In this supplement to his study of monastic theology published in Bijdragen 57 381-404 Martijn Schrama demonstrates how in the development of the scholastic theology of the 13th century interest for the affect diminishes. However, where the affective moment is stimulated anew by the theologians of the Schola Augustiniana, it serves to emphasize the pastoral aspect of theology, in oppositition to the dogmatic aspect of the discipline.

This paper seeks to initiate a theory of “imaginative dialogues” by articulating four dialogical principles that enable such a dialogue to occur. It is part of a larger project that takes the Socratic dialogue, a widely utilized conversation technique in philosophy education, as a starting point and aims to reinterpret it by shifting emphasis to the pre-reflective, pre-linguistic, and multimodal aspects of dialogues, involving both their verbal and embodied dimensions. To integrate the verbal dimensions of a dialogue with its more (...) elusive embodied dimensions, the paper will examine the notion ‘dialogue’ from the perspective of two different strategies. The first strategy chiefly focuses on the dialogic encounter. The ‘in-between’ of this dialogic encounter enables something to emerge that transcends the individual perspective of the speakers involved. The second strategy is primarily concerned with internal differentiation. The minor differences that constitute this internal differentiation, differentiate a dialogue from within. These strategies are not mutually exclusive but indicate a variation in starting point and orientation. This paper proposes to combine these two strategies by linking accounts of the productive moments in verbal dialogues to an account of the imaginative potential of embodied dialogues. This will enable the articulation of four dialogical principles (derived from Lev Yakubinsky, Oswald Ducrot, Martin Buber, and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz) through which an imaginative dialogue can proceed. (shrink)

A central intuition many epistemologists seem to have is that knowledge is distinctively valuable. In his paper 'Radical Scepticism, Epistemic Luck and Epistemic Value', Duncan Pritchard rejects the virtue-theoretic explanation of this intuition. This explanation says that knowledge is distinctively valuable because it is a cognitive achievement. It is maintained, in the first place, that the arguments Pritchard musters against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement are unconvincing. It is argued, in the second place, that even if the (...) arguments against the thesis that knowledge is a cognitive achievement were convincing, there is another explanation of the intuition that knowledge has final value available: the question-relative treatment of knowledge. (shrink)

Subject sensitive invariantism is the view that whether a subject knows depends on what is at stake for that subject: the truth-value of a knowledge-attribution is sensitive to the subject's practical interests. I argue that subject sensitive invariantism cannot accept a very plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I argue, furthermore, that semantic contextualism and contrastivism can accept this plausible principle for memory to transmit knowledge. I conclude that semantic contextualism and contrastivism are in a dialectical position better than (...) subject sensitive invariantism is. (shrink)

This chapter provides an analysis of the often mentioned but rarely explained ‘systematicity’ of Proclus’ version of Neoplatonism, and an introduction into the basics of his metaphysics. Starting from the assumption that any philosophical system stems from the desire for explanations, and that for Platonists this involved bridging the opposition between explanandum and explanans, it formulates a number of ensuing requirements, which lead to the construction of what is generally called a philosophical system. The authors then show how this pans (...) out in Proclus’ metaphysics, specifically the One, causality, and triads. Finally, they address the relevance of all this for human life, and briefly evaluate the downsides of Proclus’ systematicity and what sets him apart from predecessors. (shrink)

