Some claim that moral factors affect the epistemic status of our beliefs. Call this _the moral encroachment thesis_. It’s been argued that the moral encroachment thesis can explain at least part of the wrongness of racial profiling. The thesis predicts that the high moral stakes in cases of racial profiling make it more difficult for these racist beliefs to be justified or to constitute knowledge. This paper considers a class of racial generalizations that seem to do just the opposite of (...) this. The high moral stakes of the beliefs we infer from these generalizations make it _easier_ rather than _harder_ for these beliefs to be justified or to constitute knowledge. I argue that the existence of this class of cases—cases of “positive profiling”—give us reason to expand our account of moral encroachment in a way that brings it closer to the ideal of pragmatic encroachment that motivates it in the first place. (shrink)

The thesis of Weak Unrestricted Composition says that every pair of objects has a fusion. This thesis has been argued by Contessa and Smith to be compatible with the world being junky and hence to evade an argument against the necessity of Strong Unrestricted Composition proposed by Bohn. However, neither Weak Unrestricted Composition alone nor the different variants of it that have been proposed in the literature can provide us with a satisfying answer to the special composition question, or so (...) we will argue. We will then go on to explore an alternative family of purely mereological rules in the vicinity of Weak Unrestricted Composition, Cardinal Composition: A plurality of pairwise non-overlapping objects composes an object iff the objects in the plurality are of cardinality smaller than $$\kappa$$ κ. As we will show, all the instances for infinite $$\kappa$$ κ s determine fusion and are compatible with junk, and every instance for a $$\kappa > \aleph _0$$ κ > ℵ 0 is furthermore compatible with gunk and dense chains of parthood. (shrink)

Thinking about oneself as a subject leaves unanswered fundamental questions about one’s identity as an object: about which thing one is, about what kind of thing one is, and about whether one exists at all. I put forward a new way of thinking about these questions by outlining the subject-as-object problem, a problem for inquiry directed at oneself qua subject. I argue that the source of the problem lies in the relationship between a basic precondition for inquiry – that something (...) be present – and a framework that enables us to conceive of ourselves as inquirers in an objective world – the framework of objectivity. Once the problem is recognized, we can explain why there is always room for questions about one’s identity in response to any account of oneself and one’s relation to the world. (shrink)

What makes solitude a positive experience? What distinguishes experiences of solitude from experiences of loneliness? We review some of the literature on the benefits of solitude, focusing on freedom, creativity, and spirituality. Then, we argue that the relationship between agent and environment is an important factor in determining the quality of experiences of solitude. In particular, we find that solitude may support a person’s sense of agency, expanding the possibilities for action that a person has, and creating the conditions for (...) authenticity. We describe a phenomenology of solitude, based on a study that explores the nature of experiences of loneliness and solitude in a religious community. One finding is that solitude is characterised by presence, whereas loneliness is characterised by absence. Another finding is that solitude can contribute to a sense of empowerment that enables agents to pursue and achieve the goals they find valuable. (shrink)

In philosophy, psychiatry, and cognitive science, definitions of clinical delusions are not based on the mechanisms responsible for the formation of delusions, since there is no consensus yet on what causes delusions. Some of the defining features of delusions are epistemic and focus on whether delusions are true, justified, or rational, as in the definition of delusions as fixed beliefs that are badly supported by evidence. Other defining features of delusions are psychological and focus on whether delusions are harmful, as (...) in the definition of delusions as beliefs that disrupt good functioning. Even if the epistemic features go some way towards capturing what otherwise different instances of clinical delusions have in common, they do not succeed in distinguishing delusions as a clinical phenomenon from everyday irrational beliefs. Focusing on the psychological features is a more promising way to mark the difference between clinical and non-clinical irrational beliefs, but there is wide variability in the extent to which delusions are psychologically harmful, and some everyday irrational beliefs can affect functioning in similarly negative ways. In this chapter we consider three types of belief that share similar epistemic features and exhibit variation with respect to how psychologically harmful they are: (1) delusions of thought insertion, (2) alien abduction beliefs, and (3) self-enhancing beliefs. In the light of the similarities and differences among these cases, we highlight the difficulty in providing an answer to what makes an irrational belief delusional. (shrink)

Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality asks what happens when the sense that "I must" collides with the realization that "I can't." Bringing together philosophical and empirical work in moral psychology, Lisa Tessman here examines moral requirements that are non-negotiable and that contravene the principle that "ought implies can.".

