The rules that govern Jewish Orthodox women’s bodies, in particular those of ritual purity and immersion, are often criticized as patriarchal and an expression of oppression or domination. This study challenges the structuralist analysis of the regimen of ritual purity by examining how religious women themselves live and experience this system. The authors interviewed 30 Orthodox Jewish women living in Israel who observe these rituals in an effort to hear their experiences. The women’s expression of their experiences moved beyond the (...) conventional, schematic abstractions of the oppression-empowerment dichotomy into a multitextured range of responses. This article presents the ways in which they voiced this multiplicity of feelings and experiences. (shrink)

Humans can follow different social learning strategies, sometimes oriented toward the models’ characteristics. The goal of the present study was to explore which who-strategy is preferentially followed in the technological context based on the models’ psychological characteristics. We identified three potential who-strategies: Copy the pedagogue, copy the engineer, and copy the friend. We developed a closed-group micro-society paradigm in which participants had to build the highest possible towers. Participants began with an individual building phase. Then, they were gathered to discuss (...) the best solutions to increase tower height. After this discussion phase, they had to make a new building attempt, followed by another discussion phase, and so forth for a total of six building phases and five discussion rounds. This methodology allowed us to create an attraction score for each participant. We also assessed participants’ theory-of-mind skills, technical-reasoning skills, and prosocialness to predict participants’ attraction scores based on these measures. Results show that we learn from engineers because they are the most successful. Their attraction power is not immediate, but after they have been identified as attractors, their technique is copied irrespective of their pedagogy or friendliness. These findings open avenues for the study of the cognitive bases of human technological culture. (shrink)

The U.S. scientific community has long led the world in research on such areas as public health, environmental science, and issues affecting quality of life. These scientists have produced landmark studies on the dangers of DDT, tobacco smoke, acid rain, and global warming. But at the same time, a small yet potent subset of this community leads the world in vehement denial of these dangers. -/- Merchants of Doubt tells the story of how a loose-knit group of high-level scientists and (...) scientific advisers, with deep connections in politics and industry, ran effective campaigns to mislead the public and deny well-established scientific knowledge over four decades. Remarkably, the same individuals surface repeatedly-some of the same figures who have claimed that the science of global warming is "not settled" denied the truth of studies linking smoking to lung cancer, coal smoke to acid rain, and CFCs to the ozone hole. "Doubt is our product," wrote one tobacco executive. These "experts" supplied it. -/- Naomi Oreskes and Erik M. Conway, historians of science, roll back the rug on this dark corner of the American scientific community, showing how ideology and corporate interests, aided by a too-compliant media, have skewed public understanding of some of the most pressing issues of our era. (shrink)

The strong sensorimotor account of perception gives self-induced movements two constitutive roles in explaining visual consciousness. The first says that self-induced movements are vehicles of visual awareness, and for this reason consciousness ‘does not happen in the brain only’. The second says that the phenomenal nature of visual experiences is consists in the action-directing content of vision. In response I suggest, first, that the sense in which visual awareness is active should be explained by appeal to the role of attention (...) in visual consciousness, rather than self-induced movements; and second, that the sense in which perceptual consciousness does not happen in the brain only should be explained by appeal to the relational nature of perceptual consciousness, appeal to which also shows why links with action cannot exhaust phenomenal content. (shrink)

Antirealism about metaphysical explanation is relatively underexplored. This paper maps out the territory for the antirealist, explaining what it would take to be an antirealist given various different conceptions of metaphysical explanation, and of the relationship between metaphysical explanation and grounding.

Are doctors right when they tell us vaccines are safe? Should we take climate experts at their word when they warn us about the perils of global warming? Why should we trust science when so many of our political leaders don't? Naomi Oreskes offers a bold and compelling defense of science, revealing why the social character of scientific knowledge is its greatest strength--and the greatest reason we can trust it. Tracing the history and philosophy of science from the late (...) nineteenth century to today, this timely and provocative book features a new preface by Oreskes and critical responses by climate experts Ottmar Edenhofer and Martin Kowarsch, political scientist Jon Krosnick, philosopher of science Marc Lange, and science historian Susan Lindee, as well as a foreword by political theorist Stephen Macedo. (shrink)

