Abstract

This dissertation focuses on the topic of analyticity. The traditional concept of analyticity characterizes analytic sentences in at least two ways. On the one hand, these sentences are thought to be true in virtue only of the meaning of the expressions that constitute them. On the other hand, they are thought to be such that they can be concluded by competent speakers in an a priori fashion--that is, merely on the basis of the speakers' knowledge of the meaning of the expressions contained in the sentences. In the dissertation I argue that these two ways of characterizing analyticity do not single out the same set of sentences, and that at least two different notions of meaning should be postulated to account for this fact. ;To show this I focus first on the notion of truth in virtue of meaning. I identify two ways in which a sentence can be said to be true in virtue of meaning: on the one hand, if the condition it expresses necessarily obtains; on the other hand, if semantic facts concerning the reference of the expressions that constitute it determine that it has to be true. I argue that the sets of sentences that can be said to be true in virtue of meaning according to these two criteria and the set of sentences ordinarily deemed analytically true do not coincide. ;I focus then on the second traditional criterion for analyticity--i.e., apriority. This criterion determines a set of sentences--what I call a priori acceptable sentences--that seems to coincide most closely with the set of sentences we ordinarily judge to be analytic. To account for the disparity between the extensions of this and the 'truth in virtue of meaning' criteria I propose that a distinction should be made between truth-conditional meaning--which concerns the contribution of expressions to truth-conditions--and conceptual meaning--which concerns the abilities necessary for competence in a language. I finally argue that conceptual meaning cannot always guarantee the truth of a priori acceptable sentences