This paper discusses the legal implications of setting up two new biobanks in Belgium. The first is hospital-based and will archive tissue from patients with haematologic cancer, whereas the second is linked to a general practice based morbidity registry and will involve storage of blood samples. To date, Belgium has no specific legislation that regulates storage of human tissue and related databases. Several issues concerning the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal medical data are discussed from (...) the existing privacy legislation. We will address the principle of consent (broad versus specific) and the type of data recorded (anonymous, encoded and identifiable) for both biobanks. (shrink)

Is GDP a good proxy for social welfare? Building on economic theory, this book confirms that it is not, but also that most alternatives to it share its basic flaw, i.e., a focus on specific aspects of people's lives without sufficiently taking account of people's values and goals. A better approach is possible.

This paper re-examines the welfare economics of risk. It singles out a class of criteria, the “expected equally-distributed equivalent”, as the unique class which avoids serious drawbacks of existing approaches. Such criteria behave like ex-post criteria when the final statistical distribution of wellbeing is known ex ante, and like ex-ante criteria when risk generates no inequality. The paper also provides a new result on the tension between inequality aversion and respect of individual ex ante preferences, in the vein of Harsanyi’s (...) aggregation theorem. (shrink)

The heart of the matter -- The evolution of the French medicine -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of interest in France -- The rise of a protected medical market : the United States before 1950 -- The commercial transformation : the United States, 1950-1980 -- The logic of medical markets : the United States, 1980 to the present -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of interest in the United States -- The evolution of Japanese medicine -- Coping with physicians' conflicts of (...) interest in Japan -- Reforms -- Professionalism reconsidered. (shrink)

How do humans discover causal relations when the effect is not immediately observable? Previous experiments have uniformly demonstrated detrimental effects of outcome delays on causal induction. These findings seem to conflict with everyday causal cognition, where humans can apparently identify long-term causal relations with relative ease. Three experiments investigated whether the influence of delay on adult human causal judgements is mediated by experimentally induced assumptions about the timeframe of the causal relation in question, as suggested by Einhorn and Hogarth (1986). (...) Causal judgements generally decreased when a delay separated cause and effect. This decrease was less pronounced when the thematic context of the causal relation induced participants to expect a delay. Experiment 3 ruled out an alternative explanation of the effect based on variations of cue and outcome saliencies, and showed that detrimental effects of delay are reduced even more when instructions explicitly mentioned the timeframe of the causal relation in question. Knowledge thus mediates the impact of delay on human causal judgement. Implications for contemporary theories of human causal induction are discussed. (shrink)

The gloriously simple practice of choosing one thing to do, when to do it, and getting it done. Every day, a billion knowledge workers wake up, gravitate towards a pixelated screen and process information for eight hours or more, facing an endless and bewildering array of work and life choices. We're confronted with countless always-on options; untimely, unsolicited notifications; and a constant competition for our attention. This depletes our faculty for choosing the right things to do, leading millions to become (...) perplexed, frazzled, anxious, or depressed. Timeboxing by Marc Zao-Sanders is a comprehensive guide to carefully and intentionally selecting what to do, specifying start and finish times, focusing solely on that single activity, and getting it done to an acceptable standard within that timeframe. This is the fundamental, transcendent time-management practice; countless luminaries, from Carl Jung and Albert Einstein to Bill Gates and Steve Jobs, have employed some form of it in their daily lives. Zao-Sanders provides an informative and accessible look at every aspect of this revolutionary method- how to do it consistently, and how to do it well. Timeboxing offers guidance on what you can, should, and will do at any given moment. This pragmatic and life-changing practice of intentional daily activity has been proven to yield what almost every human being wants most: a chosen, cherished life. (shrink)

I have two concerns about Pugh et al ’s case that vaccine requirements without a natural immunity exception are unjustified.1 First, the scientific question they suggest must be answered to justify the policy is in my view the wrong one, or at least not the only relevant one. Second, the authors set up a standard for public health regulation that will be often unattainable, risking paralysis of public health authorities. Pugh et al suggest two legitimate bases for vaccine mandates: ‘the (...) prevention of severe outcomes from COVID-19 and the reduction of viral transmission.’ Governments and employers have a legitimate interest in protecting the health of their citizens and workers, respectively. To maximally accomplish these goals, the relevant scientific question for whether people with prior infection should be subject to a vaccine mandate is: in persons who have been previously infected, does vaccination enhances protection against severe disease and/or infection and transmission? The relevant comparison, if one is trying to maximise protection in the population, is not vaccination vs prior infection, but vs prior infection alone. I am unaware of a systematic review of this question, but the answer in two recent studies appears to be that the combination is more protective.2,3 The comparison the authors propose, in contrast, seems to be one based on an unstated conception of fairness and adequacy: if vaccination alone provides some level of protection, and prior infection can’t be shown to provide an inferior level, then prior infection should be an acceptable alternative to vaccination to satisfy mandates. No argument is given to support the greater relevance of the comparison the authors emphasise. A second and independent concern is that the authors’ proposal …. (shrink)

