Poetizing is the originary naming of the gods. But the poetic word first obtains its naming power when the gods themselves bring us to speak. Martin Heidegger The first decades of the twentieth cen...

Konstantin Pollok - Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion - Journal of the History of Philosophy 44:4 Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.4 559-575 Muse Search Journals This Journal Contents Kant's Critical Concepts of Motion Konstantin Pollok There are two significant places in Kant's Critical corpus where he discusses the concept of motion. The first is in the Critique of Pure Reason, where in the "Deduction of the Categories" Kant writes: Motion, as an act of the subject , (...) and therefore the synthesis of the manifold in space, first produces the concept of succession—if we abstract from this manifold and attend solely to the act through which we determine the inner sense according to its form. In this passage Kant simply refers to the concept of motion, and the immediate context in which this reference occurs reveals little about what he means by it. In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, however, motion plays a more significant role, and, concomitantly, it is in his writings on natural science that Kant most fully expresses his thoughts on the subject. For present purposes, the most relevant passage is paragraph 15 of the Preface of the Metaphysical Foundations, where Kant says that the concept of matter had … to be carried through all four of the indicated functions of the concepts of the understanding , where in each a new determination of this concept was added. The.. (shrink)

The original proof of the four-color theorem by Appel and Haken sparked a controversy when Tymoczko used it to argue that the justification provided by unsurveyable proofs carried out by computers cannot be a priori. It also created a lingering impression to the effect that such proofs depend heavily for their soundness on large amounts of computation-intensive custom-built software. Contra Tymoczko, we argue that the justification provided by certain computerized mathematical proofs is not fundamentally different from that provided by surveyable (...) proofs, and can be sensibly regarded as a priori. We also show that the aforementioned impression is mistaken because it fails to distinguish between proof search (the context of discovery) and proof checking (the context of justification). By using mechanized proof assistants capable of producing certificates that can be independently checked, it is possible to carry out complex proofs without the need to trust arbitrary custom-written code. We only need to trust one fixed, small, and simple piece of software: the proof checker. This is not only possible in principle, but is in fact becoming a viable methodology for performing complicated mathematical reasoning. This is evinced by a new proof of the four-color theorem that appeared in 2005, and which was developed and checked in its entirety by a mechanical proof system. (shrink)

Konstantin Pollok offers the first book-length analysis of Kant's theory of normativity that covers foundational issues in theoretical and practical philosophy as well as aesthetics. Interpreting Kant's 'critical turn' as a normative turn, he argues that Kant's theory of normativity is both original and radical: it departs from the perfectionist ideal of early modern rationalism, and arrives at an unprecedented framework of synthetic a priori principles that determine the validity of our judgments. Pollok examines the hylomorphism in Kant's theory (...) of normativity and relates Kant's idea of our reason's self-legislation to the 'natural right' tradition, revealing Kant's debt to his predecessors as well as his relevance to contemporary debates on normativity. This book will appeal to academic researchers and advanced students of Kant, early modern philosophy and intellectual history. (shrink)

In den Kant-Forschungen werden sowohl historisch als auch systematisch orientierte Arbeiten zur Philosophie Immanuel Kants veröffentlicht. Die Bände stellen Funde unbekannter oder verschollen geglaubter Kantischer Autographen und Vorlesungsskripte vor und erörtern Editionsprobleme der Kantischen Vorlesungen und Werke. Sie enthalten darüber hinaus Studien zu Kants Umfeld und zur Kant-Rezeption im 18. Jahrhundert sowie systematisch angelegte Arbeiten zu Architektonik und System der Philosophie Kants.

Synchronic norms of theory choice, a traditional concern in scientific methodology, restrict the theories one can choose in light of given information. Diachronic norms of theory change, as studied in belief revision, restrict how one should change one’s current beliefs in light of new information. Learning norms concern how best to arrive at true beliefs. In this paper, we undertake to forge some rigorous logical relations between the three topics. Concerning, we explicate inductive truth conduciveness in terms of optimally direct (...) convergence to the truth, where optimal directness is explicated in terms of reversals and cycles of opinion prior to convergence. Concerning, we explicate Ockham’s razor and related principles of choice in terms of the information topology of the empirical problem context and show that the principles are necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence to the truth. Concerning, we weaken the standard principles of agm belief revision theory in intuitive ways that are also necessary for reversal or cycle optimal convergence. Then we show that some of our weakened principles of change entail corresponding principles of choice, completing the triangle of relations between,, and. (shrink)

PA is Peano Arithmetic. Pr(x) is the usual Σ1-formula representing provability in PA. A strong provability predicate is a formula which has the same properties as Pr(·) but is not Σ1. An example: Q is ω-provable if PA + ¬ Q is ω-inconsistent (Boolos [4]). In [5] Dzhaparidze introduced a joint provability logic for iterated ω-provability and obtained its arithmetical completeness. In this paper we prove some further modal properties of Dzhaparidze's logic, e.g., the fixed point property and the Craig (...) interpolation lemma. We also consider other examples of the strong provability predicates and their applications. (shrink)

