The austere view of nonsense says that the source of nonsense is not a violation of the rules of logical syntax, but nonsense is always due to a lack of meaning in one of the components of a sentence. In other words, the necessary and sufficient condition for nonsensicality is that no meaning has been assigned to a constituent in a sentence. The austere conception is the key ingredient of the resolute reading of Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus that presents a therapeutical interpretation (...) of the work, and rejects a possibility of conveying some ineffable truths by means of nonsensical sentences. In this paper, I defend the austere view against the most important objections. Firstly, I discuss textual sources for ascribing to Wittgenstein the austere view that have not been sufficiently thoroughly discussed yet. Next, I indicate that the apparent occurrence of words out of the context of a sentence on lists of verbs and in definitions is not in conflict with the version of the context principle recommended by austere theorists, since this argument does not sufficiently take into account the distinction between sign and symbol. Furthermore, I argue that the austere conception and the principle of compositionality are jointly tenable, for the former view does not exclude the existence of syntactic and semantic rules, but only shows that they are recognizable conditionally. Finally, I indicate that the austere view of nonsense should be seen as a viable option by a contemporary theorist of nonsense, for it helps us to avoid making controversial assumptions about the nature of meaning and content. (shrink)

Involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu are phenomena that occur spontaneously in daily life. IAMs are recollections of the personal past, whereas déjà vu is defined as an experience in which the person feels familiarity at the same time as knowing that the familiarity is false. We present and discuss the idea that both IAMs and déjà vu can be explained as natural phenomena resulting from memory processing and, importantly, are both based on the same memory retrieval processes. Briefly, (...) we hypothesise that both can be described as “involuntary” or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. We map out the similarities and differences between the two, making a theoretical and neuroscientific account for their integration into models of memory retrieval and how the autobiographical memory literature can explain these quirks of daily life and unusual but meaningful phenomena. We explain the emergence of the déjà vu phenomenon by relating it to well-known mechanisms of autobiographical memory retrieval, concluding that IAMs and déjà vu lie on a continuum. (shrink)

Bogusław Wolniewicz – polski tłumacz Pism semantycznych Gottloba Fregego – przełożył termin Bedeutung na język polski jako „znaczenie”, zauważając w przypisie, że wątpliwości, jakie może budzić w tym przypadku użycie tego słowa, budzi również użycie w języku niemieckim przez Fregego słowa Bedeutung. Jednocześnie Wolniewicz, w tym samym przypisie, twierdzi, że „to, co Frege nazywa znaczeniem znaku, pokrywa się z tym, co w dzisiejszej terminologii semantycznej zwykło się nazywać »denotacją« albo »denotatem«” (Frege, 2014a, s. 62, przypis 27). W niniejszym artykule postaram (...) się przedstawić rozumienie Fregowskiej kategorii znaczenia (Bedeutung), które oddawałoby sposób, w jaki posługiwał się nim niemiecki filozof, tj. zarówno w odniesieniu do nazw, zdań, jak i predykatów. W części pierwszej przedstawię pokrótce wzajemny stosunek podziałów na przedmioty i funkcje oraz na sens i znaczenie wyrażeń. W drugiej zarysuję sposób, w jaki Frege podchodził do problemów językowych i filozoficznych. W części trzeciej dokonam szczegółowej interpretacji kategorii znaczenia dla nazw, zdań pojedynczych i złożonych, a także predykatów. Część ostatnia dotyczy kwestii Fregowskiego realizmu, która jest kluczowa z punktu widzenia późniejszych krytyk forsowanej przeze mnie interpretacji Bedeutung. (shrink)

Gottlob Frege abandoned his logicist program after Bertrand Russell had discovered that some assumptions of Frege’s system lead to contradiction (so called Russell’s paradox). Nevertheless, he proposed a new attempt for the foundations of mathematics in two last years of his life. According to this new program, the whole of mathematics is based on the geometrical source of knowledge. By the geometrical source of cognition Frege meant intuition which is the source of an infinite number of objects in arithmetic. In (...) this article, I describe this final attempt of Frege to provide the foundations of mathematics. Furthermore, I compare Frege’s views of intuition from The Foundations of Arithmetic (and his later views) with the Kantian conception of pure intuition as the source of geometrical axioms. In the conclusion of the essay, I examine some implications for the debate between Hans Sluga and Michael Dummett concerning the realistic and idealistic interpretations of Frege’s philosophy. (shrink)

