Humean accounts of natural lawhood have often been criticized as unable to account for the laws’ characteristic explanatory power in science. Loewer has replied that these criticisms fail to distinguish grounding explanations from scientific explanations. Lange has replied by arguing that grounding explanations and scientific explanations are linked by a transitivity principle, which can be used to argue that Humean accounts of natural law violate the prohibition on self-explanation. Lange’s argument has been sharply criticized by Hicks and van Elswyk, Marshall, (...) and Miller. This paper shows how Lange’s argument can withstand these criticisms once the transitivity principle and the prohibition on self-explanation are properly refined. The transitivity principle should be refined to accommodate contrasts in the explanans and explanandum. The prohibition on self-explanation should be refined so that it precludes a given fact p from helping to explain why some other fact q helps to explain why p. In this way, the transitivity principle avoids having counterintuitive consequences in cases involving macrostates having multiple possible microrealizations. The transitivity principle is perfectly compatible with the irreducibility of macroexplanations to microexplanations and with the diversity of the relations that can underwrite scientific explanations. (shrink)

Descartes holds that the tell-tale sign of a solid proof is that its entailments appear clearly and distinctly. Yet, since there is a limit to what a subject can consciously fathom at any given moment, a mnemonic shortcoming threatens to render complex geometrical reasoning impossible. Thus, what enables us to recall earlier proofs, according to Descartes, is God’s benevolence: He is too good to pull a deceptive switch on us. Accordingly, Descartes concludes that geometry and belief in God must go (...) hand in hand. However, I argue that, while theism adds a layer of psychological reassurance, the mind-independent reality of God would ensure the preservation of past demonstrations for atheists as well. (shrink)

I review the brain disease model of addiction promoted by medical, scientific, and clinical authorities in the US and elsewhere. I then show that the disease model is flawed because brain changes in addiction are similar to those generally observed when recurrent, highly motivated goal seeking results in the development of deep habits, Pavlovian learning, and prefrontal disengagement. This analysis relies on concepts of self-organization, neuroplasticity, personality development, and delay discounting. It also highlights neural and behavioral parallels between substance addictions, (...) behavioral addictions, normative compulsive behaviors, and falling in love. I note that the short duration of addictive rewards leads to negative emotions that accelerate the learning cycle, but cortical reconfiguration in recovery should also inform our understanding of addiction. I end by showing that the ethos of the disease model makes it difficult to reconcile with a developmental-learning orientation. (shrink)

I have two concerns about Pugh et al ’s case that vaccine requirements without a natural immunity exception are unjustified.1 First, the scientific question they suggest must be answered to justify the policy is in my view the wrong one, or at least not the only relevant one. Second, the authors set up a standard for public health regulation that will be often unattainable, risking paralysis of public health authorities. Pugh et al suggest two legitimate bases for vaccine mandates: ‘the (...) prevention of severe outcomes from COVID-19 and the reduction of viral transmission.’ Governments and employers have a legitimate interest in protecting the health of their citizens and workers, respectively. To maximally accomplish these goals, the relevant scientific question for whether people with prior infection should be subject to a vaccine mandate is: in persons who have been previously infected, does vaccination enhances protection against severe disease and/or infection and transmission? The relevant comparison, if one is trying to maximise protection in the population, is not vaccination vs prior infection, but vs prior infection alone. I am unaware of a systematic review of this question, but the answer in two recent studies appears to be that the combination is more protective.2,3 The comparison the authors propose, in contrast, seems to be one based on an unstated conception of fairness and adequacy: if vaccination alone provides some level of protection, and prior infection can’t be shown to provide an inferior level, then prior infection should be an acceptable alternative to vaccination to satisfy mandates. No argument is given to support the greater relevance of the comparison the authors emphasise. A second and independent concern is that the authors’ proposal …. (shrink)