In this paper I discuss the power of corporations as epistemic agents. Corporations need to hold certain forms of knowledge in order to develop and produce goods and services. Intellectual property is meant to incentivize them to do so, in ways that orient their activities towards the public good. However, corporations often use their knowledge strategically, not only within markets, but also in the processes that set the rules for markets. I discuss various historical examples, including the so-called “tobacco strategy” (...) of creating doubt about scientific evidence, and argue that as long as corporations are set up as profit-oriented entities, it is a dangerous strategy to provide them with too much epistemic power. I suggest various policies for reigning in this form of corporate power, for example regulations on PR activities. I then turn to the power of digital corporations, which is based on their collection and analysis of data. These kinds of companies, and the technologies they use, make the control of corporations as epistemic agents all the more urgent for democratic societies. (shrink)

Do individuals have moral duties to fulfil all the demands of their jobs? In this paper, we discuss how to understand such ‘occupational duties’ and their normative bases, with a specific focus on duties that go beyond contractually agreed upon duties. Against views that reduce occupational duties to contractual duties, we argue that they often have greater moral weight, based on skills, roles, and the duty of social cooperation. We discuss what it would take to make sure that individuals are (...) not unfairly overburdened by such occupational duties, distinguishing between choice conditions (voluntariness, availability of alternatives, full information) and conditions concerning the role and the social structures within which such duties are embedded (feasible role design, existence of support structures, employee voice). These conditions, however, are not fulfilled for many existing jobs, especially for jobs typically occupied by structurally disadvantaged groups such as women or ethnic minorities. This leads to a dilemma between the claims of those who depend on the occupational duties to be fulfilled, and the rights of those who hold these occupations and are unfairly overburdened. We conclude by arguing for the need for structural reform to dissolve this dilemma. (shrink)

We talk about irrationality when behaviour defies explanation or prediction, when decisions are driven by emotions or instinct rather than by reflection, when reasoning fails to conform to basic principles of logic and probability, and when beliefs lack coherence or empirical support. Depending on the context, agents exhibiting irrational behaviour may be described as foolish, ignorant, unwise or even insane. -/- In this clear and engaging introduction to current debates on irrationality, Lisa Bortolotti presents the many facets of the (...) concept and offers an original account of the importance of judgements of irrationality as value judgements. The book examines the standards against which we measure human behaviour, and reviews the often serious implications of judgements of irrationality for ethics and policy. Bortolotti argues that we should adopt a more critical stance towards accepted standards of rationality in the light of the often surprising outcomes of philosophical inquiry and cognitive science research into decision making. -/- Irrationality is an accessible guide to the concept and will be essential reading for students and scholars interested in the limitations of human cognition and human agency. (shrink)

A provocateur does not pose a threat of harm. Hence, a forceful response to provocation is generally considered wrongful. And yet, a provocateur is often denied recourse to a self-defence justification if she defends herself against such a violent response. In recent work, Kimberly Ferzan argues that a provocateur forfeits defensive rights but this forfeiture cannot be explained in the same way as an aggressor’s rights forfeiture. Ordinarily, one forfeits the right not to be harmed and to self-defend against harm (...) by threatening to violate another person’s rights. But provocateurs forfeit their defensive rights because they bring about the situation in which defence becomes necessary. As I argue here, positing these two types of forfeiture justifications is neither desirable nor necessary. I suggest a unified rights forfeiture account that grounds rights forfeiture in moral responsibility for an unjust threat. My account offers clearer distinctions than alternative unified accounts, which I briefly discuss. Furthermore, the account can provide better explanations of intuitively plausible judgements. A provocateur will have less extensive defensive rights than an innocent victim, but will not lose all her defensive rights simply because ‘she started it.’. (shrink)

While discussion is a hallmark of philosophy teaching methods, some instructors express doubt as to the possibilities for its meaningful implementation in online classes. Here, I report on a routine that utilized synchronous and asynchronous discussion strategies to promote community-building and critical engagement in an educational philosophy class forced online due to the COVID-19 pandemic. Before class, students used social annotation software to collaboratively read a text. During class, we pursued whole-group discussion using student-centered strategies before breaking into partners for (...) small-group work on a written discussion prompt. After class, students individually replied to the prompts written by these small groups. Results show that students found that this routinized structure promoted engagement with the course content and each other, ultimately building a community that supported critical thinking in the virtual classroom. Implications are raised regarding instructor workload and control over course outcomes. (shrink)