The article reflects on a 2006 keynote about sex and religion discussing a topic the author has addressed as a central issue. Although the author has been involved in what has been known as the field of women and religion for decades, theory that is now emerging under the rubric of what is at times called ‘critical religion’, has led her to a different approach to the topic. The article reflects on the past and moves forward to introduce this trajectory (...) of theory. The hope is to convince the reader that thinking critically about sex and religion together is a new and necessary adventure. (shrink)

A pesar de que en los estudios sobre el Imperio Mameluco (1250-1517) se ha prestado gran atención a los esclavos blancos del ejército y a los libertos, se ha pasado por alto a los esclavos negros (¿abid). En Egipto la sociedad mameluce, especialmente la sociedad militar, se caracterizaba por un discurso profundamente racial que privilegiaba lo blanco sobre lo negro. Ésta no era la única clasificación étnica/racial de gentes y grupos, ni el único mecanismo de establecer privilegios. Sin embargo, la (...) definición de los esclavos negros como subalternos, tuvo consecuencias sociales, económicas y políticas que no pueden ser ignoradas. Estas definiciones son especialmente evidentes en los relatos sobre esclavos negros que se considera que han violado los límites existentes. Mi propósito en este artículo es explorar los modos con que seis historiadores mamelucos construyen las narraciones, a menudo contradictorias, de los esclavos negros transgresores. (shrink)

Models all the way down Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-6 DOI 10.1007/s11016-011-9558-9 Authors Naomi Oreskes, Department of History, University of California, San Diego La Jolla, CA 92093-0104, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

What if you woke up one morning and found you'd acquired another self--a double who was almost you and yet not you at all? What if that double shared many of your preoccupations but, in a twisted, upside-down way, furthered the very causes you'd devoted your life to fighting against? Not long ago, the celebrated activist and public intellectual Naomi Klein had just such an experience--she was confronted with a doppelganger whose views she found abhorrent but whose name and (...) public persona were sufficiently similar to her own that many people got confused about who was who. Destabilized, she lost her bearings, until she began to understand the experience as one manifestation of a strangeness many of us have come to know but struggle to define: AI-generated text is blurring the line between genuine and spurious communication; New Age wellness entrepreneurs turned anti-vaxxers are scrambling familiar political allegiances of left and right; and liberal democracies are teetering on the edge of absurdist authoritarianism, even as the oceans rise. Under such conditions, reality itself seems to have become unmoored. Is there a cure for our moment of collective vertigo? Naomi Klein is one of our most trenchant and influential social critics, an essential analyst of what branding, austerity, and climate profiteering have done to our societies and souls. Here she turns her gaze inward to our psychic landscapes, and outward to the possibilities for building hope amid intersecting economic, medical, and political crises. With the assistance of Sigmund Freud, Jordan Peele, Alfred Hitchcock, and bell hooks, among other accomplices, Klein uses wry humor and a keen sense of the ridiculous to face the strange doubles that haunt us--and that have come to feel as intimate and proximate as a warped reflection in the mirror. Combining comic memoir with chilling reportage and cobweb-clearing analysis, Klein seeks to smash that mirror and chart a path beyond despair. Doppelganger asks: What do we neglect as we polish and perfect our digital reflections? Is it possible to dispose of our doubles and overcome the pathologies of a culture of multiplication? Can we create a politics of collective care and undertake a true reckoning with historical crimes? The result is a revelatory treatment of the way many of us think and feel now--and an intellectual adventure story for our times. (shrink)

Naomi Scheman argues that the concerns of philosophy emerge not from the universal human condition but from conditions of privilege. Her books represents a powerful challenge to the notion that gender makes no difference in the construction of philosophical reasoning. At the same time, it criticizes the narrow focus of most feminist theorizing and calls for a more inclusive form of inquiry.

In a passage from Apollodorus’ Against Neaera ([Dem.] 59.113), the manuscripts have unanimously transmitted the feminine plural genitive of ‘citizen’, πολιτίδων. Since Reiske's 1770 emendation, however, editions of the text have printed the considerably more common masculine form, πολιτῶν. Emphasizing the importance of female citizenship in Athens, this note proposes restoring the manuscript reading of the text.

