Many prominent theories of moral responsibility rely on the notion of “tracing,” the idea that responsibility for an outcome can be located in (i.e., “traced back to”) some prior moment of control, perhaps significantly antecedent to the proximate sources of a considered action. In this article, I show how there is a problem for theories that rely on tracing. The problem is connected to the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. Many prima facie good candidate cases for tracing analyses appear to (...) violate the knowledge condition on moral responsibility. So, either we need to dispense with tracing approaches or we must refine our understanding of the knowledge condition or we are responsible less frequently than we suppose. (shrink)

This article summarizes the moderate revisionist position I put forth in Four Views on Free Will and responds to objections to it from Robert Kane, John Martin Fischer, Derk Pereboom, and Michael McKenna. Among the principle topics of the article are (1) motivations for revisionism, what it is, and how it is different from compatibilism and hard incompatibilism, (2) an objection to the distinctiveness of semicompatibilism against conventional forms of compatibilism, and (3) whether moderate revisionism is committed to realism about (...) moral responsibility. (shrink)

In recent years, reflection on the relationship between individual moral responsibility and determinism has undergone a remarkable renaissance. Incompatibilists, those who believe moral responsibility is incompatible with determinism, have offered powerful new arguments in support of their views. Compatibilists, those who think moral responsibility is compatible with determinism, have responded with ingenious counterexamples and alternative accounts of responsibility. Despite the admirable elevation of complexity and subtlety within both camps, the trajectory of the literature is somewhat discouraging. Every dialectical stalemate between (...) incompatibilists and compatibilists seems to be superseded by a similar though often more subtle stalemate.1 The stalemates have two sources. On the one hand, incompatibilists again and again find powerful intuitive support from our folk concept. On the other hand, compatibilists seem right to insist that even if determinism were true, this would not mitigate our need for a concept of responsibility. (shrink)

In this article I propose a resolution to the history issue for responsible agency, given a moderate revisionist approach to responsibility. Roughly, moderate revisionism is the view that a plausible and normatively adequate theory of responsibility will require principled departures from commonsense thinking. The history issue is whether morally responsible agency – that is, whether an agent is an apt target of our responsibility-characteristic practices and attitudes – is an essentially historical notion. Some have maintained that responsible agents must have (...) particular sorts of histories, others have argued that no such history is required. Resolution of this contentious issue is connected to a wide range of concerns, including the significance and culpability of different forms of manipulation, the plausibility of important incompatibilist criticisms of compatibilism, and of course, a satisfactory account of moral responsibility. As it turns out, history matters sometimes, but less frequently than we might think. (shrink)

I argue that Plato was right in claiming that justice is more profitable, more rational, and more intrinsically valuable than injustice, and that this is particularly true for business organizations. The research on prisoners’ dilemmas and social dilemmas shows that ethical behavior is more profitable and more rational than unethical behavior in terms of both the negative sanctions on unethical behavior when interactions with stakeholders are iterated, and the positive rewards of habitually ethical behavior when stakeholders can identify those who (...) are predisposed to be ethical. In addition, the psychological research on justice shows that justice is intrinsically valued, both from an outcome and from a process perspective, and so crucial for business organizations, particularly in terms of organizational effectiveness. (shrink)

In this paper I criticize libertarianism and skepticism about free will. The criticism of libertarianism takes some steps towards filling in an argument that is often mentioned but seldom developed in any detail, the argument that libertarianism is a scientifically implausible view. I say "take some steps" because I think the considerations I muster (at most) favor a less ambitious relative of that argument. The less ambitious claim I hope to motivate is that there is little reason to believe that (...) extant libertarian accounts satisfy a standard of naturalistic plausibility, even if they do satisfy a standard of naturalistic compatibility. The argument against skepticism about free will tries to show (1) perhaps the most prominent form of skeptical argument against the existence of free will does not work, and (2) there is a good general argument against skepticism about free will. (shrink)

This dissertation focuses on the topic of analyticity. The traditional concept of analyticity characterizes analytic sentences in at least two ways. On the one hand, these sentences are thought to be true in virtue only of the meaning of the expressions that constitute them. On the other hand, they are thought to be such that they can be concluded by competent speakers in an a priori fashion--that is, merely on the basis of the speakers' knowledge of the meaning of the (...) expressions contained in the sentences. In the dissertation I argue that these two ways of characterizing analyticity do not single out the same set of sentences, and that at least two different notions of meaning should be postulated to account for this fact. ;To show this I focus first on the notion of truth in virtue of meaning. I identify two ways in which a sentence can be said to be true in virtue of meaning: on the one hand, if the condition it expresses necessarily obtains; on the other hand, if semantic facts concerning the reference of the expressions that constitute it determine that it has to be true. I argue that the sets of sentences that can be said to be true in virtue of meaning according to these two criteria and the set of sentences ordinarily deemed analytically true do not coincide. ;I focus then on the second traditional criterion for analyticity--i.e., apriority. This criterion determines a set of sentences--what I call a priori acceptable sentences--that seems to coincide most closely with the set of sentences we ordinarily judge to be analytic. To account for the disparity between the extensions of this and the 'truth in virtue of meaning' criteria I propose that a distinction should be made between truth-conditional meaning--which concerns the contribution of expressions to truth-conditions--and conceptual meaning--which concerns the abilities necessary for competence in a language. I finally argue that conceptual meaning cannot always guarantee the truth of a priori acceptable sentences. (shrink)

