Retributivists are often thought to give 'deontological' theories of punishment, arguing that we should punish not for the beneficial consequences of doing so such as deterrence or incapacitation, but purely because justice demands it. Kant is often regarded as the paradigmatic retributivist. In some passages Kant does appear to give a deontological theory of punishment. For example, Kant insists that on an island where all the people were to leave the next day, forever dissolving and dispersing the community, the last (...) murderer in jail would have to have his execution carried out before the diaspora--justice demands it. In other passages, however, Kant defends punishment by appealing to its beneficial consequences. For example, after supposing that one man on a life raft pushes the other off to save his own life, Kant says that the former man should not be legally punished "because that punishment would have to be death, and it would be an absurd law that threatened death to one who refuses to die voluntarily in a dangerous situation." In this passage Kant's reasoning is that state laws, by threatening us with sanctions, are intended to prevent us from violating rights--the point of these laws is to deter. A law that imposes a punishment that could not deter is an absurd law. I argue that while Kant rejects consequentialism in thinking about moral actions, he distinguishes law and morality, and in the sphere of law, an action we take is to be justified by appealing to the good it yields. The point of legal punishment is to deter violations of rights and protect us from a state of nature in which no one's freedom is assured. Kant's theory of legal (as opposed to moral) punishment is not deontological. Nevertheless we can characterize his consequentialist theory of legal punishment as retributive in some sense. The paper then considers how the passages about punishment in which Kant invokes consequentialist thinking can be reconciled with other passages where he insists on punishment regardless of the consequences. (shrink)

The Kennedy Krieger lead paint study received a lot of attention after a US Court of Appeals ruled that a parent cannot consent to the participation of a child in non-therapeutic research. The ruling has raised fears that, if it goes unchallenged, valuable research might not proceed and ultimately all children would be harmed. The author discusses significant aspects of the study that have been neglected, and argues that the study was unethical because it involved injustice and its design meant (...) that the study lacked importance and value. Issues of benefit, risk, and consent are vital, but it is sometimes a mistake to consider these issues before settling questions about justice and the importance and value of a research project. The author concludes by offering a strategy for researchers and reviewers of research to appreciate, in a vivid way, the implications of research participation. (shrink)

LET ME BEGIN this inquiry with the simple but fundamental fact that the flow of time, or passage, as it is also known, is given in experience, that it is as indubitable an aspect of our perception of the world as the sights and sounds that come in upon us, even though it is not the peculiar property of a special sense. Consider, by way of illustration, that I am now sitting at the desk in my study. This particular event (...) was not present at any earlier time, nor will it be present shortly as I become involved in other activities. The present, as I experience it, is regularly associated with later and later events. It does not hop about capriciously from here to a later time, to a previous time, and then to a much later time, or trace out some other such indiscriminate pattern; instead I find it always in association with the next moment, and as I look backward and inward, so to speak, I find that the prior moment was present and that this next-later moment is present. Quite often this condition is expressed by means of imagery. We are asked to envision either a moving present racing along a fixed track of moments or events from earlier to later, or alternatively a fixed present through which stream a series of moments or events, first the earlier and then the later ones. One is in truth hard-pressed to find references to passage which do not employ quasi-poetical tropes and metaphors, and while these do help in some sense to say what we mean, great caution is required when handling them because of their ready tendency to draw us away from the actual phenomenon requiring explanation. (shrink)

More than one third of the human brain is devoted to the processes of seeing - vision is after all the main way in which we gather information about the world. But human vision is a dynamic process during which the eyes continually sample the environment. Where most books on vision consider it as a passive activity, this book is unique in focusing on vision as an 'active' process. It goes beyond most accounts of vision where the focus is on (...) seeing, to provide an integrated account of seeing AND looking. The book starts by pointing out the weaknesses in our traditional approaches to vision and the reason we need this new approach. It then gives a thorough description of basic details of the visual and oculomotor systems necessary to understand active vision. The book goes on to show how this approach can give a new perspective on visual attention, and how the approach has progressed in the areas of visual orienting, reading, visual search, scene perception and neuropsychology. Finally, the book summarises progress by showing how this approach sheds new light on the old problem of how we maintain perception of a stable visual world. Written by two leading vision scientists, this book will be valuable for vision researchers and psychology students, from undergraduate level upwards. (shrink)

Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie is metaphysical, to be sure; but it is also political. To help show this I will make sense, and show the plausibility and relevance, of what appears to be one of the most metaphysical (and bizarre) claims to be found in Hegel's political philosophy: his justification of hereditary monarchy. While among Hegel scholars Hegel's theory of constitutional monarchy has been a focus of heated debate over whether Hegel is a liberal or a conservative; and has recently become a (...) focus in the debate over whether Hegel accommodated himself to the Prussian government out of fear of censorship by publishing an exoteric view endorsing hereditary monarchy that belies his �genuine�, more democratic view, to the nonspecialist Hegel's argument will seem to be of little relevance -- hereditary monarchy is not a live option for us in the 1990s. My intention in giving it serious consideration is not to have us entertain hereditary monarchy as an undeservedly neglected possibility, but rather to put the brakes on a tendency to dismiss Hegel as too much the idealist to dirty his hands with politics. (shrink)