Typically, if I understand a sentence, then it expresses a proposition that I entertain. Nonsensical sentences don’t express propositions, but there are contexts in which we talk about understanding nonsensical sentences. For example, we accept various kinds of semantically defective sentences in fiction, philosophy, and everyday life. Furthermore, it is a standard assumption that if a sentence is nonsensical, then it makes no sense to say that it implies anything or is implied by other sentences. Semantically uninterpreted sentences don’t have (...) logical characteristics. Hence, the riddle of understanding nonsense arises. We seem to use nonsensical sentences in reasoning, thinking, judging, and drawing conclusions, but they convey no propositions, which are the vehicles of their semantic properties. In this article, I propose the pretence theory of understanding nonsense to explain the riddle of understanding nonsense, and discuss alternative frameworks that are insufficient to solve it. -/- . (shrink)

The aim of my paper is to describe and evaluate different conceptions of holism in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. I distinguish three readings of holistic elements in this work: i) Minimal Holism (E. Anscombe, M. Black, D. Pears); ii) Moderate Holism (J. Conant, C. Diamond, G. Ryle); and iii) Radical Holism (G. Bar-Elli, M. Kremer, P. Livingston). The conclusion is that the most viable option is Moderate Holism since it embraces the logico-syntactical notion of use, rejects an anachronistic interpretation of (...) Tractatarian ontology and allows us to see that the holistic elements are complementary to the initial atomism of the work. Moreover, I point to the consequences of the topic for the overall reading of Wittgenstein’s early and late work. (shrink)

The article offers a concise view on the problems related to the compatibility of the religious clauses in the Polish Constitution with the principles and standards of the European Union and with the constitutional regulations of other individual member states. The author particularly demonstrates to what extent Poland is different or even unable to enter this community and fully participate in the integration of the continent. In the first part of the article, the author studies the content of the Polish (...) basic law provisions on religion, in the second—the corresponding European Union regulations and similar rules in force in the individual nations of the continent. The article concludes that the constitutional provisions on religious matters demonstrate that regulations in the Polish basic statute are not more confessional than those established in other European Union countries. (shrink)

This anthropological essay provides a meditation on mass tourism while analysing the mechanisms of conflict between the needs of mass tourism and the local urban environment, extraterritorial spaces that fit into the universal heritage of humanity. Historical districts/ entertainment districts in capital cities are discussed as extraterritorial areas treated as ambivalent, bypassed, business bases. The tourists themselves constitute thoroughly ambivalent figures as tame strangers, treated simultaneously as a potential source of maximum earnings and intruders.

In the paper, I propose a novel approach to Frege’s view on the principle of compositionality, its relation to the propositional holism and the formation of concepts. The main idea is to distinguish three stages of constructing a logically perfect language. At the first stage, only a sentence as a whole expresses a Thought. It is impossible to assign meaning to less complex units. This is the stage of an ordinary language. The second phase concerns the proper level of construction (...) of a logically perfect language. We are forced to discriminate syntactic and semantic parts of sentences to account for the inference relations. We can distinguish senses and references of parts of sentences. Furthermore, it is possible here to choose between different ways of analysing the given Thought. Finally, at the third stage, every expression of the language has an unambiguous sense and this sense determines a unique reference. The logically perfect language is ready. We may view Thoughts as composed from primitive elements. Moreover, the senses of parts of a sentence correspond to the parts of a Thought, so that the structure of the sentence serves as the image of the structure of the Thought. The principle of compositionality is met and we can discern how understanding of the infinite numbers of Thoughts is possible and how languages are learnable. The main advantage of the presented view is that it allows accommodating some aspects of Frege’s philosophy that are often seen as mutually incompatible. Furthermore, I submit extensive textual data in favour of the discussed views and conceptions. (shrink)

In this article I examine some remarks from Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus about the point and the method of his work. First part of the article concerns relationships between Frege‘s conception of elucidation and Wittgenstein‘s conception of philosophy. Second part of the article is about Wittgenstein‘s attitude to science and the role of science in philosophy. Third part of my article concerns the ethical purpose of Wittgenstein‘s Tractatus logico-philosophicus.

Recenzja: Saul Kripke, Kłopoty filozoficzne, Warszawa: Wydawnictwo Naukowe PWN, 2023. Review of the Polish-language edition of Saul Kripke's Philosophical Troubles, vol. 1.

