Category Theory

There is some consensus among orthodox category theorists that the concept of adjoint functors is the most important concept contributed to mathematics by category theory. We give a heterodox treatment of adjoints using heteromorphisms that parses an adjunction into two separate parts. Then these separate parts can be recombined in a new way to define a cognate concept, the brain functor, to abstractly model the functions of perception and action of a brain. The treatment uses relatively simple category theory and (...) is focused on the interpretation and application of the mathematical concepts. (shrink)

In this paper, we develop a mathematical model of awareness based on the idea of plurality. Instead of positing a singular principle, telos, or essence as noumenon, we model it as plurality accessible through multiple forms of awareness (“n-awareness”). In contrast to many other approaches, our model is committed to pluralist thinking. The noumenon is plural, and reality is neither reducible nor irreducible. Nothing dies out in meaning making. We begin by mathematizing the concept of awareness by appealing to the (...) mathematical formalism of higher category theory. The beauty of higher category theory lies in its universality. Pluralism is categorical. In particular, we model awareness using the theories of derived categories and (infinity, 1)-topoi which will give rise to our meta-language. We then posit a “grammar” (“n-declension”) which could express n-awareness, accompanied by a new temporal ontology (“n-time”). Our framework allows us to revisit old problems in the philosophy of time: how is change possible and what do we mean by simultaneity and coincidence? Another question which could be re-conceptualized in our model is one of soteriology related to this pluralism: what is a self in this context? A new model of “personal identity over time” is thus introduced. (shrink)

Recent developments in pure mathematics and in mathematical logic have uncovered a fundamental duality between "existence" and "information." In logic, the duality is between the Boolean logic of subsets and the logic of quotient sets, equivalence relations, or partitions. The analogue to an element of a subset is the notion of a distinction of a partition, and that leads to a whole stream of dualities or analogies--including the development of new logical foundations for information theory parallel to Boole's development of (...) logical finite probability theory. After outlining these dual concepts in mathematical terms, we turn to a more metaphysical speculation about two dual notions of reality, a fully definite notion using Boolean logic and appropriate for classical physics, and the other objectively indefinite notion using partition logic which turns out to be appropriate for quantum mechanics. The existence-information duality is used to intuitively illustrate these two dual notions of reality. The elucidation of the objectively indefinite notion of reality leads to the "killer application" of the existence-information duality, namely the interpretation of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

This paper shows how the universals of category theory in mathematics provide a model (in the Platonic Heaven of mathematics) for the self-predicative strand of Plato's Theory of Forms as well as for the idea of a "concrete universal" in Hegel and similar ideas of paradigmatic exemplars in ordinary thought. The paper also shows how the always-self-predicative universals of category theory provide the "opposite bookend" to the never-self-predicative universals of iterative set theory and thus that the paradoxes arose from having (...) one theory (e.g., Frege's Paradise) where universals could be either self-predicative or non-self-predicative (instead of being always one or always the other). (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to show that the dual notions of elements & distinctions are the basic analytical concepts needed to unpack and analyze morphisms, duality, and universal constructions in the Sets, the category of sets and functions. The analysis extends directly to other concrete categories (groups, rings, vector spaces, etc.) where the objects are sets with a certain type of structure and the morphisms are functions that preserve that structure. Then the elements & distinctions-based definitions can be (...) abstracted in purely arrow-theoretic way for abstract category theory. In short, the language of elements & distinctions is the conceptual language in which the category of sets is written, and abstract category theory gives the abstract arrows version of those definitions. (shrink)

Saunders Mac Lane famously remarked that "Bourbaki just missed" formulating adjoints in a 1948 appendix (written no doubt by Pierre Samuel) to an early draft of Algebre--which then had to wait until Daniel Kan's 1958 paper on adjoint functors. But Mac Lane was using the orthodox treatment of adjoints that only contemplates the object-to-object morphisms within a category, i.e., homomorphisms. When Samuel's treatment is reconsidered in view of the treatment of adjoints using heteromorphisms or hets (object-to-object morphisms between objects in (...) different categories), then he, in effect, isolated the concept of a left representation solving a universal mapping problem. When dualized to obtain the concept of a right representation, the two halves only need to be united to obtain an adjunction. Thus Samuel was only a now-simple dualization away for formulating adjoints in 1948. Apparently, Bodo Pareigis' 1970 text was the first and perhaps only text to give the heterodox "new characterization" (i.e., heteromorphic treatment) of adjoints. Orthodox category theory uses various relatively artificial devices to avoid formally recognizing hets--even though hets are routinely used by the working mathematician. Finally we consider a "philosophical" question as to whether the most important concept in category theory is the notion of an adjunction or the notion of a representation giving a universal mapping property (where adjunctions arise as the special case of a bi-representation of dual universal mapping problems). (shrink)

