Straipsnyje svarstoma galimybė, ar ritmo konceptas, funcionuojantis Gillesio Deleuze’o ir Félixo Guattari tekstuose, negalėtų padėti atsekti minties judėjimo linijų nuo filosofijos link skirtingų meno formų ir atgal. Pradedant nuo dinaminės problemų ir sąvokų kartografijos, kurią kaip tinkamą tokiems minties eksperimentams įžvelgė Anne Sauvagnargues, Jamesas M. Buchananas, Ronaldas Bogue, Stephenas Zepke, šiame tyrime siūloma sąvoka ritmas yra tinkama kaip siejamoji galimų filosofijos ir įvairių menų sankabos jungtis. Ritmas Deleuze’o ir Guattari tekstuose tampa filosofine sąvoka ir įgauna ontologinį statusą, transcenduojantį siauras filosofijos (...) ir meno apibrėžtis. Ji funkcionuoja tarpinėje teritorijoje: tarp minties, garso, žodžio ir vaizdo, meno kūrinio, filosofijos, gyvenimo. Būtent žvelgiant iš tokios ontologinės perspektyvos, ši sąvoka įgauna galią atverti ne horizontaliuosius, o vertikaliuosius, genealoginius meno kaip tapsmo aspektus. (shrink)

Straipsnis skiriamas prancūzų aktoriaus, poeto, scenaristo, žiaurumo teatro idėjos autoriaus Antonino Artaud idėjų pėdsakų šifravimui Gilles’io Deleuze’o kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje keliami klausimai: kuo Artaud idėjų traktuotė antrajame knygos „Kinas“ tome „Vaizdinys-laikas“ skiriasi nuo čia pat aptariamų rusų režisieriaus Sergejaus Eisensteino idėjų įtakos? Kaip modernaus kino filosofijoje veikia Deleuze’ui svarbi Artaud mintis apie pamatinę minties bejėgystę, įkūnytą pačioje mintyje? Ar iš Artaud pasiskolintas „kūno be organų“ konceptas išveda į kasdienį ir ceremonijų kūną, apie kurį rašo Deleuze’as kaip apie modernaus kino ženklą? (...) Straipsnyje prieinama prie išvados, kad visgi galima išskirti dvi Deleuze’o iš Artaud perimtas kūno traktuotes: iki-šizofrenišką pozų ir gestų kūną, kuris sudaro pamatinę „žiaurumo teatro“ konceptualinę šerdį ir kuria remiasi Deleuze’as, rašydamas apie modernaus kino tapsmą, bei šizofrenišką „kūną be organų“, kuris turėjo įtakos Deleuze’o ir Guattari tyrimams. Pamatinė straipsnyje ginama tezė: tiriant teorines įtakas Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijai, neįmanoma apeiti ir nepastebėti Artaud. (shrink)

Straipsnyje svarstomas laiko išsišakojimo į tris modusus klausimas, kuris aktualus klasikinėje filosofijoje, fenomenologijoje, literatūroje, struktūruojamas kino mene ir modernaus kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje tiriamos kelios šio laiko išsišakojimo įvaizdinimo ir jo filosofinio reflektavimo trajektorijos: Tarkovskio įvaizdintas laikas, apokaliptinis laikas bei jo virsmas į laiko kristalus Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijoje.

Ðio straipsnio pavadinime uþkoduota ir tyrimo problema. Èia bus svarstomas filosofijos ir literatûrossuartëjimo prieigø dekonstrukcinis tyrimas Jacques Derrida postfilosofijoje. Kantas simbolizuoja klasikinæ filosofo, Kafka – literato laikysenà. Taèiau tai tik straipsnio autorës iðmonë. Bus atsispirta nuo to,kaip Derrida perskaito Kafkos parabolæ Prieð ástatymà romane Procesas. Autorë pripaþins, kad ið tiesøsodieèio kaip kantininko ir durininko kaip paties Derrida suprieðinimas leidþia geriau suvokti Derridaiðrastos sàvokos différance konotacijas. Kita vertus, taip suprasta skirtis iðveda á singuliarumo, paraðo,paslapties sàvokø judëjimà Derrida tekstuose. Taèiau lieka neaiðku, (...) ar ið tiesø Derrida neprieðtaraujasavo teiginiui, kad raðymas vyksta anapus filosofijos ir literatûros, kai prieina prie iðvados, kad sodietis--kantininkas negalëjo suprasti jam skirto áëjimo singuliarumo, nes turëjo problemø su literatûra. Ar taireiðkia, kad literatûra, skirtingai nei filosofija, lieka atvira paslapèiai ir neþinojimui? O filosofija tampasusijusi su þinojimu ir paslapties áminimu? Autorës nuomone, paties Derrida hermeneutikos dekonstrukcija knygoje Pentinai: Nietzsche’s stiliai tokiai iðvadai prieðtarautø.Pagrindiniai þodþiai: differénce, Derrida, Kafka, sodietis-kantininkas, filosofija ir literatûra. (shrink)