Electroencephalography-neurofeedback has become a valuable tool in the field of psychology, e.g., to improve cognitive function. Nevertheless, a large percentage of NF users seem to be unable to control their own brain activation. Therefore, the aim of this study was to examine whether a different kind of visual feedback could positively influence NF performance after one training session. Virtual reality seems to have beneficial training effects and has already been reported to increase motivational training aspects. In the present study, we (...) tested 61 young healthy adults to investigate, whether 3D VR-based NF training has a more beneficial effect on the sensorimotor rhythm power increase than a mere 2D conventional NF paradigm. In the 3D group, participants had to roll a ball along a predefined path in an immersive virtual environment, whereas the 2D group had to increase the height of a bar. Both paradigms were presented using VR goggles. Participants completed one baseline and six feedback runs with 3 min each, in which they should try to increase SMR power over Cz. Half of the participants received real feedback whereas the other half received sham feedback. Participants receiving 3D VR-based feedback showed a linear increase in SMR power over the feedback runs within one training session. This was the case for the real as well as for the sham 3D feedback group and might be related to more general VR-related effects. The 2D group receiving the conventional bar feedback showed no changes in SMR power over the feedback runs. The present study underlines that the visual feedback modality has differential effects on the NF training performance and that 3D VR-based feedback has advantages over conventional 2D feedback. (shrink)

This paper critically examines the spatial context of discussing controversial issues in educational settings. It begins by evaluating the concept of safe spaces, addressing significant critiques such as the illusion of safety, essentialism, censorship, and the negativity of learning. Next, civility is considered as an alternative, highlighting the failure of this approach to account for crucial spatial and relational dimensions. To address these gaps, the notion of “spaces of repair” is introduced. This framework seeks to integrate individual virtues with collective (...) responsibility, emotional engagement, and empathetic communication, fostering environments where controversial issues can be addressed without neglecting the personal, emotional, and psychological effects on students. In “spaces of repair” classroom discussions are seen not only as a simulation of democratic practice, but the very enactment of democratic commitment to one another, including willingness to nurture and repair the social bonds, even through conflict and controversy. (shrink)

Stem cell research. Drug company influence. Abortion. Contraception. Long-term and end-of-life care. Human participants research. Informed consent. The list of ethical issues in science, medicine, and public health is long and continually growing. These complex issues pose a daunting task for professionals in the expanding field of bioethics. But what of the practice of bioethics itself? What issues do ethicists and bioethicists confront in their efforts to facilitate sound moral reasoning and judgment in a variety of venues? Are those immersed (...) in the field capable of making the right decisions? How and why do they face moral challenge -- and even compromise -- as ethicists? What values should guide them? In The Ethics of Bioethics, Lisa A. Eckenwiler and Felicia G. Cohn tackle these questions head on, bringing together notable medical ethicists and people outside the discipline to discuss common criticisms, the field's inherent tensions, and efforts to assign values and assess success. Through twenty-five lively essays examining the field's history and trends, shortcomings and strengths, and the political and policy interplay within the bioethical realm, this comprehensive book begins a much-needed critical and constructive discussion of the moral landscape of bioethics. (shrink)

This is a paper about philosophical inquiry and cooking. In it, I suggest that thinking about cooking can illuminate our understanding of other forms of inquiry. Specifically, I think it provides us with one way to circumvent the dilemma of absolutism and relativism. The paper is divided into two sections. In the first, I sketch the background against which my project is situated. In the second, I develop an account of cooking as inquiry, by exploring five aspects of recipe creation (...) and use. (shrink)

