20th Century Austrian Philosophy

Friedrich Stadler und sein Team schließen über 40 Jahre nach Präsentation der ersten beiden Bände das von Rudolf Haller initiierte Projekt einer umfassenden Werkschau Otto Neuraths (1882–1945) ab. In acht Bänden wird auf fast 5.000 Seiten das Schaffen eines Polyhistors dokumentiert und zugänglich gemacht, dessen intellektueller Spannweite man nicht einmal gerecht wird, wenn man ihn als Philosophen, Nationalökonomen, Gesellschaftstechniker und Aufklärer bezeichnet.

Otto Neurath’s empiricist methodology of economics and his contributions to political economy have gained increasing attention in recent years. We connect this research with contemporary debates regarding the epistemological status of thought experiments by reconstructing Neurath’s utopias as linchpins of thought experiments. In our three reconstructed examples of different uses of utopias/dystopias in thought experiments we employ a reformulation of Häggqvist’s model for thought experiments and we argue that: (1) Our reformulation of Häggqvist’s model more adequately complies with many uses (...) of thought experiments, especially with the open-ended discussions of utopias and dystopias in thought experiments. (2) As a strict logical empiricist, Neurath is committed to a strictly empiricist account of thought experiments. John Norton’s empiricist argument view can indeed account for the justifications of empirical beliefs and genuine discoveries targeted by scientific utopianism in three distinct (yet connected) ways, all of which Neurath already contemplated: (2.I) Dealing with utopias and thought experiments on a regular basis increases creativity and inventiveness. (2.II) Particular ways of presenting knowledge facilitate scientific discovery and social progress. (2.III) The use of utopias in thought experiments can prompt conceptual change and allow access to new phenomena. We conclude by highlighting that, even though thought experiments support a positive attitude for exploring new social possibilities, Neurath points out that active decisions are unavoidable. The exploration of alternatives and the awareness of a need for decisions in policy discussion avert a technocratic outlook in social science. (shrink)

This volume gathers papers, which were read at the congress held at the University of Castilla-La Mancha in Toledo (Spain), in September 2007, under the general subject of phenomenology. The book is devoted to Wittgenstein s thoughts on phenomenology. One of its aims is to consider and examine the lasting importance of phenomenology for philosophic discussion. For E. Husserl phenomenology was a discipline that endeavoured to describe how the world is constituted and experienced through a series of conscious acts. His (...) fundamental concept was that of intentional consciousness. What did drag Wittgenstein into working on phenomenology? In his 'middle period' work, Wittgenstein used the headline 'Phenomenology is Grammar'. These cornerstones can be signalled by notions like language, grammar, rule, visual space versus Euclidean space, minima visibilia and colours. L. Wittgenstein s main interest takes the form of a research on language.". (shrink)

The three young philosophers Kevin Mulligan, Peter Simons and Barry Smith have become well-known in the last few years especially in German-speaking analytical philosophy and phenomenology circles. This is on the one hand as a result of their historical and systematic philosophical work; but it is also because of the provocative way in which they represent their philosophy. Because they often appear in threes, they have become known as the "gang of three" or "three musketeers" or even – and this (...) in an admiring sense – "mafiosi" (Rescher). They are known primarily for the small workshops they have been organizing in uncomplicated Anglo-Saxon manner all over Europe. Their goal has been to show that analytic philosophy as it has been pursued up to now is in need of reform and also that the history of scientific philosophizing is not identical to the history of Anglo-Saxon analytic philosophy. Above all, they have tried to make more well known the Austrian tradition of scientific philosophy, and they can be given credit for having done much to promote the current interest in this tradition, which means: the history of Austrian philosophy of the 19th and early 20th centuries and its historical context in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. (shrink)

