Hugh Lacey (1939) é pesquisador emérito na Swarthmore College, Pennsylvania, Estados Unidos, onde começou a lecionar em 1972. É Doutor em História e Filosofia da Ciência pela Universidade de Indiana (EUA), tendosido professor visitante na Universidade de São Paulo em diversas ocasiões (1973, 1996, 2000 e 2004). Seus trabalhos atribuem lugares próprios aos valores dentro da tecnociência, procurando mostrar que a abordagem científica materialista precisa assumir também o lugar que as coisas ocupam em sistemas ecológicos e sociais. Lacey (...) é autor de diversos artigos e livros, entre os quais estão Valores e Atividade Científica 1, Valores e Atividade Científica 2, A Controvérsia sobre os transgênicos: questões científicas e éticas, entre outros. (shrink)

My aim in this paper is to rebut objections that have been made of the account of the various roles for values in scientific activities that I have developed, initially in my book Is Science Value Free?, in response to criticizing the proposal that science is value free. Specifically I respond to objections that my account does not recognize the significance of basic science, and that my defense of the ideal of impartiality cannot be sustained.

I distinguish three matters about which decisions have to be made in scientific activities: (1) adoption of strategy; (2) acceptance of data, hypotheses, and theories; and (3) application of scientific knowledge. I argue that, contrary to the common view that only concerning (3) do values have a legitimate role, value judgments often play indispensable roles in connection with decisions concerning (1)—that certain values may not only be furthered by applications of the scientific knowledge gained under a strategy, but they may (...) also provide a primary reason for conducting research under the strategy. However, this is compatible with making decisions concerning (2) that in no way draw upon values. While, in my opinion, this account applies to all the sciences, it has special salience in the behavioral and cognitive sciences. The behavioral scientist, qua scientist, makes value judgments when making decisions about which strategy to adopt, but not when deciding which theories to accept as providing knowledge and understanding of specified domains of phenomena. (shrink)

Can Martyrdom survive Secularization? is a survey of martyrdom in western society starting with the early Christian martyrs, and narrating its increasing politicization and secularization in more modern times. It argues that martyrdom is a two way street: the courage of men and women in the face of torture and death and the willingness of society to grant them the title of martyr. It recounts the careers of John Brown and his death on a Virginia gallows in 1859, Dietrich Bonhoeffer (...) and his execution by the Nazis in 1945, and Julius and Ethel Rosenberg and the atomic bomb. The story ends with the advent of suicide bombers, the apparent reintroduction of religion as a motive and their role as a political weapon. (shrink)

The central question addressed is: How should scientific research be conducted so as to ensure that nature is respected and the well being of everyone everywhere enhanced? After pointing to the importance of methodological pluralism for an acceptable answer and to obstacles posed by characterizing scientific methodology too narrowly, which are reinforced by the ‘commercial-scientific ethos’, two additional questions are considered: How might research, conducted in this way, have impact on—and depend on—strengthening democratic values and practices? And: What is thereby (...) implied for the responsibilities of scientists today? (shrink)

The question of conjoined artistic- and phenomenological research practice is explored through two realizations of a drawing-based practice, complemented with a language-based practice that includes transcriptions of a spoken monologue while and about drawing. Through adapting the sense that the monologue’s addressee is an apparently other person, and narrating this situation, the author expresses through the article that the experiential process of drawing is automatically phenomenological. In turn, the article is a presentation of how phenomenological reflection is implicit in the (...) practice. The artist- referenced in the article is termed the artist-author, declared as such to the reader, and is thereafter suggested as split into an apparently more reflexively inclined artist and a more reflectively inclined author/interlocutor. The hypothesis that both artistic- and phenomenological research can manifest as a single practice is embedded in the article’s manner of presentation, the reader of which is almost in the same interlocutory position as the author-, of the artist-author, in being able to notice this. The article’s actual author, however, refers to himself as a homunculus, in effect the hyphen of artist-author, that enables him to detach sufficiently from what can be read and seen to format the article in such terms as enable the reader to critically reflect on its hypothesis. The role of the camera itself, considered as a metaphor for interaction between the reflexive event and its subsequent language-based reflection, is also acknowledged, especially in the context of the artist-’s referencing in the drawing and in his speech how the camera both aids and obfuscates the process, and linking this to theory. The transcript conveys spoken enunciation, especially through its grammatically formatted disfluency and extended pauses, and the author’s personal declaration and observation of himself – reminding the reader that the article’s content is after all about its narrator – is italicized. (shrink)