In our target article, we presented the idea that involuntary autobiographical memories (IAMs) and déjà vu may both be based on the same retrieval processes. Our core claim was thus straightforward: Both can be described as “involuntary” or spontaneous cognitions, where IAMs deliver content and déjà vu delivers only the feeling of retrieval. Our proposal resulted in 27 commentaries covering a broad range of perspectives and approaches. The majority of them have not only amplified our key arguments but also pushed (...) our ideas further by offering extensions, refinements, discussing possible implications and providing additional empirical, neuroscientific and clinical support. The discussion launched by the commentaries proves to us the importance of bringing IAMs and déjà vu into mainstream discussions of memory retrieval processes. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThis article introduces a general framework for the critique of the university in crisis that originates in the Marxist tradition. After indicating the limitations of current proposals rega...

The aim of this article is to examine Frege’s view of the context principle in his mature philosophical doctrine. Here, the author argues that the context principle is embodied in the contextual explanation of value-ranges presented in Basic Laws of Arithmetic. The contextual explanation of value-ranges plays essentially the same role as the context principle in The Foundations of Arithmetic. It is supposed to show how a reference to natural numbers is possible. Moreover, the author argues against the view that (...) the context principle should be separated from the recarving thesis. This aspect of Frege’s view leads the author to the rejection of the purely referential view of the context principle, which is fairly widely accepted in the current literature. (shrink)

In this paper, I try to answer the following questions: what are objects in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus? What function does a name perform in a sentence according to Wittgenstein? What is the Bedeutung of a name? I argue that answers to these questions come from the Wittgensteinian vision of logic. The first part of the article concerns Frege and Russell’s universalist conception of logic, which is the main object of Wittgenstein’s attack. The second part of the article is about Wittgenstein’s (...) conception of logic and some consequences of this conception for the interpretation of Tractatarian objects and names. My main result is that the meaning of a name should be understood as a truth-value potential of an expression. The last part concerns the connections between the so-called ontological parts of the Tractatus and Wittgenstein’s views on an ideal formal language. (shrink)

In “Models and Reality”, H. Putnam formulated his model-theoretic argument against “metaphysical realism”. The article proposes a meta-reconstruction of Putnam’s model-theoretic argument in the light of two mutually compatible interpretations of it–elaborated by Manuel Garcia-Carpintero and Igor van Douven. A critical reflection on these interpretations and their adequacy for Putnam’s argument allows us to expose new theses coherent with Putnam’s reasoning and indicate new paths to improve this argument for our reconstruction task. In particular, we show that Putnam’s position may (...) be coherent with van Douven’s versions of Global Descriptivism under some conditions, but Putnam cannot reject realism as quickly as Carpintero suggests. We show that Suszko’s canonic axiomatic system and Sneed’s concept of theory may provide valuable support for Putnam’s argument. Finally, we critically evaluate Carpintero’s theses about the genesis of unintended interpretations of our languages, adopting the machinery of the Upward Skolem–Loewenheim Theorem and Knight’s Theorem. (shrink)

The Principle of Compositionality is the principle stating that the meaning of an expression is a function of (and only of) the meanings of its parts together with the method by which those parts are combined. The paper concerns the relationship between this principle and the phenomenon of context dependence. In a compositional language, it seems, the meaning of an expression depends upon the meanings of its parts in a bottom-up fashion, so some philosophers (e.g. Fodor&Lepore) argued that compositionality places (...) a context-independence constraint on the properties of lexical meanings. However, some others philosphers (e.g. Szabo, Recanati) don’t see context--dependence as a challenge to the compositionality of language. This poses questions about the methodological status of the principle of compositionality, possible justifications of the principle, and various constraints on language required by compositional semantics. In the article I propose a version of the principle of compositionality which can help us deal with the phenomenon of context dependence. Then I investigate its formal representation and the effective arguments from context-dependence against thus formulated principle of contextual compositionality. The last part of the article concerns the relationship between the computability of a function and the compositional interpretation of a sentence. (shrink)

Despite the great expansion and many benefits of information and communication technologies in healthcare, the attitudes of Polish general practitioners to e-health have not been explored. The aim of this study was to determine the GPs’ perception of ICT use in healthcare and to identify barriers to the adoption of EMR in the Podlaskie Voivodeship. Online and telephone surveys were conducted between April and May 2013. Responses from 103 GP practices, 43% of all practices in the region, were analysed. The (...) results showed that 67% of the respondents agreed that IT systems improve quality of healthcare services. In the GP group who declared at least partial EMR implementation, 71.4% see the positive impact of IT on practice staff processes and 66.1% on personal working processes. In this group, more than three-quarters of GPs did not see any positive impact of ICT on the average number of patients treated per day, number of patients within the practice or scope of services. The four most common barriers to EMR implementation were: lack of funds, risk of a malfunction in the system, resistance to change, and lack of training and proper information. Although the use of ICT by Polish GPs is limited, their attitude to e-health is generally positive or neutral and resembles the overall pattern in Europe. Barriers identified by GPs need to be taken into account to ensure the effective implementation of e-health across the country. (shrink)