This study purports a unifying view of the ontology of mathematics and fiction presented in Husserl’s 1894 manuscript “Intentional Objects” [Intentionale Gegenstände] in relation to his theory of manifolds. In particular, I clarify that Husserl’s argument supposes deductive systems of mathematical theories and fictional work as well as their “correlates,” which are mathematical manifolds in the former cases. This unifying view concretizes the concept of manifolds as an ontological concept that is not bound to mathematics. Although mathematical and fictional objects (...) differ in whether they are purely formal or materially filled, the concept of manifolds can be extended to admit materially filled objects, thus encompassing the two into the unitary theory of manifolds. By contrast, reviewing the subsequent developments of Husserl’s theory of manifolds naturally leads to restricting its concept to be strictly formal. This notion is consistent with the view that describes manifolds as forms of worlds and states of affairs; however, I suggest that the concept of the manifold is more fundamental than the concept of the world and state of affairs. (shrink)

In this essay I take the opportunity to recast some insights from my extensive study over the last decade of Wittgenstein’s remarks on music into a coherent and concise portrayal of Wittgenstein’s philosophical underpinning and upshots pertaining to his perception of the modern music scene in interwar Austria. The gist of the present essay is to show that, for better or for worse, Wittgenstein’s personal taste in music was powered by philosophical reasoning, which was organic to his philosophical development, and (...) that ultimately his philosophical attitude to the music scene of interwar Austria manifests a deeply probing gradation. I are argue that we can distinguish between four varieties of the absurd in the music of interwar Austria, according to Wittgenstein. First is the nonsensical absurd of the incapability of seeing that the nonsensicality of the form of progress is incomprehensible. This category pertains to music which straightforwardly tries to emulate the various maxims and formulations derived from the form of progress. Such nonsensically absurd music typifies progressive Romantic composers such as Richard Strauss, Max Reger, and the early Arnold Schoenberg. Second is the vacuous absurd of the incapability of seeing what the form of progress renders incomprehensible. This category pertains to music which denounces the predominantly nonsensical maxims and formulations of modernity, thus destining itself to keeping on groping for something which it cannot express. Such vacuously absurd music is best exemplified, in Wittgenstein’s mind, by Josef Labor. Third is the philosophical absurd of rendering what is incomprehensible (from the perspective of a cultured person) comprehensible within the same purview. For Wittgenstein, Mahler’s music betokens such incommensurability, evoking a relativist philosophical puzzle: whether cultural progress is real, and it is us who have been left behind, or whether culture has really been vanquished, and we are the only ones left to notice it. The very thought of an artwork of “a totally different sort” remains invariably hypothetical. Fourth is the praxeological absurd of giving rise to an auxiliary, praxeologically dislodged musical language, replacing the transparency of human gesture with exact rules of comprehensibility. From Wittgenstein’s perspective, the shunning of the expanse of lived experience in a musical language fit for the meaning-blind would be the inglorious spot assigned to Arnold Schoenberg’s vision of the music of the future. (shrink)

Carl Mengers Grundsätze der Volkswirthschaftslehre erscheinen 1871 und markieren die Geburtsstunde der Österreichischen Schule der Nationalökonomie. 150 Jahre später kennen mehr Menschen in mehr Ländern die Österreichische Schule als je zuvor. -/- Carl Menger, Ludwig Mises und Friedrich Hayek werden verteufelt oder wie Popstars verehrt. Ihre Köpfe zieren Poster und T-Shirts in aller Welt. -/- Die Wurzeln der heutigen Neo-Austrian School liegen aber in Wien, wo zwischen 1871 und 1934 Wissenschaft, Philosophie, Kunst und Kaffeehauskultur einander zu Höchstleistungen inspirieren. Von diesen (...) interdisziplinären und vielfältigen Wiener Ursprüngen und ihren globalen Folgen handelt dieses Buch. -/- Möge es als Fußnote zur glorreichen Wiener Spätaufklärung Wissen vermitteln, Ideen stiften, zum Nachdenken und tolerant-kritischen Diskutieren anregen – und hoffentlich auch ein wenig unterhalten! (shrink)