This essay endeavors to define the concept of indefinite extensibility in the setting of category theory. I argue that the generative property of indefinite extensibility for set-theoretic truths in category theory is identifiable with the Grothendieck Universe Axiom and the elementary embeddings in Vopenka's principle. The interaction between the interpretational and objective modalities of indefinite extensibility is defined via the epistemic interpretation of two-dimensional semantics. The semantics can be defined intensionally or hyperintensionally. By characterizing the modal profile of $\Omega$-logical validity, (...) and thus the generic invariance of mathematical truth, modal coalgebras are further capable of capturing the notion of definiteness for set-theoretic truths, in order to yield a non-circular definition of indefinite extensibility. (shrink)

Lecture Notes On Eric Schmid's "Prospectus to a Homotopic Metatheory of Language" Presented at the Book Release Event at Triest Gallery (NYC) on January 19, 2024 -/- Prospectus to a Homotopic Metatheory of Language by Eric Schmid proposes that mathematics does not involve the discovery of a synthetic a priori. In other words, mathematics is not a stable transcendent object of knowledge. Instead, Schmid defines math as a language that depends on an infinitely large network topology of inferences. Importantly, this (...) metatheory can be applied not just to the disciplinary specific languages of computer & natural science, but also ordinary & public languages. Mathematics is not the discovery of transcendent concepts, but a dynamic evolving language of inquiry. (shrink)

This sketch of a perhaps future 'Elementary Theory of the Category of Mereological Sums (including Mereological Wholes and Parts)' relates to my previous papers "The Topos of Emergence" and "Intelligible Gunk". I assert that for successfully categorizing Mereology one has to start with a specific setting of gunk. In this paper we will give a sketch of a categorically version of particular mereological structures. I.e. we will follow the example of F.W.Lawvere’s “An elementary theory of the category of sets” -/- (...) where he introduced a categorised version of set theory. We refer to sirenians mainly for the reason that they are the closest living relatives of elephants. -/- But they are also rather underestimated creatures - at the first moment rather dull and clumsy, but moving gracefully and elegant in their natural habitat.And some sailors already reckognized their bewitching attraction before we did.Yet we still think this sirenia is a modest creature compared with the elephant in the room. (shrink)

What is cognition? Equivalently, what is cognition good for? Or, what is it that would not be but for human cognition? But for human cognition, there would not be science. Based on this kinship between individual cognition and collective science, here we put forward Isbell conjugacy---the adjointness between objective geometry and subjective algebra---as a scientific method for developing cognitive science. We begin with the correspondence between categorical perception and category theory. Next, we show how the Gestalt maxim is subsumed by (...) the mathematical construct of colimit, a generalization of summation. The universal mapping property definitions of mathematical constructs, by virtue of being the best with respect to the universe of discourse, can be learned using reinforcement learning algorithms, which raises the possibility of abstracting the architecture of mathematics by artificial intelligence. Subsequently, we present naturality (to be contrasted with miracles), understood as 'Becoming consistent with Being', which governs the transformations of both things and their theories, as the zeroth law of change. Furthermore, the contrast---physical [mechanism] vs. biological [organism]---is smoothed via natural transformation, wherein transformations are respectful of the cohesion of the objects transformed. In closing, upon recognizing the scientific value of learning difficult-to-master differential calculus by physicists, of learning a strange four-letter language by biologists, and of learning the grammar of our respective mother tongues, we make a case for learning the theory of naturality / category theory for developing cognitive science. (shrink)

A quick introduction to category theory and topos theory, axiomatically. These notes are adapted from Prof. Pettigrew’s notes.

This Gentle Introduction is very much still work in progress. Roughly aimed at those who want something a bit more discursive, slower-moving, than Awodey's or Leinster's excellent books. -/- The current [Jan 2018] version is 291pp.

Scientists and philosophers frequently speak about levels of description, levels of explanation, and ontological levels. This paper presents a framework for studying levels. I give a general definition of a system of levels and discuss several applications, some of which refer to descriptive or explanatory levels while others refer to ontological levels. I illustrate the usefulness of this framework by bringing it to bear on some familiar philosophical questions. Is there a hierarchy of levels, with a fundamental level at the (...) bottom? And what does the answer to this question imply for physicalism, the thesis that everything supervenes on the physical? Are there emergent higher-level properties? Are higher-level descriptions reducible to lower-level ones? Can the relationship between normative and non-normative domains be viewed as one involving levels? And might a levelled framework shed light on the relationship between third-personal and first-personal phenomena? (shrink)

Yale Gallery Talk, Language Perception and Representation Tanya Kelley and James Prosek Linguist and artist Tanya Kelley, Ph.D., and artist, writer, and naturalist James Prosek, B.A. 1997, discuss color manuals used by artist-naturalists and biologists and lead visitors in close looking and drawing. Presented in conjunction with the exhibition James Prosek: Art, Artifact, Artifice. Space is limited. Open to: General Public .

