In our text, we follow the traces of a (1) paradox, (2) an ambivalence and (3) a dialectic that constitute digitalized public spheres and discuss the resulting tensions in discourse-ethical and political-theoretical perspectives using the blocking of Donald J. Trump’s Twitter account as an example. Starting from this, we determine the conditions of constitution of the digital public sphere and locate the dynamics of its development in the dialectical tension between private and public: The fact that the two other relations (...) of autonomy and heteronomy, intensification and polarization come to such a head is based on an insufficient socialization of all those means of production that produce the current digital public sphere. Using the example of Donald J. Trump’s recently suspended Twitter account and with a view to Habermas’s discourse ethics, we illustrate the extent to which Trump’s partly racist and conspiracy-theoretical post violates discourse ethics standards and is also highly problematic with regard to the political; however, banishment from a part of the digital public sphere is certainly not an act that should be incumbent on a private company. From this, we conclude that the normative potentials of digital public spheres can only be vol. (shrink)

No other recent book in Anglophone philosophy has attracted as much criticism and has found so few friends as Saul Kripke's "Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language". Amongst its critics, one finds the very top of the philosophical profession. Yet, it is rightly counted amongst the books that students of philosophy, at least in the Anglo-American world, have to read at some point in their education. Enormously influential, it has given rise to debates that strike at the very heart of (...) contemporary philosophy of mind and language. In this major new interpretation, Martin Kusch defends Kripke's account against the numerous weighty objections that have been put forward over the past twenty years and argues that none of them is decisive. He shows that many critiques are based on misunderstandings of Kripke's reasoning; that many attacks can be blocked by refining and developing Kripke's position; and that many alternative proposals turn out either to be unworkable or to be disguised variants of the view they are meant to replace. Kusch argues that the apparent simplicity of Kripke's text is deceptive and that a fresh reading gives Kripke's overall argument a new strength. (shrink)

En este trabajo trato de demostrar que Nino no logra articular un liberalismo completamente antiperfeccionista en su respuesta al comunitarismo. Para ello, parto de reconstruir el diagnóstico que Nino ofrece de la crítica comunitarista al liberalismo y señalo que para darle respuesta se compromete con una concepción particular del bien basada en la idea de autorrealización autónoma. En la siguiente sección desarrollo la manera en la que esa concepción del bien da forma al liberalismo de Nino y, en el apartado (...) siguiente, la confronto con un experimento mental destinado a evaluar si es capaz de bloquear distintas políticas estatales de corte perfeccionista. En la última sección ofrezco unas breves conclusiones respecto al modo en el que la adopción de una concepción del bien particular limita las pretensiones antiperfeccionistas de su teoría liberal. In this paper I attempt to prove that Nino does not succeed in developing a fully antiperfectionist account of liberalism as an answer to the communitarian challenge. I begin with a reconstruction of Nino’s diagnosis of the communitarian challenge to liberalism and point out that, in order to answer it he commits himself to a particular conception of the good based on the idea of autonomous self-realization. In the next section I develop the way by which that conception of the good shapes Nino’s liberalism. I further challenge his liberalism with a mental experiment designed to asses if it is capable of blocking several perfectionist State policies. In the last section I offer some brief remarks on the way the adoption of a particular conception of the good limits the antiperfectionist scope of Nino’s liberalism. (shrink)

Questions about the validity of eye fixations in the blocks task as a memory indicator are discussed. Examples from reading research illustrate the influence of extraneous factors.

Who should decide what passes for disinformation in a liberal democracy? During the COVID-19 pandemic, a committee set up by the Dutch Ministry of Health was actively blocking disinformation. The committee comprised civil servants, communication experts, public health experts, and representatives of commercial online platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn. To a large extent, vaccine hesitancy was attributed to disinformation, defined as misinformation (or data misinterpreted) with harmful intent. In this study, the question is answered by reflecting on what (...) is needed for us to honor public reason: reasonableness, the willingness to engage in public discourse properly, and trust in the institutions of liberal democracy. (shrink)

Dynamic logic, broadly conceived, is the logic that analyses change by decomposing actions into their basic building blocks and by describing the results of performing actions in given states of the world. The actions studied by dynamic logic can be of various kinds: actions on the memory state of a computer, actions of a moving robot in a closed world, interactions between cognitive agents performing given communication protocols, actions that change the common ground between speaker and hearer in a conversation, (...) actions that change the contextually available referents in a conversation, and so on. (shrink)