En el siguiente estudio se evalúa un panorama con respecto al comportamiento sociológico en un preámbulo tanto antes durante y después de esta crisis social que se está viviendo debido a la pandemia de hoy en día. Por ello para sustentar dicha investigación se realizó un censo en el cuál, mediante el uso de herramientas estadísticas, se pudo realizar una comparación entre un antes y un durante de la pandemia, lo cual facilitaría intrínsicamente a la predicción de una denominada post (...) pandemia. En este texto se pretende detallar el proceso y forma de la encuesta, al igual que los resultados obtenidos de la misma. Se proveen, además, posibles explicaciones para estos resultados, guiándose por las restricciones de salud nacionales como posibles razones para el cambio de comportamiento actual. Palabras Clave: coronavirus, pandemia, frecuencia de salida. Referencias [1]P. Byass, «Eco-epidemiological assessment of the COVID-19 epidemic in China, January-February 2020,» Web Of Science, vol. 13, nº 1, 2020. [2]P. Stefanoni, «Brasil: pandemia, guerra cultural y precariedad,» Nueva Sociedad, pp. 49-59, 2020. [3]M. J. Báguena Cervellera, «La pandemia de COVID-19 a la luz de la historia de la medicina,» Investigación y Ciencia, 2020. [4]A. Levy, «La pandemia de COVID-19 podr{ia ayudar a resolver una gran incógnita climática,» Investigación y Ciencia, 2020. [5]T. Marcel Ariel, «Relaciones en tiempos de pandemia: COVID-19 y bienestar animal, ambiental y humano,» Revista Facultad Nacional De Agronomia Medellin, vol. 2, 2020. [6]F. Manrique-Abril, «Modelo SIR de la pandemia de Covid-19 en Colombia/SIR model of the COVID-19 pandemic in Colombia,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, pp. 1-6, 2020. [7]D. Arango-Londoño, «Predicciones de un modelo SEIR para casos de COVID-19 en Cali, Colombia/Predictions of a SEIR model for COVID-19 cases in Cali-Colombia,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 1-9, 2020. [8]J. Gonzales-Castillo, «Pandemia de la COVID-19 y las Políticas de Salud Pública en el Perú: marzo-mayo 2020/COVID-19 pandemic and Public Health Policies in Peru: March-May 2020,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº2, pp. 1-9, 2020. [9]A. Valenzuela-Cazés y L. Becerra-Ostos, «Práctica clínica, ámbito laboral y riesgos de la fisioterapia ante el COVID-19/Clinical practice, work and risks of physical therapy in the face of COVID-19,» Revista De Salúd Publica, vol. 22, nº 2, pp. 1-4, 2020. [10]P. Montes-Alarcón y A. Campo-Arias, «Los médicos generales y la salud mental en la pandemia por COVID-19,» Duazary, vol. 17, nº 3, pp. 4-6, 2020. (shrink)

When reading, orthographic information is extracted not only from the word the reader is looking at, but also from adjacent words in the parafovea. Here we examined, using the recently introduced OB1‐reader computational model, how orthographic information can be processed in parallel across multiple words and how orthographic information can be integrated across time and space. Although OB1‐reader is a model of text reading, here we used it to simulate single‐word recognition experiments in which parallel processing has been shown to (...) play a role by manipulating the surrounding context in flanker and priming paradigms. In flanker paradigms, observers recognize a central word flanked by other letter strings located left and right of the target and separated from the target by a space. The model successfully accounts for the finding that such flankers can aid word recognition when they contain bigrams of the target word, independent of where those flankers are in the visual field. In priming experiments, in which the target word is preceded by a masked prime, the model accounts for the finding that priming occurs independent of whether the prime and target word are in the same location or not. Crucial to these successes is the key role that spatial attention plays within OB1‐reader, as it allows the model to receive visual input from multiple locations in parallel, while limiting the kinds of errors that can potentially occur under such spatial pooling of orthographic information. (shrink)

Amsterdam University Press is a leading publisher of academic books, journals and textbooks in the Humanities and Social Sciences. Our aim is to make current research available to scholars, students, innovators, and the general public. AUP stands for scholarly excellence, global presence, and engagement with the international academic community.