Šiame straipsnyje siekiama atsakyti į klausimą, kas galėtų susieti filosofiją ir vizualiuosius bei žodinius menus. Ar įmanoma ir jei taip, tai kaip įmanoma reflektuoti visus menus kaip vieno kūrybinio įvykio momentus? Siekiant atsakyti į šį klausimą, pirma, aptariamas logikos ir kūrybiškumo susikertant menui ir filosofijai susidūrimas, antra – žodžio ir vaizdo nebendramatiškumas, surastas / išrastas belgų siurrealisto René Magritte’o ir reflektuotas Michelio Foucault. Čia sugrįžtama prie klasikinio F. Niezsche’s disputo su Sokratu apie logikos ir kūrybiškumo priešpriešą ir siekiama atsakyti į (...) klausimą, kurią pusę – Sokrato ar F. Nietzsche’s – paremia šioje diskusijoje Gilles’is Deleuze’as ir Félixas Guattari. Atrodytų, kad jie suderina logiką ir kūrybiškumą, pastebėdami, kad menas nėra nei mokslinio mąstymo, nei filosofijos koreliatas ar papildas, kad trys minties formos – menas, mokslas ir filosofija – turi po nepriklausomą specifinę kryptį, Kita vertus, interpretuodamas I. Kantą, G. Deleuze’as pastebi disharmoniją tarp vaizduotės, supratimo ir proto, ir, sekdamas Antonino Artaud’o įžvalgomis, jis išskiria naują minties tipą kaip tarpinę teritoriją tarp žodžio ir vaizdo. (shrink)

Straipsnyje nagrinėjama Kanto nužymėtos ir Deleuze’o eksperimentiniame mąstyme rekonstruotos vaizduotės kaip vieno iš trijų proto gebėjimų raiškos lauko alternatyvos. Siekiama atsakyti į paties Deleuze’o išsikeltą kantišką klausimą: kokia yra giliausia paslaptis? Aptinkamos kelios atsakymo alternatyvos. Šiame tyrime paaiškėjo, kad Deleuze’o atsakymai į paties išsikeltą klausimą „kokia yra giliausia vaizduotės paslaptis?“ patiria metamorfozes, kurios apsuka ratą. Nuo pradinės pozicijos, kai vaizduotė veikia tik paklusdama intelektui ar protui, ji juda link laisvo trijų nepriklausomų sugebėjimų – intelekto, proto, vaizduotės atitikimo, paskui – link (...) jų nedarnios dermės, jų kovos, kuri skatina kiekvienos naują atsiskleidimą, galiausiai – prie vaizduotės anihiliacijos, kuri leidžia užgimti naujai minčiai, taigi, ratas apsisuka ir grįžtama prie jų dermės naujame lygmenyje, moderuojant filosofiniam skoniui. Tačiau visas šias metaformorfozes jungia viena bendra Kanto suformuluota prielaida: vaizduotė niekada neišvengia triadinės priklausomybės, ji neveikia viena; ji galima tik santykyje su intelektu ir protu, t. y. kitais trimis jai paraleliais ir simultaniškais sugebėjimais. (shrink)

This article concentrates on two main interpreta- tions of Friedrich Nietzshe's philosophy: hermeneuti- cal , originated in Martin Heidegger's book "Nietzsche" and deconstnlctive -, elaborated in Jacques Derrida's book "Esperon: Le Styles de Nietzsche. Spurs. Nietzshe's Styles".and his article "Interpreting Signatures : Two Questions". The author of the article considers that the idea of in- verted platonism as a main paradigm of Nietzsche's thought is original Heidegger's idea, underlying his interpretation of Nietzsche as a last methaphysisian in Western thought. Derrida, (...) interpreting the same one page fragment "History of an Error" from Nietzche's work "Twilight o f the Idols" opposed Heidegger's intention to unite the diversity o f Nietzsche's thought into one paradigmatic schema. Author of the article considers, that his deconstructive efforts clearly exposed, that Heidegger's interpetation neglecting the pliuralistic diversity of Nietzsche's philosophys is influenced more by his longing for axi- omatic unity common to methaphysical thought than by original Nietzsche's thinking. Raktiniai iodiiai: Platonizmas, ~pvertiina.~, pa- skutinis nzetapzikas, Nietzsclze b stilius. (shrink)