Organizations face a plethora of moral challenges. To address these challenges, they must develop the capacity for moral action. Drawing on pragmatist philosophy and, more specifically, on the concept of moral imagination, we theorize such organizational capacity building as moral learning. We propose three conceptual building blocks, which together form the framework for moral learning. First, we posit that morality may be anchored in concrete action rather than in general rules or principles. In particular, we suggest that the locus of (...) morality may reside in action itself, and not predominantly in the inner motivations for action or the external consequences of action. Second, we hold that, by providing normative guidance, evaluation goes hand in hand with moral action. Such evaluation is related to a specific action rather than abstract values. In a third step, we suggest that moral learning represents a feedback loop between moral action and evaluation. This loop is embedded in an enabling ethical infrastructure, i.e., organizational structures, spaces, and technologies, which provide the necessary socio-material conditions for moral development and learning to occur. The value of our framework for moral learning is in its heuristic ability to render ethics in organizations both legible and practicable. (shrink)

Mathematical theorems are cultural artifacts and may be interpreted much as works of art, literature, and tool-and-craft are interpreted. The Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, the Central Limit Theorem of Statistics, and the Statistical Continuum Limit of field theories, all show how the world may be put together through the arithmetic addition of suitably prescribed parts (velocities, variances, and renormalizations and scaled blocks, respectively). In the limit — of smoothness, statistical independence, and large N — higher-order parts, such as accelerations, (...) are, for the most, part irrelevant, affirming that, in the end, most of the world's particulars may be averaged over (a very un-Scriptural point of view). (We work out all of this in technical detail, including a nice geometric picture of stochastic integration, and a method of calculating the variance of the sum of dependent random variables using renormalization group ideas.) These fundamental theorems affirm a culture that is additive, ahistorical, Cartesian, and continuist, sharing in what might be called a species of modern culture. We understand mathematical results as useful because, like many other such artifacts, they have been adapted to fit the world, and the world has been adapted to fit their capacities. Such cultural interpretation is in effect motivation for the mathematics, and might well be offered to students as a way of helping them understand what is going on at the blackboard. Philosophy of mathematics might want to pay more attention to the history and detailed technical features of sophisticated mathematics, as a balance to the usual concerns that arise in formalist or even Platonist positions. (shrink)

Global citizenship is a positive outcome often associated with participation in study abroad. One essential building block of global citizenship is a sense of empathy toward those of other cultures. This paper proposes a study of variables that may increase intercultural empathy and global citizenship due to a study abroad experience. Proposed variables contributing to intercultural empathy include integration with the host culture, program duration, the economic and cultural distance of the host country, and the incorporation of guided reflection (...) and cultural study in the program content. The proposed study aims to provide guidelines that can be used in designing future study abroad programs to increase students’ sense of individual social responsibility. (shrink)

It is often overlooked that, in addition to the integrity of protein‐coding sequences (PCSs), human health is crucially linked to the normal expression of genes by cis‐regulatory sequences (CRSs). These CRSs often lie at some considerable distance from the PCSs whose expression they control and often within other genes. The resulting gene interdigitation can make long‐range CRS identification and characterisation difficult. We propose that the need to conserve long‐range CRSs in cis with their target PCSs through evolution, in combination with (...) gene interdigitation and co‐regulation of many genes by individual CRSs, has contributed to the persistence of conserved synteny blocks between diverse species. We further hypothesise that examination of the varying extents of synteny blocks between multiple species in combination with phylogenetic footprinting to find CRSs might provide important clues to the existence of crucial functional CRS–PCS linkages. Identifying CRS–PCS linkages crucial to human health will lead to a better understanding of how their disruption by CRS mutation or chromosome translocation might contribute to many distressing human diseases. BioEssays 26:1217–1224, 2004. © 2004 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

The inscribed stone, of which an illustration is here given, was found in a wall composed of large blocks, which had all formed part of some other construction. This wall, which had certainly formed no part of the original building, separated the eastern portion of House XI into two rooms numbered 5 and 6 in our plan. The text of the inscription as given by Dr. Ashby in the report published in Archaeologia is as follows.