[opening paragraph]: If we think intuitively and non-professionally about the evolution of consciousness, the following is a compelling thought. What the emergence of consciousness made possible, uniquely in the natural world, was the capacity for representing the world, and, hence, for acquiring knowledge about it. This is the kind of thought that surfaces when, for example, we make explicit what lies behind wondering whether a frog, as compared to a dog, say, is conscious. The thought that it might not be (...) is closely bound up with doubts about whether there is a world out there for it. Such doubts are reinforced by neurophysiological and psychological theories to the effect that its purpose-specific, bug-detecting input does not provide for a connected spatial representation of the environment. Or rather there is no need to postulate such a representation in order to explain its tongue lashing out to catch the bug. Reflecting further, it seems that something else critical is lacking, or not necessarily present, in the explanation of the movement of the frog's tongue, namely the kind of appeal we normally make to another major feature we think consciousness introduced into world -- wants, emotions, desires, or, more generally, affective states and events. Without their existence, the intuition is, all we have are, at most, non-conscious information processing mechanisms. And when we ask what is required for desires and the like to be in play, we seem to come full circle. For whether or not it is correct to speak of individual desires for specific things in the world seems to have some kind of dependence on whether the organism in question is capable of representing those things, which in turn seems to depend on whether there is a world out there for it. And finally we tend to think that it is only when we have in play this kind of explanation of movement that action and agency appear on the scene. (shrink)

Vaak wordt gesteld dat ongelijkheid een individuele verantwoordelijkheid is. Om sociale ongelijkheid te verkleinen zoekt men dan de oplossingen in het ondersteunen van individuen. Maar daarbij wordt meestal voorbijgegaan aan de morele dimensies van ongelijkheid, en aan het belang van de groep of de netwerken waarin mensen wonen, werken en leven. De essays in dit boek, gebaseerd op de nieuwste wetenschappelijke inzichten, tonen aan dat juist die groepsdimensie een zeer belangrijk perspectief is, waaraan in beleidsoplossingen te vaak voorbij wordt gegaan. (...) 0Als je leven niet loopt zoals je dat voor ogen hebt, is dat dan je eigen schuld of hangt dat wellicht met meer zaken samen? Iedereen weet dat omgevingsfactoren een belangrijke rol spelen: Waar ben je geboren? Welk netwerk heb je tot je beschikking? Toch worden bij pogingen om de ongelijkheid in de wereld te reduceren in de eerste plaats individuele oplossingen aangedragen. Dit boek laat voor de verschillende domeinen in de samenleving als de zorg, het onderwijs, werk, migratie en milieu zien hoe dat (niet) werkt. (shrink)

(2010). How many Commonwealths can Leviathan Swallow? Covenant, Sovereign and People in Hobbes's Political Theory? British Journal for the History of Philosophy: Vol. 18, No. 4, pp. 575-596.

Educational research as an academic field can be understood as a network or group of networks and, therefore, to consist of interconnected nodes that structure the way the field operates and understands its purpose. This paper deals with the nature of the induction of postgraduate students into the network of educational research that takes place through research methods courses, the textual domain, the professional and social practices involved in collaboration, conferences and publication. The consideration of this in the light of (...) Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's (1988) writings on smooth and striated space problematises the notion of flows provided by Manuel Castells' (1996) understanding of networks and, by resisting the dualist simplification in terms of which the field is often discussed, offers an alternative account of how the nature of thought and practice governs the route between nodes in the network. This enables consideration of the nature of thought in relation to academic practice in educational research. (shrink)

