Sextus Empiricus ascribes to Epicurus a curious account of truth and falsehood, according to which these characteristics belong to things in the world about which one speaks, not to what one says about them. I propose an interpretation that takes this account seriously and explains the connection between truth and existence that the Epicureans also seem to recognise. I then examine a second Epicurean account of truth and falsehood and show how it is related to the first.

In several of his philosophical works, Cicero gives reports of the Epicurean views on bivalence and the excluded middle that are not always consistent. I attempt to establish a coherent account that fits the texts as well as possible and can reasonably be attributed to the Epicureans. I argue that they distinguish between a semantic and a syntactic version of the law of the excluded middle, and that whilst they reject bivalence and the semantic law for fear of certain fatalistic (...) consequences, they endorse the syntactic law. Subsequently, I show that certain principles that they seem to endorse in the context of Cicero’s discussion of Chrysippus’ argument for fate, when modified by the addition of the atomic swerve, suggest that the Epicureans have in mind something like a supervaluationist model of truth at times, which has the desired results with respect to the three logical principles. (shrink)

Amidst the surge in AI-oriented commercial ventures, music is a site of intensive efforts to innovate. A number of companies are seeking to apply AI to music production and consumption, and amongst them several are seeking to reinvent the music listening experience as adaptive, interactive, functional and infinitely generative. These are bold objectives, having no clear roadmap for what designs, technologies and use cases, if any, will be successful. Thus each company relies on speculative product visions. Through four case studies (...) of such companies, I consider how product visions must carefully provide a clear plan for developers and investors, whilst also remaining open to agile user-centred product development strategies, which I discuss in terms of the ‘blind search’ nature of innovation. I suggest that innovation in this area needs to be understood in terms of technological emergence, which is neither technologically determinist nor driven entirely by the visions of founders, but through a complex of interacting forces. I also consider, through these cases, how, through the accumulation of residual value, all such start-up work risks being exapted for more familiar extractive capitalist agendas under the general process that Doctorow calls “enshittification”. Lastly, I consider a number of other more specific ways in which these projects, if their growth is achieved, could influence music culture more broadly. (shrink)

Bowne examines the philosophy of Herbert Spencer and critiques the first principles of Spencer's system. This book is an important contribution to the critique of Spencer's philosophy. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as (...) no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

A key question in understanding microtubule dynamics is how GTP hydrolysis leads to catastrophe, the switch from slow growth to rapid shrinkage. We first provide a review of the experimental and modeling literature, and then present a new model of microtubule dynamics. We demonstrate that vectorial, random, and coupled hydrolysis mechanisms are not consistent with the dependence of catastrophe on tubulin concentration and show that, although single-protofilament models can explain many features of dynamics, they do not describe catastrophe as a (...) multistep process. Finally, we present a new combined (coupled plus random hydrolysis) multiple-protofilament model that is a simple, analytically solvable generalization of a single-protofilament model. This model accounts for the observed lifetimes of growing microtubules, the delay to catastrophe following dilution and describes catastrophe as a multistep process. (shrink)

My aim in this chapter is to present the fundamentals of Epicurus’ views on physics and ontology and to raise some questions that a competitor to Aristotelian hylomorphism ought to be able to handle. In section 1, I present the basic ontological framework; in section 2, I introduce atoms, which most closely correspond in Epicurus’ system to Aristotelian matter, and show how he attempted to account for some phenomenal and psychological properties of compound bodies by appealing just to the characteristics (...) and arrangement of their atomic parts. But it turns out that not all macroscopic properties are regarded as explicable in this way. In section 3, I introduce an alternative Epicurean analysis of bodies that treats them not as aggregates of material parts but rather as complexes of attributes that have so-called ‘permanent natures’ at their core. I argue that this analysis must play an ineliminable explanatory role in some contexts, in order to account for the unity of compound bodies, their persistence over time, and to ground modal claims about what belongs to them necessarily or non-necessarily. In section 4, I briefly discuss a semi-technical formulation that some Epicurean philosophers use when making such claims. (shrink)

The topic of demonstration lies at the intersection of logic and epistemology. It is motivated by the following question: what features must an argument possess to be suitable for providing us with knowledge? A first, obvious thought is that it ought to be valid and to have true premises. But some ancient philosophers came to the view that this is not yet sufficient for an argument to grant knowledge of the truth of its conclusion; there are further requirements, concerning the (...) epistemic status of its premises and the relations they bear towards its conclusion. The expression ‘demonstration’ (apodeixis) was used as a label for arguments that are capable of yielding knowledge, and various accounts were proposed of the features that a demonstration must possess. This chapter introduces this topic by giving an overview of three treatments of demonstration in antiquity: those of Aristotle; the Stoics; and some philosophers working in the Epicurean tradition. (shrink)

Theory of Thought and Knowledge is an unchanged, high-quality reprint of the original edition of 1897. Hansebooks is editor of the literature on different topic areas such as research and science, travel and expeditions, cooking and nutrition, medicine, and other genres. As a publisher we focus on the preservation of historical literature. Many works of historical writers and scientists are available today as antiques only. Hansebooks newly publishes these books and contributes to the preservation of literature which has become rare (...) and historical knowledge for the future. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.This work is in the public domain in (...) the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