We introduce a three-tiered framework for modelling and reasoning about agents who (i) can use possibly complete reasoning systems without any restrictions but who nevertheless are (ii) bounded in the sense that they never reach infinitely many results and, finally, who (iii) perform their reasoning in time. This last aspect does not concern so much the time it takes for agents to actually carry out their reasoning, as the time which can bring about external changes in the agents’ states such (...) as arriving of new information or discarding previously available information due to bounds of the agent’s resources. These three aspects are treated with the maximal possible degree of independence from each other. The treatment of layer (iii) can be combined with arbitrary logic at level (ii) which, in turn, can be combined with arbitrary agent logic at level (i). At the level (iii), we discuss briefly the duality (or rather, complementarity) of system descriptions based on actions and transitions, on the one hand, and states and their changes, on the other. We settle for the latter and present a simple language, for describing state changes, which is parameterized by an arbitrary language for describing properties of the states. The language can be viewed as a simple fragment of step logic, admitting however various extensions by appropriate choices of the underlying logic. Alternatively, it can be seen as a very specific fragment of temporal logic (with a variant of ‘until’ or ‘chop’ operator), and is interpreted over dense linear time. The reasoning system presented here is sound, as well as strongly complete and decidable (provided that so is the parameter logic for reasoning about single states). We give the main idea of the completeness proof and suggest a wide range of possible applications, which is a simple consequence of the parametric character of both the language and the reasoning system. We address then in more detail the case of non-omniscient rational agents, (ii). Their models are syntactic structures (sets of available formulae) similar in spirit, though not in the technical formulation, to the models used in other syntax oriented approaches and in active logic. We give a new sound, complete and decidable system for reasoning about such agents. Finally, we illustrate its extensions with the internal reasoning of agents, (i), by equipping them with some example logics. (shrink)

Pickard’s contribution reminds me that conceptualizing choice is no simple matter. Pickard sees choice as entirely voluntary, while I argue that choice is only partially voluntary. Choices are based on appraisals of situations, which fluctuate due to external circumstances and internal states such as emotion and mood. Habit itself competes with volition, and all these parameters vary with development. Psychological factors such as delay discounting and especially one's belief in one's agency are critical for volitional choice as well.

Although I reject neuronormativity -- an idea central to the Brain Disease Model of Addiction -- Henden and Gjelsvik argue that the disease definition might refer to normativity in nonneural domains. They profess that a cognitive dysfunction, or a mismatch of evolutionary intentions, could also qualify as norm violations, thus legitimizing the disease label. The need for dividing lines is questioned as well. I rebut these criticisms in turn, but I must admit they are thought provoking.

Wakefield doesn't mind my focus on parallels between addiction and love. But love can fall outside the bounds of what evolution intended. So, he claims, comparing addiction with love does not preclude a naturally defined "disorder." I counter with the argument that evolution handed us such highly general response systems, the bounds of normality cannot be defined.

Berridge's nuanced approach to the conceptualization of addiction as a disease is easier for me to accept than most others. In fact, Berridge and I agree on many core features of addiction, but still not on how to label it. When competing definitions reach a standoff on intellectual grounds, we should look at the clinical utility of each. And here I think that Berridge misses a critical insight. Yet, we end by agreeing to keep listening to each other.

This article shows how, starting from Schelling and Henry, one can build a radical critique of objectification and subjectification within humanities. This critique opens the way for the construction of a point of view of immanence, which is characterized by the experimentation of a constitution of affects in a process from which proceeds the subjectivity. This point of view of immanence questions the accepted attitudes in the production of social relationships and the norms that govern them, so as to increase (...) the attention to the vulnerability of these processes and their power to transform the affects. (shrink)

This article is an examination of killing in war in its moral and normative dimension – with attention given to how killing affects the acting agent. The author argues against the commonplace belief – often tacitly held if not consciously asserted – among academics, the general public, and even – if surprisingly – military professionals, that killing, including in a justified war, is always morally wrong – even when legally sanctioned and necessary to avert a greater moral wrong. This critique (...) of the “killing is wrong but in war it is necessary” trope is motivated in part by the large numbers of psychiatric battle casualties (specifically moral injury) suffered during operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, and which have attended military activity throughout history. The article approaches the issue through the field of Christian ethical reflection on just war. In building a moral framework for killing in combat, the article explores a typology of homicide, intention, double effect, love, and whether the attitudinal expectations of just warriors in the Christian tradition is realistic in combat. With this moral framework for killing in hand, this article concludes by drawing a critical distinction between moral injury and moral bruising. (shrink)