In order to operate effectively, modern capitalism depends on agents who evince a rather morally undemanding type of moral character; one that is acquisitive, pecuniary, recognition-seeking and merely prudent. Adam Smith is considered to have been the key legitimiser of this archetype. In this paper I respond to the view that Smith is actually sceptical about the value of material acquisition and explore whether he really believed that the pursuit of tranquillity and virtue—especially beneficence—offers a superior route to happiness than (...) the commercial world of materialist acquisition. I approach these issues partly by considering the roles of beneficence and sympathy in Smith's system and partly by analysing the story of ‘The Poor Man's Son’ related in Book IV of The Theory of Moral Sentiments. As he narrates this story, Smith seems highly critical of the unrelenting drive for worldly success. But what is the real moral of the story? Should people contain their ambition for recognition and material succe... (shrink)

metaphysics of goodness is the work of an unrelentingly systematic mind, but this is no surprise at all. It is simply true to form for Bob Neville, who for decades has been working out the intricacies of his systematic thought. For Bob, being systematic has never meant being systematically selective of, but rather systematically attentive to the cosmic miscellany. This is no less true of his most recent work, in which he develops his strongly realist theory of goodness.The work as (...) a whole builds across three parts, each composed of four chapters, from the thesis of form as goodness to an account of personhood and human flourishing. These latter parts, where Neville transitions from cosmological considerations to... (shrink)

This article explores Adam Smith's (1723-90) cosmopolitanism by examining his conception of the ideal global regime and his attitudes to classical cosmopolitanism, British imperialism, American independence, war, mercantilism, benevolence, global integration, specialization, patriotism and his own alleged nationalism. It is argued that Smith shares with the Stoics the ideal of a world community but his cosmopolitanism is based, not on the sympathetic workings of universal benevolence, but on mutual enablement and the desire for and satisfaction of exponential material enrichment. Such (...) a state precludes conflict and territorial rivalry. Patriotism will not disappear but will be moderated by a pacific desire for prosperity via free trade. Eventually fierce nationalistic sentiments and intense alliances between security allies will be subdued by a development-induced aversion to conflict and the habits of amicable strangership underlying commercial cosmopolitanism. The article outlines the efficient mechanisms by which this is to be achieved and, in so doing, shows why, for Smith, economic cosmopolitanism is at once desirable, necessary and natural. (shrink)

Lindquist et al. argue that emotional categories do not map onto distinct regions within the brain, but rather, arise from basic psychological processes, including conceptualization, executive attention, and core affect. Here, we use examples from cultural neuroscience to argue that psychological constructionism, not locationism, captures the essential role of emotion in the social and cultural brain.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Justice and Generality After CritiqueLisa Landoe Hedrick (bio)The context for my paper is Wesley J. Wildman's understanding of the dispute between modernity and postmodernity; namely, that it is fundamentally a dispute about generality and justice. Where postmodern critique goes wrong, he argues, is in failing to appreciate how a tireless commitment to self-criticism can manage the risks of assertion. We need both consciousness-raising critique and orienting conceptual interpretations of (...) the world—achieving such checks and balances is the promise of a pragmatic theory of inquiry. In contrast to postmodernist asceticism, Wildman invites us to build responsibly. I agree that constructive steps are needed after genealogical, post-colonial, feminist, and other such critical social theories. My concern, shared by several contributors to Religion in Multidisciplinary Perspective, is that these steps can be taken too soon, meaning before they have been sufficiently retooled by way of such theories' concerns about the politics of discourse and inquiry and the conceptual tools with which we conceive comparative programs.I begin by detailing Wildman's position with respect to postmodern criticism. I then explore (and second) concerns voiced by LeRon Shults, Timothy Knepper, and Sarah Fredericks with respect to this position. I proceed to put them in constructive conversation with contemporary anthropologists striving for new conceptions of comparative inquiry in response to similar concerns. My purpose is to show how shame-induced asceticism about a certain type of assertion can create space, not just for greater readiness to revise, but for entirely new senses of assertion.Wildman regards the work of postmodernist critics as "far and away the most ascetic form of philosophy ever attempted."1 The contributions of these "philosophical analysts of ideology in politics and discourse" including thinkers "from Freud and before to Derrida and beyond" have greatly improved our awareness and understanding of "the power of narratives and theories to structure imaginations."2 But they have almost exclusively regarded this power in negative ways, as a subject of suspicion and enemy of an authentic [End Page 12] life. Attempting to systematically avoid ideology, these thinkers have developed highly "ritualized form[s] of discourse" as a way of habitually divulging and eliminating frameworks of understanding.This expectation, according to Wildman, is "impossible" to satisfy and is as such "disabling," not to mention "undesirable."3 Ideology can be as helpful as it can be hurtful and, in any case, it is unavoidable: "[these] coded frameworks of interpretation and meaning … are invaluable in helping us to engage our social worlds constructively." He continues, "Without partially hidden frameworks for orienting ourselves to the endless complexities of social life and politics, we have only painful exposure to the harsh light of more self-awareness than we can tolerate, producing paralysis and impotence. Thus, we need both partially submerged frameworks for social orientation and efficient mechanisms for correcting those frameworks when they produce undesirable or unjust effects."4 Bracketing the discussion about how we judge effects to be "undesirable" or "unjust," I wonder about what this statement implies regarding the placating function of frameworks against reality. What is it about which we become aware that produces paralysis? And what is the framework within which we can make such assessments?Wildman does not see any issue in answering such questions; he draws upon evolutionary biology to establish a positive valence for ideology to counterbalance postmodernist concerns.The ability to appeal to the natural sciences is central to Wildman's protest, since a one-sided account of the way power penetrates knowledge overestimates the arbitrariness and irrationality of that knowledge and invalidates any bid for authority on the part of the natural sciences. As I understand him, Wildman takes this postmodernist move to be symptomatic of a broader lack of self-awareness, which forgets that ideological criticism was itself a modern creation.5 He takes the very fact that ideological criticism has emerged to be a testament against postmodernist fatalism. A two-sided account of the way power penetrates knowledge would, presumably on his logic, admit partial arbitrariness and partial irrationality. (It is unclear to me what differentiates arbitrariness from irrationality here, and I'd be grateful for a lesson.)At least in this context... (shrink)

