Kristen Hessler argues that philosophy can best contribute to understanding human rights by exploring the full range of their use in practice. Her approach emphasizes how human rights activism and adjudication can both reveal and dismantle unjust social hierarchies. The result is an innovative vision of interdisciplinary human rights scholarship.

Norenzayan, Smith, Jun Kim, and Nisbett (2002) investigated cultural differences in the use of intuitive versus formal reasoning in 4 experiments. Our comment concerns the 4th experiment where Norenzayan et al. reported that, although there were no cultural differences in accuracy on abstract logical arguments, Koreans made more errors than U.S. undergraduates in judging the logical validity of concrete arguments. Norenzayan et al. concluded that Koreans are less likely than European Americans to decontextualize an argument's content from its logical structure, (...) as Koreans were more likely to consider the believability of the conclusion when assessing an argument's validity (a belief bias). Notably, Korean participants were more conservative (less likely to say an argument is valid) than European American participants when assessing arguments. An analysis of the average of the hit and correct rejection rates in each of the conditions (abstract, concrete–believable, concrete–nonbelievable) revealed that, contrary to conclusions of Norenzayan et al., European Americans were no better than Koreans at determining the validity of concrete deductive arguments with conclusions varying in believability. (shrink)

Several science studies scholars report instances of scientific “hype,” or sensationalized exaggeration, in journal articles, institutional press releases, and science journalism in a variety of fields (e.g., Caulfield and Condit 2012). Yet, how “hype” is being conceived varies. I will argue that hype is best understood as a particular kind of exaggeration, one that explicitly or implicitly exaggerates various positive aspects of science in ways that undermine the goals of science communication in a particular context. This account also makes clear (...) the ways that value judgments play a role in judgments of “hype,” which has implications for detecting and addressing this problem. (shrink)

Beller, Bender, and Medin (this issue) offer a provocative proposal outlining several reasons why anthropology and the rest of cognitive science might consider parting ways. Among those reasons, they suggest that separation might maintain the diversity needed to address larger problems facing humanity, and that the research strategies used across the disciplines are already so diverse as to be incommensurate. The present paper challenges the view that research strategies are incommensurate and offers a multimethod approach to cultural research that can (...) help to establish common ground while maintaining diversity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Five More MinutesKristen Carey RockFive more minutes. How many times have you said the phrase, "I need just five more minutes"—perhaps to finish a note, clean up the kitchen, or read the kids a bedtime story? It is a seemingly insignificant amount of time. But what if you knew that these five minutes were the last five minutes you would spend conscious on this earth? The last five minutes (...) you would spend with your parents and your young children before you would receive a sedative and be transported down to the operating room, where you would be removed from life support and then donate your organs? In a hoarse rasp through his tracheostomy, he kept whispering, "Please. Just five more minutes."This is the reality that I walked into one Friday morning in 2021 as I took over the ICU service at my hospital. I am an ICU doctor at a busy academic center in the northeast and was on the frontlines of our COVID response, including the care of patients who required ECMO (extracorporeal membrane oxygenation)—the last resort for treating patients suffering from severe lung disease.I did not have the privilege of meeting this patient until the morning of his death, but I knew he had been in the hospital for close to three months due to acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS) due to COVID-19. On the spectrum of COVID symptoms, this problem is the worst of the worst, and it left his lungs in tatters—so much so that he had relied on an ECMO machine to perform the functions of his lungs for many weeks in hopes that he would either recover or become eligible for a lung transplant. During this time, many hundreds of doctors, nurses, nurse practitioners and respiratory therapists had gotten to know him quite well. They met his father, former wife, and his four school-aged children. They learned of his service to our country as a member of the Air Force and his subsequent devotion to his community as a religious leader and beacon in his community. As he recovered to the point where he was able to be awake and interactive with a tracheostomy, allowing him to mouth words, they also got to know him as a kind and gentle man with a fierce will to live and devotion to his family.Yet, after many weeks of ups and downs, progress and setbacks, it became clear that he could not survive without the help of his ECMO machine. Though it is possible for someone to survive for many months on ECMO, like most forms of life support, it is a bridge rather than a destination therapy. More complicated and invasive than other forms of life support, it is resource-intense and fraught with medical complications. And one day, came the heartbreaking news that due to too many blood transfusions during his illness, he would not be able to receive a lung transplant. He and his care team realized this meant there was no path forward. It came as little surprise to those who knew him that when he realized that he could not live independent of machines or outside the walls of an intensive care unit, his final act would be to help others. He would give others the opportunity for the organ transplant that he so cruelly could not receive.And so, the date and time were set. The transplant teams from other hospitals began to arrive. His final morning on earth would be spent with his family, except for a last trip outside to see the sunshine. With masterful coordination, his ICU room was recreated on the roof atop our helipad. As an army of caregivers attended to his tubes, pumps, and machines, he was able to feel the warmth of the spring wind as the Air Force sent an honor guard of fighter jets to pay their final respects. I watched him smile as the planes flew overhead, unsure if he could see or just hear them. Even though someone had the foresight to place a pair of sunglasses on his face, he still grimaced at the sunlight after months of artificial... (shrink)