If the explanatory gap between phenomenal consciousness () and the brain cannot be closed by current naturalistic theories of mind, one might instead try to dissolve the explanatory gap problem. We hold that such a dissolution can start from the notion of consciousness as a social construction. In his target article, however, Block (1995) argues that the thesis that consciousness is a social construction is trivially false if it is construed to be about phenomenal consciousness. He ridicules the idea (...) that the occurrence of p-consciousness requires that the subject of p-consciousness already have the concept of p-consciousness. This idea is not as ridiculous as Block supposes. To see this, one must accept that in a unique sense, p-consciousness is what we as the subjects of consciousness takeit to be. Furthermore, the notion of consciousness as a social construction does not depend on the view that the concept of consciousness somehow precedes the occurrence of consciousness as such. In sum, consciousness can plausibly be seen as a social construction, and this view can promote a dissolution of the explanatory gap problem. (shrink)

In order to understand cognition, we often recruit analogies as building blocks of theories to aid us in this quest. One such attempt, originating in folklore and alchemy, is the homunculus: a miniature human who resides in the skull and performs cognition. Perhaps surprisingly, this appears indistinguishable from the implicit proposal of many neurocognitive theories, including that of the 'cognitive map,' which proposes a representational substrate for episodic memories and navigational capacities. In such 'small cakes' cases, neurocognitive representations are assumed (...) to be meaningful and about the world, though it is wholly unclear who is reading them, how they are interpreted, and how they come to mean what they do. We analyze the 'small cakes' problem in neurocognitive theories (including, but not limited to, the cognitive map) and find that such an approach a) causes infinite regress in the explanatory chain, requiring a human-in-the-loop to resolve, and b) results in a computationally inert account of representation, providing neither a function nor a mechanism. We caution against a 'small cakes' theoretical practice across computational cognitive modelling, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence, wherein the scientist inserts their (or other humans') cognition into models because otherwise the models neither perform as advertised, nor mean what they are purported to, without said 'cake insertion.' We argue that the solution is to tease apart explanandum and explanans for a given scientific investigation, with an eye towards avoiding van Rooij's (formal) or Ryle's (informal) infinite regresses. (shrink)

While universalistic assumptions have been undermined by experiences of cultural difference, the notion of culture has been universalized. But it seems that the notion of culture, the way it has prevailed in public discourse as well as in social and cultural studies, has to be seen as the main stumbling block to intercultural dialogue. The article argues for an interactional concept of culture, or interpretation, as also of research and representation. Emphasis has to be put on modes of linkage (...) between social action and discourses and on social reflexivity. While attempting to avoid the logic of identity, epistemologically, identity has to be understood as a social project. Thus universalism, which `as such' is underdetermined and shows only contextually, has to be seen not as something achieved and secured, but as an objective. Universalism has to prove itself within difference, it cannot be imposed by one side. (shrink)

Polyglutamine (polyQ) diseases are genetically inherited neurodegenerative disorders. They are caused by mutations that result in polyQ expansions of particular proteins. Mutant proteins form intranuclear aggregates, induce cytotoxicity and cause neuronal cell death. Protein interaction data suggest that polyQ regions modulate interactions between coiled‐coil (CC) domains. In the case of the polyQ disease spinocerebellar ataxia type‐1 (SCA1), interacting proteins with CC domains further enhance aggregation and toxicity of mutant ataxin‐1 (ATXN1). Here, we suggest that CC partners interacting with the polyQ (...) region of a mutant protein, increase its aggregation while partners that interact with a different region reduce the formation of aggregates. Computational analysis of genetic screens revealed that CC‐rich proteins are highly enriched among genes that enhance pathogenicity of polyQ proteins, supporting our hypothesis. We therefore suggest that blocking interactions between mutant polyQ proteins and their CC partners might constitute a promising preventive strategy against neurodegeneration. (shrink)

This short note considers the migration of the skyscraper from New York and Chicago to Asia and its absence in the emerging megacities of the Global South. Following 9/11, many commentators assumed that the skyscraper was finished, but this was clearly not the case, with super-tall construction now accelerating. However, the distributions of contemporary skyscrapers show us that there are shifts in global power and also in urban form.