The present article reviews the Polish-language edition of Gottlob Frege’s scientific correspondence. In the article, I discuss the material hitherto unpublished in Polish in relation to the remainder of Frege’s works. First of all, I inquire into the role and nature of definitions. Then, I consider Frege’s recognition criteria for sameness of thoughts. In the article’s third part, I study letters devoted to the principle of semantic compositionality, while in the fourth part I discuss Frege’s remarks concerning the context principle.

ADP‐ribosylation is a post‐translational modification catalyzed by writer enzymes – ADP‐ribosyltransferases. The modification is part of many signaling events, can modulate the function and stability of target proteins, and often results in the recruitment of reader proteins that bind to the ADP‐ribosyl groups. Erasers are integral actors in these signaling events and reverse the modification. ADP‐ribosylation can be targeted with therapeutics and many inhibitors against writers exist, with some being in clinical use. Inhibitors against readers and erasers are sparser and (...) development of these has gained momentum only in recent years. Drug discovery has been hampered by the lack of specific tools, however many significant advances in the methods have recently been reported. We discuss assays used in the field with a focus on methods allowing efficient identification of small molecule inhibitors and profiling against enzyme families. While human proteins are focused, the methods can be also applied to bacterial toxins and virus encoded erasers that can be targeted to treat infectious diseases in the future. (shrink)

This paper explores the program of theology of science proposed by renowned Polish physicist and philosopher, Michael Heller, with a particular focus on its ontological dimensions through the lens of Trinitarian theology. Firstly, an overview of the status and current discussions of theology of science is presented. Next, drawing on Heller's key texts the Trinitarian doctrine is used to enhance the intelligibility of the Universe, wherein the dynamic interplay of unity, diversity, and relationality is mirrored in the structure of physical (...) reality itself. Most importantly, however, we examine how Heller's theological perspective thus equipped provides justification for the specificity of the method of science itself, thereby revealing new dimensions of relations between science and theology. Through critical engagement with Heller's thought, this paper seeks ultimately to illuminate the profound implications of a Trinitarian perspective in his theology of science, shedding light on the interconnectedness of Christian doctrine and ontology in shaping our understanding of the universe and its underlying structure. (shrink)

In his formal papers on existential graphs , Peirce tended to obscure the simplicity of EGs with distracting digressions. In MS 514, however, he presented his simplest introduction to the EG syntax, semantics, and rules of inference. This article reproduces Peirce's original words and diagrams with further commentary, explanations, and examples. Unlike the syntax-based approach of most current textbooks, Peirce's method addresses the semantic issues of logic in a way that can be transferred to any notation. The concluding section shows (...) that his rules of inference can clarify the foundations of proof theory and relate diverse methods, such as resolution and natural deduction. To relate EGs to other notations for logic, this article uses the Existential Graph Interchange Format , which is a subset of the CGIF dialect of Common Logic. EGIF is a linear notation that can be mapped to and from the Alpha, Beta, and Gamma variants of EGs. It can also be translated to or from other formalisms, algebraic or geometrical. (shrink)

Commonly overlooked in the commentaries on Husserl’s conception of the lifeworld is the fact that Husserl conceived his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science with an empirical as well as a non-empirical (eidetic) stage. At the lower stage, it deals with our factical lifeworld and aims at general propositions about the very world we live in. At the higher stage, i.e., the primary stage for Husserl, it aims at general propositions about the lifeworld as such but not about (...) our factical lifeworld, which now serves only as one possible lifeworld among others. This higher-level science of the lifeworld is a descriptive eidetics made up of pure descriptive concepts and pure descriptive laws (descriptive eidetic laws), in which no factical entity is posited explicitly or implicitly. The present paper analyzes these relationships. In an excursus, it also traces out the elements, principles and methodology of a descriptive eidetics in general to see how they are applied to Husserl’s descriptive eidetics of the lifeworld as it is subsequently developed in his lectures on Phenomenological Psychology from 1925, a text in which Husserl explicitly outlines his science of the lifeworld as a two-stage science. (shrink)