Contemporary financial markets have recently witnessed a sea change with the ‘algorithmic revolution’, as trading automats are used to ease the execution sequences and reduce market impact. Being constantly monitored, they take an active part in the shaping of markets, and sometimes generate crises when ‘they mess up’ or when they entail situations where traders cannot go backwards. Algorithms are software codes coding practices in an IT significant ‘textual’ device, designed to replicate trading patterns. To be accepted, however, they need (...) to comply with regulatory texts, which are nothing else but codes of conduct coding accepted practices in the markets. In this article, I draw on ethnographic fieldwork in order to open these black boxes, while trying to describe their existence as devices encapsulating several points of views. I address the question of a possible misalignment between those visions, and more specifically try to draw the consequences raised by such discrepancies as regards the future of financial regulation. (shrink)

The present essay on the being of the sensible investigates the individuation of intensity differentials. This is Deleuze's theme in the fifth chapter of Difference and Repetition, where he places individuation in the context of his ‘transcendental empiricism’. The mechanisms of subjectivation are conceived as spatially-temporally determined actualisations (of the virtual) whose implicit intensity relations are neither accessible empirically nor are they governed by transcendental conditions (in the conventional sense). Central to the discussion is the distinction, stemming from Kant, between (...) intensive and extensive magnitudes. (shrink)

Historians of science have long believed that Abraham Trembley’s celebrity and impact were attributable chiefly to the incredible regenerative phenomena demonstrated by the polyp, which he discovered in 1744, and to the new experimental method he devised to investigate them. This essay shows that experimental method alone cannot account for Trembley’s success and influence; nor are the marvels of the polyp sufficient to explain its scientific and cultural impact. Experimental method was but one element in a new conception of the (...) laboratory that called for both experimental and para‐experimental skills whose public availability depended on a new style of communication. The strategy of generosity that led Trembley to dispatch polyps everywhere enabled experimental naturalist laboratories to spread throughout Europe, and the free circulation of living objects for scientific research led practitioners to establish an experimental field distinct from mechanical physics. Scholars reacted to the marvels of the polyp by strengthening the boundaries between the public and academic spheres and, in consequence, opened a space for new standards in both scientific work and the production of celebrity.… comme l’Auteur de l’Histoire des Polypes, il a passé de plein vol à l’immortalité.—Julien Offrey de La Mettrie … comme l’Auteur de l’Histoire des Polypes, il a passé de plein vol à l’immortalité.—Julien Offrey de La Mettrie. (shrink)

. I emphasize the importance of broadening behavioral, ecological, and conservation science into a more integrative, interdisciplinary, socially responsible, compassionate, spiritual, and holistic endeavor. I stress the significance of studies of animal behavior, especially ethological research concerned with animal emotions in which individuals are named and recognized for their own personalities, for helping us to learn not only about the nonhuman animal beings with whom we share Earth but also about who we are and our place in nature. We are (...) best understood in relationship with others. To this end I develop the notions of “minding animals” and “deep ethology.” Animals are sources of wisdom, a way of knowing. We are all citizens of Earth, members of a global community in which intimate reciprocal and beneficent peaceful relationships are mandatory. A world without cruelty and with boundless compassion, respect, grace, humility, spirituality, and love would be a better world in which to live. We have compelling responsibilities for making Earth a better and more peaceful habitat for all beings. It is essential that we do better than our ancestors. We must reflect and step lightly as we “redecorate” nature. Time is not on our side. I plead for the development of heartfelt and holistic science that allows for joy and play. Science need not be suspicious of things it cannot fully understand. We must not avert our eyes or other senses from the eyes and voices of other beings who urgently need our uncompromising and unconditional aid and love. We can do much more than we have done for animals and the Earth. (shrink)

En el presente artículo analizamos la relación que mantienen la memoria y el conocimiento en el marco de la obra Filosofía de la expresión de Giorgio Colli. Una correlación que nos permitirá abordar una gnoseología en la que la razón, recuperando el viejo sentido griego, terminará concibiéndose como un discurso destinado a «reevocar» otra cosa y, al mismo tiempo, como la señal que subrayará la degradación respecto a ese límite metafísico que manifestará. Este falseamiento que exhibirá el conocimiento entendido en (...) cuanto expresión y en estrecha concomitancia con la memoria defendemos que será el que finalmente articulará una original crítica a la teoría de la representación moderna, cuyo valor pensamos que tendría que otorgar a Colli un papel significativo entre los pensadores contemporáneos. (shrink)

Leibniz defends concurrentism, the view that both God and created substances are causally responsible for changes in the states of created substances. Interpretive problems, however, arise in determining just what causal role each plays. Some recent work has been revisionist, greatly downplaying the causal role played by created substances—arguing instead that according to Leibniz only God has productive causal power. Though bearing some causal responsibility for changes in their perceptual states, created substances are not efficient causes of such changes. This (...) paper argues against such revisionism; not only was Leibniz a consistent advocate of concurrentism (at least in his “mature” years), but also his account of concurrentism involves both God and created substances asefficient causes of the changes in the states of created substances. (shrink)

In a model of private good allocation, we construct social orderings which depend only on ordinal non-comparable information about individual preferences. In order to avoid Arrovian-type impossibilities, we let those social preferences take account of the shape of individual indifference curves. This allows us to introduce equity and cross-economy robustness properties, inspired by the theory of fair allocation. Combining such properties, we characterize two families of fair social orderings.