Zero has been axial in human development, but the origin and discovery of zero has never been satisfactorily addressed by a comprehensive, systematic and above all interdisciplinary research program. In this volume, over 40 international scholars explore zero under four broad themes: history; religion, philosophy & linguistics; arts; and mathematics & the sciences. Some propose that the invention/discovery of zero may have been facilitated by the prior evolution of a sophisticated concept of Nothingness or Emptiness (as it is understood in (...) non-European traditions); and conversely, inhibited by the absence of, or aversion to, such a concept of Nothingness in the West. But not all scholars agree. Join the debate. (shrink)

Practical approaches to the notions of subsets and extension sets are compared, coming from broadly set-theoretic and category-theoretic traditions of mathematics. I argue that the set-theoretic approach is the most practical for ‘looking down’ or ‘in’ at subsets and the category-theoretic approach is the most practical for ‘looking up’ or ‘out’ at extensions, and suggest some guiding principles for using these approaches without recourse to either category theory or axiomatic set theory.

-/- This volume brings together scholars across various domains of the history and philosophy of mathematics, investigating duality as a multi-faceted phenomenon. Encompassing both systematic analysis and historical examination, the book endeavors to elucidate the status, roles, and dynamics of duality within the realms of 19th and 20th-century mathematics. Eschewing a priori notions, the contributors embrace the diverse interpretations and manifestations of duality, thus presenting a nuanced and comprehensive perspective on this intricate subject. -/- Spanning a broad spectrum of mathematical (...) topics and historical periods, the book uses detailed case studies to investigate the different forms in which duality appeared and still appears in mathematics, to study their respective histories, and to analyze interactions between the different forms of duality. The chapters inquire into questions such as the contextual occurrences of duality in mathematics, the influence of chosen forms of representation, the impact of investigations of duality on mathematical practices, and the historical interconnections among various instances of duality. Together, they aim to answer a core question: Is there such a thing as duality in mathematics, or are there just several things called by the same name and similar in some respect? What emerges is that duality can be considered as a basic structure of mathematical thinking, thereby opening new horizons for the research on the history and the philosophy of mathematics and the reflection on mathematics in general. -/- The volume will appeal not only to experts in the discipline but also to advanced students of mathematics, history, and philosophy intrigued by the complexities of this captivating subject matter. (shrink)

Notions such as śūnyatā, catuṣkoṭi, and Indra's net, which figure prominently in Buddhist philosophy, are difficult to readily accommodate within our ordinary thinking about everyday objects. Famous Buddhist scholar Nāgārjuna considered two levels of reality: one called conventional reality, and the other ultimate reality. Within this framework, śūnyatā refers to the claim that at the ultimate level objects are devoid of essence or "intrinsic properties", but are interdependent by virtue of their relations to other objects. Catuṣkoṭi refers to the claim (...) that four truth values, including contradiction, are admissible in reasoning. Indra's net refers to the claim that every part of a whole is reflective of the whole. Here we present category theoretic constructions that are reminiscent of these Buddhist concepts. The universal mapping property definition of mathematical objects, wherein objects of a universe of discourse are defined not in terms of their content, but in terms of their relations to all objects of the universe is reminiscent of śūnyatā. The objective logic of perception, with perception modeled as [a category of] two sequential processes (sensation followed by interpretation), and with its truth value object of four truth values, is reminiscent of the Buddhist logic of catuṣkoṭi. The category of categories, wherein every category has a subcategory of sets with zero structure within which every category can be modeled, is reminiscent of Indra's net. Our thorough elaboration of the parallels between Buddhist philosophy and category theory can facilitate better understanding of Buddhist philosophy, and bring out the broader philosophical import of category theory beyond mathematics. (shrink)

In this chapter, I use the language of category theory to address a relevant part of the Christian Trinitarian doctrine. Using a categorical conceptual apparatus usual to mathematicians, it is possible to represent important points of Trinitarian theology and show that such discourse can be considered free of contradictions. Problems concerning the Trinity are therefore approached from a category theory perspective.