Austrian economist Ludwig Mises’s central role in the socialist calculation debates has been consensually acknowledged since the early 1920s. Yet, only recently Nemeth, O’Neill, Uebel, and others have drawn particular attention to Mises’s encounter with logical empiricist Otto Neurath. Despite several surprising agreements, Neurath and Mises certainly provide different answers to the questions “what is meant by rational economic theory” (Neurath) and whether “socialism is the abolition of rational economy” (Mises). Previous accounts and evaluations of the exchange between Neurath and (...) Mises suffer from attaching little regard to their idiosyncratic uses of the term “rational.” The paper at hand reconstructs and critically compares the different conceptions of rationality defended by Neurath and Mises. The author presents two different resolutions to a detected tension in Mises’s deliberations on rationality: the first is implicit in Neurath’s, O’Neill’s, and Salerno’s reading of Mises and faces several interpretational problems; the author proposes a divergent interpretation. Based on the reconstructions of Neurath’s and Mises’s conceptions of rationality, the author suggests some implications with respect to Viennese Late Enlightenment and the socialist calculation debates. (shrink)

In recent academic and to some extent public debates, mainstream economics has been accused of excessive mathematization. The rejection of mathematical and other formal methods is often cited as a crucial trait of Austrian economics. Based on a systematic discussion of potential benefits and potential drawbacks of formalization in economics, the paper concludes that - contrary to the received view - the most prominent representatives of Austrian economists including Carl Menger, Ludwig Mises, and Friedrich August Hayek neither provide a justification (...) for a rejection of formalization tout court nor actually reject it. Those Neo- Austrians who do, seem to rely on an unconvincing Sprachgeist argument traceable to Friedrich Wieser. (shrink)

This book provides a new all-round perspective on the life and work of Edgar Zilsel (1891-1944) as a philosopher, historian, and sociologist. He was close to the Vienna Circle and has been hitherto almost exclusively referred to in terms of the so-called “Zilsel thesis” on the origins of modern science. Much beyond this “thesis”, Zilsel’s brilliant work provides original insights on a broad number of topics, ranging from the philosophy of probability and statistics to the concept of “genius”, from the (...) issues of scientific laws and theories to the sociological background of science and philosophy, and to the political analysis of the problems of his time. Praised by Herbert Feigl as an “outstanding brilliant mind”, Zilsel, being as a Social-Democrat of Jewish origins, mostly led a life of hardship marked by emigration and coming to a sudden and tragic end by suicide in 1944. The impossibility of an academic career has hindered the reception of Zilsel’s scientific work for a long time. This volume is a contribution to its late reception, providing new insights especially into his work during his years in Vienna; moreover, it shows the heuristic value of Zilsel’s ideas for future Scholar research – in philosophy, history, and sociology. -/- (ISSN: 0929-6328). (shrink)

Logical empiricism and the Austrian School of economics are two of the internationally most influential intellectual movements with Viennese roots. By and large independently of each other, both have been subject to detailed historical and philosophical investigations for the last two dec-ades. However, in spite of numerous connections and interactions be-tween the two groups, their relationship has captured surprisingly sparse attention. My dissertation focuses on the many-faceted juxtaposition of two supposedly antagonistic championsof Viennese Late Enlightenment: logical empiricist Otto Neurath and (...) Austrian economist Ludwig Mises. I rationally reconstruct and critically compare their epistemological, meth-odological, and economic positions and demonstrate that a closer look reveals more compatibilities and similarities than acknowledged by the received view and by the protagonists themselves. Over and above the historiographic task of challenging and amending this received view, the analytic components of my thesis inform contemporary debates in phi-losophy, politics, economics, and other sciences. (shrink)

Yleensä Wienin piirin loogista empirismiä kannattaneet filosofit mielletään antirealisteiksi. Tässä artikkelissa kuitenkin argumentoidaan, että piirin johtohahmo Moritz Schlick oli eräänlainen realisti myös nykystandardien valossa. Näin ollen – niin yllättävältä kuin se kuulostaakin – positivismi ja realismi ovat yhteensovitettavissa. Schlick tosin erotti kannattamansa empiirisen realismin jyrkästi metafyysisestä realismista, jota hän piti merkityksettömänä. Schlickin realismin esittelyn lisäksi artikkelissa tarkastellaan yleisellä tasolla hänen epistemologiaansa, kielifilosofiaansa ja metafysiikan kritiikkiään. Tekstissä pohditaan myös Schlickin suosiman realismin asemaa ja relevanssia nykyisessä realismikeskustelussa.