I argue on the basis of extensive empirical research that perception and emotion are more deeply entangled than we might have thought. This evidence strongly suggests that we should expand our conception of perception to include emotional elements, and our conception of emotion to include perceptual ones. This expansion poses a challenge to our current taxonomic practices. In the face of this challenge, I advocate principled pluralism about psychological kinds. This view holds that, depending on our explanatory purposes, psychological processes (...) can be legitimately classified in more than one way. (shrink)

In spite of his post-World War II works on international law, which seems more purely juridical, Hans Kelsen continues to put forward in his vast body of work an implicit – and sometimes even explicit – juridical objectivism and pacifism. Especially before and during the second World War he makes – by means of many moral-political writings – an effort for a more effective assurance of international peace. The fact that Kelsen regards the law as the pre-eminent means to achieve (...) the end of peace, is – in view of the tradition running from Hobbes to Kant – still not very innovating. But the primary and central role he assigns to the judiciary in order to guarantee international peace is on the other hand really original. To bring out Kelsen’s juridical objectivism and pacifism, I restrict myself in this article to his plea before and during the second World War for the judicial primacy in the international legal order. In that plea, which is spread over many writings and founded by several arguments, I distinguish however three main convincing arguments – namely an evolutionary, a technical and a moral-political argument – for the establishment of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction as the ‘guardian of international peace’. The fact that Kelsen’s original plea is still relevant to our times, is already evident from the post-World War II UN-system of peace-enforcement, which still functions little satisfactorily and of which the existing plans of reform go no further than strengthening the position of the Security Council, the current hardly effective ‘maintainer of world peace’. (shrink)

Purpose: In the educational field a lack of focus on the process of arriving at a level of profound understanding of a phenomenon can be observed. While classical approaches in education focus on "downloading," repeating, or sometimes optimizing relatively stable chunks of knowledge (both facts and procedural knowledge), this paper proposes to shift the center of attention towards a more dynamic and constructivist perspective: learning as a process of individual and collective knowledge creation and knowledge construction. The goal of this (...) process is to profoundly understand a phenomenon in its multi-dimensionality and complexity and to reflect on the processes that have lead to this understanding. The issue we want to tackle in this paper is how this profound understanding can be brought about in a technology-enhanced learning environment. Method: Part 1 of this paper explores strategies of technology-enhanced knowledge sharing/creation in the field of higher education. Part 2 presents a successful blended learning scenario that illustrates the implementation of these learning strategies in a concrete course design. In this case study students are involved in active theory construction processes by conducting virtual experiments with a virtual organism. Part 3 elaborates on the epistemological implications of this case study. Findings: A constructivist framework for modes of knowing and modes of coming to know is developed. It is shown that -- in order to reach a profound understanding of a phenomenon -- it is essential to take into account the multi-facetted character of knowledge and to use the strategy of double-loop learning. Conclusion: This leads to an understanding of learning/teaching as a process of socio-epistemological engineering. Furthermore, the role of the teacher changes in such a constructivist setting of learning/teaching: Their primary task is to provide a "pedagogically (and technologically) augmented environment." They are responsible for creating an atmosphere of collective knowledge construction and reflection. Beyond the role of a coach and moderator the teacher has to act as a facilitator or "enabler" for the (individual and collective) processes of double-loop learning. (shrink)

Bundle theory reduces particulars to bundles of properties. Bundle theorists have been working to explain individuation within an ontology of repeatable properties, but the outcomes are not satisfactory. Even the trope approach toward properties is not capable of establishing individuation. This article argues that bundle theorists are wrong in searching for individuators within the bundles of properties. Rather, indi­viduation should be established within ontologically more fundamental level of events. Events, with their spatial and temporal character, enable us to individuate the (...) bundles of properties involved and this is one of the reasons for the superiority of bundle theory to other competitive theories of substance. (shrink)