Some have argued, following Stalnaker, that a plausible functionalist account of belief requires coarse-grained propositions. I have explored a class of functionalist accounts, and my argument has been that, in this class, there is no account which meetsall of the following conditions: it is plausible, noncircular, and allows for the validity of the argument to coarse-grained propositions. In producing this argument, I believe that I have shown that it might be open to a functionalist to adopt fine-grained propositions; thus, one (...) might be a functionalist without holding that all mathematical beliefs are about strings of symbols (and that the belief that all bachelors are unmarried men is a belief about words).My project in this paper has been minimal in the following sense. I havenot argued thatno functionalist account of belief which meets the three conditions can be produced; rather, I have simply explored the inadequacies of certain sorts of accounts. I think that this is useful insofar as it makes clear the challenges to be met by an account of belief which can play the required role in the argument to coarse-grained propositions. It is compatible with my position that such an account is forthcoming, insofar as I have not produced a functionalist theory of belief which is clearly non-circular, plausible, and which yields fine-grained propositions. Of course, it is also compatible with my position that no plausible, non-circular functionalist account of belief of any sort can be produced. My argument has been that,if one construes such mental states as belief as functional states, no convincing argument has yet been produced that they require coarse-grained objects. (shrink)

Pragmatism can be understood as a position that conceives of epistemic and moral claims in the terms of a realization within the framework of our collective forms of activity. In this respect, it on the one hand proves to be compatible with current discussions in anthropology, which take Aristotle and German Idealism as their starting point. At the same time however, the two seem to be in tension with regard to the concept of form presupposed in the neo-Aristotelian debates which (...) seems to block a practice-theoretical reading. This article argues for a reconciliation of the two concepts: The human form of life is realized in collective practices that further define the concept of this form of life. For such a reconcilement, both pragmatist as well as neo-Aristotelian accounts however must partially be re-engineered. (shrink)

Fenton et al. present a Bayesian‐network analysis of the case, using their previously developed set of building blocks (‘idioms’). They claim that these idioms, combined with their opportunity‐based method for estimating the prior probability of guilt, reduce the subjectivity of their analysis. Although their Bayesian model is less cognitively feasible than scenario‐ or argumentation‐based models, they claim that it does model the standard approach to legal proof, which is to continually revise beliefs under new evidence.

Although information-processing theories cannot provide a full explanatory account of P-consciousness, there is less conflation and confusion in cognitive psychology than Block suspects. Some of the reasoning that Block criticises can be interpreted plausibly in the light of a folk psychological view of the relation between P-consciousness and A-consciousness.

Most clinical neurofeedback studies based on functional magnetic resonance imaging use the patient's own neural activity as feedback. The objective of this study was to create a subject-independent brain state classifier as part of a real-time fMRI neurofeedback system that can guide patients with depression in achieving a healthy brain state, and then to examine subsequent clinical changes. In a first step, a brain classifier based on a support vector machine was trained from the neural information of happy autobiographical imagery (...) and motor imagery blocks received from a healthy female participant during an MRI session. In the second step, 7 right-handed female patients with mild or moderate depressive symptoms were trained to match their own neural activity with the neural activity corresponding to the “happiness emotional brain state” of the healthy participant. The training was carried out using the rt-fMRI NF system guided by the brain-state classifier we had created. Thus, the informative voxels previously obtained in the first step, using SVM classification and Effect Mapping, were used to classify the Blood-Oxygen-Level Dependent activity of the patients and converted into real-time visual feedback during the neurofeedback training runs. Improvements in the classifier accuracy toward the end of the training were observed in all the patients [Session 4–1 Median = 6.563%; Range = 4.10–27.34; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.031]. Clinical improvement also was observed in a blind standardized clinical evaluation [HDRS CE2-1 Median = 7; Range 2 to 15; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.016], and in self-report assessments [BDI-II CE2-1 Median = 8; Range 1–15; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.031]. In addition, the clinical improvement was still present 10 days after the intervention [BDI-II CE3-2_Median = 0; Range −1 to 2; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.50/ HDRS CE3-2 Median = 0; Range −1 to 2; Wilcoxon Test, 2-tailed p = 0.625]. Although the number of participants needs to be increased and a control group included to confirm these findings, the results suggest a novel option for neural modulation and clinical alleviation in depression using noninvasive stimulation technologies. (shrink)