The vertebrate immune system uses an impressive arsenal of mechanisms to combat harmful cellular states such as infection. One way is via cells delivering real‐time snapshots of their protein content to the cell surface in the form of short peptides. Specialized immune cells (T cells) sample these peptides and assess whether they are foreign, warranting an action such as destruction of the infected cell. The delivery of peptides to the cell surface is termed antigen processing and presentation, and decades of (...) research have provided unprecedented understanding of this process. However, predicting the capacity for a given peptide to be immunogenic—to elicit a T cell response—has remained both enigmatic and a long sought‐after goal. In the era of big data, a point is being approached where the steps of antigen processing and presentation can be quantified and assessed against peptide immunogenicity in order to build predictive models. This review presents new findings in this area and contemplates challenges ahead. (shrink)

Moral and legal philosophy are too entangled: moral philosophy is prone to model interpersonal moral relationships on a juridical image, and legal philosophy often proceeds as if the criminal law is an institutional reflection of juridically imagined interpersonal moral relationships. This article challenges this alignment and in so doing argues that the function of the criminal law lies not fundamentally in moral blame, but in regulation of harmful conduct. The upshot is that, in contrast to interpersonal relationships, the criminal law (...) cannot lose its standing to blame through institutional analogues of hypocrisy, complicity, and meddling. Rather, certain forms of structural and severe historical and contemporary injustice point to the question of the overall legitimacy of state authority. (shrink)

We argue that work on norms provides a way to move beyond debates between proponents of individualist and structuralist approaches to bias, oppression, and injustice. We briefly map out the geography of that debate before presenting Charlotte Witt’s view, showing how her position, and the normative ascriptivism at its heart, seamlessly connects individuals to the social reality they inhabit. We then describe recent empirical work on the psychology of norms and locate the notions of informal institutions and soft structures with (...) respect to it. Finally, we argue that the empirical resources enrich Witt’s ascriptivism, and that the resulting picture shows theorists need not, indeed should not, choose between either the individualist or structuralist camp. (shrink)

Exploring the role of values in scientific inquiry, Hugh Lacey examines the nature and meaning of values, and looks at challenges to the view, posed by postmodernists, feminists, radical ecologists, Third-World advocates and religious fundamentalists, that science is value free. He also focuses on discussions of 'development', especially in Third World countries. This paperback edition includes a new preface.

IVF as lottery or investment: contesting metaphors in discourses of infertilityThis paper reports an aspect of a poststructural feminist study in which I explored the discursive formations within which women for whom in vitro fertilisation (IVF) was unsuccessful constitute themselves. In my exploration I draw on data from interviews with women who discontinued infertility treatment, print media material and infertility self‐help books. Specifically, I highlight a metaphor of lottery in discourses of infertility, arguing that it is hegemonic and showing how (...) when women are situated as gamblers, the metaphor is instrumental in polarising them into ‘winners’ or ‘losers’ in relation to the subjectivity of motherhood. I further deconstruct these subjectivities, showing how ‘winners’ are valorised and ‘losers’ are pathologised. But importantly, I show how infertile women who are not mothers resisted locating themselves as ‘losers’ in a metaphor of lottery and instead situated themselves in a contesting metaphor of investment as diligent ‘workers’ and as active agents in choosing the best employment of their bodily and monetary resources. This paper therefore amplifies the marginalised perspective of infertile women who are not mothers. (shrink)

Individuals shift their language to converge with interlocutors. Recent work has suggested that convergence can target not only observed but also expected linguistic behavior, cued by social information. However, it remains uncertain how expectations and observed behavior interact, particularly when they contradict each other. We investigated this using a cooperative map task experiment, in which pairs of participants communicated online by typing messages to each other in a miniature “alien” language that exhibited variation between alien species. The overall task comprised (...) three phases, in each of which participants were told that they would be paired with a different partner. One member of the pair was given explicit linguistic expectations in each phase, while the software controlled whether or not observed behavior from their partner would be consistent or inconsistent with these expectations. The other participant was given no such expectations, allowing us to control for the role of expectation. Participants converged to both observed and expected linguistic behavior, and convergence was boosted when observation and expectation were aligned. When expected and observed behavior were misaligned, participants updated their expectations, though convergence levels did not drop. Furthermore, participants generalized what they learned about one partner to apparent novel partners of the same alien species. We also discuss individual variation in convergence patterns and the lack of a relationship between linguistic convergence and success at the map task. Findings are consistent with observations outside the laboratory that language users converge toward expected linguistic behavior. They also have broader implications for understanding linguistic accommodation and the influence of social information on linguistic processing and production. (shrink)

