How rich should the 1% be? And, most importantly, when does the distance in economic resources between the richest citizens and ‘us’, the average citizenry, become a concern for justice? This volume explores how excessive economic inequality gives the best-off considerably more political influence than average citizens, thereby violating political equality. It argues that the gap between the best-off and the worst-off should not be reduced because it is good, but rather as an inescapable instrument to protect citizens from the (...) risk of material domination. For this reason, it defends the ‘principle of proportionality’: economic inequality should not exceed a certain range or proportion to enable both the best-off and the worst-off to be co-authors of the legal, political, and socioeconomic rules that govern the ‘social’ relations in which they are involved. Further, the book discusses material domination and explains how money influences politics and what are the remedies for this phenomenon; how social justice should face and harmonise power, poverty, efficiency, individual merit, and economic liberties; and, most importantly, how to determine income and wealth limit ratios in a liberal democracy. A thoughtful investigation on the interdependencies of money and justice and their influence our socio-political systems, this volume will be of great interest to students and researchers of political theory, political philosophy, economics and development, economics theory and philosophy, and social policy. (shrink)

In the current debate on human rights, the political conception is attractive in its ability to try to find solutions to the central questions and problems, which the orthodox conception has difficulties in solving, because of its own nature it does not need a moral foundation that is independent of the recognition established by international law and practice. On the one hand, it is necessary to recognize that the current practice and the international doctrine consider human rights as tools addressed, (...) mainly, to establish the limits of the legitimate sovereignty of the state, thus, recognizing the plausibility of the political conception. On the other hand, the article intends to show that this specific function, while important, should not exhaust all that human rights perform. Therefore, the political conception runs the serious risk of weakening the normative force of human rights and conflating two different agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. To go through this argument, first of all, the article presents the contemporary genesis of the political conception of human rights based on the work of John Rawls. Secondly, it focuses on the reformulation given by Raz and Beitz’s approaches. Finally, in the third section, I criticize three main assumptions which ground the current paradigm of political conception of human rights. (shrink)

This article argues about John Rawls' paradigm shift in contemporary political philosophy. In the article, this paradigm is defined as democratic insofar it claims, among other things, to leave enough room for democratic deliberations and citizens’ political autonomy. On this specific issue, Rawls and Habermas dialogue is still particularly fruitful. Both authors believe that contemporary political philosophy must be modest in some relevant theoretical and methodological aspects but they disagree on which of these aspects should be more or less modest. (...) This article argues that when we look for the legitimate boundaries of the contemporary political philosophy, Rawls and Habermas projects should be seen as closely complementary to one another. On the one hand, the article partially agrees with Habermas’ objections to Rawls that political philosophy should not be too modest in providing orientations for the normative grounds of the political justification. On the other hand, against Habermas, the article remains on Rawls's side on the idea that political philosophy cannot be agnostic regarding the substantive and distributive issues of social justice. (shrink)

The article argues that the possibility of an unlimited gap in income and wealth between the top and bottom segments of society is incompatible with a democratic commitment to political equality. T...

In the anapaestic sequences of Eur. Alc. 93–7 and 105–11, a fast-paced exchange takes place between two choreuts eager to learn about Alcestis’ fate. The two passages pose several metrical and textual problems. The most serious is the presence at lines 94 and 106 of the ᴗ ᴗ – – sequence, which finds no parallel in anapaestic poetry from any age or literary genre. The same sequence occurs at the beginning of the short anapaestic coda of lines 132–5, which, whether (...) authentic or not, from a metrical point of view presents certain affinities with the two previous sequences. (shrink)

This book examines the origin, philosophy and achievements of abolitionism and reviews the literature on penal abolitionism from the 1960s to the 1980s.

Recently there has been a spate of interest in Max Scheler’s social phenomenology (Schloßberger, 2016; Szanto & Moran, 2016; Cusinato, 2018). In this paper I aim to show that his philosophical contribution on Europe and Europeanism has its focal point on the concepts of rebuilding (Wiederaufbau) and rebirth (Wiedergeburt). My idea is that, for Scheler, the essential condition of any attitude towards socio-cultural change (Umkehr) have its center in the idea of the formation and the development of the personal singularity (...) (Personbildung) (Scheler, 2009a; Scheler, 2010a; Scheler, 2013). And this means the growth and the expression, in a solidaristic perspective, of one’s own ethical singularity (An-sich-Gutes für mich) and of one’s own vocations. The idea of solidarity declined in terms of Bildung is therefore strictly interdependent on the testimony coming from Otherness-exemplar (Vorbild) (Scheler, 2009f). (shrink)

v.1. Dalle origini a Platone.--v.2. Da Aristotele al neo-platonismo.

