No Need for the Disease Label: Choice is Complicated. Reply to Heather

Neuroethics 10 (1):125-127 (2017)
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Abstract

Despite its historical contribution, Heather sees the Brain Disease Model of Addiction as failing to relieve stigma, increasing fatalism, and fundamentally wrong. He also sees “choice” as partly volitional and partly unconscious, implying no moral violation. I agree on all counts. Heather then presents a disorder-of-choice model of addiction, highlighting the failure of self-regulation with respect to immediate goals. Not only do I endorse such modeling, but the neural mechanisms I describe may help to explicate it more thoroughly.

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Intertemporal Bargaining in Habit.George Ainslie - 2016 - Neuroethics 10 (1):143-153.
Once More, with Feeling! Reply to Ainslie.Marc Lewis - 2017 - Neuroethics 10 (1):155-156.

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