The type-level abstraction is a formal way to represent molecular structures in biological practice. Graphical representations of molecular structures of biological objects are also used to identify functional processes of things. This paper will reveal that category theory is a formal mathematical language not only to visualize molecular structures of biological objects as type-level abstraction formally but also to understand how to infer biological functions from the molecular structures of biological objects. Category theory is a toolkit to understand biological knowledge (...) at the type-level formally, not individual token-level, as well as typical heuristic strategies in molecular biology. (shrink)

Science does not exist in vacuum; it arises and works in context. Ground-breaking achievements transforming the scientific landscape often stem from philosophical thought, just as symbolic logic and computer science were born from the early analytic philosophy, and for the very reason they impact our global worldview as a coherent whole as well as local knowledge production in different specialised domains. Here we take first steps in elucidating rich philosophical contexts in which Samson Abramsky’s far-reaching work centring around categorical science (...) as a new kind of science may be placed, explicated, and articulated. We argue, inter alia, that Abramsky’s work, as a whole, may be construed as demonstrating the categorical unity of science, or rather the sciences, in a mathematically rigorous, down-to-earth manner, which has been a salient feature of his work. At the same time we trace his intellectual history, leading from duality, to intensionality, and to contextuality, and place it in a broader context of philosophy beyond the analytic-continental divide, namely towards the reintegration of them as in the post-analytic tradition. Besides, we address issues in philosophy of category theory, such as the foundational autonomy of category theory and the (presumably two) dogmas of set-theoretical foundationalism, which Abramsky actually touch upon in one of his few philosophically inclined works. As to philosophy of category theory, we also address categorical structuralism as higher-order structuralism, categorical epistemology as elucidating higher-order meta-laws, and categorical ontology as allowing for reduction of ontological commitment via structural realism, the structuralist resolution of Benaceraff’s dilemma, and the pluralistic multiverse view of science as opposed to the set-theoretical reductionist ‘universe’ view. We conclude by speculating about the existence of the Oxford School of (Pluralistic) Unified Science as opposed to the Vienna Circle of (Monistic) Unified Science and to the Stanford School of (Pluralistic) Disunified Science; Categorical Unified Science may potentially allow us to reconcile the two camps on the unity and disunity of science whilst doing justice to both of them. Categorical unity arguably allows for unification via epistemological and ontological networking, and via knowledge transfer thus enabled, rather than unification via the reduction of everything and every truth to a single foundationalist framework, whilst taking at face value disunity, plurality, and diversity, and their significance in science and in human civilisation as a whole. (shrink)

The main research goal of the work is to study the notion of co-topos, its correctness, properties and relations with toposes. In particular, the dualization process proposed by proponents of co-toposes has been analyzed, which transforms certain Heyting algebras of toposes into co-Heyting ones, by which a kind of paraconsistent logic may appear in place of intuitionistic logic. It has been shown that if certain two definitions of topos are to be equivalent, then in one of them, in the context (...) of a subobject classifier, there should be a neutral label for the generic subobject, or if the label "true" appears instead, it carries no additional properties or assumptions. It has been shown that a natural isomorphism occurring in one of the definitions of topos need not be an isomorphism of the corresponding algebraic structures on the sets, so that a co-Heyting algebraic structure can be defined on the set of characteristic morphisms, which moreover will also be natural. The analyzes suggest that the notion of co-topos may be considered correct. However, it should be strongly emphasized that although the possibility of defining the notion of co-topos has been shown, its further full consequences should be very carefully examined, which can severely limit its logical applications. (shrink)

Categorial logic, as its name suggests, applies the techniques and machinery of category theory to topics traditionally classified as part of logic. We claim that these tools deserve attention from a greater range of philosophers than just the mathematical logicians. We support this claim with an example. In this paper we show how one particular tool from categorial logic---hyperdoctrines---suggests interesting metaphysics. Hyperdoctrines can provide semantics for quantified languages, but this account of quantification suggests a metaphysical picture quite different from the (...) one suggested by standard model-theoretic semantics. (shrink)

The Elementary Process Theory (EPT) is a collection of seven elementary process-physical principles that describe the individual processes by which interactions have to take place for repulsive gravity to exist. One of the two main problems of the EPT is that there is no proof that the four fundamental interactions (gravitational, electromagnetic, strong, and weak) as we know them can take place in the elementary processes described by the EPT. This paper sets forth the method by which it can be (...) proven that the EPT agrees with the knowledge that derives from the successful predictions of a modern interaction theory T. This determines a fundamentally new research program in theoretical physics. (shrink)