Straipsnis skiriamas prancūzų aktoriaus, poeto, scenaristo, žiaurumo teatro idėjos autoriaus Antonino Artaud idėjų pėdsakų šifravimui Gilles’io Deleuze’o kino filosofijoje. Straipsnyje keliami klausimai: kuo Artaud idėjų traktuotė antrajame knygos „Kinas“ tome „Vaizdinys-laikas“ skiriasi nuo čia pat aptariamų rusų režisieriaus Sergejaus Eisensteino idėjų įtakos? Kaip modernaus kino filosofijoje veikia Deleuze’ui svarbi Artaud mintis apie pamatinę minties bejėgystę, įkūnytą pačioje mintyje? Ar iš Artaud pasiskolintas „kūno be organų“ konceptas išveda į kasdienį ir ceremonijų kūną, apie kurį rašo Deleuze’as kaip apie modernaus kino ženklą? (...) Straipsnyje prieinama prie išvados, kad visgi galima išskirti dvi Deleuze’o iš Artaud perimtas kūno traktuotes: iki-šizofrenišką pozų ir gestų kūną, kuris sudaro pamatinę „žiaurumo teatro“ konceptualinę šerdį ir kuria remiasi Deleuze’as, rašydamas apie modernaus kino tapsmą, bei šizofrenišką „kūną be organų“, kuris turėjo įtakos Deleuze’o ir Guattari tyrimams. Pamatinė straipsnyje ginama tezė: tiriant teorines įtakas Deleuze’o modernaus kino filosofijai, neįmanoma apeiti ir nepastebėti Artaud. (shrink)

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...) acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Sev- eral lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception. (shrink)

“Free Will” is a philosophical term of art for a particular sort of capacity of rational agents to choose a course of action from among various alternatives. Which sort is the free will sort is what all the fuss is about. (And what a fuss it has been: philosophers have debated this question for over two millenia, and just about every major philosopher has had something to say about it.) Most philosophers suppose that the concept of free will is very (...) closely connected to the concept of moral responsibility. Acting with free will, on such views, is just to satisfy the metaphysical requirement on being responsible for one's action. (Clearly, there will also be epistemic conditions on responsibility as well, such as being aware—or failing that, being culpably unaware—of relevant alternatives to one's action and of the alternatives' moral significance.) But the significance of free will is not exhausted by its connection to moral responsibility. Free will also appears to be a condition on desert for one's accomplishments (why sustained effort and creative work are praiseworthy); on the autonomy and dignity of persons; and on the value we accord to love and friendship. (See Kane 1996, 81ff. and Clarke 2003, Ch.1.). (shrink)

All organised bodies are composed of parts, similar to those composing inorganic nature, and which have even themselves existed in an inorganic state; but the phenomena of life, which result from the juxtaposition of those parts in a certain manner, bear no analogy to any of the effects which would be produced by the action of the component substances considered as mere physical agents. To whatever degree we might imagine our knowledge of the properties of the several ingredients of a (...) living body to be extended and perfected, it is certain that no mere summing up of the separate actions of those elements will ever amount to the action of the living body itself. (shrink)

Many philosophers are persuaded by familiar arguments that free will is incompatible with causal determinism. Yet, notoriously, past attempts to articulate how the right type of indeterminism might secure the capacity for autonomous action have generally been regarded as either demonstrably inadequate or irremediably obscure. This volume gathers together the most significant recent discussions concerning the prospects for devising a satisfactory indeterministic account of freedom of action. These essays give greater precision to traditional formulations of the problems associated with indeterministic (...) accounts and to the range of theoretical avenues for pursuing resolutions. The first four essays set out different challenges (from both compatibilists and those skeptical of the possibility of free will) to the adequacy of standard indeterministic theories. The next seven essays meet one or more of these challenges. Each of the fundamental types of approach--simple indeterminism, causal indeterminism, and agent causation--is represented in these novel and sophisticated proposals. The collection finishes with two essays that debate whether compatibilism entails that freedom of choice is a comparatively rare phenomenon within an individual's life. Eloquently presenting some of the most compelling and accessible arguments surrounding this central philosophical issue, Agents, Causes, and Events makes a valuable contribution to courses in free will/action theory and metaphysics. (shrink)

