In two experiments (total N=693) we explored whether people are willing to consider paintings made by AI-driven robots as art, and robots as artists. Across the two experiments, we manipulated three factors: (i) agent type (AI-driven robot v. human agent), (ii) behavior type (intentional creation of a painting v. accidental creation), and (iii) object type (abstract v. representational painting). We found that people judge robot paintings and human painting as art to roughly the same extent. However, people are much less (...) willing to consider robots as artists than humans, which is partially explained by the fact that they are less disposed to attribute artistic intentions to robots. (shrink)

Discussions of psychological measurement are largely disconnected from issues of measurement in the natural sciences. We show that there are interesting parallels and connections between the two, by focusing on a real and detailed example (temperature) from the history of science. More specifically, our novel approach is to study the issue of validity based on the history of measurement in physics, which will lead to three concrete points that are relevant for the validity debate in psychology. First of all, studying (...) the causal mechanisms underlying the measurements can be crucial for evaluating whether the measurements are valid. Secondly, psychologists would benefit from focusing more on the robustness of measurements. Finally, we argue that it is possible to make good science based on (relatively) bad measurements, and that the explanatory success of science can contribute to justifying the validity of measurements. (shrink)

Benjamin Libet’s work paved the way for the neuroscientific study of free will. Other scientists have praised this research as groundbreaking. In philosophy, the reception has been more negative, often even dismissive. First, I will propose a diagnosis of this striking discrepancy. I will suggest that the experiments seem irrelevant, from the perspective of philosophy, due to the way in which they operationalize free will. In particular, I will argue that this operational definition does not capture free will properly and (...) that it is based on a false dichotomy between internal and external causes. However, I will also suggest that this problem could be overcome, as there are no obvious obstacles to an operationalization of free will that is in accord with the philosophical conception of free will. (shrink)

According to Anscombe, acting intentionally entails knowledge in ac- tion. This thesis has been near-universally rejected due to a well-known counter- example by Davidson: a man intending to make ten legible carbon copies might not believe with confidence, and hence not know, that he will succeed. If he does, however, his action surely counts as intentional. Damaging as it seems, an even more powerful objection can be levelled against Anscombe: while act- ing, there is as yet no fact of the (...) matter as to whether the agent will succeed. Since his belief that he will is not yet true while his action is in progress, he can- not possibly know that he is indeed bringing about the intended goal. Knowl- edge in action is not only unnecessary for intentional action, it seems, but–at least as regards success-bound types of action–impossible to attain in the first place. -/- In this paper I argue that traditional strategies to counter these objections are unsatisfactory and propose a new account of knowledge in action which has two core features: (i) It invokes an externalist conception of justification which not only meets Davidson’s challenge, but also casts doubts on the tacit internalist premise on which his example relies. (ii) Drawing on recent work about by John MacFarlane, the proposed account conceives of claims to in action as assessment-sensitive so as to overcome the factivity objection. From a retrospective point of evaluation, previous claims about future events and actions can not only be deemed as having been true, but also as having been known. (shrink)

Este breve artigo traz em seu bojo a articulaçáo da compreensáo physiologica do corpo-carne em Epicuro com a Techne he Ietrike (Medicina Antiga), com vistas a mostrar o ethos (carater) comum à medicina e a filosofia na antiguidade.

The volume contains the written versions of all papers given at the workshop, divided into five chapters and followed by Alvin Goldman's replies in the sixth.

Resenha do livro "Morte", de Giovanni Casertano.

The articles in this special issue of the yearbook Logical Analysis and History of Philosophy all concern, in one way or another, Hume’s epistemology and metaphysics. There are discussions of our knowledge of causal powers, the extent to which conceivability is a guide to modality, and testimony; there are also discussions of our ideas of space and time, the role in Hume’s thought of the psychological mechanism of ‘completing the union’, the role of impressions, and Hume’s argument against the claim (...) that our perceptions are ‘locally conjoined’ with any entity (namely, a soul). (shrink)

I argue that Kant acknowledges two models of spontaneous self-determination that rational beings are capable of. The first model involves absolute unconditional necessity and excludes any form of contingency. The second model involves (albeit not as a matter of definition) a form of contingency which entails alternative possibilities for determining oneself. The first model would be exhibited by a divine being; the second model is exhibited by human beings. Human beings do, however, partake in the divine model up to an (...) extent, namely, as far as the legislative spontaneity of their law-giving faculties are concerned. I conclude by suggesting that for Kant, the mechanistic principle that we are exclusively determined by natural causes poses a twofold threat for human agency. In one respect (in relation to the second model), it threatens us with the obliteration of contingency, or with the universality of hypothetical necessity. But in another respect (in relation to the first model), it threatens us (and our putative "laws") with the obliteration of absolute necessity, or with the universality of contingency. (shrink)

This volume provides the reader with exclusive insights into Ernest Sosa’s latest ideas as well as main aspects of his philosophical work of the last 50 years. Ernest Sosa, one of the most distinguished contemporary philosophers, is best known for his ground-breaking work in epistemology, and has also contributed greatly to metaphysics, metaphilosophy and philosophy of language.