GraphicalThirty healthy participants received 60 trials of intermittent SO tACS at an intensity of 2 mA. Motor cortical excitability was assessed using TMS-induced MEPs acquired across different oscillatory phases during and outlasting tACS, as well as at the start and end of the stimulation session. Mean MEP amplitude increased by ∼41% from pre- to post-tACS ; however, MEP amplitudes were not modulated with respect to the tACS phase.Converging evidence suggests that transcranial alternating current stimulation may entrain endogenous neural oscillations to (...) match the frequency and phase of the exogenously applied current and this entrainment may outlast the stimulation. However, observing entrainment in the electroencephalograph during stimulation is extremely difficult due to the presence of complex tACS artifacts. The present study assessed entrainment to slow oscillatory tACS by measuring motor cortical excitability across different oscillatory phases during and outlasting stimulation. 30 healthy participants received 60 trials of intermittent SO tACS at an intensity of 2 mA peak-to-peak. Motor cortical excitability was assessed using transcranial magnetic stimulation of the hand region of the primary motor cortex to induce motor evoked potentials in the contralateral thumb. MEPs were acquired at four time-points within each trial – early online, late online, early offline, and late offline – as well as at the start and end of the overall stimulation period. A significant increase in MEP amplitude was observed from pre- to post-tACS and from the first to the last tACS block. However, no phase-dependent modulation of excitability was observed. Therefore, although SO tACS had a facilitatory effect on motor cortical excitability that outlasted stimulation, there was no evidence supporting entrainment of endogenous oscillations as the underlying mechanism. (shrink)

It has been shown that counterintuitive ideas from mythological and religious texts are more acceptable than other world knowledge violations. In the present experiment we explored whether this relates to the way they are interpreted. Participants were presented with verification questions that referred to either the literal or a metaphorical meaning of the sentence previously read, in a block-wise design. Both behavioral and electrophysiological results converged. At variance to the literal interpretation of the sentences, the induced metaphorical interpretation specifically (...) facilitated the integration of religious counterintuitions, whereas the semantic processing of non-religious counterintuitions was not affected by the interpretation mode. We suggest that religious ideas tend to operate like other instances of figurative language, such as metaphors, facilitating their acceptability despite their counterintuitive nature. (shrink)

Information?rich environments are created to promote data use in schools for the purpose of self?evaluation and quality assurance. However, providing feedback does not guarantee that schools will actually put it to use. One of the main stumbling blocks relates to the interpretation and diagnosis of the information. This study examines the relationship between data literacy competences, support given in interpreting the information, actual use of the feedback and potential school improvement effect. A randomised field experiment with 188 school principals from (...) primary education was set up and a post?test was used to investigate the effects of a support initiative. The results revealed that a minority of schools invested significantly in the interpretation and diagnosis of the school performance feedback (SPF), despite the fact that most of the respondents showed an interest in the SPF report. In addition, data competence support and the subsequent use of feedback were found to be limited. (shrink)

The Blockage Argument is designed to improve upon Harry Frankfurt’s famous argument against the Principle of Alternative Possibilities by removing the counterfactual intervener altogether. If the argument worked, then it would prove in a way that Frankfurt’s argument does not that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, not even the weakest “flicker of freedom”. -/- Some philosophers have rejected the Blockage Argument solely on the basis of their intuition that the inability to do otherwise is incompatible with (...) moral responsibility. I will argue, however, that it is not merely the inability to do otherwise by itself but rather the inability to do otherwise in combination with the absence of a counterfactual intervener that is incompatible with moral responsibility. If I cannot do otherwise and it is not because of a counterfactual intervener, then it must be the case that I am being forced to choose and therefore act as I do, in which case I cannot be morally responsible for this action. -/- Because the Blockage Argument fails, and because it was really the only way to establish that moral responsibility does not require any alternative possibilities whatsoever, it follows that moral responsibility does indeed require at least one alternative possibility in any given situation. But it turns out that this conclusion does not tip the balance in favor of incompatibilism over compatibilism. It would have if blockage and determinism were equivalent. But they are not. Unlike blockage, determinism is compatible with certain counterfactuals that compatibilists traditionally believed the ability to do otherwise reduces to. So even though moral responsibility is incompatible with blockage, it does not necessarily follow that moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism. (shrink)