How is time transformed when signs appear? In the sign system of the conditioned reflex, the sign (conditioned stimulus) reverses, changes the direction of time, and overcomes its unidirectionality and irreversibility. In a sense, there is a “return” to the past in the form of the future when the sign is introduced. The sign serves as a “Time machine” of sorts. The mechanism of time transformation is possible because a mirror is embedded inside the sign, the surface of which represents (...) the psychological present time. When past experience meets that surface in the present, it may be reflected in the form of a future event. In the course of reflection, time changes its direction: if earlier time flowed from the event (the cause), it subsequently flows to other events (the purpose). Previously inaccessible past experience is now projected into the present, “comes to life” in it and is transformed into the future. In humans, unlike in animals, signs of the second order appear. Inside the signs of the second order, a mirror is built in, and the experience of the past as a subject is reflected in the future form as an object. An individual has the opportunity to consider oneself externally as an object. It goes beyond the subjective form. Thus, secondary signs once again change time direction. Due to this phenomenon, time becomes doubly reversible: first it turns around in a conditioned stimulus, and then in a secondary sign. (shrink)

Michael J. Thompson (ed.): Georg Lukács Reconsidered. Critical Essays in Politics, Philosophy and Aesthetics, London/New York: Continuum 2011, 253 + ix p. Timothy Bewes/Timothy Hall (eds.): Georg Lukács: The Fundamental Dissonance of Existence. Aesthetics, Politics, Literature, London/New York: Continuum 2011, 239 + xi p.

By taking into account some texts published between the first and the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason that have been neglected by most of those who have dealt with the deduction of the categories, I argue that the core of the deduction is to be identified as the ‘almost single inference from the precisely determined definition of a judgment in general’, which Kant adumbrates in the Metaphysical Foundations in order to ‘make up for the deficiency’ of the (...) A-deduction. Whereas the first step of the B-deduction is an attempt to show that the manifold of an intuition belongs to the ‘necessary unity of self-consciousness’ by means of the synthesis of the understanding, the second step has the task of showing that the very same synthesis is responsible for the spatio-temporal unity of the manifold. Thus, Kant's ‘answer to Hume’ is that no spatio-temporal objects of experience at all are merely ‘given’, independently of the conceptual activities of the understanding. Against the established view I substantiate the claim that with this ‘almost single inference’ of the second proof step the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience consequently vanished from Kant's thinking. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Kant-Studien Jahrgang: 105 Heft: 4 Seiten: 509-530.

The RNA editing enzyme ADAR1 seemingly has more functions besides RNA editing. Mouse models lacking ADAR1 and sensors of foreign RNA show that RNA editing by ADAR1 plays a crucial role in the innate immune response. Still, RNA editing alone cannot explain all observed phenotypes. Thus, additional roles for ADAR1 must exist. Binding of ADAR1 to RNA is independent of its RNA editing function. Thus, ADAR1 may compete with other RNA-binding proteins. A very recent manuscript elaborates on this and reports (...) competition of ADAR1 with STAUFEN1, thereby modulating RNA-degradation. ADAR1 is also known to recruit proteins such as DROSHA to nascent transcripts. Still, many open questions remain. For instance, the biological role of the Z-DNA binding domains in ADAR1 is not defined. Moreover, the impact of ADAR1 on the RNA-folding landscape is unclear. In sum, moonlighting functions of ADAR1 may be manifold and have a great impact on the transcriptome. Adenosine to inosine RNA editing by ADAR1 is mostly known for its role in the innate immune response to help discriminate self from non-self RNA. Here we discuss the other face of ADAR1 that impacts on cellular processes independent of its editing function. These include Staufen-mediated-decay, mRNA processing, or miRNA maturation. (shrink)

ArgumentPost-Stalinist reforms resulted in dramatic changes in the ways of operation of Soviet science: one can say that they altered the very understanding of what science was, or should be, in the socialist society. A new vision came about as a result of political and rhetorical efforts of scientists, who pushed forward their various, often conflicting, agendas acting in accordance with specific rules of Soviet polity. The most visible part of the reform came with the 1961 administrative reorganization of the (...) USSR Academy of Sciences. The related series of changes, however, was much broader and comprehensive, modifying the relationships between science and ideology, politicians and academic researchers, and establishing the very division between fundamental and applied research, which had been strongly rejected during the preceding Stalinist period. (shrink)