Even though the 3Rs are widely accepted as ethical standards when evaluating research projects using animals as experimental subjects, the ethical status of the 3Rs still remains to be clarified. The 3Rs were not derived from any ethical theory, but they represented an attempt to increase humanity to animal experimentation and at the same time to improve validity of scientific data . The aim of the present article was to provide an ethical analysis of the 3Rs through Engelhardt's bioethics theory (...) . The analysis revealed the 3Rs fitted to some extent Engelhardt ethical values. But the analysis also revealed some internal contradictions between the 3Rs and Engelhardt's ethical vaules. Although the 3Rs are still valuable tools in animal ethical evaluation, the present analysis suggests that some ethical issues still remain to be clarified. (shrink)

When the New Organon appeared in 1620, part of a six-part programme of scientific inquiry entitled 'The Great Renewal of Learning', Francis Bacon was at the high point of his political career, and his ambitious work was groundbreaking in its attempt to give formal philosophical shape to a new and rapidly emerging experimentally-based science. Bacon combines theoretical scientific epistemology with examples from applied science, examining phenomena as various as magnetism, gravity, and the ebb and flow of the tides, and anticipating (...) later experimental work by Robert Boyle and others. His work challenges the entire edifice of the philosophy and learning of his time, and has left its mark on all subsequent philosophical discussions of scientific method. This volume presents a new translation of the text into modern English by Michael Silverthorne, and an introduction by Lisa Jardine that sets the work in the context of Bacon's scientific and philosophical activities. (shrink)

American Immanence begins with the following premise: as the Earth becomes increasingly a product of human existence, we are faced with a radical unsettling of our traditional modes of self-understanding, both in relation to each other and to the broader environment. As Hogue succinctly observes, “By making the Earth homo imago, by terraforming our own self-image into the Earth, we have discovered ourselves as earth creatures, terra bēstiae”. The anthropogenic shifts that have beset our ecological, religious, and political climates, he (...) insists, require us to reconceive many of our basic anthropological, ethical, and theological assumptions. These shifts signify the paradoxicality of the Anthropocene as, at... (shrink)

Despite a perception of philosophical antagonism, the resemblances between German idealism of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century and classical American pragmatism can be rather striking. Historically, pragmatism may be viewed as a distillation of Kant’s practical postulates from his preponderant pursuits of theoretical reason. Indeed, Peirce appropriated the term pragmatism from Kant’s first critique while shedding its pejorative connotations. Hegel, I will argue, can be read as employing a pragmatist epistemological method, albeit in a blinkered way, by building (...) on Kant’s own pragmatist sympathies in light of a more developmental understanding of the relationship between our beliefs and our.. (shrink)