It has generally been recognized that while Bruno Latour’s and Martin Heidegger’s respective philosophies of technology converge on key points there is also a significant difference of attitudes towards the themes discussed. To better appreciate the similarities and differences, I suggest that we seek to understand both Latour and Heidegger as philosophers of the event, who seek to rescue the novel emergence of beings from the sedimentation of reductive, explanatory frameworks. I take up this line of thought and compare (...) Latour’s and Heidegger’s theories of things and the types of experiences they presume. Latour’s metaphysics of the actant ensures that no actant’s activity is ever reduced to being the passive effect of another. Yet while the actant can be ‘applied’ to any entity, from a Heideggerian standpoint this strength is precisely its weakness. Latour’s metaphysics provides a horizon of thought that blocks an original experience of things that Heidegger’s thought points towards. By stepping back from the horizonal experience Latour’s metaphysical blueprint for entities imposes, one can enter into an original opening that stems neither from humans nor nonhumans, but an ineradicable mystery at the origin of being. This mystery is nothing more than the inability to give ultimate reasons for the presence of beings. While Latour’s actant as _Ding_ is simply an actant with innumerable relations, Heidegger’s _das Ding_ is the concrete experience of the dissolution of metaphysical reasons, first and last causes. Precisely because Heidegger’s _das Ding_ emerges from a prior mystery that suspends any overarching causal or purposive schema, things can more freely presence from themselves. (shrink)

When our smartphones distract us, much more is at stake than a momentary lapse of attention. Our use of smartphones can interfere with the building-blocks of meaningfulness and the actions that shape our self-identity. -/- By analyzing social interactions and evolving experiences, Roholt reveals the mechanisms of smartphone-distraction that impact our meaningful projects and activities. Roholt’s conception of meaning in life draws from a disparate group of philosophers—Susan Wolf, John Dewey, Hubert Dreyfus, Martin Heidegger, and Albert Borgmann. Central to (...) Roholt’s argument are what Borgmann calls focal practices: dinners with friends, running, a college seminar, attending sporting events. As a recurring example, Roholt develops the classification of musical instruments as focal things, contending that musical performance can be fruitfully understood as a focal practice. -/- Through this exploration of what generates meaning in life, Roholt makes us rethink the place we allow smartphones to occupy in the everyday. But he remains cautiously optimistic. This thoughtful, needed interrogation of smartphones shows how we can establish a positive role for technologies within our lives. (shrink)

Jon Stewart often delivers the satire himself, but nearly every episode also features at least one of The Daily Show's numerous correspondents. This chapter focuses on Larry Wilmore, who as Senior Black Correspondent is able to discuss issues of race in ways that a white correspondent probably could not. For example, Wilmore has discussed how the election of Barack Obama could be perceived by the African‐American community in the United States, proposing that peer pressure creates a monolithic voting block (...) among African‐Americans. Other issues discussed by Wilmore include the Trayvon Martin case, whether the Congressional Black Caucus has “maxed out” the race card, and how Obama should “go blacker” in response to the US credit downgrade. (shrink)

Historically, there has been little agreement between advocates of radical financial reform and socialist theoreticians. However, in the new circumstances of the twenty-first century, a productive synthesis of these two traditions might be possible. Drawing on the franchise model of credit creation elaborated by Robert C. Hockett and the dysfunctions created by the extreme concentration of private financial institutions, this article outlines a reform agenda that would both democratize finance and facilitate the flow of funds into valuable forms of investment (...) that are currently starved for resources. If the new institutions envisioned in this proposal were able to take root and expand, they could ultimately facilitate a transition to socialism, defined as the subordination of the market to democratic politics. (shrink)

Despite the dominant role of market fundamentalist ideas in U.S. politics over the last thirty years, the Federal government has dramatically expanded its capacity to finance and support efforts of the private sector to commercialize new technologies. But the partisan logic of U.S. politics has worked to make these efforts invisible to mainstream public debate. The consequence is that while this “hidden developmental state” has had a major impact on the structure of the U.S. national innovation system, its ability to (...) be effective in the future is very much in doubt. The article ends by arguing that the importance of these developmental initiatives to the U.S. economy could present a significant opening for new progressive initiatives. (shrink)

While financial institutions have not figured prominently in utopian thinking, the democratization of finance is central to any vision of bringing contemporary economies under democratic control. This paper is an initial effort to conceptualize a series of feasible reforms that could incrementally weaken the power of incumbent financial institutions while helping to facilitate economic development that is more egalitarian and sustainable. While the focus is on the US economy, the specific ideas have relevance in other national contexts. The core of (...) the reform idea is to mobilize a combination of governmental supports and grassroots entrepreneurialism to create an expanding network of nonprofit financial institutions that would redirect household savings to finance clean energy, growth of small and medium-sized enterprises, and infrastructure. (shrink)