This article relates four concepts present in the thought of Édouard Glissant (poetics, optionality, exteriority, and unlearning) to show that they are also present in different authors of decolonial theory. These concepts lead us out of the framework of modern hypercriticism and allow us to enter into a philosophy of relation that opens up new possibilities for intercultural encounters. Through the constant recourse to the contrast between Glissant and the decolonial school, the text goes through its classic themes, such as (...) the coloniality of power, knowledge and being, and decolonial pedagogy and feminism. (shrink)

Les récents débats sur la place de la religion à l’école et sur l’affaire des orphelins de Duplessis convoquent à débattre de la religion dans l’espace public. C’est à ce débat que cet article contribue, non pas en l’abordant de front, mais en passant par les discussions sur la philosophie morale, politique et sociale contemporaine. Les auteurs examinent d’abord le statut accordé à la religion dans les approches libérales et communautariennes de la morale publique ; puis, ils s’intéressent à un (...) thème emblématique de la constitution du lien civil, celui de la reconnaissance, en comparant les approches de C. Taylor, J. Habermas et J.-M. Ferry ; enfin, suivant ce dernier, ils proposent une relecture du lien religieux et de son articulation à la morale publique. (shrink)

Towards the end of his life, Bataille became increasingly fascinated by prehistoric culture. His analysis of the Lascaux cave frames it as the symbolic site of our birth, envisioning in its art the final step to anthropogenesis: we, as a species, became human once we began smearing pigment on cave walls. Bataille’s account of this dual birth of art and humanity is neither an ode to our rational mind nor to our capacity for aesthetic contemplation. Rather, the murals adorning the (...) cave would be the result of primordial ecstatic experiences. For Bataille, art ties in with excess: an activity devoid of use-value rising above necessity or instinct. Lascaux becomes the scene of a primordial crime against utility. Bataille’s cave stands as a counterargument to the enlightenment’s fixation on progress and productivity. The decades since, have seen our obsession with productivity grow even more pervasive. This paper explores the constellation of excessive behaviours which Bataille presents as key to the birth of art and, through an autoethnographic study, asks whether, and how, this ‘spectrum of excess’ is still relevant to artists today. (shrink)

The book examines the particular character Neoplatonism takes in this retrieval, and traces connections between leading figures within the French and Anglophone ...

This review emphasizes the worldwide and U.S. evolving population demographics and the need for the dental profession to exercise its professional and ethical duty to expand its traditional patient base to provide needed services.

Although convergence in emotion expressions within small groups is well documented, the motives that explain why members converge are rarely explicated. We approach expressive convergence from a conformity perspective and introduce the Emotional Conformity Framework, in which we posit that members match their groupmates’ emotion expressions because they are motivated to gain an accurate understanding of reality (informational conformity motive) or to form and maintain social relationships (normative conformity motive). These motives determine members’ standards for correctness, social responses, and plausible (...) convergence mechanisms, while members’ personalities and situational properties shape the relative strength of the two motives. By explicating these motivational underpinnings, the Framework improves our capacity to understand, predict, and regulate expressive convergence and emphasizes its functionality. (shrink)