Observers inspected normal, high quality color displays of everyday visual scenes while their eye movements were recorded. A large display change occurred each time an eye blink occurred. Display changes could either involve "Central Interest" or "Marginal Interest" locations, as determined from descriptions obtained from independent judges in a prior pilot experiment. Visual salience, as determined by luminance, color, and position of the Central and Marginal interest changes were equalized. -/- The results obtained were very similar to those obtained in (...) prior experiments showing failure to detect changes occurring simultaneously with saccades, flicker, or “mudsplashes” in the visual scene: Many changes were very hard to detect, and Marginal Interest changes were harder to detect than Central Interest changes. -/- Analysis of eye movements showed, as expected, that the probability of detecting a change depended on the eye’s distance from the change location. However a surprising finding was that both for Central and Marginal Interest changes, evenwhen observers were directly fixating the change locations (within 1 degree),more than 40% of the time they still failed to see the changes. It seems that looking at something does not guarantee you “ see” it. (shrink)

Philosophical theories of emotions, and to an extent some theories of scientific psychology, represent attempts to capture the essence of emotions basically as they are conceived in common sense psychology. Although there are problems, the success of explanations of our behavior in terms of believes, desires and emotions creates a presumption that, at some level of abstraction, they reflect important elements in our psychological nature. It is incumbent on a theory of emotions to provide an account of two salient facts (...) about emotions as conceived in common sense psychology. As intentional states, emotions have representational and rational properties: emotions represent states of affairs; and they are rationally related to other mental representations, figure in rational explanations of behavior, and are open to rational assessment. Emotions also have a close relationship to a range of non-intentional phenomena: in typical cases, emotions involve physiological changes, usually associated with the activation of the autonomic nervous system, which are proprioceptively experienced; and they often involve behavioral tendencies, as well. (shrink)

Change-blindness occurs when large changes are missed under natural viewing conditions because they occur simultaneously with a brief visual disruption, perhaps caused by an eye movement, a flicker, a blink, or a camera cut in a film sequence. We have found that this can occur even when the disruption does not cover or obscure the changes. When a few small, high-contrast shapes are briefly spattered over a picture, like mudsplashes on a car windscreen, large changes can be made simultaneously in (...) the scene without being noticed. (shrink)

I argue that sounds are best conceived not as pressure waves that travel through a medium, nor as physical properties of the objects ordinarily thought to be the sources of sounds, but rather as events of a certain kind. Sounds are particular events in which a surrounding medium is disturbed or set into wavelike motion by the activities of a body or interacting bodies. This Event View of sounds provides for a uni- ?ed perceptual account of several pervasive sound phenomena, (...) including transmission through barriers, constructive and destructive interference, and echoes. (shrink)

One familiar affirmative answer to this question holds that these facts suffice to entail that Descartes' picture of the human mind must be mistaken. On Descartes' view, our mind or soul (the only essential part of ourselves) has no spatial location. Yet it directly interacts with but one physical object, the brain of that body with which it is, 'as it were, intermingled,' so as to 'form one unit.' The radical disparity posited between a nonspatial mind, whose intentional and conscious (...) properties are had by no physical object, and a spatial body, all of whose properties are had by no mind, has prompted some to conclude that, pace Descartes, causal interaction between the two is impossible. Jaegwon Kim has recently given a new twist to this old line of thought.(1) In the present essay, I will use Kim's argument as a springboard for motivating my own favored picture of the metaphysics of mind and body and then discussing how an often vilified account of freedom of the will may be realized within it. (shrink)