Logic, language and information integration is one of areas broadly explored nowadays and at the same time promising. Authors use that approach in their 8 years long research into Structured Semantic Knowledge Base System. The aim of this paper is to present authors idea of system capable of generating synergy effect while storing various type of information. The key assumption, which has been adopted, is the thesis that the attempt to find universal way of the reality description is very inefficient (...) solution. Combination of several solutions into one system must be based on the principle of supporting rather than on redundancy, ambiguity or mutual antagonism areas of logic, language and information. Natural language processing in the context of logics or information processing is ineffective, not to say pointless in the means of certainty. It is simply caused by the fact that natural languages have been formed long time ago as the main communication channel, rather than for automatic information processing. It was one of the reasons that logic has been founded as the universal language of mathematics and formalized communication in more extensive sense. Information processing however brought more sophisticated problems that mathematics could not smoothly solve, what made computer science appear. Studies over artificial intelligence revealed even more complex issues to solve. The unity of those three areas: logics, language and information is a necessity to acquire complementarity and synergy. (shrink)

L’une des tâches de la phénoménologie transcendantale, que Husserl lui-même définit comme une science éidétique des phénomènes transcendentalement réduits, est de découvrir des lois a priori matérielles d’un type spécial : des lois éidétiques descriptives établies sur la base de concepts descriptifs purs. Cet article s’attache d’abord à préciser la notion husserlienne d’essence au le sens large, définie comme une fonction d’état-de-choses (Sachverhaltsfunktion) ; une telle fonction noématique est le corrélat « objectif » de cette fonction propositionnelle que nous appelons (...) « concept » et qui est une partie de la proposition, c’est-à-dire de la visée-d’état-de-choses (Sachverhaltsmeinung) par laquelle on projette un état-de-choses. En revanche, par essences au sens étroit ou strict on entend ces essences pures que Husserl appelle « Eide ». Le concept d’essence pure propre à l’éidétique descriptive phénoménologique est ainsi clarifié par une explication de la notion husserlienne de « concept descriptif pure », dans le but de montrer comment ces concepts, qui sont des pures concepts de types, se distinguent des concept descriptifs impures, et notamment des concepts dénotant des genres naturels. Fondées exclusivement sur des concepts descriptifs purs, les lois éidétiques descriptives (Wesensgesetze) possèdent des conditions de vérités particulières et nécessitent de modalités d’examen tout autant spécifiques. La place propre à la méthode appelée « variation éidétique » est justement celle de examiner, falsifier ou justifier des lois éidétiques descriptives présumées. A partir de cas exemplaires d’états-de-choses familiers confirmant les lois présumées, la variation libre, qui opère dans la pure imagination, a pour tâche de construire des contre-exemples possibles dont le but est de falsifier la loi éidétique présumée. La propriété d’être falsifiable par des contre-exemples construits dans la pure imagination permet de distinguer les lois empiriques des lois éidétiques descriptives de l’éidétique husserlienne. La possibilité de falsifier par des contre-exemples fictionnels ou factuels montre que la phénoménologie transcendantale est une entreprise scientifique ouverte à l’examen intersubjectif, et cela justement en raison de son caractère éidétique. (shrink)

Since the pioneering work by Kripke and Montague, the term possible world has appeared in most theories of formal semantics for modal logics, natural languages, and knowledge-based systems. Yet that term obscures many questions about the relationships between the real world, various models of the world, and descriptions of those models in either formal languages or natural languages. Each step in that progression is an abstraction from the overwhelming complexity of the world. At the end, nothing is left but a (...) colorful metaphor for an undefined element of a set W called worlds, which are related by an undefined and undefinable primitive relation R called accessibility. For some purposes, the resulting abstraction has proved to be useful, but as a general theory of meaning, the abstraction omits too many significant features. So much information has been lost at each step that many philosophers, linguists, and psychologists have dismissed model-theoretic semantics as irrelevant to the study of meaning. This article examines the steps in the process of extractingthe pair (W,R) from the world and the way people talk about the world. It shows that the Kripke worlds can be reinterpreted as part of a Peircean semiotic theory, which can also include contributions from many other studies in cognitive science. Among them are Dunn’s semantics based on laws and facts, the lexical semantics preferred by manylinguists, psychological models of how the world is perceived, and philosophies of science that relate theories to the world. A full integration of all those sources is far beyond the scope of this article, but an outline of the approach suggests that Peirce’s vision is capable of relating and reconciling the competing sources. (shrink)