As two parts of one overarching legal positivist project, it is likely assumed that the constitutive elements of Joseph Raz’s analysis of the rule of law are compatible with his thinking on the nature of legal authority. The aim of this article is to call this assumption into question by reading Raz in light of the core, if under-recognised, preoccupation of the jurisprudence of Lon Fuller: namely, the latter’s concern to illuminate the relationship between the distinctive form of law and (...) human agency. This not only opens up a new engagement between Raz and Fuller that was far from exhausted within debates about law and morality, but also reveals tensions between Raz’s analysis of the rule of law and his analysis of legal authority that proponents of Raz’s legal positivism need to address. (shrink)

Several feminist theorists have claimed that feminist values ought to influence theory choice. Susan Haack has argued that this is implausible because normative claims about what ought to be the case can never provide justification for descriptive claims. I argue against one of the premises of Haack's argument. Furthermore, I attempt to show that the most promising defense of this premise would cast doubt on a second premise of Haack's argument. My aim is to open up the possibility that value (...) judgments can play a legitimate role in theory choice. (shrink)

Several have argued that the aims of scientific research are not always independent of social and ethical values. Yet this is often assumed only to have implications for decisions about what is studied, or which research projects are funded, and not for methodological decisions or standards of evidence. Using the case of the recently developed HPV vaccines, we argue that the social aims of research can also play important roles in justifying decisions about (1) how research problems are defined in (...) drug development, (2) evidentiary standards used in testing drug “success”, and (3) clinical trial methodology. As a result, attending to the social aims at stake in particular research contexts will produce more rational methodological decisions as well as more socially relevant science. (shrink)

When do humans become moral beings? This commentary draws on developmental psychology theory to expand the understanding of early moral behaviours. We argue that by looking at a broader range of other-oriented acts than what has been considered by Baumard et al., we can find support for the mutualistic approach to morality even in early instances of other-oriented behaviours.