One of the most important questions about divine revelation is the question – what is the nature of divine revelation? This conceptual question even precedes such epistemological questions as whether we can know that a divine revelation occurred, or whether divine revelation can produce religious knowledge. In this paper, I argue for a particular analysis of the concept of divine revelation. Key to my proposal is that ‘to reveal’ is a term of epistemic appraisal: if a subject revealed a proposition (...) to a receiver, then this implies that the receiver actually accepted the information offered. I will end this paper by investigating what the consequences of my proposal are for answering the two epistemological questions. (shrink)

While Minsky’s work is often identified with the critique of financial speculation, this paper argues that there is a different side to his work. We argue that Minsky can be read as offering a post-foundational perspective on political economy that recognizes the speculative dimension of all economic activity. This post-foundational reading allows for an understanding of neoliberal policymaking in terms of the provision of liquidity to too-big-to-fail constituencies. The article discusses how some segments of Western societies have been able to (...) participate in the inflationary logic of this too-big-to-fail dynamic, whereas others are locked out and face increasingly tight liquidity constraints. This differential access to liquidity is an increasingly central aspect of the stratifying rationality of contemporary capitalism. By connecting Minsky’s insights into the temporal logic of capital to key issues in social theory, the article presents a new theorization of (il)liquid life that advances on extant accounts. (shrink)

In cases of imaginative contagion, imagining something has doxastic or doxastic-like consequences. In this reply to Tamar Szabó Gendler's article in this collection, I investigate what the philosophical consequences of these cases could be. I argue (i) that imaginative contagion has consequences for how we should understand the nature of imagination and (ii) that imaginative contagion has consequences for our understanding of what belief-forming mechanisms there are. Along the way, I make some remarks about what the consequences of the contagion (...) cases are for the relation between knowledge and imagination. (shrink)

Contextualist theories of knowledge have received a lot of attention in the contemporary epistemological literature. The central idea of such theories is that contextual factors play an important role in determining whether a particular knowledge sentence is true or false. Thus, on contextualist theories of knowledge it might be the case that a particular subject knows a proposition in one context but fails to know that same proposition in another context--while the only thing that has changed is the context. Of (...) the extant contextualist theories of knowledge, attributer contextualism (that is, the type of contextualism that makes the context of the attributer of knowledge crucial in determining whether a subject knows a proposition) has been discussed the most. The papers in the present collection continue this focus on attributer contextualism, and offer a fairly critical treatment of this theory. Nevertheless, a number of papers also outline new types of contextualism. What results is a collection of papers that, though negative towards attributer contextualism, for the most part is sympathetic towards contextualism in general. (shrink)

In this paper I defend biblical miracles against the popular objection that they are impossible. Doing this requires three stages of development. First, we need to know what miracles are: if we do not know this, how can we then argue that miracles are not impossible? I start out by distinguishing between two categories of miracles: subjective miracles and objective miracles. Then I go on to point out that there are two types of subjective miracles as well as two types (...) of objective miracles. Second, we need to know what the concept ‘impossible’ means: if we do not know this, how can we then argue that miracles are not impossible? I say that there are at least three senses in which we can use the word ‘impossible’. Third, we need to show that miracles are not impossible . After having show that miracles are not impossible , I draw three theological and hermeneutical consequences from the preceding discussion. (shrink)

Computational modeling of the brain holds great promise as a bridge from brain to behavior. To fulfill this promise, however, it is not enough for models to be 'biologically plausible': models must be structurally accurate. Here, we analyze what this entails for so-called psychobiological models, models that address behavior as well as brain function in some detail. Structural accuracy may be supported by (1) a model's a priori plausibility, which comes from a reliance on evidence-based assumptions, (2) fitting existing data, (...) and (3) the derivation of new predictions. All three sources of support require modelers to be explicit about the ontology of the model, and require the existence of data constraining the modeling. For situations in which such data are only sparsely available, we suggest a new approach. If several models are constructed that together form a hierarchy of models, higher-level models can be constrained by lower-level models, and low-level models can be constrained by behavioral features of the higher-level models. Modeling the same substrate at different levels of representation, as proposed here, thus has benefits that exceed the merits of each model in the hierarchy on its own. (shrink)