Scientists make judgments of value all the time. They usually evaluate their theories according to “cognitive values” (empirical adequacy, power to make predictions, explanatory power etc). But a theory can also be evaluated according to non-cognitive values (social, political, economical, etc). Traditionally, cognitive and non-cognitive kinds of values are maintained separated from one another in order to protect science’s “autonomy”, impartiality”, and “neutrality”. However, social and moral values, as well as other kinds of non-cognitive values, play their role in science, (...) not only by addressing the ethical issues of scientific research, but also by establishing the strategies according to which the problems to be investigated are chosen, and practical applications are sought. Therefore, science is not “neutral”, nor properly “autonomous” - it is permeated by those non-cognitive values. But scientific research can and should be said “impartial” in relation to the cognitive evaluation of its results, in order to make the progress of the research possible, and to allow a diversity of values to make room for a variety of competing strategies. Key words: cognitive values, non-cognitive values, scientific research, strategies, impartiality. (shrink)

Book reviewed:Prakash Sethi and Oliver Williams, Economic Imperatives and Ethical Values in Global Business.

Features of gait are determined at multiple levels, from the selection of the gait itself (e.g. walk or run) through the specific parameters utilized (stride length, frequency, etc.) to the pattern of muscular excitation. The ultimate choices are neurally determined, but what is involved with that decision process? Human locomotion appears stereotyped not so much because the pattern is predetermined, but because these movement patterns are good solutions for providing movement utilizing the machinery available to the individual (the legs and (...) their requisite components). Under different circumstances the appropriate solution may differ broadly (different gait) or subtly (different parameters). Interpretation of the neural decision making process would benefit from understanding the influences that determine the selection of the appropriate solution in any set of circumstances, including that of normal conditions. In this review we survey an array of studies that point to energetic cost as a key input to the gait coordination system, and not just an outcome of the gait pattern implemented. We then use that information to rigorously define the construct proposed by Sparrow and Newell (1998) where the effects of environment, organism and task act as constraints determining the solution set available, and the coordination pattern is then implemented under a pressure for energetic economy. Environment is defined in terms of affordances based on the ecological psychology definition of the concept and organism is defined as classic morphology and physiology based capabilities. We rely on a novel conceptualization of task that recognizes that the task goal needs to be separated from the mechanisms that achieve the goal if the motivation behind the selection of the mechanism strategy is to be exposed and understood. This reformulation of the Sparrow and Newell construct is then linked to the proposed pressure for economy by considering it as an optimization problem, where the most readily selected gait strategy will be that which achieves the task goal at (or near) the energetic minimum. (shrink)

A Philosophy of Struggle: The Leonard Harris Reader. By HarrisLeonard.

Appraising public policies about using technoscientific innovations requires attending to the values reflected in the interests expected to be served by them. It also requires addressing questions about the efficacy of using the innovations, and about whether or not using them may occasion harmful effects ; moreover, judgments about these matters should be soundly backed by empirical evidence. Clearly, then, scientists have an important role to play in formulating and appraising these public policies. However, ethical and social values affect decisions (...) made about the criteria for identifying the range of risks, and of relevant empirical data needed for making judgments about them, that should be considered in public policy deliberations, and for determining how well claims concerning risks should be supported by the available data in order to warrant that they have a decisive role in the deliberations. Consider the case of public policies about using GMOs. Concerning the range of data: is it sufficient for risk assessment only to be informed by data relevant to investigating the risks of using GMOs that may be occasioned by way of physical/chemical/biological mechanisms directly triggered by events within their modified genomes? Or: should data pertaining to the full range of ecological and socioeconomic effects of using them, in the environments in which they are used and under the socioeconomic conditions of their use, also inform this assessment? Those interested in producing and using GMOs, in the light of their adhering to values of capital and the market, are likely to give a positive answer to the first question; those holding competing values, e.g., connected with respect for human rights and environmental sustainability, to the second. And, concerning the degree of support: the former – citing the ethical gravity of losses that would be incurred by failing to use GMOs on a wide scale – are likely to require less stringent standards of evidential appraisal than the latter. Scientists, qua scientists, however, do not have special authority in the realm of values. Thus, their judgments, about the evidential support that claims about risks have, may sometimes be reasonably contested partly on value-laden grounds – as they have been in the GMO case, where the contestation has generated considerable controversy, and continues to do so. It follows that, in the context of deliberations about public policy, unless scientists engage with representatives of all stakeholders in the outcomes of the policies – taking into account that their competing values may lead to making different decisions about what are the relevant data, as well as about the degree of support required for their claims about risks to gain the required credibility to inform the deliberations; and respecting "tempered equality" of participants in the dialogue – their trustworthiness is put into question and their authority diminished. (shrink)

The relationship between typology and Cognitive Linguistics was first posed in the 1980s, in terms of the relationship between Greenbergian universals and the knowledge of the individual speaker. An answer to this question emerges from understanding the role of linguistic variation in language, from occasions of language use to typological diversity. This in turn requires the contribution of discourse analysis, sociolinguistics, and evolutionary historical linguistics as well as typology and Cognitive Linguistics. While Cognitive Linguistics is part of this enterprise, a (...) theory of language that integrates all of these approaches is necessary. (shrink)