In this paper, we identify and explain three kinds of bedrock in moral thought. The term "bedrock," as introduced by Wittgenstein in §217 of the Philosophical Investigations, stands for the end of a chain of reasoning. We affirm that some chains of moral reasoning do indeed end with certainty. However, different kinds of certainties in morality work in different ways. In the course of systematizing the different types of certainties, we argue that present accounts of certainties in morality do not (...) reflect their diversity. Our analysis yields three types of moral certainty: QUASI-UNDOUBTABLE CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, CERTAIN PROPOSITIONS, and TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES. We show that the first two types can, at least to some extent, be intelligibly doubted. Therefore, they do not possess the characteristics that would classify them as bedrock in the strictest sense. TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES cannot likewise be doubted because they are rules that enable moral thinking. Thus, deviating from them is unintelligible. We shall argue that all three types reflect ways in which moral language games come to an end, while only one, TRANSCENDENTAL CERTAINTIES, displays the characteristic of being solid bedrock. (shrink)

Author contends in the paper that there exists, in contemporary world philosophy, the necessity for a new branch?the philosophical cosmology. Meeting this challenge himself, author introduces an original framework of cosmological assumptions, aimed to create the fundamentals for the new discipline. His own original approach builds on the Russian cosmist philosophical tradition of pan?unity and active evolution. Working on this basis, he states the core elements of the new discipline: its subject, object, purpose, method, and key conceptions (including the conceptions (...) of ?Cosmist Dualism? and ?Homo sapience cosmicus?. He also characterises the corps of philosophical cosmology, which should be constituted of the philosophers?"synthesists? disposed to undertake the ?all?embracing synthesis? in the true area of ?epistemological realism?. In completion, the notion of ?Cosmist Enlightenment? is proposed. (shrink)

In this paper, we tackle the widely held view that practice-oriented approaches to ethics are conservative, preserving the moral status quo, and, in particular, that they do not promote any (fundamental) change in our dealings with animals or formulate clear principles that help us to achieve such change. We shall challenge this view with reference to Wittgensteinian ethics. As a first step, we show that moral thought and action rest on basic moral certainties like: equals are to be treated equally (...) and unequals unequally. We then explore the relations between this insight and the notion of the difficulty of reality elaborated by Cora Diamond. Our goal is to show that a Wittgensteinian-Diamondian approach to animal ethics is not necessarily morally conservative. Indeed, it offers a profound practice-oriented approach to animal ethics that is capable of promoting change in human dealings with animals because it is compatible with radical critique. (shrink)

IMMANUEL KANT GRADUATED IN 1755 from the University of Königsberg on the basis of the dissertation On Fire and with the essay A New Exposition of the First Principles of Metaphysics written specifically for the occasion; he took up a position as lecturer in the same year. In 1756 he wrote a third Latin essay, the Physical Monadology, and applied for a professorship at the Albertina in Königsberg. The application was unsuccessful and, more significantly, the work failed to attract the (...) attention Kant had hoped. He had to wait until 1770—some fourteen years later—for an appointment as full professor in Königsberg, and it was not until the publication of the Critique of Pure Reason in 1781 that he finally established his reputation as a philosopher. (shrink)

The article offers a discursive account of what generality in machine learning research means and how it is constructed in the development of general artificial intelligence from the perspectives of cultural and media studies. I discuss several technical papers that outline novel architectures in machine learning and how they conceive of the “world”. The agency to learn and the learning curriculum are modulated through worlding (in the sense of setting up and unfolding of the world for artificial agents) in machine (...) learning engineering. In recent computer science articles, large models trained on Internet-scale datasets are framed as general world simulators—despite their partiality, historicity, finite nature, and cultural specificity. I introduce the notion of “model worlds” to refer to composable interactive environments designed for the purpose of machine learning that partake in legitimising that claim. I discuss how large models are grounded through interaction in model worlds, arguing that model worlds mediate between the sheer scale of language models and their hypothetical capacity to generalise to new tasks and domains, rehashing the empiricist logic of “big data”. Further, I show that the emerging capacity of artificial agents to generalise redraws the epistemic boundary between artificial agents and their learning environments. Consequently, superficial statistics of language models and abstract action are made meaningful in distilled model worlds, giving rise to synthetic agency. (shrink)

Dnevnik : obshchenie s samim soboĭ v prostranstve totalʹnoĭ kommunikat︠s︡ii -- Rassuzhdenie o stereotipakh, ili uteshenie metodom -- Shepot demona -- Maksimy.