Unamuno es un apasionado de su ser. En su dialéctica que es hegeliana en el sentido de limitación-tensión, él es el protagonista y, frente a él, un mundo de sombras shakespearianas en el que se perfilan como antagonistas Dios, el mundo, el otro y todo aquello que limite, ya sea en el espacio, ya sea en el tiempo, ya sea ontológica o psicológicamente, su yo. El mundo le acucia a conocerlo para incorporarlo a sí mismo. Apasionadamente lo encuentra y desencuentra (...) en su trascenderse vivido como trágica limitación del conocimiento y del ser. Dios es lo que él querría ser en su mundo, hecho de la misma materia que los sueños. Y pelea con esa idea y ese todopoderoso antagonista, que le ha vencido desde la eternidad, con el espíritu rebelde de un perdedor. «El otro» le persigue en su existencia desde un sentimiento edípico, antagonista vivido con instintos camitas , raíz en última instancia de su culpabilidad de ser, de ser el bueno y no el otro, de ser querido y no «todo lo querido», causa, en fin, de ese afán de totalidad que es el comedón de su sentimiento trágico de la vida. Toda esta dialéctica existencial apasionadamente subjetiva no podrá ser plasmada nada más que en literatura. La pesantez de los conceptos filosóficos rompería los sueños. Y cubre su filosofía con los ropajes de Mab, la reina de los sueños de Romeo yJulieta, cuyos vestidos son de alas de saltamonte y telas de arafla y sus collares de líquidos rayos de luna. Sus sueños son él y, sus personajes, productos de su fantasía en el más estricto sentido freudiano. A través de sus sueños, se puede llegar al alma de este Caballero de la Trágica Figura que peleó contra gigantescos monstruos del conocimiento montado en el dudoso Caballo de Clavileño de la fe. En los mundos de Don Miguel hay dos sueños, Niebla y San Manuel Bueno, mártir, que se nos presentan como claves para interpretar los hitos de su pensamiento y, a través de éste, la evolución del propio Unamuno. (shrink)

En Psicología Fisiológica se entiende que cierto nivel de estrés favorece el estudio y el aprendizaje. Sin embargo, unible excesivo de ansiedad dificulta la gestión de la atención y de la concentración y repercute negativamente en el aprendizaje y en la memoria. Desde el punto de vista Neuropsicofisiológico el estrés y la emoción son fenómenos diferentes pero altamente relacionados. Si bien en este artículo nos vamos a centrar fundamentalmente en el estrés, es importante tener presente que una emoción específica puede (...) activar reacciones fisiológicas de estrés. Al mismo tiempo diferentes niveles de estrés pueden causar emociones concretas que pueden ir desde la alegría al miedo, la ira, etc. (shrink)

"Parts of Classes" tries to separate the unproblematic part of set theory (mereology) from the problematic part (singletons). In the process several things get lost: an empty set which is really empty; a satisfying account of the paradoxes; and the motivation for the iterative conception of set. Lewis' attack on the coherence of singletons makes it puzzling what he sees his book as doing. Nor is it clear that mereology is as ontologically innocent as Lewis would have us believe.

En este ensayo el autor se propone desarrollar la hipótesis del Mundo 4, sobre la base de la teoría de los tres mundos de Popper, de la cual se derivaría en consecuencia la necesidad lógica y ontológica de formular su existencia objetiva, siendo ésta una característica primordial de los tres mun..

The paper explores different possibilities in order of maintaining a compatibilism between free will, in a strong sense, and determinism. The notion of determinism is analyzed in deep. It is defended a general conception of free will as a certain kind of mental causation in absence of fatalism. Also, it is argued that other compatibilist possibilities would be possible inside that general conception of free will, being some of them more radical than other ones.

Open peer commentary on the target article “How and Why the Brain Lays the Foundations for a Conscious Self” by Martin V. Butz. Excerpt: There are circumstances when anticipation can be maladaptive. In the following paragraphs, the occurrence of maladaptive anticipation will be illustrated in reference to psychological disorders (depression, generalised anxiety disorder, social phobia). It will be shown that anticipation does not always lead to improved control of oneself and the environment and that anticipation is not always beneficial. Finally, (...) the question is raised of whether it is the strength of the anticipatory drive or the content of the anticipations that is the important factor in the development and construction of the self. (shrink)

A logically perfect language must meet following requirements: (i) it must not contain „empty“ expressions designating nothing and (ii) it must not involve phrases that are synonymous, homonymous etc. According to Frege, the meaning of a compound expression is a function of meanings of its components, i.e. the meaning of an expression consisting of a functional phrase and a name is the value of the function for the argument. However, for some arguments a function need not give values and, hence, (...) some compound phrases designate nothing in spite of the fact that every simple expression does designate something. Frege’s construction of a logically perfect language fails because it violates condition (i). According to Wittgenstein, every language is logically perfect; otherwise it cannot represent the world. Every expression, simple or compound, does designate something; the meaning of a compound expression consists of meanings of its components; the structure of a complex expression’s meaning mirrors, when completely analysed, the syntactic structure of the expression. Wittgenstein distinguishes between language and notation and we are supposed to look for a logically perfect notation that does not contain homonymy or synonymy. However, following some ideas from Tractatus, it can be shown that Wittgenstein cannot eliminate these phenomena and, hence, violates condition (ii). (shrink)