We considered supererogatory behavior as illustrated by people who rescued Jews in Nazi Europe. When we did so, we encountered a puzzling empirical finding: rescuers insisted they had no choice in their life-or-death actions. Rescuers' perspectives -- how they saw themselves in relation to others -- served as a powerful constraint on choice as traditionally conceived. Traditional moral theories failed to provide satisfactory explanations for this phenomenon, and we turned to virtue ethics to determine whether this approach, with its emphasis (...) on character, would provide a useful philosophical tool for explicating rescue behavior.Our conclusion on virtue ethics is mixed. We find the focus on character found in virtue ethics is superior to the traditional rule-based theories of moral choice, with virtue ethics able to account both for the supererogatory nature of rescue behavior and for rescuers' reports that they had no choice. Yet even as virtue ethics provides insight into the way character forms the preconditions for moral action and affects what people define as moral situations, it fails to capture the critical role of perspective in moral choice. Nor does it provide an answer to the conundrum that troubles us when we consider the implications of rescue behavior: can we assign moral responsibility if character determines actions? The reports of the rescuers present a concrete description of what has been called a perception of a common humanity. It is this perspective that constitutes the particular moral imperative that moved the rescuers to risk their lives for others, and whose full explication eludes us. Supererogatorisches Verhalten zeigt sich bei Menschen, die im Europa der Nazizeit Juden gerettet haben. Dazu sind wir auf einen verwirrenden empirischen Befund gestoßen: Retter bestehen darauf, daß sie mit Bezug auf ihre Handlungen, bei denen es um Leben und Tod ging, gar keine Wahl gehabt haben. Die Retterperspektive - wie sich die Retter selbst in ihrer Beziehung zu anderen sehen - wirkte sich als eine machtvolle Beschränkung der Wahlmöglichkeiten aus, wie sie traditionell angenommen werden. Traditionelle Moraltheorien haben es nicht geschafft, befriedigende Erklärungen für dieses Phänomen zu liefern, und wir haben uns der Tugendethik zugewendet, um herauszufinden, ob sie, die den Charakter betont, ein nützliches philosophisches Hilfsmittel für die Erklärung derartigen Rettungsverhalten bereitstellt.Unsere Schlußfolgerungen bezüglich der Tugendethik sind gemischt. Wir sind der Ansicht, daß die Betonung des Charakters durch die Tugendethik den traditionellen, auf Regeln basierenden Theorien über moralische Wahlmöglichkeiten überlegen ist, wobei die Tugendethik sowohl der supererogatorischen Natur des Rettungsverhaltens als auch den Aussagen der Retter, sie hätten gar keine Wahl gehabt, Rechnung trägt. Obwohl die Tugendethik sogar Einsichten in die Art und Weise liefert, wie der Charakter die entscheidende Vorbedingung für moralisches Handeln bildet und wie Menschen moralische Situationen bestimmen, versagt sie doch dabei, die maßgebliche Rolle zu definieren, die die moralische Perspektive bei der moralischen Wahl spielt. Ebensowenig gibt sie eine Antwort auf das Rätsel, das uns beschäftigt, wenn wir die Implikationen des Rettungsverhaltens bedenken: Können wir moralische Verantwortlichkeit zuschreiben, wenn der Charakter die Handlungen bestimmt? Die Aussagen der Retter geben eine konkrete Beschreibung von etwas, was als Perzeption einer gemeinsamen Menschheit bezeichnet worden ist. Es ist diese Perspektive, die das besondere moralische Gebot in Kraft setzt, das die Retter dazu bewogen hat, ihr Leben für andere zu riskieren. Diese Perspektive läßt sich nicht vollständig erklären. (shrink)

Fluctuations in attentional state and their relation to goal neglect were examined in the current study. Participants performed a variant of the Stroop task in which attentional state ratings were given prior to each trial. It was found that pre-trial attentional state ratings predicted subsequent trial performance, such that when participants rated their current attentional state as highly focused on the current task, performance tended to be high compared to when participants reported their current attentional state as being unfocused on (...) the current task. This effect was larger for incongruent than congruent trials leading to differences in the magnitude of the Stroop effect as a function of pre-trial attentional state. Furthermore, variability in attentional state was correlated with overall levels of performance, and when attentional state was covaried out, the Stroop effect was greatly reduced. These results suggest a link between fluctuations in pre-trial attentional state and goal neglect. (shrink)

This paper presents an extensional account of manyand few that explains data that have previously motivated intensional analyses of these quantifiers :599–620, 2000). The key insight is that their semantic arguments are themselves set intersections: the restrictor is the intersection of the predicates denoted by the N’ or the V’ and the restricted universe, U, and the scope is the intersection of the N’ and V’. Following Cohen, I assume that the universe consists of the union of alternatives to the (...) nominal and verbal predicates, where an alternative to a property ψ is one that shares a pragmatic presupposition with ψ, and a pragmatic presupposition is one that is selected by context from a set of potential presuppositions associated with the sentence. A many/few-quantified sentence is then true iff the proportion of the scope to the restrictor is greater/less than some threshold, n. In addition to explaining various problematic cases from the literature, the analysis shows how the readings of a many/few-quantified sentence can be derived from the same syntactico-semantic structure, it being unnecessary to claim lexical or structural ambiguity. The analysis also provides strong support for the idea that natural language quantification is always purely extensional. (shrink)