In this paper I will propose six principles governing the proper role of moral and social values in the conduct of scientific investigation. I offer them for your consideration, and hope that together we can sharpen their formulation, explore their implications and test their acceptability. In making my proposals I draw considerably from my recent books, Valores e Atividade Científica (VAC, Lacey 1988) and Is Science Value Free? Values and Scientific Understanding (SVF, Lacey 1999a). The detailed argument, and (...) elaboration of the technical notions that I use are to be found in them (and summarized in Lacey 1999c). The sketch of the argument that I offer here is intended to display the motivation behind the proposed principles. (shrink)

Securitizing Islam examines the impact of 9/11 on the lives and perceptions of individuals, focusing on the ways in which identities in Britain have been affected in relation to Islam. 'Securitization' describes the processes by which a particular group or issue comes to be seen as a threat, and thus subject to the perceptions and actions which go with national security. Croft applies this idea to the way in which the attitudes of individuals to their security and to Islam (...) and Muslims have been transformed, affecting the everyday lives of both Muslims and non-Muslims. He argues that Muslims have come to be seen as the 'Other', outside the contemporary conception of Britishness. Reworking securitisation theory and drawing in the sociology of ontological security studies, Securitizing Islam produces a theoretically innovative framework for understanding a contemporary phenomenon that affects the everyday lives of millions. (shrink)

Published to coincide with an exhibition at Open Eye Gallery in Liverpool, Women on the Waterfront combines essays, first-person accounts, and stunning photographic images to tell the story of the twentieth-century women who worked, and continue to work, in and around the city’s waterfront—or who abandoned urban life to earn a living at sea. At the heart of the project are Michelle Sank’s remarkable and vibrant portraits of the women she has photographed, alongside their own words—alternately chillingly real in their (...) gritty depictions of life on the waterfront and remarkably confident, vulnerable, and even otherworldly. Enhancing these already extraordinary stories is Joanne Lacey’s rich essay, “Journey to the Water’s Edge,” which examines the story behind this fascinating archive and its origins in Lacey’s own family history. (shrink)

This paper describes DIVA (Dynamic Imagery for Visual Analogy), a computational model of visual imagery based on the scene graph, a powerful representational structure widely used in computer graphics. Scene graphs make possible the visual display of complex objects, including the motions of individual objects. Our model combines a semantic-network memory system with computational procedures based on scene graphs. The model can account for people’s ability to produce visual images of moving objects, in particular the ability to use dynamic visual (...) analogies that compare two systems of objects in motion. (shrink)

We begin by a summary of the standardized version of the model of the interaction between scientific activities and values (elaborated fully in Lacey and Mariconda, 2015), and based on it we argue that there is a profound incoherence in the self- understanding of the modern scientific tradition, and that the main options actually available to ensure continuity with the positive realizations of this tradition can be well represented by two sorts of ideal types that we name, respectively,“commercially orientated (...) technoscience” and “multi-strategic research”. Then, in the light of the predominance that commercially oriented technoscience has gained in contemporary scientific institutions, we argue for the importance of developing multi-strategic research in areas such as agriculture. This is needed so that adequate evaluation of the potential risks of large scale applications of technoscience, as well as harm they may have actually occasioned, can be made; and also so that these applications can be rigorously compared with scientifically informed practices, such as agroecology, which are not as problematic for human health and the environment and which explore the regenerative powers of nature itself. (shrink)

Progress and the values it secretes Content Type Journal Article Pages 1-3 DOI 10.1007/s11016-010-9519-8 Authors Hugh Lacey, Department of Philosophy, Swarthmore College, 500 College Ave, Swarthmore, PA 19081, USA Journal Metascience Online ISSN 1467-9981 Print ISSN 0815-0796.

In this brief introduction, I shall rather reflect, from a biographer’s viewpoint, on the significance of Discretion for our understanding of the trajectory of Hart’s ideas and on the significance of his year at Harvard. I shall then move on to consider the intriguing question of why Hart did not subsequently publish or build on some of the key insights in the paper itself. Here I highlight the fact that, almost uniquely in Hart’s work, Discretion features a notable emphasis on (...) the significance of institutional factors in our understanding of the nature of legal decisionmaking; and I argue that Hart’s failure fully to develop this insight in the essay, or to build on it in his subsequent work, derives from the fact that such a development would have necessitated a diversion from the philosophical issues that were his core intellectual concern, and moreover would have presented certain dangers to his conception of legal positivism. I shall conclude by considering what contribution the essay makes to our overall interpretation and evaluation of Hart’s legal philosophy. (shrink)