This article engages with current discussions on the politics of aesthetics to theorize the role of popular art in reproducing or contesting urban orders. Specifically, we engage with scholars who have taken up the work of Jacques Rancière to understand how power structures are normalized through ‘the distribution of the sensible’. Building on and critically engaging with debates on the ‘post-political city’, we suggest that all too often scholars fall back on a binary, state-centric approach that depicts non-state popular aesthetics (...) as either revolutionary and disruptive, or as indicative of an alternative form of oppression. Drawing on our work in Kingston, Jamaica, and Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, we argue that sensorial-political, art-based urban struggles shape multiple urban orders that are distinct but not necessarily antagonistic. Applying Stuart Hall’s work on popular culture to contexts of criminal governance, we show how art is often simultaneously supportive and disruptive of urban orders. (shrink)

In order to explain such puzzling cases as the Bank Case and the Airport Case, semantic contextualists defend two theses. First, that the truth-conditions of knowledge sentences fluctuate in accordance with features of the conversational context. Second, that this fluctuation can be explained by the fact that 'knows' is an indexical. In this paper, I challenge both theses. In particular, I argue (i) that it isn't obvious that 'knows' is an indexical at all, and (ii) that contrastivism can do the (...) same work as contextualism is supposed to do, without being linguistically implausible. (shrink)

One of the hardest questions to answer for a (Neo)platonist is to what extent and how the changing and unreliable world of sense perception can itself be an object of scientific knowledge. My dissertation is a study of the answer given to that question by the Neoplatonist Proclus (Athens, 411-485) in his Commentary on Plato’s Timaeus. I present a new explanation of Proclus’ concept of nature and show that philosophy of nature consists of several related subdisciplines matching the ontological stratification (...) of nature. Moreover, I demonstrate that for Proclus philosophy of nature is a science, albeit a hypothetical one, which takes geometry as its methodological paradigm. I also offer an explanation of Proclus’ view of what is later called the mathematization of physics, i.e. the role of the substance of mathematics, as opposed to its method, in explaining the natural world. Finally, I discuss Proclus’ views of the discourse of philosophy of nature and its iconic character. (shrink)

-/- In Plato's work the "Sophist", Socrates, who typically occupies a central position in Plato's dialogues, is assigned a supporting role. This has led some scholars to argue for a shift in Plato's oeuvre, where he distances himself from Socrates and introduces a new main protagonist. However, this new protagonist remains unnamed and is only identified by his social position as Xenos, indicating that he is an outsider and a stranger whose identity is ambiguous. In this article, I argue that (...) Plato's decision to leave the character unnamed serves to raise a first problem: the question of whether this stranger is a friend or an adversary of philosophy. At the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates employs a series of references to Homer to bring into play a second problem: the problem of disguise. The third problem, “What is a sophist?”, is attributed to the Xenos. This is the only problem that is explicitly developed and is, therefore, the most prominent in the dialogue. If we relate these three problems to each other, it becomes clear that they represent contradictory intuitions without providing us with a strict criterion for deciding which of these intuitions is correct. By presenting these problems in their entanglement without providing a way out, Plato invites his readers to think without making explicit what the outcome of this thinking should be. -/- [In Dutch: In de "Sofist" speelt Sokrates, vaak het meest prominente personage in Plato’s dialogen, alleen maar een bijrol. Dit heeft veel interpreten ertoe verleid om een breuk in het oeuvre van Plato te postuleren, waarbij Plato afstand zou nemen van Sokrates ten behoeve van een nieuw personage. Ik zal echter laten zien dat Plato er bewust voor kiest om dit nieuwe personage naamloos te laten en hem alleen aan te duiden via zijn sociale positie als xenos (vreemdeling). Hiermee roept Plato, zo zal ik betogen, impliciet een eerste probleem op: is deze naamlo- ze Xenos een vriend of een vijand van de filosofie? Aan het begin van de dialoog wordt er door Sokrates een tweede probleem in spel gebracht: het probleem van de vermomming. Het derde probleem — ‘wat is een sofist?’ — wordt toegeschreven aan de Xenos. Dit is het enige probleem dat expliciet wordt uitgewerkt en is dan ook het meest prominent aanwezig in de dialoog. Als we deze drie problemen op elkaar betrekken dan wordt duidelijk dat ze tegenstrijdige intuïties vertolken, zonder dat we een strikt criterium krijgen aangereikt om te beslissen welke van deze intuïties de juiste is. Door deze problemen in een nog niet ontwarde kluwen te presenteren, nodigt Plato zijn lezers uit tot denken, zonder expliciet te maken wat de uitkomst van dit denken zou moeten zijn.]. (shrink)