Whitehead’s metaphysics provides resources for understanding a world in value-realist terms. Central to this value realism is an aesthetic conception of rationality that sees a hope implicit in our practices—the hope that our linguistic tools are suited to the task of getting things right in our fields of inquiry. This pragmatic hope entails an understanding of individual freedom and responsibility to participate in a patient restructuring of the world toward the highest retention of value. It also enables an understanding of (...) individual freedom as obstructive to this restructuring. One task of this article is to show that attunement in theory to the hope implicit in practice can ameliorate this obstructiveness. A subsequent task is to show that, insofar as this preliminary hope is not a metaphysical premise, but a regulative ideal seeking satisfaction, it can serve as a warrant for an implicit theology in linguistic pragmatism. In this way, I argue that we can come to see pragmatism as a method lending itself to a philosophical theology of the Whiteheadian variety. We can do this precisely insofar as rationalism is seen as predicated on an aesthetic ideal of harmony—a harmony between what is and what ought to be our matters of concern. We can come to see the structure of rationality in terms of an aestheticism corrective of analytic conceptions of meaning and truth. (shrink)

This paper addresses Koch's concern about whether a coresponsible theorist can engage in inquiry with a theorist who is “beyond the pale.” On what grounds, he ash, can a coresponsible inquirer argue against one who uses a racist, sexist, or classist model for inquiry? 1 argue that, in such situations, the coresponsible inquirer brings to inquiry both a theoretical framework, or “attitude,” and a set of practical concerns which manifest that attitude.

In this brief paper, I want to begin to explore the possibility that bi-trans dialogue can challenge those forms of oppression that are grounded in sex, gender, and sexuality. I am particularly interested in pursuing the possibility that bi-trans dialogue might result in additional critiques of the sex-gender-sexuality triad. Despite multiple challenges, and myriad historical transmogri-fications (including, it must be noted, the very late addition of gender), that triad maintains its foundationality and posits deep causal links among its three parts. (...) The effect of this causal chain is to render untenable or incomprehensi-ble the lives of all sorts of actual, living persons—lives that are anything but incomprehensible to those living them, but that are made to be so on a system in which there is still a strong tendency to hold that sex causes gender and sexuality. The resilience of this presumed causal connection contributes to ensuring the continued dominance of a two-sex, two-gender, two-sexuality system. (shrink)

In this paper, I develop a way to conceive of free speech that begins by redefining speech. My definition affirms the fact that speaking is an activity that goes on among people in a community. Speaking, I will suggest, is an activity that involves not only the present speaker, but also others who act as listeners and potential speakers. I contend that liberal conceptions of free speech have often proven ill equipped to address certain free speech issues, precisely because they (...) have tended to conceive of speech not as a collective activity in which participation involves both speaking and listening, but as an individualized activity in which only speakers and their utterances are relevant.Of course not all liberal notions of speech are radically individualistic; a useful distinction might be made between "solipsistic" liberal models, and "two-or-more-person" models. The latter sort do ascribe some sort of role to those who hear and respond to speech. John Stuart Mill's arguments for the value of free speech, for example, display a significant emphasis on the role of the community. Mill's model emphasizes the importance of free debate and discussion as a means by which to improve one's ideas. One of his chief arguments in support of free speech is that collecting others' responses to one's speech enables one to develop clearer, stronger ideas. But such a view only addresses others' roles as speakers--as producers of ideas. My position recognizes an even broader role for these others; I shall suggest that listening/potential speaking are themselves aspects of speaking. Thus, others' interests are do not become relevant (and eligible for protection) only when others themselves become speakers; the interests of listeners (and even "ignorers") as listeners must be taken into account in evaluating whether speech in a particular situation is free.¯ The conception I develop defines speaking as collective, thereby illuminating the role played in it by listeners/potential speakers. In the bulk of activities that go under the name "speech", a community of "others" (listeners, potential listeners, "ignorers") plays some sort of role. Those instances of speaking in which there are no relevant others may be defined in terms of their relation to speech-with-listeners. That is, they are exceptions to the general cases, and their presence in the category "speaking" can be understood by reference to one of these general cases. My original motivation for developing this conception of speech was to provide a way to illuminate those forms of sexual harassment that consist of sexist speech. I intend for the conception to characterize free speech in such a way that preventing someone from using sexist language does not (at least automatically) constitute a violation of their free speech rights, but in fact may increase the level of freedom of the community. I develop my account by first providing a critical outline of one version of a liberal conception of free speech.In the course of this outline, I examine two central liberal justifications for protecting speech; the argument from individual rights and the argument from utility. I conclude this section by making explicit my criticisms of this liberal conception. Following this, I turn to develop an alternative collective conception of speaking and of free speaking. I argue that this conception is preferable for two reasons; first, because speaking is a collective activity, and to treat it otherwise is to mask its powers and disguise the benefit or harm it may bring to users. Second, a collective conception of speaking preserves the values of free speech advanced in liberal views better than does a liberal conception. (shrink)