El siguiente artículo de reflexión es el resultado de un análisis y contrastación entre el pensamiento de Julián Marías, filósofo español y Ernst Bloch, filósofo alemán, sobre el tema del joven como lugar común en el desarrollo de la reflexión de ambos pensadores. ¿Qué han pensado y dicho cada uno de estos autores? ¿Cuáles son los lugares comunes o puntos de encuentro sobre esta etapa de la vida humana para estos filósofos tan divergentes en sus posturas? Al contrastar estos filósofos (...) tan dispares podremos encontrar en la reflexión sobre el joven interesantes coincidencias. (shrink)

When engaging in verbal communication, we do not simply use language to dispense information, but also to perform a plethora of actions, some of which depend on conventionalised, recurrent linguistic structures. Additionally, we must be skilled enough to arrive at the speaker’s intended meaning. However, speakers’ performance may deviate from certain habits and expectations concerning the way of speaking or accomplishing actions, while various factors may hinder comprehension, which may give rise to misappraisals of their respective abilities and capacities as (...) competent language users. This paper discusses whether such misappraisals may be subsumed by any of the already identified types of epistemic injustice and proposes a new label for them. It also describes the consequences of those misappraisals and approaches their origins from a cognitive perspective. (shrink)

Focusing on the recent work of Michael Bratman as emblematic of several important developments in the philosophy of action, I raise four questions that engage with a set of interlocking concerns about systemic functionalism in the philosophy of action. These questions are: (i) Are individual and institutional intentions the same kind of thing? (ii) Can the risk of proliferation of systemic functional explanations be managed? (iii) Is there an appealing basis for the apparent methodological individualism in our theories of action (...) and agency? and (iv) Why not, instead, pursue a methodologically anti-individualist and ecological approach to action and agency? The latter alternative, I suggest, offers a promising way to retain many of the core insights of the Bratmanian project while avoiding the difficulties inherent to some of the methodological presumptions of some strands of contemporary philosophy of action. (shrink)

A partir de dos poemas de Borges se emprende un análisis de la experiencia del instante, inicialmente al trasluz de la crítica hegeliana de la inmediatez sensible como decir inconsciente, para, después, trasponerla al vacío constitutivo de la identidad que destapa el deseo, empresa que conduce hasta un fenómeno del presente como diástasis que depara la presencia de la ausencia.

In June 1795, Fichte sent his second contribution to Schiller’s journal, The Hours : his article, Concerning the Spirit and the Letter within Philosophy, where he explains his views on the relation between aesthetic experience and virtue. Schiller, who had until then been rather well-disposed toward Fichte, violently and categorically rejected the article, thus putting an end to their friendship. Scholars commonly understand this conflict as a predictable confrontation between two irreconcilable conceptions of the moral ideal : that of the (...) cold philosopher, personified by Fichte, aiming to repress sensibility, and that of the warm-blooded artist, personified by Schiller, advocating for it. I shall argue that this interpretation is untenable, since Fichte and Schiller not only shared the same conception of virtue, but also agreed concerning the function assumed by the artist in mankind’s moral education. Rather, the conflict arose because Schiller could not bear the idealistic conception of nature – as pure representational activity – which Fichte thought was implied by these views. En juin 1795, Fichte fit parvenir à Schiller sa deuxième contribution destinée aux Heures : l’article Sur l’esprit et la lettre dans la philosophie, où il expose ses idées sur le rapport entre l’expérience esthétique et la vertu. Schiller, jusque-là plutôt bien disposé envers Fichte, lui opposa un refus de publication violent et catégorique, mettant ainsi un terme à leur amitié. On interprète habituellement cette rupture comme la conséquence prévisible d’une rencontre opposant deux conceptions irréconciliables de l’idéal moral : celle du froid philosophe, incarné par Fichte, visant à réprimer la sensibilité, et celle de l’artiste brûlant de passion, incarné par Schiller, souhaitant la glorifier. Je conteste pour ma part cette interprétation, Fichte et Schiller s’accordant non seulement sur la manière dont la vertu devait être conçue, mais également sur la fonction assumée par l’artiste dans l’éducation morale de l’être humain. À l’origine du conflit se trouve plutôt l’aversion de Schiller pour la conception idéaliste de la nature (comme activité purement représentative) qui, selon Fichte, était impliquée par ces idées. (shrink)