Ausgehend von historischen und sozialtheoretischen Befunden rekonstruieren wir zunächst in skizzenhafter Form, wie es zu einer Konstruktion von Behinderungen als Verkörperungen einer Mangelhaftigkeit anthropologischen Ausmaßes gekommen ist. In Anschluss hieran vertreten wir die These, dass Behinderung eine kulturelle Norm darstellt, die der Kultur selbst Grenzen setzt. Nicht der Mensch stellt das „eigentliche“ Mängelwesen dar, sondern die gesellschaftliche Kultur vorenthaltener oder eingeschränkter Teilhabe sowie die pädagogische Kultur mangelhafter Bildungsmaßnahmen. In ethischer Hinsicht begründen wir diese These von der Verantwortung gegenüber dem Anderen (...) her, dessen Andersheit wir als irreduzibel bzw. radikal fassen. Wir schließen mit einer kurzen Reflexion über die Frage, wie sich dieser veränderte Zugang zu Menschen mit Behinderungen bildungstheoretisch fassen lässt. (shrink)

Context: Cognitive science, as an interdisciplinary research endeavour, poses challenges for teaching and learning insofar as the integration of various participating disciplines requires a reflective approach, considering and making explicit different epistemological attitudes and hidden assumptions and premises. Only few curricula in cognitive science face this integrative challenge. Problem: The lack of integrative activities might result from different challenges for people involved in truly interdisciplinary efforts, such as discussing issues on a conceptual level, negotiating colliding frameworks or sets of premises, (...) asking profound questions challenging one’s own paradigm, and differences in terminologies, as well as from the “personal” challenge of realising one’s own limits of knowledge and, hence, the need to trust in another person’s expertise. This implies that the proposed curriculum structure provides an “epistemic laboratory”: a space for experiencing and negotiating, as well as constructing different viewpoints in a trustful setting. Approach: A newly-designed interdisciplinary cognitive science curriculum is presented that is based on a constructivist epistemology. We suggest that a careful construction of the learning space is a necessary requirement. The MEi:CogSci curriculum is designed and structured in such a way that enables didactical measures that allow for collaborative construction of meaning by discussing concepts, methods and terminologies and also hidden assumptions. Findings: The experience with four cohorts of students has shown that a truly interdisciplinary approach to cognitive science demands a different attitude towards knowledge as well as towards teaching and learning on both sides: the teacher and the student. The research orientation promotes an understanding of knowledge as something that is actively constructed, rendering the role of the teacher that of a co-learner rather than a transmitter of knowledge, thereby also changing the responsibility of students. (shrink)

Der zweite Band der Reihe Philosophische Forschung spannt zwei Kerngebiete der Analytischen Philosophie zusammen: die Semantik und die Ontologie. Was sind die Grundbausteine unserer Ontologie? Wie beziehen wir uns sprachlich bzw. geistig auf sie? Diese und weitere Fragen werden von international renommierten Philosophen aus historischer und systematischer Perspektive diskutiert. Die Beiträge sind in Deutsch und English verfasst. Sie stammen von Christian Beyer, Johannes Brandl, Dagfinn Føllesdal, Dorothea Frede, Rolf George, Gerd Graßhoff, Peter Hacker, Andreas Kemmerling, Edgar Morscher, Kevin Mulligan, Rolf (...) Puster, Richard Schantz, Benjamin Schnieder, Oliver Scholz, Severin Schröder, Peter Simons, Thomas Spitzley, Markus Stepanians, Ralf Stoecker und Daniel von Wachter. (shrink)

Perhaps in the world’s destruction it would be possible at last to see how it was made. Oceans, mountains. The ponderous counterspectacle of things ceasing to be. The sweeping waste, hydroptic and coldly secular. The silence.In recent years, few novelists have gone to chart the abyss of human violence and unflinchingly returned its gaze to shape our vision of apocalypse as has the Irish American author Cormac McCarthy. Writing in thorough obscurity for almost 25 years, he is today considered not (...) only one of America’s greatest living writers but also the heir apparent to the grand literary tradition associated with Melville and Faulkner. Born a decade after René Girard, McCarthy is also a writer whose novels—which... (shrink)

In 2015 over one million people applied for asylum in Europe and pushed it into political turmoil because no common answer could be found to the “European migrant crisis.” Germany was heavily criti...