In Der logische Aufbau der Welt, first published in 1928, Carnap aims to rationally reconstruct all objects of cognition by logico-definitional means. As a result, he intends to obtain a fully objective framework in which scientific discourse can take place. This is made possible by the novel method of ‘purely structural definite description’ of all scientifically relevant objects, which is first introduced in the Aufbau. Key to the attainment of this goal is the notion of ‘foundedness’, which Carnap presents as (...) a new basic notion of logic, in order to establish a link between the purely conventional world of logical and mathematical knowledge and the empirical world of knowledge of scientific objects. This idea experienced major criticism by Friedman (1999a,b) since he considers it to lead to the demolition of the boundary between those two worlds. In this essay, we want to defend foundedness against Friedman’s critique by arguing that its introduction is necessary within Carnap’s logicist world of thought to deal with a more fundamental problem: the demarcation of the empirical parts of the Aufbau. In the last section, we will give an outlook on the actual cause for the failure of the Aufbau, the lack of a principle to determine the truth of the instances of the basic relation in the Aufbau, and we will show how this can contribute to the explanation of Carnap’s future philosophical development and retrospective self-evaluation. This essay serves as a dense informal sketch for a later extensive formal treatment of this reading of foundedness and focuses on its implications for the interpretation of Carnap’s post-Aufbau development. (shrink)

0 [] 1 Ludwig von Mises 2 The Miseskreis 3 Felix Kaufmann 4 Editing of the Miseskreis songs.

0 [] 1 Ludwig von Mises 2 Der Miseskreis 3 Felix Kaufmann 4 Redaktion der Miseskreis-Lieder.

In the first part of this paper I review the two most recent biographies on Otto Neurath and Ludwig von Mises as well as the scarce literature on the relations between their lives and ideas. Recent publications by Nemeth, O’Neill, and Uebel reflect growing interest in the connections between these two main proponents of Logical Empiricism and the Austrian School of Economics respectively, but are mainly focused on the so-called socialist calculation debates. In the second part I propose that additional (...) research on Neurath’s and Mises’ idiosyncratic positions is likely to uncover general relations between epistemological assumptions, economic theories, and political views. -/- . (shrink)

Musil wollte der Versuchung widerstehen, der Mohammed seiner eigenen Ideen zu sein. Ich möchte heute diese Rolle übernehmen, Musils Mohammed zu sein, ich werde dieser Versuchung nachgeben. Musils großartige Philosophie und insbesondere ihr Herzstück, die Analyse des Gefühls, ist, als philosophische Leistung, nie richtig eingestuft worden. Und zwar, weil sie thematisch eng zusammenhängt mit zwei philosophischen Traditionen, der einen, die er teilweise gekannt hat - der deskriptiven Psychologie von Brentano, Meinong, Höfler, Baley, Stumpf, Husserl, Scheler und den Gestalt-Psychologen - der (...) anderen, die er nicht kennen konnte - der analytischen philosophy of mind nach Wittgenstein. Nun, deutschsprachige Philosophen kennen die erste kaum, da sie thematisch und methodologisch meilenweit entfernt von den Anliegen Meister Eckharts und Kants ist, und anglophone Philosophen kennen Musil kaum, da die Druckfahnenkapitel und die Essays ihnen kaum zugänglich (gewesen) sind. (shrink)