En 2010 tuvo lugar en Roma el Sínodo de Oriente Medio. Este artículo presenta los problemas, conflictos, oportunidades y esperanzas de la región y de las comunidades cristianas de Oriente Medio, y su reflejo en el Instrumentum Laboris. Se describe su desarrollo, resumiendo las aportaciones del Papa, de los Padres Sinodales, de los Delegados Fraternos de otras Iglesias y de los Delegados Especiales de otras religiones, sus reflexiones en busca de una respuesta espiritual, teológica y pastoral a las múltiples necesidades (...) humanas y religiosas de los cristianos y de todas las personas de otros credos, insistiendo en la libertad religiosa, las respuestas ecuménicas y la colaboración interreligiosa, concluyendo con las propuestas presentadas al Papa Benedicto XVI por parte de la Asamblea Sinodal. (shrink)

What exactly is the role of empirical beliefs in moral reflective equilibrium (RE)? And if they have a part to play, can changes in our empirical beliefs effectuate changes in the moral principles we adopt? Conversely, can empirical beliefs be adjusted in light of certain moral convictions? While it is generally accepted that empirical background theory is of importance to the method of wide reflective equilibrium (WRE), this article focuses on a different aspect, namely the role of empirical beliefs that (...) is intrinsic to the coherence relation of moral beliefs in any (narrow or wide) conception of RE. First, it is shown that in the application of RE, empirical beliefs are crucial to the procedure of matching principles to considered judgments. Changes in our empirical beliefs may therefore upset the relevant coherence relation and motivate changes in the moral principles we adopt. This more detailed account of the interplay between empirical and moral beliefs can help evaluate the overall philosophical appeal of RE. Finally, it is argued that, at least in WRE, the relation between empirical and moral beliefs need not be a one-way street, that is, moral convictions can provide us with some epistemic means of adjudicating between competing empirical descriptions of the world. (shrink)

Has philosophy paid sufficient attention to love? It is evident that the thinkers of the past expended a large part of their intellectual energies on talking about feelings, passions, emotions or affections, to mention just some of the terms under which, one way or another, love has tended to be subsumed. By doing so they undoubtedly granted it a philosophical importance, but not necessarily the kind that should be its due. Because love is much more than a philosophical subject with (...) the same rank as the most important ones: in the end it is, to put it rather abruptly, what makes philosophy itself possible. Why not consider love as we traditionally consider the experience of astonishment, that is, as foundational, as prephilosophical, in the same sense that we commonly talk of the prepolitical? To dispute just for a moment with the authority which has held the monopoly of the prephilosophical for so long: if we are astonished it is because we love to know. Only someone who already loves wisdom is in a position to be astonished. (shrink)

El artículo trata sobre la negación estoica y su crítica a la fórmula aristotélica según los testimonios de Apuleyo, Alejandro de Afrodisias y Boecio. La crítica se divide en tres aspectos: (i) sistematicidad (ya que una misma regla no se aplica a todo tipo de proposición); (ii) universalidad (ya que todo par contradictorio no divide la verdad y la falsedad sin excepción alguna); y (iii) rigurosidad (ya que el sujeto de la proposición puede no existir o no ser lo que (...) creemos que es). Se concluye que el fondo de la crítica no se relaciona con que una fórmula es inconsistente o hace imposible la lógica y sus operaciones, sino que tiene relación con cuál fórmula es más ambigua y menos preferible. (shrink)

Une des difficultés de la philosophie de l’être de Thomas d’Aquin est la multiplicité des sens de la notion d’ esse dans les différents lieux du corpus. En vue de mettre de l’ordre dans le sens et l’origine des formules de Thomas, deux herméneutiques opposées se sont affrontées depuis le milieu du xx e siècle sur sa pensée authentique. Après avoir présenté les arguments des uns et des autres, on aborde la question difficile de l’articulation des aspects immanent et transcendant (...) de l’être au sein de l’entité. (shrink)

La preparación del Jubileo del 2000 pasa por el descubrimiento de la importancia de los años santos en la historia de la Iglesia. Esto es lo que pretendemos con esta investigación: acercarnos a los años santos celebrados a lo largo de la historia de la Iglesia. En este trabajo abordamos la institución del primer año santo, la historia de los jubileos y la idea fundamental de cada uno de ellos, su periodicidad y la labor de mecenazgo cultural y artístico de (...) los papas con motivo de los años santos. Por último, se estudia la participación de la Iglesia de Sevilla en algunos años santos. (shrink)