In this book, Naomi Fisher provides a cohesive interpretation of Schelling's philosophical work from 1792-1802 as a mystical Platonism. According to this interpretation, Schelling is guided by two overarching commitments during this time. First, Schelling is committed to mysticism regarding the absolute. That is, the absolute is ineffable; it cannot be described in conceptual terms. For this reason, it remains inferentially external to any given philosophical system. Second, Schelling is committed to a priority monism: All things are grounded in (...) the absolute, but finite things possess an integral unity all their own, and so have a distinct and relatively independent existence. This book shows how these two commitments cohere in a project that fulfils the distinctive aims of post-Kantian philosophy, and it traces their inspiration to Schelling's early engagement with Plato's dialogues and to his education, which was Neoplatonic in orientation. In presenting Schelling's philosophy of this decade as guided by these two fundamental commitments, this book poses a challenge to those readings of Schelling's philosophy according to which it shifts frequently in its basic commitments during this time. According to the interpretation presented in this book, Schelling's appropriations of various strands of Platonism distinguish him from his contemporaries and give rise to his idiosyncratic approach to the projects of post-Kantian philosophy. Mysticism, Platonism, monism, Schelling, Neoplatonism, philosophy of nature, identity philosophy, German Idealism, Romanticism In this book, Naomi Fisher provides a cohesive interpretation of Schelling's philosophical work from 1792-1802 as a mystical Platonism. According to this interpretation, Schelling is guided by two overarching commitments during this time. First, Schelling is committed to mysticism regarding the absolute. That is, the absolute is ineffable; it cannot be described in conceptual terms. For this reason, it remains inferentially external to any given philosophical system. Second, Schelling is committed to a priority monism: All things are grounded in the absolute, but finite things possess an integral unity all their own, and so have a distinct and relatively independent existence. This book shows how these two commitments cohere in a project that fulfils the distinctive aims of post-Kantian philosophy, and it traces their inspiration to Schelling's early engagement with Plato's dialogues and to his education, which was Neoplatonic in orientation. In presenting Schelling's philosophy of this decade as guided by these two fundamental commitments, this book poses a challenge to those readings of Schelling's philosophy according to which it shifts frequently in its basic commitments during this time. According to the interpretation presented in this book, Schelling's appropriations of various strands of Platonism distinguish him from his contemporaries and give rise to his idiosyncratic approach to the projects of post-Kantian philosophy. Mysticism, Platonism, monism, Schelling, Neoplatonism, philosophy of nature, identity philosophy, German Idealism, Romanticism In this book, Naomi Fisher provides a cohesive interpretation of Schelling's philosophical work from 1792-1802 as a mystical Platonism. According to this interpretation, Schelling is guided by two overarching commitments during this time. First, Schelling is committed to mysticism regarding the absolute. That is, the absolute is ineffable; it cannot be described in conceptual terms. For this reason, it remains inferentially external to any given philosophical system. Second, Schelling is committed to a priority monism: All things are grounded in the absolute, but finite things possess an integral unity all their own, and so have a distinct and relatively independent existence. This book shows how these two commitments cohere in a project that fulfils the distinctive aims of post-Kantian philosophy, and it traces their inspiration to Schelling's early engagement with Plato's dialogues and to his education, which was Neoplatonic in orientation. In presenting Schelling's philosophy of this decade as guided by these two fundamental commitments, this book poses a challenge to those readings of Schelling's philosophy according to which it shifts frequently in its basic commitments during this time. According to the interpretation presented in this book, Schelling's appropriations of various strands of Platonism distinguish him from his contemporaries and give rise to his idiosyncratic approach to the projects of post-Kantian philosophy. Mysticism, Platonism, monism, Schelling, Neoplatonism, philosophy of nature, identity philosophy, German Idealism, Romanticism. (shrink)

Philosophy of Race: An Introduction provides plainly written access to a new subfield that has been in the background of philosophy since Plato and Aristotle. Part I provides an overview of ideas of race and ethnicity in the philosophical canon, egalitarian traditions, race in biology, and race in American and Continental Philosophy. Part II addresses race as it operates in life through colonialism and development, social constructions and institutions, racism, political philosophy, and gender. This book constructs an outline that will (...) serve as a resource for students, nonspecialists, and general readers in thinking, talking, and writing about philosophy of race. (shrink)

This chapter argues that a central division among accounts of joint attention, both in philosophy and developmental psychology, turns on how they address two questions: What, if any, is the connection between the capacity to engage in joint attention triangles and the capacity to grasp the idea of objective truth? How do we explain the kind of openness or sharing of minds that occurs in joint attention? The chapter explores the connections between answers to both questions, and argues that theories (...) can be divided into two distinct types according to how these connections are developed. (shrink)

This paper explores a middle way between realism and eliminativism about grounding. Grounding-talk is intelligible and useful, but it fails to pick out grounding relations that exist or obtain in reality. Instead, grounding-talk allows us to convey facts about what metaphysically explains what, and about the worldly dependence relations that give rise to those explanations.