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories (...) are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain–emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories. (shrink)

This article explores “determining gender,” the umbrella term for social practices of placing others in gender categories. We draw on three case studies showcasing moments of conflict over who counts as a man and who counts as a woman: public debates over the expansion of transgender employment rights, policies determining eligibility of transgender people for competitive sports, and proposals to remove the genital surgery requirement for a change of sex marker on birth certificates. We show that criteria for determining gender (...) differ across social spaces. Gender-integrated spaces are more likely to use identity-based criteria, while gender-segregated spaces, like the sexual spaces we have previously examined, are more likely to use biology-based criteria. In addition, because of beliefs that women are inherently vulnerable and men are dangerous, “men’s” and “women’s” spaces are not policed equally—making access to women’s spaces central to debates over transgender rights. (shrink)

Dissent is thought to play a valuable role in science, so that scientific communities ought to create opportunities for receiving critical feedback and take dissenting views seriously. There is concern, however, that some dissent does more harm than good. Dissent on climate change and evolutionary theory, for example, has confused the public, created doubt about existing consensus, derailed public policy, and forced scientists to devote resources to respond. Are there limits to the extent to which scientific communities have obligations to (...) seek and engage dissenting views? We consider the two main criteria that have been offered for what constitutes “normatively appropriate dissent” or the sort of dissent that ought to have the opportunity to be heard and taken seriously. Many have argued that dissenters must (1) engage in uptake of criticism against their own views and (2) share some standards for theory appraisal. We argue these criteria ultimately are unsuccessful. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

Unlike other primate males, men invest substantial effort in producing food that is consumed by others. The Hunting Hypothesis proposes this pattern evolved in early Homo when ancestral mothers began relying on their mates’ hunting to provision dependent offspring. Evidence for this idea comes from hunter-gatherer ethnography, but data we collected in the 1980s among East African Hadza do not support it. There, men targeted big game to the near exclusion of other prey even though they were rarely successful and (...) most of the meat went to others, at significant opportunity cost to their own families. Based on Hadza data collected more recently, Wood and Marlowe contest our position, affirming the standard view of men’s foraging as family provisioning. Here we compare the two studies, identify similarities, and show that emphasis on big game results in collective benefits that would not be supplied if men foraged mainly to provision their own households. Male status competition remains a likely explanation for Hadza focus on big game, with implications for hypotheses about the deeper past. (shrink)

Intimate partners are sometimes unable to resolve an argument in a single episode. Often this results in serial arguing as one individual repeatedly confronts a resisting other over the same issue. This study investigates how adopting the role of initiator versus resistor impacts experiences with and perceptions of a serial argument. The results of a survey of undergraduates in dating relationships indicate that relative to resistors, initiators report that the initial argumentative episode resulted from an urgent need for action; that (...) they planned what they would say prior to the confrontation; and that they were demanding while their partners withdrew from the interaction. Regardless of an individual's argumentative role, the more times a serial argument had occurred, the more predictable or ‘scripted’ the content of each episode was perceived to be. However, among resistors, the more times a serial argument had occurred, the less resolvable the argument was perceived to be and the more harmful it was seen to be to the relationship. In contrast, among initiators, there were nonsignificant trends which indicated that the more times a serial argument had occurred, the more resolvable it was perceived to be and the less relational harm that had resulted from it. Implications for future research are discussed. (shrink)

While it is widely acknowledged that science is not “free” of non-epistemic values, there is disagreement about the roles that values can appropriately play. Several have argued that non-epistemic values can play important roles in modeling decisions, particularly in addressing uncertainties ; Risbey 2007; Biddle and Winsberg 2010; Winsberg : 111-137, 2012); van der Sluijs 359-389, 2012). On the other hand, such values can lead to bias ; Bray ; Oreskes and Conway 2010). Thus, it is important to identify when (...) it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in modeling decisions. An approach is defended here whereby such value judgments are legitimate when they promote democratically endorsed epistemological and social aims of research. This framework accounts for why it is legitimate to appeal to non-epistemic values in a range of modeling decisions, while addressing concerns that the presence of such values will lead to bias or give scientists disproportionate power in deciding what values ought to be endorsed. (shrink)

Journal of Social Philosophy, EarlyView.