Als die zwei auch für die Wissenschaftstheorie relevantesten Konversionen der letzten Jahre gelten die von Holzkamp hin zum Marxismus sowie die von Feyerabend hin zum Anarchismus oder Dadaismus. Beide Forscher haben autobiographische Notizen publiziert, die ihre Konversion plausibel machen sollen. Darüberhinaus liegt durch jüngste Publikationen auch bei Feyerabend inzwischen genügend theoretisches Material vor, aufgrund dessen eine erste Bilanz gewagt werden kann. Mit dem Schwerpunkt auf Feyerabend lautet die Hauptfrage, warum er "nur" zum Anarchismus konvertierte, nicht aber zum Marxismus. Bezogen auf (...) die Auseinandersetzung zwischen emanzipatorischer Anthropologie und nomothetischer Methodologie wird zunächst die Kritik der Forschungspraxis aufgezeigt, wie sie vom frühen Holzkamp und von Feyerabend geübt wurde. Spätestens bei dem seit den Analysen von Kuhn aktuellem Bruch zwischen Wissenschaftstheorie und -praxis ist Feyerabend im Unterschied zu Holzkamp nicht mehr motiviert, diesen Bruch rational zu rekonstruieren. Vielmehr tut Feyerabend alles dafür, die Autorität der Wissenschaft zu erschüttern. Die Überführung seines durchaus teilbaren Kampfes gegen ein Falsifikationsprinzip in einen Kampf für pluralistische Methodologie ist letztlich ein Zeichen der Hilflosigkeit einer idealistischen und voluntaristischen Philosophie. Seine radikaldemokratische Konzeption der Wissenschaft als Abstimmungsgeschäft etabliert jene 'Mob'-Herrschaft, die er in seiner Auseinandersetzung mit Lakatos' Basisurteilen noch ablehnte. Als Ursache für den Unterschied in der Konversion bei Holzkamp und Feyerabend wird herausgestellt: Das liberalistische Privatindividuum Feyerabend ist im Unterschied zu Holzkamp nie in der Lage, seine Interessen an Wissenschaft von der Praxis her disziplinieren zu lassen und die positiven Ansätze zu einer "kosmologischen" Analyse in einer umfassenden Reflektion des Zusammenhangs von Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft aufzuheben. (shrink)

This paper takes the form of a series of sketches of 19th century Austrian political and intellectual history, allied with a number of more general reflections designed to contribute to our understanding of some of the peculiar characteristics of Austrian thought, particularly Austrian philosophy and economics, in the period in question.

Gilbert Ryle wrote that "Meaning-theory expanded just when and just in so far as it was released from that 'Fido'-Fido box, the lid of which was never even lifted by Meinong". This paper sets out to relieve Ryle's oversimplification about Meinong and the role of meaning theory in his thought. One step away from canine simplicity about meaning is the recognition of a distinction between sense and reference, such as we find in Frege, Husserl, and the early Russell. In Über (...) Möglichkeit und Wahrscheinlichkeit (1915) Meinong seems to corroborate Ryle when he writes, "Word-meanings are objects", but immediately after this, he qualifies it: "Word-meanings are very often auxiliary objects". The distinction between auxiliary and target objects in Meinong's later work allows us to attribute to him a theory of sense and reference which shows him to have indeed lifted the box-lid. (shrink)

Review text: "Ronald W. Langacker is universally acclaimed as one of the founding fathers of the cognitive linguistics movement. His pioneering efforts towards developing a meaning-oriented, usage-based theory of grammar have given cognitive linguistics many of its key concepts, and his theory of Cognitive Grammar is not only one of the cornerstones of cognitive linguistics, it is also a magnificent achievement in its own right." Dirk Geeraerts, January 2009.

Hayek a souvent été critiqué pour avoir changé de méthodologie, passant de l’abstraction misesienne à l’empirisme popperien. L’article défend la thèse que Hayek n’a pas changé de position méthodologique et qu’il a, au contraire, toujours défendu l’adaptation des méthodes aux objets d’analyse à partir d’une conception présente dans The Sensory Order. Cette conception, qui le situe dès les années 20 entre celle de Mises et de Popper, peut être qualifiée d’“apriorisme faillibiliste” selon l’expression empruntée à Barry Smith.Hayek has often been (...) taken to task for having allegedly changed his methodological allegiance by discarding Misesian abstraction in favor of Popper’s empiricism. This paper shows that Hayek has not altered his methodological stance but has rather continuously proposed to adapt the methods to the object being analyzed, and so, from an epistemological perspective worked out in The Sensory Order. This conception which locates him between Mises and Popper as early as the 1920s can be dubbed “faillibilistic apriorism”, to use Barry Smith’s felicitous design. (shrink)