Naomi Zack brings us an indispensable work in the ethics of race through an inquiry into the history of moral philosophy. The Ethics and Mores of Race: Equality after the History of Philosophy enters into a web of ideas, ethics, and morals that untangle our evolving ideas of racial equality straight into the twenty-first century. In the preface to the paperback edition, Zack addresses the criticisms raised in response to this book and concludes that a focus on rights and (...) justice, rather than privilege, is the only fruitful pathway towards a functioning ethics of race. (shrink)

John Ford’s The Broken Heart has been interpreted as a play in which “mannered artifice” is able to impose beauty onto the chaos and misery of human affairs.1 For Sharon Hamilton, each character in the play “makes his blighted life more bearable by envisioning it as a work of art”: the “spiritual starvation” of the characters is consequently set against the fact that they are “beautifully stylized.”2 Apollo, god of beautiful form and appearance, and the patron of the Sparta in (...) which the play is set, is thus seen to triumph over the tragedies it charts, offering a means of redemption.3 In this essay, I argue, instead, that the play depicts beauty as a metaphysical ideal, identical with truth and... (shrink)

Animal welfare in pig production is frequently a topic of debate and is sensitive in nature. This debate is partly due to differences in values, forms, convictions, interests and knowledge among the stakeholders that constitute differences among their frames of reference with respect to pigs and their welfare. Differences in frames of reference by stakeholder groups are studied widely, but not specifically with respect to animal behaviour or welfare. We explored this phenomenon using a qualitative behaviour assessment . Participating stakeholders (...) were classified into two expert groups consisting of pig farmers and animal scientists and a lay-group consisting of urban citizens . The stakeholders were asked to observe the behaviour of a specific pig in each of the nine videos and to assign a score for each video using 21 predefined terms describing the mood, such as ‘happy’ or ‘irritated’. They were asked to complete two additional questionnaires to obtain information on their frames of reference. Results from the QBA showed that the pig farmers observed the behaviour of pigs more positively than the urban citizens and the animal scientists. This was evident from the consistently higher scores on the positive terms to assess pig behaviour. The questionnaires revealed that the farmers had a different frames of reference regarding pigs and different understanding of welfare, which might explain the differences in assessment. In a follow-up stakeholder workshop, which focussed on differences in observation, QBA showed to be an effective tool to stimulate mutual learning among stakeholders, which is necessary to find shared solutions. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 4, Page 17-19, April 2012.

A central intuition regarding self-knowledge is that if I say (or think) that I believe that it is raining – to use a familiar example – I do not merely state a fact about my mental life but also express my view of the world: I take it to be the case that it is raining. The notion of avowal is supposed to capture this duality of perspectives: whilst occupying one’s first-person perspective, one self-attributes a mental attitude, which is a (...) fact that is supposed to be true independent of one’s own perspective. Another way of putting this is that avowal is a self-attribution of an intentional mental attitude that is first-personal and commissive. Many grant that avowal and its commissive form are essential to the first-person character of self-knowledge – which I call the commitment view. However, only a few argue that avowal remains essential in achieving self-knowledge of one’s substantial mental attitudes, i.e., attitudes that are significant to a person’s life and self-conception, such as one’s values, deeper desires, and cares. In fact, current orthodoxy is skeptical that avowal has any role to play in acquiring substantial self-knowledge. According to this skeptical view of avowal, such attitudes are often distorted in the first-person perspective and are better reflected in someone’s behavior, i.e., in the relevant patterns of action and reaction. Rather than avowing an attitude, interpreting these patterns is supposed to provide substantial self-knowledge. The paper proceeds by first clarifying the commitment view (section 2) and the skeptical view (section 3). I will then offer two arguments against the skeptical view. First, I will show that substantial mental attitudes cannot, as the skeptical view needs to assume, be discovered in patterns of action and reaction (section 4). Secondly, I will inquire the complex relation between avowal and patterns of action and reaction and argue that a gap between the two cannot be determined nor understood without the agent’s perspective, including their avowal (section 5). Both arguments establish that the skeptic cannot deny a necessary role for avowal. This reflects the agential nature of substantial mental attitudes and challenges the dominant skeptical view of substantial self-knowledge. (shrink)

It’s widely accepted that we have most reason to accept theories that best fulfill the following naturalistically respectable criteria: internal consistency, consistency with the facts, and exemplification of the theoretical virtues. It’s also widely accepted that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. I argue that if you accept the aforementioned criteria, you have most reason to reject that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. By applying the criteria to worlds that are all prima facie possible, I show that contingent local matters of (...) particular fact partly determine which theory of composition we should accept at a world. For instance, I argue that when we apply the criteria to our world, we should accept Mereological Nihilism. Furthermore, even if you think that the worlds I mention, such as gunky worlds, are impossible, you should still reject the brute principle that metaphysical theories are necessarily true. Instead, you should only accept that a theory of composition is necessarily true if contingent local matters of particular fact at possible worlds cannot tell in favor of one theory of composition over another. (shrink)