In this essay we introduce a new tool for studying the patterns of sentential reference within the framework introduced in [2] and known as the language of paradox $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ : strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ -homomorphisms. In particular, we show that (i) strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ -homomorphisms between $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ constructions preserve paradoxicality, (ii) many (but not all) earlier results regarding the paradoxicality of $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ constructions can be recast as special cases of our central result regarding (...) strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ -homomorphisms, and (iii) that we can use strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf { P}}$ -homomorphisms to provide a simple demonstration of the paradoxical nature of a well-known paradox that has not received much attention in this context: the McGee paradox. In addition, along the way we will highlight how strong $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ -homomorphisms highlight novel connections between the graph-theoretic analyses of paradoxes mobilized in the $\mathcal {L}_{\mathsf {P}}$ framework and the methods and tools of category theory. (shrink)

A formal model of abductive inference is provided in which abduction is conceived as expansive and contractive movements through a topological space of theoretical and practical commitments. A pair of presheaves over the space of commitments corresponds to communities sharing commitments on the one hand and possible obstructions to commitments on the other. In this framework, abductive inference is modeled by the dynamics of redistributed communities of commitment made in response to obstructive encounters. This semantic-pragmatic model shows how elementary category (...) theory tools can be used to formalize abductive inference while hewing close to ordinary intuitions about collective agency and reasoning. (shrink)

All biological objects in living systems are composed of their components. They are also involved in biological mechanisms that produce regular phenomena. Mechanistic philosophy is a recent framework for understanding biological sciences. In this dissertation, I will suggest a categorical formalism of mechanism supported by algebraic constraints by virtue of a mathematical language, category theory. First, I formalize the essential groundwork for mechanistic explanations, component parts, and activities by assuming that mechanistic explanations do not allow for infinite decomposition of components, (...) and that they essentially require explanatory baselines. Second, I formalize temporal organizations by introducing Petri nets and monoidal categories. Then, I argue that phenomenal models of mechanisms as explananda of mechanistic explanations are semantic interpretations of models of dynamical systems. By doing so, I show a mathematical alliance of dynamical systems with temporal organizations of biological mechanisms. Third, I formalize spatial organizations and argue that spatial organizations provide significant clues to make mechanistic explanations. Mechanistic explanations must include relevant components of a mechanism, particularly activities. Activities are responsible for producing explanandum phenomena. I will emphasize that spatially organized features of entities are prerequisite resources to determine relevant activities to produce explanandum phenomena. Further, we will notice that hierarchical relations are established between entities and their own sub-parts, not between a mechanism and components. Fourth, I will emphasize that constitutive relations are not associated with causation at all. Consequently, I conclude that categorical formalism is a promising approach to represent biological mechanisms and expect that the mechanistic philosophy will be positioned as an integrative framework of diverse scientific fields such as physics, chemistry, and biology. (shrink)

Frege’s Basic Law V and its successor, Boolos’s New V, are axioms postulating abstraction operators: mappings from the power set of the domain into the domain. Basic Law V proved inconsistent. New V, however, naturally interprets large parts of second-order ZFC via a construction discovered by Boolos in 1989. This paper situates these classic findings about abstraction operators within the general theory of F-algebras and coalgebras. In particular, we show how Boolos’s construction amounts to identifying an initial F-algebra in a (...) certain category, we identify a natural coalgebraic dual to Boolos’s axiom which naturally interprets large parts of Aczel’s non-well-founded set theory via the construction of a certain terminal F-coalgebra, and we suggest a coalgebraic way forward for an abstraction-theoretic axiomatization of the real numbers. (shrink)

Purity has been recognized as an ideal of proof. In this paper, I consider whether purity continues to have value in contemporary mathematics. The topics (e.g., algebraic topology, algebraic geometry, category theory) and methods of contemporary mathematics often favor unification and generality, values that are more often associated with impurity rather than purity. I will demonstrate this by discussing several examples of methods and proofs that highlight the epistemic significance of unification and generality. First, I discuss the examples of algebraic (...) invariants and of considering a mathematical object from several different perspectives to illustrate that the methods used in contemporary mathematics favor impurity. Then I consider an example from category theory which demonstrates how unification and generality are related to impurity and that impure solutions can be explanatory. In light of this discussion, we see that purity only has marginal value within contemporary mathematics which instead prioritizes the epistemic values associated with impurity. (shrink)