The study analyzes the philosophy of artificial consciousness presented in the first season of TV series 'Westworld' and as a result of the analysis shows the collision of two opposite philosophical views on consciousness and the possibility of creation of artificial consciousness from the standpoint of two characters of TV series - Arnold Weber and Robert Ford. Arnold Weber proceeds from two philosophical assumptions: consciousness really exists and human consciousness can be a prototype for modeling consciousness in an artificial intelligence (...) bearer. And he has to choose: either to pick out one of the already existing conceptions of consciousness to implement the emergence of artificial consciousness within artificial intelligence or to invent his own; Arnold Weber chooses the Julian Jaynes' conception of consciousness as a basis for artificial consciousness what means that artificial consciousness must have the following features: 1) artificial consciousness has to be the result of the breakdown of the bicameral mind, the state of mind in which cognitive functions are divided into two part, a 'speaking' part and 'hearing' part, until the breakdown that makes the bicameral mind the unified mind; 2) artificial consciousness has to be a mind-space based on language and characterized by introspection, concentration, suppression, consilience and an analog 'I' narratizing in the mind-space. Robert Ford believes that consciousness does not exist at all and that there are only stories which human beings and artificial beings, modeled in the image and likeness of human beings, tell each other and always the basis of all those stories is suffering. (shrink)

У статті аналізується філософський розумовий експеримент, запропонований у кінофільмі Robocop, суть якого полягає в моделюванні ситуації, в якій людина перетворюється на кіборга. Кінофільм Robocop досліджує, що таке бути кіборгом як кіборгізованою людиною, та показує, що до кіборгізованої людини можливі три види ставлення: кіборгізована людина більше не сприймається як людина, до неї ставляться як до робота ; кіборгізована людина сприймається як людина, до неї ставляться як до людини ; кіборгізована людина сприймається як людина, до неї ставляться як до людини, але при (...) цьому вважається, що на фізичному рівні між людиною та роботом немає жодної відмінності. Третій вид ставлення потенційно стирає різницю між людиною та машиною зі штучним інтелектом не лише на фізичному, але й на інших рівнях, наприклад, юридичному чи етичному. (shrink)

This article is a commentary on ChatGPT and LLMs (Large Language Models) in general. It argues that this technology has matured to the point where calling systems such as ChatGPT “stochastic parrots” is no longer warranted. But it also argues that these systems continue to have serious limitations when it comes to reasoning. These limitations are much more severe than commonly thought. A large array of examples are given to support these claims.

Against the well-established critical rejection of rights a growing literature in the tradition of agonistic democracy asserts their emancipatory role in the struggles for social change. However, agonistic theorists, invested as they are in the idea of democratic innovation as a process of gradual ‘augmentation’ of existing rules, institutions and practices, fail to account for the ruptural capacity, and hence for the full radical potential, of rights. Using the performative approach, I develop a conception of rights claiming as a defiant (...) practice to express the ruptural dimension of certain forms of rights politics. I demonstrate how defiant rights claiming articulates immanent critique by declaring the incapacity of putative duty-bearer institutions and governments to uphold the claimed right due to structural constraints, thereby generating inevitable contradictions within the extant order and creating the necessity for an alternative one. Moreover, in order to fully capture the emancipatory potential and creative capacity of rights, this article argues for understanding certain forms of rights politics both as augmentation and rupture, taking the two to be different dimensions of the same radical democratic practice. I present the creative use of rights discourse by the Landless Workers’ Movement in Brazil and the transnational network of agrarian movements, La Via Campesina, as precisely such a combination of the practice of augmentation and defiant claims, which has led to the transformation of the right to food and land into the right to food sovereignty, demonstration of the structural embeddedness of rights violations in the existing global regime of food production and distribution, and authorisation of an alternative vision of the future. (shrink)

Various publications claim that medical AI systems perform as well, or better, than clinical experts. However, there have been very few controlled trials and the quality of existing studies has been called into question. There is growing concern that existing studies overestimate the clinical benefits of AI systems. This has led to calls for more, and higher-quality, randomized controlled trials of medical AI systems. While this a welcome development, AI RCTs raise novel methodological challenges that have seen little discussion. We (...) discuss some of the challenges arising in the context of AI RCTs and make some suggestions for how to meet them. (shrink)

As a discipline, psychiatry is in the process of finding the right set of concepts to organize research and guide treatment. Dissatisfaction with the status quo as expressed in standard manuals has animated a number of computational paradigms, each proposing to rectify the received concept of mental disorder. We explore how different computational paradigms: normative modeling, network theory and learning-theoretic approaches like reinforcement learning and active inference, reconceptualize mental disorders. Although each paradigm borrows heavily from machine learning, they differ significantly (...) in their methodology, their preferred level of description, the role they assign to the environment and, especially, the degree to which they aim to assimilate psychiatric disorders to a standard medical disease model. By imagining how these paradigms might evolve, we bring into focus three rather different visions for the future of psychiatric research. Although machine learning plays a crucial role in the articulation of these paradigms, it is clear that we are far from automating the process of conceptual revision. The leading role continues to be played by the theoretical, metaphysical and methodological commitments of the competing paradigms. (shrink)