This reflection focuses on what insights Catholic Social Teaching can provide for corporate governance. I argue that the ‘standard’ agency theory is overly reductionist and insufficiently incorporates important economic limitations as well as human frailty. As a result, such agency theory insufficiently distinguishes firms from markets, which can easily relativize how we treat others and facilitate rationalization of unethical behavior. I then explore how three pillars of CST—human dignity, solidarity, and subsidiarity—can help overcome these limitations. CST proposes a vision of (...) the business corporation as a community of persons, working together in cooperative business relationships toward the shared purpose of contributing to human flourishing. (shrink)

Privacy is valued by many. But what it means to have privacy remains less than clear. In this paper, I argue that the notion of privacy should be understood in epistemic terms. What it means to have (some degree of) privacy is that other persons do not stand in significant epistemic relations to those truths one wishes to keep private.

Background In the Netherlands, people can receive (limited) demedicalised assistance in suicide (DAS)—an option less well known than physician-assisted dying (PAD). Aim This study explores which trajectories people take to seek DAS, through open-coding and inductive analysis of in-depth interviews with 17 people who receive(d) DAS from counsellors facilitated by foundation De Einder. Results People sought DAS as a result of current suffering or as a result of anticipating possible prospective suffering. People with current suffering were unable or assumed they (...) would be unable to obtain PAD. For people anticipating possible prospective suffering, we distinguished two trajectories. In one trajectory, people preferred PAD but were not reassured of help by the physician in due time and sought DAS as a backup plan. In the other trajectory, people expressed a preference for DAS mainly as a result of emphasising self-determination, independence, taking their own responsibility and preparing suicide carefully. In all trajectories, dissatisfaction with physician–patient communication—for instance about (a denied request for) PAD or fearing to discuss this—influenced the decision to seek DAS. Conclusions While PAD is the preferred option of people in two trajectories, obtaining PAD is uncertain and not always possible. Dissatisfaction with physician–patient communication can result in the physician not being involved in DAS, being unable to diagnose diseases and offer treatment nor offer reassurance that people seem to seek. We plea for more mutual understanding, respect and empathy for the limitations and possibilities of the position of the physician and the patient in discussing assistance in dying. (shrink)

Standardisation is increasingly seen as a means to insert ethics in innovation processes. We examine the institutionalisation of responsible innovation in de jure standardisation as this is an important but unexplored research area. In de jure standardisation, stakeholders collaborate in committees to develop standards. We adopt the anticipation, inclusion, reflexivity, and responsiveness responsible innovation framework as our theoretical lens. Our study suggests that responsible standardisation processes should embody forms of these four dimensions. We investigate the institutionalisation of these dimensions and (...) identify 96 factors that can motivate, hinder, or facilitate responsible standardisation. Factors were found through in-depth interviews with managers of a standard developing organisation. These are subsequently validated/rejected using surveys completed by committee representatives. The results suggest that the social desirability of standards is not self-evident. This study could pave the way for future research on responsible standardisation processes, complementing research on legitimacy, responsible innovation, and standardisation. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Millennium Jahrgang: 11 Heft: 1 Seiten: 69-100.

This chapter discusses a central problem in Sebastian Rödl’s Self-Consciousness & Objectivity (SC&O) and in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus. In a statement of the form “I think p”, the words “I think” do not contribute to the content and yet they are not redundant. What comes to the same, a thinking subject is not something and yet not nothing. But then in what sense is a thinking subject a part of the world? The problem is intractable on a merely negative understanding of (...) “I think”, like Anscombe’s merely negative thesis, endorsed by SC&O, that “I” is not a referring expression. In search of a positive understanding, this chapter proposes to understand “I think” by comparison to “hello”. A speaking subject is the expression of mutual presence in conversation — in that sense a limit of the world. Such expression may be compared to facial expression, with the crucial difference that a verbal expression can be taken up - repeated - in the third person. A speaking subject, then, is potentially absent from conversation — in that sense a part of the world. (shrink)