Although connectionism is advocated by its proponents as an alternative to the classical computational theory of mind, doubts persist about its _computational_ credentials. Our aim is to dispel these doubts by explaining how connectionist networks compute. We first develop a generic account of computation—no easy task, because computation, like almost every other foundational concept in cognitive science, has resisted canonical definition. We opt for a characterisation that does justice to the explanatory role of computation in cognitive science. Next we examine (...) what might be regarded as the “conventional” account of connectionist computation. We show why this account is inadequate and hence fosters the suspicion that connectionist networks aren’t genuinely computational. Lastly, we turn to the principal task of the paper: the development of a more robust portrait of connectionist computation. The basis of this portrait is an explanation of the representational capacities of connection weights, supported by an analysis of the weight configurations of a series of simulated neural networks. (shrink)

Book description: * Seventeen brand-new essays by leading philosophers and psychologists * Genuinely interdisciplinary work, at the forefront of both fields * Includes a valuable introduction, uniting common threads Leading philosophers and psychologists join forces to investigate a set of problems to do with agency and self-awareness, in seventeen specially written essays. In recent years there has been much psychological and neurological work purporting to show that consciousness and self-awareness play no role in causing actions, and indeed to demonstrate that (...) free will is an illusion. The essays in this volume subject the assumptions that motivate such claims to sustained interdisciplinary scrutiny. Patients with Anarchic Hand syndrome sometimes find their hands perform apparently goal-directed actions which the patients disown, yet seem to be unable to suppress (for example, reaching out for someone else's food in a restaurant). On the face of it, these patients lack the kind of control and self-awareness we ordinarily take ourselves to have when acting intentionally. Questions raised by this phenomenon include: What is involved in being aware of an action as one's own? What is the nature of the control these patients are lacking and which characterizes normal intentional actions? What is the relation between a priori explanations of consciousness and self-consciousness, on the one hand, and empirical work on the information-processing mechanisms involved in action control, on the other? Questions of action control and self-awareness tend to be treated separately in both philosophy and psychology. The central idea behind this volume is that outstanding unresolved issues on both topics, and in both disciplines, can only be resolved by an interdisciplinary examination of the relations between them. The editors' useful introductory essay offers a guide to cross-disciplinary reading of the contributions, and makes connections between them explicit. The book will be compulsory reading for psychologists and philosophers working on action explanation, and for anyone interested in the relation between the brain sciences and consciousness. (shrink)

This paper advances the thesis that sensory concepts have as a semantic component the first-person indexical. It is argued that the private nature of our access to our own sensations forces, in our talking about them, an indexical reference to the inner states of the speaker in lieu of publicly accessible properties by which reference is usually fixed. Indexicals, such as ‘here’, can be understood despite ignorance of their referent. Such is the case with sensory terms. Furthermore, the thesis that (...) sensory terms are indexical has considerable explanatory power. I give two examples: firstly, I argue that clashes of intuition over Block's ‘inverted spectrum’ thought experiment can be explained by appeal to semantic properties of indexicals. Secondly, I argue that multiple realisability intuitions can be shown to be consistent with the view that sensations are type-identical with brain states. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to articulate further what may be called an agency theory of self-knowledge. Many theorists have stressed how important agency is to self- knowledge, and much work has been done drawing connections between the two notions.² However, it has not always been clear what _epistemic_ advantage agency gives us in this area and why it does so. I take it as a constraint on an adequate account of how a subject knows her own mental states (...) and acts, that it construe the known mental states and acts realistically and as independent of their self-ascription, and that it deliver genuine epistemic standing to the knower. The main task of the paper will, then, be to explore how our having rational agency with respect to our mental states may be able to secure genuine epistemic warrant for our self-ascriptions of states or acts independent of the ascriptions. This task will be carried out by focussing on the question of what account we should give of our knowledge of what I call our acts of judging. In the remainder of this section, I will do a little to clarify what is meant by that question. Section 2 will attempt to introduce us to elements of the best way to approach the question by considering some alternative strategies. Section 3 is devoted to forming some idea of what _kind_ of warrant we are looking for when considering how agency might give us self-knowledge. Section 4 aims to present a suggestion as to how agency gives us the kind of warrant identified over our acts of judging. Section 5 deals with some objections. (shrink)

It is a commonplace of philosophy that the notion of free will is a hard nut to crack. A simple, compelling argument can be made to show that behavior for which an agent is morally responsible cannot be the outcome of prior determining causal factors.1 Yet the smug satisfaction with which we incompatibilists are prone to trot out this argument has a tendency to turn to embarrassment when we're asked to explain just how it is that morally responsible action might (...) obtain under the assumption of indeterminism. Despair over the prospect of giving a satisfactory answer to this question has led some contemporary philosophers to a position rarely, if ever, held in the history of philosophy: free, responsible action is an incoherent concept.2. (shrink)

