A key premise underlying medical ethics discussion is the notion (...) that the placebo effect necessitates patient deception. Indeed, the American Medical Association guidelines imply that placebo treatment necessary entails a form of deception. As a consequence of this assumption, the fulcrum of debate on the use of placebo treatment has hinged on whether that deception is ever justified. Recently performed experiments with open-label transparently prescribed placebos have begun to challenge the notion that deception is necessary in eliciting the placebo effect and such effects necessarily involve a binary distinction between autonomy and beneficence. In this article we focus on the content of disclosures in distinctive open-label, transparently disclosed placebo studies and inquire whether they might be said to invoke deception in clinical contexts, and if so, whether the deception is unethical. We find that open placebos may be said to involve equivocation over how placebos work. However, drawing on surveys of patient attitudes we suggest that this equivocation appears to be acceptable to patients. We conclude that open placebos fulfil current American Medical Association guidelines for placebo use, and propose future research directions for harnessing the placebo effect ethically. (shrink)

With the concept of the open work, Umberto Eco addressed the poetics to which art turned with modernism. In the article the author analyzes the notion of the open work, the references relevant to this concept and the relations of this concept to similar concepts introduced by other scholars such as Roland Barthes. Scholars discussing the openness of art were deriving primarily from Paul Valéry, and they distanced themselves from the myth of the artist as a genius and (...) from the concept of art as a vehicle for communication to transmit the truth and instead emphasized the performative character of art. Art on this track aimed at poetic use of its own media. The author argues that Eco’s definition of the open work comprises different dimensions of openness, i.e. the semantic and formal openness of the works of art, as well as the notion addresses the perceptual openness of the world. The author examines how the concept of the openness of art placed stress on the relevance of interpretation instead of the author’s intention and how it was part of a broader debate on interpretation and weak thought. By establishing autonomous poetic situations and exploring the means of art, art began performing philosophical discussions about itself, wherein, as the author argues, the notion of the open work is linked to the notions of the end or the death of art and denotes the dissolution of art into philosophy. Other sorts of dissolution of art which mean the death of art regard the dissolution of art into culture in a broader sense and its subordination to propagandist or political goals, which means art loses its autonomy. Finally, the author questions participatory art as a potential contemporary successor of the open work and argues that this mode of art, though it actively involves the participant, remains semantically closed. (shrink)

Galleries, libraries, archives and museums are striving to retain audience attention to issues related to cultural heritage, by implementing various novel opportunities for audience engagement through technological means online. Although born-digital assets for cultural heritage may have inundated the Internet in some areas, most of the time they are stored in “digital warehouses,” and the questions of the digital ecosystem’s sustainability, meaningful public participation and creative reuse of data still remain. Emerging technologies, such as artificial intelligence, are used to bring (...) born-digital archives to light, aiming to enhance the public’s engagement and participation. At the core of this debate lies both the openness of data and issues of privacy. How open to the public should born-digital archives be? Should everything be open and available online, and what does it take to achieve balance between openness and privacy, especially through AI initiatives? The study is qualitative and builds on the rationale of grounded theory. The role of AI development is critically investigated in relation to opening up born-digital archives online, by considering privacy and ethics issues. Grounded in the context of the author’s PhD research, the paper proposes a human-centred approach to AI development for democratising its development towards fairness and social inclusion, contrary to the stereotypical cliché of blackboxing, allowing space for the plurality of born-digital archives to flourish. (shrink)

In this study, Open Mind – an interactive learning platform – was introduced as a pedagogical tool in developing students’ intellectual humility using a sample of 35 upper level undergraduate business students enrolled in a business ethics course in the mid-Atlantic region of the U.S.. Students completed the 5-step Open Mind learning assignment as a measure of intellectual humility during the first four weeks of class. Class lectures were concurrently given while students completed the Open Mind exercise. (...) Students were subsequently required to debate a controversial topic during the remaining 11 weeks of the class. Various grading rubrics as well as skill assessment matrix are provided to assist faculty in adopting this learning platform in their classrooms. Initial evidence showed that Open Mind was efficacious in fostering student intellectual humility. Implications for teaching business ethics using Open Mind to cultivate intellectual humility are discussed. (shrink)

Skepticism is both a historical and foundational problem in epistemology. Jonathan Schaffer (2010) has provided a new expression of its threat. The Debasing Demon appears to generate a novel form of radical doubt, one that has gained prominence in recent debates. Instead of targeting the connection between belief and truth, it undercuts the link between belief and evidence (or reasons). This contribution presents the Debasing Demon Problem, analyzing its reach. It will provide an account for explaining how its threat is (...) raised, explore its relationship to classical varieties of skepticism, and assess some of the main objections against it. It will be argued that Schaffer’s Demon institutes a consistent epistemic threat, one that might represent the main variety of skepticism to be tackled in epistemology. Some consequences of this analysis are then presented concerning how to face this open problem. (shrink)

In a friendly interdisciplinary debate, we interrogate from several vantage points the question of “personhood” in light of contemporary and near-future forms of social AI. David J. Gunkel approaches the matter from a philosophical and legal standpoint, while Jordan Wales offers reflections theological and psychological. Attending to metaphysical, moral, social, and legal understandings of personhood, we ask about the position of apparently personal artificial intelligences in our society and individual lives. Re-examining the “person” and questioning prominent construals of that (...) category, we hope to open new views upon urgent and much-discussed questions that, quite soon, may confront us in our daily lives. (shrink)

The question whether cognition is subserved by internal processes in the brain (internalism) or extends in to the world (active externalism) has been vigorously debated in recent years. I show how internalist and externalist ideas can be pursued in a common framework, using (1) open dynamical systems, which allow for separate analysis of an agent's intrinsic and embodied dynamics, and (2) supervenience functions, which can be used to study how low-level dynamical systems give rise to higher-level dynamical structures.