One of the most important issues concerning the foundations ofconscious perception centerson thequestion of whether perceptual consciousness is rich or sparse. The overflow argument uses a form of ‘iconic memory’ toarguethatperceptual consciousnessisricher (i.e.,has a higher capacity) than cognitive access: when observing a complex scene we are conscious of more than we can report or think about. Recently, the overflow argumenthas been challenged both empirically and conceptually. This paper reviews the controversy, arguing that proponents of sparse perception are committed to the (...) postulation of (i) a peculiar kind of generic conscious representation that has no independent rationale and (ii) an unmotivated form of unconscious representation that in some cases conflicts with what we know about unconscious representation. (shrink)

consciousness comes about as a result of irritating nervous tissue, is just as unaccountable as the appearance of Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp.

Is consciousness based in prefrontal circuits involved in cognitive processes like thought, reasoning, and memory or, alternatively, is it based in sensory areas in the back of the neocortex? The no-report paradigm has been crucial to this debate because it aims to separate the neural basis of the cognitive processes underlying post-perceptual decision and report from the neural basis of conscious perception itself. However, the no-report paradigm is problematic because, even in the absence of report, subjects might engage in post-perceptual (...) cognitive processing. Therefore, to isolate the neural basis of consciousness, a no-cognition paradigm is needed. Here, I describe a no-cognition approach to binocular rivalry and outline how this approach can help resolve debates about the neural basis of consciousness. (shrink)

I examine John Martin Fischer's attempt to block an argument for the conclusion that without alternative possibilities, morally deontic judgments (judgments of moral right, wrong, and obligation) cannot be true. I then criticize a recent attempt to sustain the principle that an agent is morally blameworthy for performing an action only if this action is morally wrong. I conclude with discussing Fisher's view that even if causal determinism undermines morally deontic judgments, it still leaves room for other significant (...) moral assessments including assessments of moral blameworthiness. (shrink)

The higher order approach to consciousness attempts to build a theory of consciousness from the insight that a conscious state is one that the subject is conscious of. There is a well-known objection1 to the higher order approach, a version of which is fatal. Proponents of the higher order approach have realized that the objection is significant. They have dealt with it via what David Rosenthal calls a “retreat” (2005b, p. 179) but that retreat fails to solve the problem.

This is my first publication of the distinction between phenomenal consciousness and access consciousness, though not using quite those terms. It ends with this: "The upshot is this: If Searle is using the access sense of "consciousness," his argument doesn't get to first base. If, as is more likely, he intends the what-it-is-like sense, his argument depends on assumptions about issues that the cognitivist is bound to regard as deeply unsettled empirical questions." Searle replies: "He refers to what he calls (...) an "access sense of consciousness." On my account there is no such sense.". (shrink)

This article compares the three frameworks for theories of consciousness that are taken most seriously by neuroscientists, the view that consciousness is a biological state of the brain, the global workspace perspective and an account in terms of higher order states. The comparison features the “explanatory gap” (Nagel, 1974; Levine, 1983) the fact that we have no idea why the neural basis of an experience is the neural basis of that experience rather than another experience or no experience at all. (...) It is argued that the biological framework handles the explanatory gap better than the global workspace of higher order views. The article does not discuss quantum theories or “panpsychist” accounts according to which consciousness is a feature of the smallest particles of inorganic matter (Chalmers, 1996; Rosenberg, 2004). Nor does it discuss the “representationist” proposals (Tye, 2000; Byrne, 2001a) that are popular among philosophers but not neuroscientists. (shrink)

This essay, written in memory of Erik Olin Wright, outlines nine characteristics of a future socialism. It elaborates socialism as a set of processes and institutional arrangements that would open the way to a society that is radically more democratic, more just, and more sustainable than the existing order.

Can we consciously see more items at once than can be held in visual working memory? This question has elud- ed resolution because the ultimate evidence is subjects’ reports in which phenomenal consciousness is filtered through working memory. However, a new technique makes use of the fact that unattended ‘ensemble prop- erties’ can be detected ‘for free’ without decreasing working memory capacity.