We make some beginning observations about the category Eq of equivalence relations on the set of natural numbers, where a morphism between two equivalence relations R and S is a mapping from the set of R-equivalence classes to that of S-equivalence classes, which is induced by a computable function. We also consider some full subcategories of Eq, such as the category Eq(Σ01) of computably enumerable equivalence relations (called ceers), the category Eq(Π01) of co-computably enumerable equivalence relations, and the category Eq(Dark*) (...) whose objects are the so-called dark ceers plus the ceers with finitely many equivalence classes. Although in all these categories the monomorphisms coincide with the injective morphisms, we show that in Eq(Σ01) the epimorphisms coincide with the onto morphisms, but in Eq(Π01) there are epimorphisms that are not onto. Moreover, Eq, Eq(Σ01), and Eq(Dark*) are closed under finite products, binary coproducts, and coequalizers, but we give an example of two morphisms in Eq(Π01) whose coequalizer in Eq is not an object of Eq(Π01). (shrink)

This book develops a theory of enriched meanings for natural language interpretation that uses the concept of monads and related ideas from category theory. The volume is interdisciplinary in nature, and will appeal to graduate students and researchers from a range of disciplines interested in natural language understanding and representation.

The standard topological representation of a Boolean algebra via the clopen sets of a Stone space requires a nonconstructive choice principle, equivalent to the Boolean Prime Ideal Theorem. In this article, we describe a choice-free topological representation of Boolean algebras. This representation uses a subclass of the spectral spaces that Stone used in his representation of distributive lattices via compact open sets. It also takes advantage of Tarski’s observation that the regular open sets of any topological space form a Boolean (...) algebra. We prove without choice principles that any Boolean algebra arises from a special spectral space X via the compact regular open sets of X; these sets may also be described as those that are both compact open in X and regular open in the upset topology of the specialization order of X, allowing one to apply to an arbitrary Boolean algebra simple reasoning about regular opens of a separative poset. Our representation is therefore a mix of Stone and Tarski, with the two connected by Vietoris: the relevant spectral spaces also arise as the hyperspace of nonempty closed sets of a Stone space endowed with the upper Vietoris topology. This connection makes clear the relation between our point-set topological approach to choice-free Stone duality, which may be called the hyperspace approach, and a point-free approach to choice-free Stone duality using Stone locales. Unlike Stone’s representation of Boolean algebras via Stone spaces, our choice-free topological representation of Boolean algebras does not show that every Boolean algebra can be represented as a field of sets; but like Stone’s representation, it provides the benefit of a topological perspective on Boolean algebras, only now without choice. In addition to representation, we establish a choice-free dual equivalence between the category of Boolean algebras with Boolean homomorphisms and a subcategory of the category of spectral spaces with spectral maps. We show how this duality can be used to prove some basic facts about Boolean algebras. (shrink)

In this short paper, using category theory, we argue that logical rules can be seen as fractions and logics as limit sketches.

This review of Alain Badiou’s The Pornographic Age—as well of the essays included in the book by William Watkin, A.J. Bartlett and Justin Clemens—illuminates that this is one of the few, if not only, texts where Badiou reverses the operational directionality of the event qua category theory, so as to “dis-image” power. In doing so, Badiou provides a theory of power based on intentionality and relation, rather than the more common Foucauldian genealogic-historical methodologies so often co-opted by contemporary thinkers of (...) biopolitics and power. Using Jean Genet’s play, The Balcony, as a fulcrum with which to strip apart the representative regime vis-à-vis the Platonic gesture, Badiou posits a politically exigent critique of contemporary neoliberal democracy. (shrink)

We present a category-theoretical analysis, based on the concept of generic figures, of a diagrammatic system for propositional logic ). The straightforward construction of a presheaf category \ of cuts-only Existential Graphs provides a basis for the further construction of the category \ which introduces variables in a reconstructedly generic, or label-free, mode. Morphisms in these categories represent syntactical embeddings or, equivalently but dually, extensions. Through the example of Peirce’s system, it is shown how the generic figures approach facilitates the (...) formal investigation of relations between syntax and semantics in such diagrammatic systems. (shrink)