Die meisten Tiere unterhalten soziale Beziehungen, aber nicht alle Tiere sind soziale Tiere. Soziale Tiere interagieren jenseits der Reproduktion auf vielfältige Weise mit ihren Artgenossen. Manche soziale Tiere leben in dauerhaften Gemeinschaften, wobei einige dieser Tiere komplexe und dynamische Gemeinschaften bilden. In sogenannten ›Fission-fusion-Gemeinschaften‹ wechseln Größe und Zusammensetzung der Gruppen je nach Tätigkeit. So trennen sich die Tiere zur Nahrungssuche oder sind in Kleingruppen unterwegs, um z. B. für den Schlaf wieder zusammenzukommen. Bei Elefanten, Affen, Delfinen und Raubtieren können Individuen (...) zeitlich stabile soziale Beziehungen unterhalten, obwohl sie in Fission-fusion-Gemeinschaften leben. So leben Bechsteinfledermäuse in solchen Gesellschaften und unterhalten stabile individuelle Beziehungen unabhängig von Alter, Größe, Reproduktionserfolg und Verwandtschaftsgrad; in großen Fledermauskolonien können sich stabile Untergruppen bilden, wobei der zeitlich stabile Kontakt zwischen diesen Untergruppen durch ältere Fledermäuse hergestellt wird. Wie können soziale Verhaltensmuster wie die Bildung von Fission-fusion-Gemeinschaften bzw. zeitlich stabile Relationen zwischen Individuen biologisch erklärt werden? Offenbar hat das Leben in Gruppen ökologische Vorteile, indem es z. B. das Risiko verringert zur Raubtierbeute zu werden. Allerdings hat die Bildung von Gruppen auch soziale Vorteile, indem sie zum Beispiel die Möglichkeit für Reproduktion erhöht. (shrink)

Societal and technological development during the last century has enabled Western economies to achieve a high standard of living. Yet this profusion of wealth has led to several outcomes that are undesirable and/or unsustainable. There is thus an imperative need for a fundamental and rapid transition towards more sustainable practices. While broad conceptual frameworks for managing sustainability transitions have been suggested in prior literature, these need to be further developed to suit contexts in which the overall vision is arguably clear, (...) such as in the case of consuming animal-originated foodstuffs. In this article we introduce a novel transition management framework that is based upon the dimensions of sustainability. The suggested transition management process includes the identification of objectives and obstacles, the listing of options and their opportunities and threats as well as the evaluation of the outcomes (the Five O’s). We argue that sustainability transition management should be a process in which the identification of the relevant dimensions of sustainability and related objectives forms the foundation for strategic, tactical and operational governance activities. We illustrate the practical applicability of the framework in the case of transition towards plant-based diets. (shrink)

Mit "Ästhetik als Freiheitsdenken" stellt Christian Tepe die philosophische Ästhetik als geheime Erkenntnistheorie vor: Indem es der ästhetischen Wahrnehmung gelingt, von den Kategorien, Absichten, Zwecken und Geschäften zu abstrahieren, die in unsere alltäglichen Weltbezüge häufig hineinragen, ermöglicht sie es, das je Eigene des Anderen in seiner Besonderheit unverstellt zu erkennen. Es wird gezeigt, wie dem ästhetischen Objekt die Freiheit gewährt wird, dasjenige zu sein, was es von sich aus ist und wie das Subjekt in solcher Hinwendung auf das Andere (...) zugleich zu sich selbst findet. Das Versunkensein des Subjekts im Wahrgenommenen resultiert dabei in einem für die ästhetische Situation charakteristischen Beglückungseffekt, der sich im Empfinden der Schönheit des Angeschauten ausdrückt. (shrink)

This article critically assesses Bell’s attempt at transforming discourse analysis into discourse interpretation by means of hermeneutics as developed by Paul Ricoeur. If a hermeneutic turn is to take place in a discipline that proceeds according to the principles of empirical research, cognitive hermeneutics is the better option compared to Ricoeur’s hermeneutics. Part I presents a short introduction to cognitive hermeneutics as developed by Tepe. Against this background, some central theses of Ricoeur’s hermeneutics, on which Bell’s approach is based, (...) are discussed in part II. (shrink)

The book addresses the constitution of the high culture of modernity as an uneasy unity of the sciences, including philosophy, and the arts. Their internal dynamism and strain is established through, on the one hand, the relationship of the author - work - recipient, and, on the other, the respective roles of experts and the market.