The representational theory of phenomenal experience is often stated in terms of a supervenience thesis: Byrne recently characterises it as the thesis that “there can be no difference in phenomenal character without a difference in content”, while according to Tye, “[a]t a minimum, the thesis is one of supervenience: necessarily, experiences that are alike in their representational contents are alike in their phenomenal character.” Consequently, much of the debate over whether representationalism is true centres on purported counter-examples – that is (...) to say, purported failures of supervenience. The refutation of putative counter-examples has been, it seems to me, by and large successful. But there is a certain class of these for which the representationalist response has been something less than completely convincing. These are the cross-modality cases. I will explain what I mean, and then argue that the response in question is not only unconvincing but actually undermines the representationalist position. (shrink)

Reid takes it to be part of our commonsense view of ourselves that "we" -- "qua" enduring substances, not merely "qua" subjects of efficacious mental states -- are often the immediate causes of our own volitions. Only if this conviction is veridical, Reid thinks, may we be properly held to be responsible for our actions (indeed, may we truly be said to "act" at all). This paper offers an interpretation of Reid's account of such agency (taking account of Rowe's recent (...) commentary), with particular attention to the issue of the causation of and responsibility for an agent's "causing" of his volition. (shrink)

Additional arguments for sense‐data begin by defending the claim that perceptual sensations are psychological individuals, examples being phosphenes, after‐images, and the ‘ringings’ of ‘tinnitus’. Five arguments for sense‐data follow. First, that since corresponding to every veridical visual field is a possible non‐veridical visual field of sensations, the latter merely needs a different and regular outer cause to be deemed veridical. Second, since bodily sensation experience is extremely strong evidence for the existence of a matching sensation cause, the experience of ‘ringing’ (...) must be strong evidence that a ‘ringing’ sensation is its cause, and this holds in the veridical hearing of a ringing sound. Third, that it is inconceivable that one has a truly visual experience of a red visual field, and absolutely nothing red‐looking be there before one had noticed. Fourth, that the experience of sound might have had a different developmental history, in which first there was merely experience of auditory sensation, and then over millennia such experience gradually found itself caused by regular outer phenomena, thereby constituting the hearing of sound. And a fifth argument that resembles the first argument. (shrink)

When it comes to applying computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, cognitive scientists appear to face a dilemma. The only strategy that seems to be available is one that explains consciousness in terms of special kinds of computational processes. But such theories, while they dominate the field, have counter-intuitive consequences; in particular, they force one to accept that phenomenal experience is composed of information processing effects. For cognitive scientists, therefore, it seems to come down to a choice between (...) a counter-intuitive theory or no theory at all. We offer a way out of this dilemma. We argue that the computational theory of mind doesn't force cognitive scientists to explain consciousness in terms of computational processes, as there is an alternative strategy available: one that focuses on the representational vehicles that encode information in the brain. This alternative approach to consciousness allows us to do justice to the standard intuitions about phenomenal experience, yet remain within the confines of cognitive science. (shrink)

In this paper I want to propose that we see solipsism as arising from certain problems we have about identifying ourselves as subjects in an objective world. The discussion will centre on Wittgenstein.

In this paper we defend a position we call radical connectionism. Radical connectionism claims that cognition _never_ implicates an internal symbolic medium, not even when natural language plays a part in our thought processes. On the face of it, such a position renders the human capacity for abstract thought quite mysterious. However, we argue that connectionism is committed to an analog conception of neural computation, and that representation of the abstract is no more problematic for a system of analog vehicles (...) than for a symbol system. Natural language is therefore not required as a representational medium for abstract thought. Since natural language is arguably not a representational medium _at all_, but a conventionally governed scheme of communicative signals, we suggest that the role of internalised (i.e., self- directed) language is best conceived in terms of the coordination and control of cognitive activities within the brain. (shrink)

Patients suffering from schizophrenia have an impaired meta-representation also known as Theory of Mind . Moreover, the presence of delusions or other positive symptoms of schizophrenia has been correlated to poor ToM performances. Lack of insight is a common symptom of schizophrenia and can be considered a critical manifestation of impaired ToM abilities. In particular, the present study addresses the role of perspective ToM ability in schizophrenic patients. Thirty severely delusional schizophrenic patients completely lack insight when interviewed about their delusions. (...) Seven subsequently gain insight about their mental state when perspective is shifted from the first person to third person. These data suggest that in some delusional schizophrenic patients, it may be possible to gain access to and modify their mental states. (shrink)

This commentry focuses on the one major ecumenical theme propounded in Andy Clark's Being There that I find difficult to accept; this is Clark’s advocacy, especially in the third and final part of the book, of the extended nature of the embedded, embodied mind.