From the PREFACE. The aim of this work is given in its title. First, it is an "introduction" only, and does not go into the details or the literature of the subject. The aim is to point out the highways of psychology, rather than its myriad byways. Secondly, it is an "introduction to psychological theory," and aims less at a knowledge of facts than at an understanding of principles. Until principles are settled there is no bar to the most fantastic (...) theories and interpretations. These principles being illustrated in the most common facts of experience, it is not necessary to psychological insight to make an anthology of madhouse and hospital stories. Such a procedure has about the same relation to psychology that the various books of "wonders" or the "brilliant experiments" of the popular lecturer have to sober physical science. An odor of quackery is perceptible in both cases. The plan of the work precludes much attention to physiological psychology. Whatever the merits of this science may be, it presupposes pure psychology. If our aim is to give a physiological explanation of psychological facts, we must' first know the facts. Or if our aim is the more modest one of finding the physical conditions or attendants of mental facts, again we must know the facts. But this knowledge is not possible by the way of physiology, and in any case the mental facts remain what they always were. Their likenesses and differences and essential nature would not be changed if physiology were supreme. Even the "new psychology " would not give us new mental facts, but only a new interpretation of the old facts. The Zeitgeist itself begins at last to see this; and the naive onslaughts on the "old psychology" are happily growing fewer. Psychological literature shows very marked progress in this respect within the last twenty years. Physiology remains a most estimable science, but the physiological reconstruction of psychology has been postponed. The study of the physical conditions of our mental life has a pathological and practical importance; but it does not promise any valuable psychological results, at least for those who can distinguish between the physical conditions and the mental facts which they condition. The limitation of plan involves many omissions; and in these there will seem to be a measure of arbitrariness. Hence many will not find here what they want, and probably still more will find what they do not want. There seems to be no way of adjusting so grave a difficulty except by maintaining, on the one hand, freedom to publish, and, on the other, freedom not to read. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

There are many obvious morphological and behavioural differences between male and female Drosophila, whose differing phenotypes are produced by a hierarchy of sex determination genes. These genes have been well characterised at the genetic and molecular level. Similarly, a number of sex‐specific differentiation genes have been characterised, such as the chorion and vitelline membrane genes in females and the sex peptide and other accessory gland proteins in males. Despite the depth of these parallel studies, there is only one example of (...) a direct link between the sex determination pathway and the downstream sex differentiation genes, namely the regulation of the female‐specific yolk protein genes. The yolk proteins are synthesised in the fat body and ovarian follicle cells of the adult female and are subsequently transported to the oocyte where they are stored for utilization during embrygenesis. The expression of the yolk protein genes is not entirely controlled by the sex determination hierarchy, as several different regulatory pathways must interact to direct their correct sexual, temporal and spatial regulation during development. (shrink)

Aboriginal Australians have an intrinsic relationship to Country, kinship and community. The processes related to colonisation have decimated traditional lifestyles, ecology and even families. The challenge for energy engineers lies in the ability to reconcile the profession of engineering with the contemporary and traditional cultural and physical needs of Aboriginal people. A discussion around Aboriginal peoples’ most deeply held values will be linked to both global and professional ethical canons. This discussion has implications for Aboriginal and Indigenous peoples globally. A (...) fictitious case study—the ‘Warrigal Downs Energy Hub’—provides us with a hypothetical project to which we can link both examples and frameworks. Our team of Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal educators and engineers provides us with a right, wrong and even better way to work sensitively, meaningfully and reciprocally with Aboriginal people in Australia and, indeed, globally. (shrink)

This article is an examination of Borden Parker Bowne’s account of diachronic personal identity. Specifically, it addresses the question of whether the kind of permanence that Bowne ascribes to persons in his analyses of memory and thought is consistent with his more general views about diachronic identity when framed within the context of his accounts of being and substance. The first section provides an examination of how Bowne understands the permanence of selves, with an emphasis on his repeated insistence that (...) they must remain numerically identical across time to make sense of certain kinds of experiences. Section II examines his embrace of a theory of being that is in some ways a forerunner of process philosophy. The article concludes by suggesting that this deeper metaphysical account of being as becoming stands in tension with what he says about the abidingness of persons. (shrink)

Under the influence of rationalism and various forms of absolute idealism in the nineteenth century, teleology took on the nature of fixity; the universe was held to be fulfilling a definite telos. Such teleology defined a closed universe. In the latter half of the same century the American pragmatists, under the influence of Bergson and Renouvier, began to develop their notion of an open universe: one whose possibilities were not predetermined but were evolving creatively. This necessarily involved a change in (...) the understanding of teleology as reflected, for example, in C. S. Peirce’s 1892 account of “developmental teleology.” These changes in turn led to the “open universe” views of Whitehead, Hartshorne, and process theology in general. Within this historical framework one view which deserves some recognition for its role in this transition is often overlooked, that is, the personalism of Borden Parker Bowne. Bowne’s personalism suggests both the need for redefining teleology and two possible avenues for accomplishing such redefinition. (shrink)

The informal letters of great philosophers often provide valuable clues not only to the development of their thought processes but also to their inner personalities. The austere and distant Hegel comes alive as a man in his correspondence, and the rigorous Spinoza takes on the blood and flesh of a gracious friend in his letters. In Kant’s correspondence, we occasionally find helpful interpretations of his thought as he answers questions put to him by friends and inquirers. And the letters of (...) William James to his wide circle of friends are uniformly charming. We do not usually find a great deal of profound significance in the extant personal correspondence of philosophers but there is an occasional insight, often a clue to the unfolding of a personality, or an unguarded comment here or there which suggests a tendency or trait. (shrink)