Metalogic is an open-ended cognitive, formal methodology pertaining to semantics and information processing. The language that mathematizes metalogic is known as metalanguage and deals with metafunctions purely by extension on patterns. A metalogical process involves an effective enrichment in knowledge as logical statements, and, since human cognition is an inherently logic–based representation of knowledge, a metalogical process will always be aimed at developing the scope of cognition by exploring possible cognitive implications reflected on successive levels of abstraction. Indeed, it is (...) basically impracticable to maintain logic–and–metalogic without paying heed to cognitive theorizing. For it is cognitively irrelevant whether possible conclusions are deduced from some premises before the premises are determined to be true or whether the premises themselves are determined to be true first and, then, the conclusions are deduced from them. In this paper we consider the term metalogic as inherently embodied under the framework referred to as cognitive science and mathematics. We propose a metalogical interpretation of Arrow’s impossibility theorem and, to that end, choice theory is understood as a mental course of action dealing with logic and metalogic issues, in which a possible mathematical approach to model a mental course of action is adopted as a systematic operating method. Nevertheless, if we look closely at the core of Arrow’s impossibility theorem in terms of metalogic, a second fundamental contribution to this framework is represented by the Nash equilibrium. As a result of the foregoing, therefore, we prove the metalogical equivalence between Arrow’s impossibility theorem and the existence of the Nash equilibrium. More specifically, Arrow’s requirements correspond to the Nash equilibrium for finite mixed strategies with no symmetry conditions. To demonstrate this proof, we first verify that Arrow’s set and Nash’s set are isomorphic to each other, both sets being under stated conditions of non–symmetry. Then, the proof is completed by virtue of category theory. Indeed, the two sets are categories that correspond biuniquely to one another and, thus, it is possible to define a covariant functor that preserves their mutual structures. According to this, we show the proof–dedicated metalanguage as a precursor to a special equivalence theorem. (shrink)

Kosta Došen argued in his papers Inferential Semantics (in Wansing, H. (ed.) Dag Prawitz on Proofs and Meaning, pp. 147–162. Springer, Berlin 2015) and On the Paths of Categories (in Piecha, T., Schroeder-Heister, P. (eds.) Advances in Proof-Theoretic Semantics, pp. 65–77. Springer, Cham 2016) that the propositions-as-types paradigm is less suited for general proof theory because—unlike proof theory based on category theory—it emphasizes categorical proofs over hypothetical inferences. One specific instance of this, Došen points out, is that the Curry–Howard isomorphism (...) makes the associativity of deduction composition invisible. We will show that this is not necessarily the case. (shrink)

In the paper we discuss the problem of limitations of freedom in mathematics and search for criteria which would differentiate the new concepts stemming from the historical ones from the new concepts that have opened unexpected ways of thinking and reasoning. We also investigate the emergence of category theory and its origins. In particular we explore the origins of the term functor and present the strong evidence that Eilenberg and Carnap could have learned the term from Kotarbiński and Tarski.

It is well-established that topos theory is inherently connected with intuitionistic logic. In recent times several works appeared concerning so-called complement-toposes, which are allegedly connected to the dual to intuitionistic logic. In this paper I present this new notion, some of the motivations for it, and some of its consequences. Then, I argue that, assuming equivalence of certain two definitions of a topos, the concept of a complement-classifier is, at least in general and within the conceptual framework of category theory, (...) not appropriately defined. For this purpose, I first analyze the standard notion of a subobject classifier, show its connection with the representability of the functor Sub via the Yoneda lemma, recall some other properties of the internal structure of a topos and, based on these, I critically comment on the notion of a complement-classifier. (shrink)

Book review: Category Theory in Physics, Mathematics, and Philosophy, Kuś M., Skowron B., Springer Proc. Phys. 235, 2019, pp.xii+134.

In this paper, the class of Fidel-structures for the paraconsistent logic mbC is studied from the point of view of Model Theory and Category Theory. The basic point is that Fidel-structures for mbC can be seen as first-order structures over the signature of Boolean algebras expanded by two binary predicate symbols N and O satisfying certain Horn sentences. This perspective allows us to consider notions and results from Model Theory in order to analyze the class of mbC-structures. Thus, substructures, union (...) of chains, direct products, direct limits, congruences and quotient structures can be analyzed under this perspective. In particular, a Birkhoff-like representation theorem for mbC-structures as subdirect products in terms of subdirectly irreducible mbC-structures is obtained by adapting a general result for first-order structures due to Caicedo. Moreover, a characterization of all the subdirectly irreducible mbC-structures is also given. An alternative decomposition theorem is obtained by using the notions of weak substructure and weak isomorphism considered by Fidel for \documentclass[12pt]{minimal} \usepackage{amsmath} \usepackage{wasysym} \usepackage{amsfonts} \usepackage{amssymb} \usepackage{amsbsy} \usepackage{mathrsfs} \usepackage{upgreek} \setlength{\oddsidemargin}{-69pt} \begin{document}$$C_n$$\end{document}-structures. (shrink)