Stability definitions for describing human behavior under conflict when coalitions may form are generalized within the Graph Model for Conflict Resolution and algebraic formulations of these definitions are provided to allow computer implementation. The more general definitions of coalitional stabilities relax the assumption of transitive graphs capturing movements under the control of decision makers, either independently or cooperatively, and allow the convenient expansion to the case of coalitions of the four basic individual stabilities consisting of Nash stability, general metarationality, symmetric (...) metarationality, and sequential stability. To permit the various coalitional stabilities to be efficiently calculated and conveniently encoded within a decision support system, algebraic expressions for the coalitional stabilities are provided in this research. Furthermore, a range of the theorems establish the mathematical credibility of employing the innovative algebraic approach to conflict resolution when coalitions are present. Finally, a conflict over the proposed exportation of bulk water from Lake Gisborne within the Canadian Province of Newfoundland and Labrador is modelled and analyzed to illustrate the practical application of the different coalitional stabilities and the strategic insights they provide. (shrink)

En el presente artículo se toma como punto de partida la distinción que condensa la concepción husserliana de la Historia en la Krisis, a saber, la formación del sentido y la sedimentación, entendidas la primera como campo fenomenológico y la segunda como institución simbólica. El hiato entre ambas manifiesta el carácter problemático de la Historia que se profundiza enseguida sobre la base de una radicalización de la formación del sentido, como presencia sin presente. Y se vuelve altamente problemática ante la (...) posibilidad de una reflexión fenomenológica no teleológica, sino estética, de los sentidos por sí mismos. La reflexión richiriana se va a detener en la conversión de la reflexión fenomenológica en reflexión teleológica, es decir en la subsunción conceptual del sentido, propio de la institución simbólica. Finalmente, comprendemos por qué el desajuste originario entre el presente y las fases de presencia no vuelve al presente un presente histórico (así en el caso del pensamiento mítico). El nacimiento de la Historia se identifica con la experiencia de lo sublime como relación con la muerte o puesta en juego del orden simbólico. (shrink)

The target article developed a dynamic systems framework that viewed the causal basis of emotion as a self-organizing process giving rise to cognitive appraisal concurrently. Commentators on the article evaluated this framework and the principles and mechanisms it incorporated. They also suggested additional principles, mechanisms, modeling strategies, and phenomena related to emotion and appraisal, in place of or extending from those already proposed. There was general agreement that nonlinear causal processes are fundamental to the psychology and neurobiology of emotion.

Frank and Nagel are very interested in the causes and consequences of moralizing about addiction. If addiction is a disease, moralistic concerns are sidelined. If it's a choice, we'd better identify clear reasons to absolve addicts from blame. While these are interesting considerations, they don't have much to do with the model of addiction I put forward in the target article.

Although these authors sometimes resort to medical terminology, we strongly agree that addiction is not a disease and that the Brain Disease Model of Addiction captures only one part of the story and distorts the big picture. Yet Satel and Lilienfeld continue to conflate a neurobiological model with a disease model. They also complain that my modeling of addiction reveals a hidden “neurocentric” bias, despite my integration of multiple levels of analysis, exactly as they recommend.

Despite its historical contribution, Heather sees the Brain Disease Model of Addiction as failing to relieve stigma, increasing fatalism, and fundamentally wrong. He also sees “choice” as partly volitional and partly unconscious, implying no moral violation. I agree on all counts. Heather then presents a disorder-of-choice model of addiction, highlighting the failure of self-regulation with respect to immediate goals. Not only do I endorse such modeling, but the neural mechanisms I describe may help to explicate it more thoroughly.

Szalavitz’s model and mine share a good many components. Foremost among them is the conviction that addiction is a developmental trajectory, not a disease. Szalavitz is correct that we should consider controlled substance use an acceptable outcome, though I would like her to shift her terminology away from the medical mainstream. Finally, I suggest that Szalavitz's important idea of a "reset" in brain development might best be addressed by the notion of kindling.

The study of current forms of governance sheds light on « forms of social experiment » based on collective participation. The effectiveness of a system of rules relies less on realizing a subsumption justifying the inner validity of a procedure than on the « power to infer the production of a satisfying form of social life ». This is why « the question of the law’s normativity is displaced from the formal coherence of its semantic content towards its pragmatic potential (...) of governance as a social institution ». It is therefore urgent to invent new forms of social cooperation able to counter the agents’ « opportunism » in their attempts to seize the new opportunities opened by the crisis of classical institutions. (shrink)