Stich begins his paper "What is a Theory of Mental Representation?" by noting that while there is a dizzying range of theories of mental representation in today's philosophical market place, there is very little self-conscious reflection about what a theory of mental representation is supposed to do. This is quite remarkable, he thinks, because if we bother to engage in such reflection, some very surprising conclusions begin to emerge. The most surprising conclusion of all, according to Stich, is that most (...) of the philosophers in this field are undertaking work that is quite futile: " It is my contention that most of the players in this very crowded field have _no_ coherent project that could possibly be pursued successfully with the methods they are using. " Stich readily admits that this is a startling conclusion; so startling, he thinks, that some may even take it as an indication that he has simply "failed to figure out what those who are searching for a theory of mental representation are up to". But it is a conclusion that he is willing to stand by, and he sets about it defending it in the body of his paper. (shrink)

Мета. У сучасному глобальному суспільстві під питанням виявилися традиційні цінності, у тому числі патріотизм і героїзм. Однак нові виклики гібридної війни потребують нових виявів героїзму, а отже, і його нового філософського осмислення. Основною метою цієї статті є філософсько-антропологічне осмислення героїзму як граничного вияву сили духу, що поєднує інституційні засади суспільного блага та індивідуальну волю до його досягнення. Теоретичний базис. Феномен героїзму досліджено в класичних працях Гомера, Плутарха, Томаса Карлайла. Важливі сучасні філософсько-антропологічні інтерпретації цього феномену надають Фрідріх Ніцше, Гельмут Плеснер та (...) Альбер Камю, згідно з якими героєм може стати кожна людина за умови виявлення нею сили духу та незламного прагнення до боротьби і перемоги. Феномен героїзму тому набуває масовості і, хоча ніколи не може бути тотальним у суспільстві, однак може стати предметом виховання і самовиховання. Наукова новизна. Сила духу воїна відображена в його повсякденній стійкості (resilience), яка не має гендерної визначеності. Її яскраві втілення в сучасному суспільстві можна простежити на прикладі героїзму, самовідданості й наполегливості воїна в умовах гібридної війни. Ці нові втілення не лише підтверджують сталі філософсько-антропологічні уявлення про героїзм, але й надають йому нових рис. Висновки. Сучасне переосмислення героїзму на прикладі граничного вияву сили духу в умовах гібридної війни дало можливість уточнити його філософсько-антропологічну концепцію. Зразкова непохитність і послідовність у виявленні демократичних цінностей у вкрай несприятливих для цього обставинах робить сучасними героями не лише професійних військових, але й усіх громадян, які демонструють свої найкращі соціальні чесноти в захисті соціальних інститутів демократії. Сучасна гібридна війна створює фронтир героїчного протистояння тоталітаризму в глобальному масштабі. Сучасний герой постає як взірцевий громадянин своєї національної держави і водночас демонструє чесноти справжнього представника світового громадянського суспільства. (shrink)

Rather surprisingly, T.H.Green's ideas on women and the family are as neglected today as they were immediately after his death in 1882, when his thought was first interpreted for a wider public by his colleagues and friends.1 Silence on such matters in the 1880s is not remarkable. It is odd, however, that it persists today, despite recent intense concern with the history of women and the family, including their place in political thought, and despite reviving philosophical interest in the British (...) Idealists and readiness to credit them with a significant impact on politics, education and social work. It has often been remarked that Green's political ideas have much in common superficially with those of John Stuart Mill, since their values and precepts are very similar, although the substructure of their thought is utterly different. Nevertheless it has altogether escaped notice that this is equally true of their ideas on women, marriage and family relationships. Today Mill's fabled feminism easily appears limited and imperceptive, and the priority he gave to the parliamentary vote strangely simplistic. Did Green show any greater realism and understanding? Did he practise as well as preach real equality between men and women, in private as well as public life? In short, what precisely was Green's position on 'the woman question'�? (shrink)