Anthony Celano argues that after Thomas Aquinas the flexibility of Aristotle’s ethics gives way to the universal codes of Christian morality. His argument posits that the Schoolmen adopted a line of moral reasoning that follows a Platonic tradition of taking universal moral principles as the basis of moral reasoning. While Thomas does work in a tradition that, resemblant of the Platonic tradition, incorporates inerrant principles of moral reasoning in the habit of _synderesis_, his understanding of those principles is distinctly Aristotelian (...) in character and thus the flexible moral reasoning of Aristotle’s _phronimos_ is retained. For Thomas _synderesis_ is the first principle of practical reason and is the source rather than the inhibitor of personal and spontaneous moral reasoning. This article will first outline Celano’s position, detail the thought of Thomas’ predecessors, and then show how Thomas employs the principle of _synderesis_ in a distinctly Aristotelian framework. (shrink)

Voluntary stopping of eating and drinking (VSED) is an increasingly popular method by which patients are choosing to hasten death when life feels unbearable. This formal act of suicide often leads to distressing symptoms, for which patients then seek palliation by medical professionals. The intentional act of hastening death is always an evil act. A Catholic physician must understand the moral implications of participating in any phase of the patient’s planning and execution of the VSED process, including cooperation in evil (...) and scandal. The Catholic physician must strive to develop a well-formed conscience and then be prepared to exercise his or her right to conscientious objection while offering an example of true compassion for the sick, the suffering, and the dying. (shrink)

To address the growing costs associated with chronic illness care, many countries, both developed and developing, identify increased patient self‐management or self‐care as a focus of healthcare reform. Health coaching, an implementation strategy to support the shift to self‐management, encourages patients to make lifestyle changes to improve the management of chronic illness. This practice differs from traditional models of health education because of the interactional dynamics between nurse and patient, and an orientation to care that ostensibly centres and empowers patients. (...) The theoretical underpinnings of coaching reflect these differences, however in its application, the practices arranged around health coaching for chronic illness self‐management reveal the social regulation and professional management of everyday life. This becomes especially problematic in contexts defined by economic constraint and government withdrawal from activities related to the ‘care’ of citizens. In this paper, we trace the development of health coaching as part of nursing practice and consider the implications of this practice as an emerging element of chronic illness self‐management. Our purpose is to highlight health coaching as an approach intended to support patients with chronic illness and at the same time, problematize the tensions contained in (and by) this practice. (shrink)

This is a transcript of a dialogue between Lisa Downing and Maggie Nelson about Nelson’s recent book, On Freedom: Four Songs of Care and Constraint (2021). The interlocutors discuss the rise of cultural authoritarianism, the role of care in shaping and delimiting freedom, the ways in which freedom and care signify differently according to the sex of the ‘free’ subject, and the vexed question of what freedom will mean in an uncertain future foreshadowed by the spectre of climate change (...) — and potential apocalypse. (shrink)