According to what I will refer to as judgmentalist approaches to the fear of death, the fear of death conforms to the structure implied by judgmentalist theories of emotion. JFD holds that fears of death are constituted in part by evaluative judgments or beliefs about one’s own death. Although many philosophers endorse JFD, there is good reason to believe that it may be problematic. For, there is a troubling objection to judgmentalist theories of emotion; if judgmentalism is false, then so (...) too is JFD. In brief, the worry with judgmentalist theories is this: it is sometimes the case that one has an emotion, but holds a belief that is in tension with the emotion. For example, I sometimes fear flying despite the fact that I believe flying is not dangerous. Emotions of this sort are often referred to as recalcitrant emotions, and they are widely thought to pose a serious challenge to judgmentalist theories. In this paper, I consider an objection to JFD based on the existence of recalcitrant bouts of the fear of death. I include in this discussion an Epicurean-inspired solution to the problem of emotional recalcitrance. Although I argue this solution may be ultimately unsuccessful, I believe it is still worth considering. For, in most discussions of the problem of emotional recalcitrance, philosophers abandon judgmentalism in favour of some other theory of emotion. The Epicurean-inspired solution I discuss in this paper, however, may allow one to retain one’s commitment to judgmentalism. (shrink)

Over the past twenty-five years, numerous articles in Hypatia have clarified, revised, and defended increasingly more nuanced views of both feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism. Feminist empiricists have argued that scientific knowledge is contextual and socially situated (Longino 1990; Nelson 1990; Anderson 1995), and standpoint feminists have begun to endorse virtues of theory choice that have been traditionally empiricist (Wylie 2003). In fact, it is unclear whether substantive differences remain. I demonstrate that current versions of feminist empiricism and standpoint feminism (...) now have much in common but that key differences remain. Specifically, they make competing claims about what is required for increasing scientific objectivity. They disagree about 1) the kind of diversity within scientific communities that is epistemically beneficial and 2) the role that ethical and political values can play. In these two respects, feminist empiricists have much to gain from the resources provided by standpoint theory. As a result, the views would be best merged into “feminist standpoint empiricism.”. (shrink)

It has been argued that Thomson's defense of abortion, if successful, implies that abortion is permissible only until the point of viability. After that point, if one wanted to end a pregnancy, one must do so by birthing the fetus through induction or cesarean. In this paper, I argue that Thomson's defense of abortion does, in fact, imply that abortion after the point of viability is sometimes permissible. To show this, I point out that the process of birthing a fetus (...) makes use of the body of the pregnant person in significant ways. Indeed, the body of the pregnant person is as much a part of this process as it is a part of the process of carrying a fetus during pregnancy. Thus, just as it is sometimes morally permissible to choose to have an abortion rather than continue a pregnancy, it is sometimes morally permissible to choose to have an abortion rather than undergo an induction or cesarean. Those who support Thomson's defense of abortion, then, have reason not to support the view that induction or cesarean are the only permissible procedures for ending an unwanted pregnancy with a viable fetus. I then use this discussion to suggest that autonomy rights are more complicated than initially thought. Given the extent to which the body is involved in detaching the fetus, it is not merely that one has a right to detach a fetus, but also a right to actualize one's reasonable preferences over the method of detachment. (shrink)

There are different ways to express impatience with, or argue for the need to move on from, the parameters of a particular theoretical debate. One could be to suggest that the question or questions...