Este artigo parte da constatação de que a análise jamesiana da consciência do tempo (The Principles of Psychology, XV-XVI) constituiu uma fonte comum fundamental das meditações husserlianas e wittgensteinianas relativas ao tempo, o specious present engendrando tanto o ursprüngliche Zeitfeld de Husserl quanto o fliehende Gegenwart do Wittgenstein de 1929. Em seguida, examino a possibilidade de apreender a articulação entre as concepções do tempo de Husserl e de Wittgenstein no nível de suas respectivas apropriações da análise de James. Respondendo de (...) modo afirmativo, sustento de início que essas apropriações se cruzam na crítica do presentismo jamesiano ("Apenas o presente é real") e da idéia segundo a qual a lembrança é uma imagem-cópia presente. Sustento, em seguida, que o anti-psicologismo dá lugar, no entanto, a desenvolvimentos muito diferentes em Husserl e em Wittgenstein. Aquele, com efeito, visa purificar o "núcleo fenomenológico" contido na análise jamesiana de seus resíduos psicológicos para revelar o que ele nos ensina acerca dos modos de aparecer temporais essenciais. De modo inteiramente diferente, Wittgenstein irá pôr em questão a própria imagem do fluxo do presente de consciência, ao descrever a genealogia dessa imagem a partir de erros acerca da linguagem ordinária. O resultado desse artigo é duplo: de um lado, se a análise jamesiana é realmente uma fonte comum às reflexões husserliana e wittgensteiniana acerca do tempo, no final das contas ela dá lugar a apropriações quase opostas; de outro, o debate James-Husserl-Wittgenstein permite confrontar as abordagens psicológica, fenomenológica e gramatical do tempo, e, desse modo, em particular, especificar esta última.James. Husserl. Wittgenstein. Tempo. Fenomenologia. Husserl and Wittgenstein as readers of James: the Question of TimeAbstractThis article is based on the fact that James’ analysis of the consciousness of time (The Principles of Psychology, XV-XVI ) was a fundamental source common both to Husserl´s and Wittgenstein´s meditations on time, the specious present generating both Husserl´s ursprüngliche Zeitfeld and Wittgenstein´s Fliehende Gegenwart of 1929. It then examines the possibility of understanding the relation between Husserl´s and Wittgenstein´s concepts of time at the level of their respective appropriations of James´ analysis. I initially sustain that these appropriations meet in the critique of James´ presentism (“Only the present is real”) and in the idea according to which memory is a present copy-image. I also argue that anti-psychologism gives way, nevertheless, to very different developments in Husserl and Wittgenstein. Indeed, the aim of the former is to purify the “phenomenological nucleus” of James’ analysis of its psychological residues to reveal what he teaches us about the essential temporal ways of appearing. In a completely different way, Wittgenstein will question the image of the flow of present consciousness itself, by describing the genealogy of this image using errors in ordinary language. The result of this article is twofold: on one hand, if James´ analysis is really a common source of Husserl´s and Wittgenstein´s reflexions on time, in the end it results in almost opposing conclusions. On the other, the James-Husserl-Wittgenstein debate allows the confrontation between the psychological, phenomenological and grammatical approaches of time and, in this way, specifies this last in particular. James. Husserl. Wittgenstein. Time. Phenomenology. (shrink)

The present paper discusses the concept of imposed relevance as developed by Alfred Schutz. Th e discussion acts on the assumption that within his writings there are two different usages of the concept: a phenomenological one and a sociological one. The argument states that both usages may not be confused—a failure which might be induced by the fact that Schutz himself never dwelled on their correlation. This being said, this paper presents some basic considerations which try to utilize phenomenological reflections (...) for sociological analyses, keeping in mind that the difference between them may not be blurred. (shrink)