Understanding Eating Disorders endeavors to answer the question “How should we behave when dealing with a person with eating disorders?” (254). In the pursuit of this question, Giordano undertakes two primary tasks. First, she constructs an analysis of eating disorders that attempts to show why they should be understood “from a moral perspective. Eating disorders signify a person’s belonging and adherence to a determined moral context” (8). Second, she conducts an exploration of autonomy, and asks whether it is justified to (...) regard persons with mental illnesses in general, and persons with eating disorders in particular, as lacking autonomy, and thus as candidates for paternalistic treatment—force feeding, for instance. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Lisa’s StoryLisa P. (wife of patient) and Jeanne KerwinMy husband suffered from sudden onset of heart failure with a very low ejection fraction and was on IV Milrinone at the age of 47. One of the most powerful things he told me was that he was not afraid to die and therefore did not want to move forward with Milrinone. He eventually “did it for the kids.” After (...) the Milrinone drip was no longer working, he was offered an LVAD (left ventricular assist device) to keep him alive. He refused, but the doctor again convinced him to “do it for your kids” and said, “we put these devices in 80-year-olds.” He did not have time to explore any other options and reluctantly accepted the LVAD. It was implanted in May of 2014 in a very long and complicated surgery with a long and difficult recovery. He was in the hospital for a long time, and then he refused to go to rehab upon discharge, making it difficult for our family to manage, as he was extremely weak and needed care of his wound dressing. He worried about the financial [End Page 7] impact of a heart transplant and the medications required, as we were already struggling with the medical bills. He refused to have more surgery with the potential complications and never agreed to get on the transplant waiting list.After the implanted LVAD, my husband was not able to do most of what he loved in life. He couldn’t work (he was a truck driver), he couldn’t go fishing or swimming in the ocean, he couldn’t go hunting and fishing, and his overall physical condition was so poor that he couldn’t cook, garden and, most aggravating to him, he could not take a regular hot shower. The LVAD had to be covered with plastic in order to avoid getting the drive-line area wet, so bathing was a complicated process. He had trouble with stairs, had neuropathic pain in his legs from diabetes, and because of the pain medications, he felt cloudy and dizzy and slept most of the day in his recliner. I took care of him, even after I had to go back to work, and at the same time, I managed our two children (ages 9 and 12 at the time of LVAD).After almost two years of living with the LVAD, multiple hospitalizations for GI bleeds then seizures, more medications, and weekly blood draws for INR1, my husband requested that the LVAD be de-activated and that he be allowed to die of his heart failure. He described his life as “miserable.” He watched as his misery impacted his children and me. He suffered daily and had none of the joys that made life worth living for him. When we approached the cardiac team that implanted and monitored his LVAD with his request, they said “no.” They would not de-activate the LVAD because it was working. It was keeping him alive and he had no other terminal illness. His palliative doctor, who was treating his pain, also heard his request and told us to call for an “ethics consult” to determine if he would be “allowed” to have the LVAD de-activated. We got the number and called on March 31, 2016.At the time of the call to Ethics, we had no idea what “Ethics” was, other than a general definition of the word ethics as in professional behaviors and such. We did not know what to expect but we called. We would never have known to call “Ethics” if the palliative doctor had not advised us to do so, and my husband might have suffered a longer, more painful life both mentally and physically prolonged by the LVAD.We explained the request to the ethics consultant. She listened to my husband describe his daily living and his dissatisfaction with the quality of his life, his physical and emotional suffering, and his wish to rid himself of the LVAD and allow nature to take its course. There was actually no decision to be made on his part. He had already made up... (shrink)

A new theory of how the brain constructs emotions that could revolutionize psychology, health care, law enforcement, and our understanding of the human mind Emotions feel automatic, like uncontrollable reactions to things we think and experience. Scientists have long supported this assumption by claiming that emotions are hardwired in the body or the brain. Today, however, the science of emotion is in the midst of a revolution on par with the discovery of relativity in physics and natural selection in biology--and (...) this paradigm shift has far-reaching implications for us all. Leading the charge is psychologist and neuroscientist Lisa Feldman Barrett, whose theory of emotion is driving a deeper understanding of the mind and brain, and shedding new light on what it means to be human. Her research overturns the widely held belief that emotions are housed in different parts of the brain and are universally expressed and recognized. Instead, she has shown that emotion is constructed in the moment, by core systems that interact across the whole brain, aided by a lifetime of learning. This new theory means that you play a much greater role in your emotional life than you ever thought. Its repercussions are already shaking the foundations not only of psychology but also of medicine, the legal system, child-rearing, meditation, and even airport security. Why do emotions feel automatic? Does rational thought really control emotion? How does emotion affect disease? How can you make your children more emotionally intelligent? How Emotions Are Made answers these questions and many more, revealing the latest research and intriguing practical applications of the new science of emotion, mind, and brain. (shrink)