[Presented at the 52nd Annual Conference of the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP), University of Oregon, 24-26 October. Part of the panel Events, Actions and the Problem of Agency in the Wake of Deleuze’s Logic of Sense, organized in collaboration with Sean Bowden and James Williams.] In this paper I will bring the positions of Gilles Deleuze and Paul Ricoeur into proximity with each other in order to draw out points of conflict. I do not aim to solve (...) these conflicts, nor to develop them into a full clash. Rather, I will show that both Ricoeur and Deleuze develop a theory of novelty that can be characterized as a reversal of Platonism. These theories are not opposed per se, but they differ in orientation. Deleuze situates novelty in the virtual event. This virtual event can be understood as a singular point of transition that transforms one system into another. Or to catch the event in a somewhat more concrete image, it is a kind of metamorphosis (in Kafka’s sense). In contrast, Ricoeur situates novelty in human actions that are played out as a fruitful tension between two poles. This tension opens up a field of potentiality in which new ideas and novel meanings can emerge. Ricoeur has analysed this tension on many levels. Its most basic structure can be found in what Ricoeur calls a living metaphor. This living metaphor is itself something ‘in action’; it brings two opposed semantic fields into a fruitful tension with each other. This tension reveals a previously unnoticed proximity between these two semantic fields, without destroying their distance. In this way a new, third semantic field is opened up that is only given in potential. Ricoeur argues that it is within tensions like this that generative differences arise, resulting in new ideas and novel meanings. The main point of divergence between Deleuze and Ricoeur can therefore be framed in two contrasting pairs: virtual event versus human action; point of transition versus tension (or: metamorphosis versus metaphor). (shrink)

Many philosophers are building a solid case in favour of the knowledge account of assertion (KAA). According to KAA, if one asserts that P one represents oneself as knowing that P. KAA has recently received support from linguistic data about prompting challenges, parenthetical positioning and predictions. In this article, I add another argument to this rapidly growing list: an argument from what I will call ‘reinforcing parenthesis’.

This article discusses the possibility of a rationally justified choice between two options neither of which is better than the other while they are not equally good either (‘3NT’). Joseph Raz regards such options as incomparable and argues that reason cannot guide the choice between them. Ruth Chang, by contrast, tries to show that many cases of putative incomparability are instead cases of parity—a fourth value relation of comparability, in addition to the three standard value relations ‘better than’, ‘worse than’ (...) and ‘equally good as’. It follows, she argues, that many choice situations in which rationally justified choice seems precluded are in fact situations within the reach of practical reason. This article has three aims: (1) it challenges Chang’s argument for the possibility of parity; (2) it demonstrates that, even if parity would exist, its problematic implications for practical reason would not differ from those of Raz’s incomparability; (3) it discusses the underlying cause of hard cases of comparison: the fact that none of the three standard value relations applies (‘3NT’). It will be shown that the problematic implications for the rational justification of the choice are due to 3NT itself, irrespective of whether 3NT is explained as incomparability or parity. (shrink)

How the Author Disappeared from Wittgenstein’s Tractatus In this essay, I investigate the status of the written word in the (early, mostly) work of Wittgenstein. In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Wittgenstein tends to imagine language as written rather than spoken. This focus on writing goes together with a sense that the author is absent from the text. I argue that the problem is not with writing in general but specifically with books, and more specifically with the fantasy of a book of (...) everything, the importance of which to Wittgenstein’s early work was brought out by Eli Friedlander. On my account, such a book, by pretending to contain the whole world, leaves no place for an author. Since the early Wittgenstein imagines subjectivity in the form of a book of everything, he is unable to place subjectivity – subjects: you and I – in the world. I end by briefly suggesting that in his later work, Wittgenstein gives up on the fantasy of a book of everything and is in a better position to address the problem of finding subjectivity in the world. (shrink)