The different kinds of knowledge which were connected in Natural Philosophy (NP) have been later separated. The real separation came when Physics took its individuality and developed specific mathematical models, such as dynamic systems. These models are not adapted to an integral study of _living systems_, by which we mean evolutionary multi-level, multi-agent, and multi-temporality self-organized systems, such as biological, social, or cognitive systems. For them, the physical models can only be applied to the local dynamic of each co-regulator agent, (...) but not to the global dynamic intertwining these partial dynamics. To ‘revive’ NP, we present the Memory Evolutive Systems (MES) methodology which is based on a ‘dynamic’ Category Theory; it proposes an info-computational model for living systems. Among the main results: (i) a mathematical translation of the part⁻whole problem (using the categorical operation colimit) which shows how the different interpretations of the problem support diverging philosophical positions, from reductionism to emergentism and holism; (ii) an explanation of the emergence, over time, of structures and processes of increasing complexity order, through successive ‘complexification processes’. We conclude that MES provides an emergentist-reductionism model and we discuss the different meanings of the concept of _emergence_ depending on the context and the observer, as well as its relations with anticipation and creativity. (shrink)

Category theory reveals commonalities between structures of all sorts. This book shows its potential in science, engineering, and beyond.

Major figures of twentieth-century philosophy were enthralled by the revolution in formal logic, and many of their arguments are based on novel mathematical discoveries. Hilary Putnam claimed that the Löwenheim-Skølem theorem refutes the existence of an objective, observer-independent world; Bas van Fraassen claimed that arguments against empiricism in philosophy of science are ineffective against a semantic approach to scientific theories; W. V. O. Quine claimed that the distinction between analytic and synthetic truths is trivialized by the fact that any theory (...) can be reduced to one in which all truths are analytic. This book dissects these and other arguments through in-depth investigation of the mathematical facts undergirding them. It presents a systematic, mathematically rigorous account of the key notions arising from such debates, including theory, equivalence, translation, reduction, and model. The result is a far-reaching reconceptualization of the role of formal methods in answering philosophical questions. (shrink)

The eta rule for a set A says that an arbitrary element of A is judgementally identical to an element of constructor form. Eta rules are not part of what may be called canonical Martin-Löf type theory. They are, however, justified by the meaning explanations, and a higher-order eta rule is part of that type theory. The main aim of this paper is to clarify this somewhat puzzling situation. It will be argued that lower-order eta rules do not, whereas the (...) higher-order eta rule does, accord with the understanding of judgemental identity as definitional identity. A subsidiary aim is to clarify precisely what an eta rule is. This will involve showing how such rules relate to various other notions of type theory, proof theory, and category theory. (shrink)

The contributions gathered here demonstrate how categorical ontology can provide a basis for linking three important basic sciences: mathematics, physics, and philosophy. Category theory is a new formal ontology that shifts the main focus from objects to processes. The book approaches formal ontology in the original sense put forward by the philosopher Edmund Husserl, namely as a science that deals with entities that can be exemplified in all spheres and domains of reality. It is a dynamic, processual, and non-substantial ontology (...) in which all entities can be treated as transformations, and in which objects are merely the sources and aims of these transformations. Thus, in a rather surprising way, when employed as a formal ontology, category theory can unite seemingly disparate disciplines in contemporary science and the humanities, such as physics, mathematics and philosophy, but also computer and complex systems science. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)

Wittgenstein’s philosophy of mathematics is often devalued due to its peculiar features, especially its radical departure from any of standard positions in foundations of mathematics, such as logicism, intuitionism, and formalism. We first contrast Wittgenstein’s finitism with Hilbert’s finitism, arguing that Wittgenstein’s is perspicuous or surveyable finitism whereas Hilbert’s is transcendental finitism. We then further elucidate Wittgenstein’s philosophy by explicating his natural history view of logic and mathematics, which is tightly linked with the so-called rule-following problem and Kripkenstein’s paradox, yielding (...) vital implications to the nature of mathematical understanding, and to the nature of the certainty and objectivity of mathematical truth. Since the incompleteness theorems, foundations of mathematics have mostly lost their philosophical driving force, and anti-foundationalism has become prevalent and pervasive. Yet new foundations have nevertheless emerged and come into the scene, namely categorical foundations. We articulate the foundational significance of category theory by explicating three forms of foundations, i.e., global foundations, local foundations, and conceptual foundations. And we explore the possibility of categorical unified science qua pluralistic unified science, arguing for the categorical unity of science on both mathematical and philosophical grounds. We then turn to an issue in conceptual foundations of mathematics, namely the nature of the concept of space. We elucidate Wittgenstein’s intensional conception of space in relation to Brouwer’s theory of space continua and to the modern conception of space as point-free structure in category theory and algebraic geometry. We finally give a bird’s-eye view of mathematical philosophy from a Wittgensteinian perspective, and further sheds new light on Wittgenstein’s constructive structuralism and his view of incompleteness and contradictions in mathematics. (shrink)