First published in 2003. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

It is commonly assumed that grounding relations are asymmetric. Here I develop and argue for a theory of metaphysical structure that takes grounding to be nonsymmetric rather than asymmetric. Even without infinite descending chains of dependence, it might be that every entity is grounded in some other entity. Having first addressed an immediate objection to the position under discussion, I introduce two examples of symmetric grounding. I give three arguments for the view that grounding is nonsymmetric (I call this view (...) ‘metaphysical interdependence’). These arguments are: (i) that metaphysical interdependence is the only theory able to reconcile competing intuitions about grounding; (ii) that it is the only theory consistent with both ‘gunk’ and ‘junk’; and (iii) that offers a satisfactory solution to the problem concerning whether or not grounding is itself grounded. (shrink)

The competition question ‘What Does It Mean To Be An Educated Person?’ is associated with a powerful and influential line of thought in the philosophy of R. S. Peters. It is a question that needs always to be asked again. I respond by asking what it means, now, to be an educated person—that is, how the value of being an educated person is currently understood, and, further, how it might be understood differently. The starting point of this paper then is (...) not exactly the question of how we should best conceive of education, or of the educated person, in terms, for example, of initiation or of moral development. Instead I am concerned with who the supposedly educated person is today, according to the particular discourses and practices to which we are subject. I begin, then, by outlining the notion of the entrepreneurial self from the perspective of governmentality, with particular reference to questions of economy and the way in which the economic imperative is present in current policy. I then reconsider the idea of the educated person with reference to notions of economy and visibility as these relate to ideas of education and the self in Plato's The Republic. Discussion of readings of The Republic and of other texts of Plato by Stanley Cavell and Michel Foucault indicates how prevailing constructions of knowledge, practice, and subjectivity might be resisted. The question of what it means to be an educated person is thereby released from a particular mode of accounting for the self. (shrink)

In this chapter, I defend a transparency account of substantial self-knowledge against the self-interpretation account. First, I question how such self-interpretation should proceed without taking up at least some of the perspectives of the attitudes at issue. I argue that the inability to assess our attitudes from a detached perspective is not just a matter of epistemic access but relates to the nature of substantial attitudes themselves. Because they are connected to a person’s conception of themselves but also their conception (...) of their values, substantial attitudes are synchronically and diachronically indeterminate. This means that they need to be translated to a particular context and person. Second, I argue that such a process of translation involves the person’s sense-making agency. Different from interpretation— and, as will be addressed, different from reflective endorsement and self-regulation—substantial attitudes can only be self-attributed if the agent determines what they mean for her, here and now. My contribution highlights aspects of substantial self- knowledge that, on the one hand, connect substantial self-knowledge to non-ideal approaches in epistemology, linking it to an emancipatory practice of self-inquiry. On the other hand, the chapter shifts our way of thinking about transparent self-knowledge, how it should not be dismissed too quickly with respect to substantial self-knowledge, and how important the agential, non-reductive, and first-personal perspective is in relation to our mental life. (shrink)