This paper examines the exercise of individual or group rights within the game form approach. It focuses in particular on what it means for a strategy or action to be feasible and admissible. Admissibility is best discussed in relation to two basic distinctions among rights, passive and active rights on the one hand and negative and positive rights on the other. It is argued that while there are quite a few cases in which the outcomes of mutual rights exercising are (...) to the fore, there are many situations where the uninhibited exercise of individual or group rights and not particular outcomes are what society is primarily interested in. (shrink)

Plus que jamais, le souverainisme, parfois opposé au mondialisme, est au cœur des polémiques contemporaines qui mettent en jeu l'avenir de notre civilisation. Ces courants de pensée souterrains structurent l'action des politiques contemporains, traversant tout le spectre des clivages, de la droite à la gauche. Pour permettre au lecteur de mieux comprendre, ce livre étudie les soubassements philosophiques et historiques profonds du souverainisme. Il montre en quoi ce dernier est une vision complète du monde, de la place de l'homme dans (...) l'univers, et qu'il est loin d'être un simple sentiment de nostalgie surannée. Ce livre propose une reconstruction des identités: celle d'une nation, celle des corps intermédiaires et celle de la personne, en particulier celle de notre identité personnelle, culturelle, et plus dérangeant, sexuelle. Il repousse le danger létal de la mentalité 'woke.' Il propose enfin une aventure humaine. Il fait connaitre l'état d'esprit d'une communauté d'hommes et de femmes, qui doivent s'unir afin de constituer une force politique porteuse de renouveau. Il vous exposera des solutions politiques, sociales, culturelles et économiques concrètes, montrant que le souverainisme est un atout battant aisément le progressisme face aux défis du monde moderne. Lorsque vous aurez lu ce livre, vous comprendrez comment le souverainisme reconstruit patiemment les liens brisés de l'humanisme et souhaiterez faire partie des hommes et des femmes accomplis, porteurs de ce renouveau politique."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Rawls's burdens of judgment are a list of factors that explain why reasonable persons in a diverse society are likely to hold different, often incompatible, conceptions of the good. According to Charles Larmore, the burdens of judgment satisfy political liberalism's ambition of supporting liberal political principles through a minimalist moral conception. By using the burdens, we ground liberal politics in the modest notion of reasonable disagreement, avoiding reliance on controversial comprehensive notions such as autonomy, individuality, skepticism about the good, or (...) value pluralism. In this paper I argue that the burdens of judgment cannot provide adequate support for liberal political principles unless they are read in a way that comports with Kymlicka's modest version of autonomy liberalism. As it renounces fallibilism, political liberalism's moral minimalism can be manipulated in a way that reconciles it with decidedly illiberal results. The only way to avoid this problem is to recognize that the justification of liberal principles cannot be detached from notions of fallibilism and critical reflection about the good. Ultimately, political liberalism's emphasis on moral minimalism deprives it of the conceptual resources it needs to deal with contemporary controversies concerning the defence and clarification of liberal policies. (shrink)

Freedom of expression is often treated as a right held by speakers, with hearers holding only a derivative right to receive expression. Roger Shiner in particular argues that we should recognize hearers rights. However, Larry Alexander argues that, if there is a moral right of freedom of expression, it is most plausibly a hearer's right to receive expression, not a speaker's right. I argue that hearers have a basic (or original) right to receive a speaker's expression, one that stands alongside (...) a speaker's right to express herself. The hearer's right to receive is no less fundamental than the speaker's right to express and, contra Alexander, the hearer's right is not more fundamental than that of the speaker. As a consequence, both Shiner's case against freedom of commercial expression and Alexander's case against so-called Track Two freedom of expression jurisprudence are weakened. (shrink)

Wilcox proposed an argument against imprecise probabilities and for the principle of indifference based on a thought experiment where he argues that it is very intuitive to feel that one’s confidence in drawing a ball of a given colour out of an unknown urn should decrease while the number of potential colours in the urn increases. In my response to him, I argue that one’s intuitions may be unreliable because it is very hard to truly feel completely ignorant in such (...) a situation. I further argue that Wilcox must also account for the conflicting intuition that it is absurd to have to feel completely convinced that a specific claim about reality is true _in the absence of any evidence_ in order to avoid being irrational. It is dubious that this intuition is considerably less universal and strongly-held than Wilcox’s own intuition. Finally, I point out that even if Wilcox’s intuition were to be universally shared among members of our biological species, it is far from being clear that someone refusing to let that intuition dictate his or her beliefs would be irrational. For all these reasons, I believe that Wilcox was not successful in proving that philosophers and scientists representing uncertainty through imprecise probabilities are violating the principles of rationality. (shrink)