There are increasing calls internationally for the development of regulation and policies related to the rapidly growing nanotechnologies sector. As part of the process of policy formation, it is widely accepted that deliberative community engagement processes should be included, enabling publics to have a say about nanotechnologies, expressing their hopes and fears, issues and concerns, and that these will be considered as part of the policy process. The Australian Federal and State governments have demonstrated a commitment to these ideals, undertaking (...) a number of public engagement activities in recent years. However, despite promises that these community engagement activities will enable policy makers to identify complex and contested community attitudes, and that these will be included as part of the policy making process, a closer look at Australia’s engagement activities reveals something quite different. Through an analysis of a number of Australia’s nano-engagement activities, this paper demonstrates the limits of public engagement related to the development of nanotechnology related policies and regulation in Australia. Our analysis reveals the extent to which industry interests have captured policy makers and regulators, dissenting voices have been excluded from engagement processes, and engagement processes have not connected with actual policy making activities. Reflecting on these limits, this paper concludes with recommendations for improving public engagement processes related to nanotechnologies in Australia. (shrink)

Reclaiming Fuller -- Before the debate -- The 1958 debate -- The morality of law -- The reply to critics -- Resituating Fuller I : Raz -- Resituating Fuller II : Dworkin -- Three conversations.

Developmental psychologists identify propensities for social engagement in human infants that are less evident in other apes; Sarah Hrdy links these social propensities to novel features of human childrearing. Unlike other ape mothers, humans can bear a new baby before the previous child is independent because they have help. This help alters maternal trade-offs and so imposes new selection pressures on infants and young children to actively engage their caretakers’ attention and commitment. Such distinctive childrearing is part of our grandmothering (...) life history. While consequences for other cooperative activities must surely follow, the novel rearing environments set up by helpful grandmothering can explain why natural selection escalated preferences and motivations for interactivity in our lineage in the first place, and why, unlike other aspects of infant development, social sensitivities are not delayed in humans compared with genus Pan. (shrink)

Agricultural biotechnology has long been criticized from an environmental justice perspective. However, an analysis, using golden rice as a case study, shows that golden rice is not susceptible to the main criticisms that are appropriate when directed at most products of agricultural biotechnology, and that golden rice has important humanitarian potential. For these reasons, an environmental justice evaluation of golden rice may need to be more nuanced and complex than a more traditional environmental ethics can provide. Study of the complexity (...) of this issue may pay off in a more effective environmentalism on its own terms. (shrink)

Perhaps no other medical advocacy movement has been as successful as breast cancer advocacy in increasing awareness and funds. Recent decades have seen a division between a “green” environmental advocacy aimed at prevention and a “pink” advocacy focused on fund-raising for a cure. The movement has largely failed to address the implications of corporate control over genetic testing, as reflected by the involvement of only one breast cancer organization in the lawsuit against Myriad Genetics Laboratory, which held patents on the (...) BRCA 1/2 genes. This article argues that the reason for this failure is an unwillingness to challenge the role that corporations play in advocacy. (shrink)

The stories in this book offer strategies and practices for applying systems thinking in education to unleash human energy for the journey of continuous improvement.

ABSTRACT This project seeks to put material culture, craft, and community in conversation with the long-standing American mythology of self-sufficiency referenced not only in elite discourse by the founding statesmen of the United States but also in contemporary popular iterations of the “Green” and urban homesteading movements. Indeed, many of the individuals involved in these movements identify not only as artists but also as advocates of a form of social activism referred to as “craftivism” that explicitly links this American iconographic (...) tradition of self-sufficiency to contemporary mandates for a politics of sustainability, particularly in urban life. Accordingly, I examine the ways in which urban craftivists are preserving and/or reintroducing traditional folkways ranging from subsistence farming to blacksmithing and welding, hand-sewing, knitting and crocheting, and film photography. Offering specific case studies related to these practices, I argue that practitioners of contemporary American craftivisms lean heavily on discourses of memory and tradition, as well as on the material practices and folkways associated therewith, but do so with the intention of creating a new world order that embraces both local and global perspectives as well as resources to support a politics of ethical production reconciling discourses of “tradition” and “sustainability” within the United States and abroad. (shrink)

Several have argued that the aims of scientific research are not always independent of social and ethical values. Yet this is often assumed only to have implications for decisions about what is studied, or which research projects are funded, and not for methodological decisions or standards of evidence. Using the case of the recently developed HPV vaccines, we argue that the social aims of research can also play important roles in justifying decisions about (1) how research problems are defined in (...) drug development, (2) evidentiary standards used in testing drug “success”, and (3) clinical trial methodology. As a result, attending to the social aims at stake in particular research contexts will produce more rational methodological decisions as well as more socially relevant science. (shrink)