Spatial Representation presents original, specially written essays by leading psychologists and philosophers on a fascinating set of topics at the intersection of these two disciplines. They address such questions as these: Do the extraordinary navigational abilities of birds mean that these birds have the same kind of grip on the idea of a spatial world as we do? Is there a difference between the way sighted and blind subjects represent the world 'out there'? Does the study of brain-injured subjects, such (...) as 'blind seers', tell us anything about the working of normal spatial consciousness? -/- The essays are arranged into five sections, each of which reflects a central area of research into spatial cognition, and opens with a short introduction by the editors, designed to facilitate cross-disciplinary reading. The volume as a whole offers a rich and compelling expression of the view that to advance our understanding of the way we represent the external world it is necessary to draw on both philosophical and psychological approaches. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 63.4 (2002) 697-716 [Access article in PDF] "La Mère Humanité":Femininity in the Romantic Socialism of Pierre Leroux and the Abbé A.-L. Constant Naomi J. Andrews Humanity, my mother, since you have led me, by so many paths, to conceive this design, support me, inspire me, affirm me. —Pierre Leroux, "Invocation to my Muse." 1It was during the July Monarchy in France, in (...) the era immediately preceding the Revolution of 1848, that the ideology we call socialism became more than an abstraction held by isolated intellectuals and conspirators. 2 A series of individuals, loose-knit associations, and more formal écoles were active during the 1830s and 1840s, developing a varied agenda of social reform, economic cooperation, or association, mystical Christianity, and women's liberation. Roughly lumped under the pejorative rubric of utopian socialism, and perhaps more accurately called romantic socialism, this movement was ultimately unsuccessful in achieving its diverse goals, but contributed significantly to the political discourse of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 3Socialism at this stage of its development overlapped in many ways with republicanism, both being, to quote one historian of the latter, "an amalgam of responses to the Enlightenment, the 1789 Revoluation and above all economic [End Page 697] change." 4 Many early socialists were also republicans, and socialist ideas influenced the ideology articulated by republicans such as Alexandre Ledru-Rollin and Auguste Blanqui. Louis Blanc, perhaps the best-known socialist of the decade surrounding the 1848 revolution, was and is known as a Jacobin socialist. 5From a certain perspective republicanism and socialism shared common origins and assumptions during the July Monarchy. Most socialists had come out of the political milieu of republicanism, whether through the carbonarist movement, opposition political clubs such as Droits de l'Homme and Les Amis du Peuple, or through the influential journalism trade of the Bourbon Restoration and early July Monarchy. Pierre Leroux, for one, had been a co-founder of the widely read journal le Globe, a bastion of liberalism, which he later turned over to the Saint-Simonians upon his conversion to their "church." 6 Although diverse in many ways, the left of this era did share certain core tenets, chief among them opposition to the Orleanist monarchy and, to varying degrees the belief in more democratic rule of the French nation.To say this, however, might erroneously imply a unity that was certainly not a feature of socialism during this period. In fact socialism, despite its near mystical devotion to ideas of unity, was anything but singular during its pre-Marxian phase. The spectrum of socialist thinkers and groups ranged widely. Standing closest to the republicans in their beliefs about politics and the revolutionary tradition were Jacobin socialists, most usually associated with Louis Blanc. Blanc and others articulated a social philosophy that sought "to unite two distinct ideologies: Jacobin democracy and co-operative socialism." 7 Thus Jacobin socialism combined republican political priorities and commitment to national political processes in general and to a centralized state in particular with attention to economic change, to reforming the distribution process along more equitable lines and to putting the situation of working people at the center of political change. In this goal Jacobin socialism reflected, as did other strains of socialism, the economic instability of the era and the emergence of an organized working class movement which followed the aborted revolution of 1830. 8At the other end of the spectrum one might put the Saint-Simonians and the Fourierist École Sociétaire. 9 Vehemently anti-republican, these groups shared [End Page 698] very little with the Jacobin socialists, other than a certain concern with the emerging working class, one of the few consistent features of early socialism. Unlike Jacobin socialists, these groups focused their theories of community at a very low level, having a strongly utopian component to their thinking. As a result, they tended to see national politics as irrelevant to the situation of ordinary people and even as a... (shrink)

To answer the question of what difference the philosophy of history makes to the philosophy of law this paper begins by calling attention to the way that Ronald Dworkin's interpretive theory of law is supposed to upend legal positivism. My analysis shows how divergent theories about what law and the basis of legal authority is are supported by divergent points of view about what concepts are, how they operate within social practices, and how we might best give account of such (...) meanings. Such issues are widely debated in the philosophy of history but are often overlooked in jurisprudential circles. When the legal positivist approach to meanings is contrasted with Dworkin's interpretivism it is clear that what is needed is an alternative to both, in the form of what we might call "historical meanings" and "historical interpretation". While Dworkin's interpretivism gets it right that legal positivism is an inadequate philosophy of law to the extent that it is committed to a "criterial semantics" view of concepts, this paper argues that post-positivism in the philosophy of law need not entail a normative jurisprudence, as Dworkin would have it. (shrink)

This review had already been published on September 11, 2020 on euppublishingblog.com. P. Crespi & S. Manghani, Rhythm and Critique. Techniques, modalities, practices, Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2020, 240 p. What is the relationship between rhythm and critique? Rhythm remains one of the most productive terms for critical enquiry into our social, political and cultural lives. References to temporality, flow, measure, pattern, variation and meter occur across a - Recensions.