Contemporary ethics has often faced questions concerning its epistemological foundations. Thus epistemological problems of ethics have become a main interest in ethics, and ethics has begun to be considered mainly as meta-ethics or analytical ethics, mainly dealing with the foundation of ethical propositions or norms. However questions raised about the foundation of ethics have mostly ended in dilemmas. Today, moral dilemmas or epistemological dilemmas of ethics pose a challenge to contemporary ethics in the form of questions like "Is ethics normative?", (...) "Is there any ethical knowledge?", "Are the statements of ethics bearers of truth-values? (these questions relate to what 1 call the Normativity Dilemma); and questions like "Are ethical judgements objective?", "Are values part of the world, out there, in the way that physical objects are?" (these questions relate to what 1 call the Objectivity Dilemma); and questions like "Is there any criterion to see which principles are correct?", "Do we have good reasons to do what is right?", "Can acting ethical ever be justified?" (these questions relate to what 1 call the Justification Dilemma). Are these dilemmas that are said to be epistemological genuine dilemmas, or are they only supposed to be so? In this paper I will tackle the epistemological foundations of these dilemmas and try to demonstrate that there are fallacies involved in them. (shrink)

This book highlights the benefits of engaging with Critical Theory for Feminist research and provides a framework for a Feminist Critical Theory.

Philosophie ist der Versuch, durch überzeugendes und durchsichtiges Argumentieren bestimmte Fragen zu lösen. Philosophische Grundthemen sind Fragen nach dem Verständnis der Welt im Ganzen und unserer Stellung in ihr. Diese Fragen können prinzipiell nur kontrovers beantwortet werden. Die Reihe Grundthemen Philosophie möchte der Diskussion solcher philosophischen Grundthemen einen Ort geben. Anstelle einer umfassenden einführenden Darstellung werden in den einzelnen Bänden in Auseinandersetzung mit ausgewählten historischen Positionen die jeweiligen Probleme analysiert und Lösungsmöglichkeiten diskutiert. Dabei setzt der Verfasser/die Verfasserin eigene Akzente und (...) bezieht Stellung, so dass sich nicht bloß ein Blick auf die Geschichte der Philosophie, sondern zugleich auch ein systematischer Beitrag zur Problemdiskussion ergibt. Zur Zeit sind weitere Bände zu den Themen Beziehungen, Kultur, Wissenschaft und Moralbegründung geplant. Die Bände der Reihe richten sich gleichermaßen an Studierende der Philosophie und anderer Fächer sowie an professionelle Philosophen. Außerdem wendet sich die Reihe an alle, die an Grundthemen der Philosophie interessiert sind. (shrink)

In der 1970 gegr ndeten Reihe erscheinen Arbeiten, die philosophiehistorische Studien mit einem systematischen Ansatz oder systematische Studien mit philosophiehistorischen Rekonstruktionen verbinden. Neben deutschsprachigen werden auch englischsprachige Monographien ver ffentlicht. Gr ndungsherausgeber sind: Erhard Scheibe (Herausgeber bis 1991), G nther Patzig (bis 1999) und Wolfgang Wieland (bis 2003). Von 1990 bis 2007 wurde die Reihe von J rgen Mittelstra mitherausgegeben.

The Turing test has a peculiar status in the artificial intelligence (AI) research community. On the one hand, it is presented as an important topic in virtually every AI textbook, and the research direction focused on developing AI systems that behave in human-like fashion is standardly called the “Turing test approach”. On the other hand, reports of computer programs passing the Turing test have had relatively little effect. Does this mean that the Turing test is no longer relevant as a (...) test, doomed to be a theoretical notion with little connection to AI practice? In this paper, I argue that there is one problem in particular with common traditional versions of the Turing test, namely their focus on deception. The criterion for passing the Turing test is standardly connected to an AI system’s ability to deceive the interrogator about its identity. But why should we connect intelligence to the ability deceive? Here I present a revised version of an intelligence test that is not based on deception. In what I call the Community-based intelligence test (CBIT), an AI is introduced to a community of human subjects. If after a sufficient number of interactions within that community the humans are not able to identify the AI system as a computer, it is considered to have passed CBIT. I discuss whether that should be enough to ascribe intelligence to the AI, and if not, what more would be needed? (shrink)