Resumen:. La constitución de un campo académico y disciplinar que hoy puede denominarse sin reservas como didáctica de la filosofía, enseñanza de la filosofía o filosofía de la enseñanza de la filosofía ha sido el resultado de una sistemática producción teórica, en una reflexión metodológica y en la conformación de redes académicas que llevan más de treinta años. En este artículo presentamos una revisión crítica de lo acontecido durante este tiempo, con el ánimo de formularnos nuevas preguntas: ¿qué impacto ha (...) tenido en las prácticas de enseñanza de la filosofía el giro didáctico-filosófico iniciado por Guillermo Obiols?; ¿qué posibilidades filosófico pedagógicas abre la didáctica aleatoria de la filosofía propuesta por Alejandro Cerletti?; ¿cómo han sido apropiadas estas y otras herramientas conceptuales y metodológicas por lxs profesorxs de filosofía en la escuela secundaria?; ¿cómo recibió la comunidad filosófica universitaria estos trabajos?; ¿qué nuevos desafíos debemos asumir en la formación del profesorado teniendo en cuenta las actuales transformaciones culturales y subjetivas? Es un buen momento para hacer un balance. Palabras clave: Enseñanza de la Filosofía; Didáctica de la Filosofía; Giro Filosófico; Virtualización; Subjetivación O ensino de filosofia na Argentina e a construção teórica do seu campo disciplinar: da virada filosófica à virtualização da realidade Resumo: A constituição de um campo acadêmico e disciplinar que hoje pode ser chamado sem reservas como didática da filosofia, ensino de filosofia ou filosofia do ensino de filosofia é fruto de uma produção teórica sistemática, de uma reflexão metodológica e de conformação de redes acadêmicas que existem há mais de trinta anos. Neste artigo apresentamos uma revisão crítica do que aconteceu nesse período, com o objetivo de formular novas questões: qual o impacto da virada didático-filosófica iniciada por Guillermo Obiols nas práticas de ensino de filosofia?; Que possibilidades filosófico-pedagógicas abre a didática aleatória da filosofia proposta por Alejandro Cerletti? Como essas e outras ferramentas conceituais e metodológicas têm sido apropriadas pelos professores de filosofia do ensino médio? Como a comunidade filosófica universitária recebeu essas obras? Que novos desafios devemos assumir na formação docente, tendo em conta as atuais transformações culturais e subjetivas? É um bom momento para fazer um balanço. Palavras-chave: Ensino de Filosofia; Didática da Filosofia; Virada Filosófica; Virtualização; Subjetivação The teaching of philosophy in Argentina and the theoretical construction of its disciplinary field: from the philosophical turn to the virtualization of reality Abstract: The constitution of an academic and disciplinary field that today can be called without reservations as didactics of philosophy, teaching of philosophy or philosophy of teaching philosophy has been the result of a systematic theoretical production, in a methodological reflection and in the conformation of academic networks that have been in existence for more than thirty years. In this article we present a critical review of what happened during this time, with the aim of formulating new questions: what impact has the didactic-philosophical turn initiated by Guillermo Obiols had on philosophy teaching practices? What philosophical-pedagogical possibilities does the random didactics of philosophy proposed by Alejandro Cerletti open up? How have these and other conceptual and methodological tools been appropriated by high school philosophy teachers? How did the university philosophical community receive these works? What new challenges should we take on in teacher training, taking into account the current cultural and subjective transformations? It is a good time to take stock. Keywords: Philosophy Teaching; Didactics of Philosophy; Philosophical Turn; Virtualization; Subjectivation Data de registro: 23/01/2023 Data de aceite: 23/08/2023. (shrink)

This paper argues that the future of capabilities approach lies on the theoretical development of the democratic political structure. For this purpose, we take into account Martha Nussbaum’s late theoretical works. Firstly, we argue that the capability approach can be divided into two main models: the top down and the bottom up. Nussbaum, for example, endorses a top-down model, which it begins from an abstractive theory of partial justice and then draws the issue of institutional implementation. On the other hand, (...) Amartya Sem advocates the bottom-up model, which starts from the immanent demands of justice from public sphere and then up to normative and abstract questions (like his “idea of justice”). In the second part of this paper, we present Nussbaum’s partial theory of justice, arguing that it is mainly composed by four issues: (a) the elaboration of the list of capabilities, (b) the process of normative evaluation, (c) arguments for stability, (d) the implementation of the model. About this last topic, we argue in the third part that the current theoretical advance of the capabilities approach lies on the issue of the democratic political structure. In other words, the future of capabilities approach depends on the interaction between its own theory and a theory of democracy. Finally, in the last section we provide a re-elaboration of Nussbaum’s threshold level of capabilities (the list) in order to make it more adherent with the democratic political structure. (shrink)

Originally published in 1921, this volume represents De Ruggiero's first appearance in English, being the first time his philosophical works were translated. Modern Philosophy presents a positive philosophical position of great interest, avowedly in continuation of Croce and in close agreement with Gentile, which sums up the progress of Italian idealism down to the writing of this book. It is a remarkable piece of historical work, focusing on the development of European philosophy in the second half of the nineteenth (...) century and the beginning of the twentieth, and was the first volume to comprehensively handle this time period. (shrink)

Some scholars believe that only governments or those who uphold governmental policies can be human rights violators. Others argue that private individuals are also able to violate human rights. The two positions have come to be known in the literature as the institutional interpretation and the interactional interpretation of human rights respectively. This paper critically analyzes an exemplary case: Thomas Pogge’s institutional conception of human rights as presented in World Poverty and Human Rights: Second Edition. This paper focuses on some (...) of the negative consequences implicit in his approach. First of all, it shows that Pogge does not provide an adequate explanation of the reason why human rights should be conceived as claims on coercive social institutions and on those who uphold such institutions but not on single individuals, independently of their commitment to institutions. Secondly, it shows that official disrespect rather than violation as a criterion to evaluate the respecting of human rights is unsuccessful or at least insufficient. It sees in Pogge the same perspective mistake that infects Rawls’ conception of human rights, namely that of expanding unduly one of the functions human rights perform - establishing the limits of legitimate sovereignty - into their very essence. Therefore, this paper puts in question the way in which Pogge’s institutionalism mix the conception of human rights with the conception of distributive justice. The conclusion to which the whole paper comes to is that proponents of the institutional interpretation misconstrue human rights because they conflate two philosophical agendas, that of human rights and that of global justice. (shrink)