In seiner Dissertano de arte combinatoria entwickelt G. W. Leibniz eine Methode, um Prädikate von einem Subjekt und Subjekte zu einem Prädikat zu finden, und er stellt eine Formel auf, um deren Anzahl zu berechnen. Ich möchte im Folgenden erläutern, wie diese Methode funktioniert und warum sie sowohl einen Teil der, wie Leibniz es nennt, logica inventiva als auch eine direkte Folge seiner Variationslehre bildet, die den zentralen Teil seiner Dissertano ausmacht. Im letzten Abschnitt dieses Beitrages werde ich auf einige (...) theoretische und historische Zusammenhänge zwischen der logica inventiva und der aristotelischen Logik eingehen. Insbesondere werde ich erläutern, in welcher Weise Leibniz' Methode mit einigen traditionellen Versuchen in Verbindung steht, die tota minora eines gegebenen Terms zu bestimmen, und ob die aristotelische Theorie der kategorischen Propositionen in der Lage war, Leibniz' Methode zum Auffinden von Subjekten und Prädikaten innerhalb der logica inventiva zu begründen. (shrink)

El artículo revisa los límites teóricos que unen y separan la lógica de Aristóteles de la lógica aristotélica y la lógica de primer orden. Considera las razones para sostener la actualidad de la lógica de Aristóteles y se pregunta por la unidad de la disciplina, destacando la importancia de la noción de ciencia en la definición de lógica. The article deals with the theoretical limits which unify Aristotle's logic with Aristotelian logic and First Order Logic, and it realizes their differences (...) too. It examines the reasons to maintain the presence and actuality of Aristotle's logic and discovers the importance of the notion of science in defining the nature of logic. (shrink)

En el presente escrito busco esclarecer las dificultades a las que se enfrenta la metafísica de Spinoza, a la luz de su contexto histórico intelectual. En particular, exploro cómo el desarrollo del concepto de grados de perfección en la escolástica tardía ejerce una fuerte influencia en el pensamiento espinosista, hasta el punto de arrojarlo a una serie de dificultades, en las que el horizonte cualitativo de la realidad se confunde con el cuantitativo. De este modo, el proyecto de naturalización de (...) Dios de Spinoza no parece solventar completamente el problema del abismo relacional que hay entre una entidad absolutamente infinita y los compuestos finitos procedentes de ella. (shrink)

The ancient commentaries on Aristotle's Peri Hermeneias give us important elements to understand more clearly some difficult passages of this treatise. In the case of the indefinite names and verbs, these commentaries reveal a doctrine which explains not only the nature of the indefinites, but also why Aristotle introduces these kinds of term in Peri Hermeneias. The coherence and explanatory capacity of this doctrine is entirely absent in modern exegesis of Peri Hermeneias. This fact has important implications: it can make (...) us to think whether there will be another topics in which the ancient commentators are still indispensable to understand Aristotle. It can also make us to think to what extent a profounder reflection of the ancient commentators can modify our idea of Aristotle and the ancient world. (shrink)

This article defines Themistius’ exegesis of the human intellect as a prodromic noetics, that is, a psychology in which the former psychological function is naturally predisposed, as a matter, to the action of the latter one, which acts as a form. This doctrine, which I claim to stem from Plato’s Timaeus, makes sense of hylomorphism by allowing separate psychological functions both to combine to non-separate ones and to unify cognitive functions and their cognitive objects. At the same time, Themistian exegesis (...) aims at defining the self, which is identified with the active intellect, since this intellect is the ultimate form of this successive prodromic interaction. Concluding remarks are intended to give weight to the thesis that Themistius’ noetics is an original attempt to recognize and reject two other extreme positions: the one which implies that actual intellect is not human but divine, as Alexander of Aphrodisias claimed; the other advanced by Zeno the Stoic, who held that the lower functions of the human soul are defined as perversions of the higher one. (shrink)

A todo el mundo le gusta estar enamorado, el amor alimenta la fantasía de poder ser otro sin dejar de ser el mismo. Devolvemos a la persona amada la imagen exagerada de sus cualidades amplificadas. Sin embargo, nuestra sociedad jalea de puertas para afuera a los enamorados y desconfía de ellos puertas para adentro. Como el resto de humanos, los grandes pensadores vivieron intensamente, para bien o para mal, el amor. Sin embargo, ellos nos han dejado el legado de todas (...) las ideas que tuvieron sobre este sentimiento. ¿Quién no ha sentido amor platónico? ¿Quién no se ha dejado arrastrar por el deseo? ¿Quién no se ha obsesionado con el amado? ¿Cuántas veces nos hemos enamorado de la imagen que nos hacemos de alguien en lugar de la persona real? (shrink)