It is often held that to have a conscious experience presupposes having some form of implicit self-awareness. The most dominant phenomenological view usually claims that we essentially perceive experiences as our own. This is the so called “mineness” character, or dimension of experience. According to this view, mineness is not only essential to conscious experience, it also grounds the idea that pre-reflective self-awareness constitutes a minimal self. In this paper, we show that there are reasons to doubt this constituting role (...) of mineness. We argue that there are alternative possibilities and that the necessity for an adequate theory of the self within psychopathology gives us good reasons to believe that we need a thicker notion of the pre-reflective self. To this end, we develop such a notion: the Pre-Reflective Situational Self. To do so, we will first show how alternative conceptions of pre-reflective self-awareness point to philosophical problems with the standard phenomenological view. We claim that this is mainly due to fact that within the phenomenological account the mineness aspect is implicitly playing several roles. Consequently, we argue that a thin interpretation of pre-reflective self-awareness—based on a thin notion of mineness—cannot do its needed job within, at least within psychopathology. This leads us to believe that a thicker conception of pre-reflective self is needed. We, therefore, develop the notion of the pre-reflective situational self by analyzing the dynamical nature of the relation between self-awareness and the world, specifically through our interactive inhabitation of the social world. (shrink)

Ethik-Komitees gehören zum festen Bestandteil des Ethikmanagements und der Organisationsethik in klinischen Einrichtungen des Gesundheitswesens. Entsprechende Ethikstrukturen und die damit verbundenen Angebote stoßen hinsichtlich ihrer Wirksamkeit allerdings an ihre Grenzen. Ihre Arbeitsweisen sind häufig reaktiv und eine Verankerung in den entsprechenden Organisationsebenen fehlt. Ausgehend von diesen Limitationen der klinischen Ethikberatung hat sich die multiprofessionelle „Arbeitsgruppe Ethik“ am Universitätsklinikum Tübingen um die Konzeption und Implementierung eines neuen Ansatzes zur nachhaltigen Integration von ethischen Reflexions- und Entscheidungsprozessen auf den Stationen des UKT bemüht. (...) Mit dem Tübinger Modell der Ethikbeauftragten der Station verfolgt sie ein Pilotprojekt, das speziell geschulte Pflegekräfte aus allen Stationen des UKT als AnsprechpartnerInnen für ethische Fragen einsetzt. Damit stellen die Ethikbeauftragten eine Erweiterung zu etablierten Strukturen der Ethikberatung dar und ergänzen vorhandene Top-Down-Strategien. Der vorliegende Beitrag stellt die Zielsetzungen des Tübinger Modells dar und schildert erste Erfahrungen in der Umsetzung. Neben der Einbettung in organisationale Strukturen der Ethikberatung werden die stationsinternen und stationsübergreifenden Aufgaben der Ethikbeauftragten dargestellt. Zudem wird das Qualifikationsprogramm für Ethikbeauftragte sowie ein Train-the-Trainer-Konzept vorgestellt, welche eine vertiefende Entwicklung von pflege- und medizinethischer Kompetenzen unterstützen und Sicherheit in den stationsbezogenen Reflexions- und Entscheidungsprozessen vermitteln. (shrink)

2006 wurde an der Washington University in St.Louis, USA, ein Seminar veranstaltet, das sich mit der Rezeption von Kelsens Lehre in verschiedenen Staaten befasste. Einige der Referenten stellten ihre Beiträge für diesen Band zur Verfügung.

This book is concerned with Aristotle’s definition of the human capacity for rational thinking (nous) offered in De anima. For Aristotle, nous is the principle, and ultimate explanans, of all the phenomena of human thinking. The book presents an in-depth interpretation of De anima III 4–8 as a single and coherent philosophical argument. More specifically, the book argues for the following views: (i) Rationalism. Humans come to know the world via two fundamentally different cognitive powers: nous and perception. They are (...) fundamentally different cognitive powers because the nature of their corresponding object is fundamentally different; -/- (ii) Essentialism. The human power for thinking is defined as a capacity for directly grasping the essences of everything there is, including itself. It is this very capacity that Aristotle shows to be the principle of all other kinds of human thinking; -/- (iii) Separatism. Human nous is unmixed with the body, has no dedicated bodily organ, and is separable from the body. As a result, it cannot be assimilated to any of the other parts of the soul. While nous belongs to our essence as human beings, it is not part of the natural world; -/- (iv) Embeddedness in the cognitive soul. Human nous is embedded in a cognitive soul. Among other things, this means that the distinctive activity of human nous—thinking—can only take place in the context of a larger set of activities which are common to the body and the soul. (shrink)

According to Enactivism, cognition should be understood in terms of a dynamic interaction between an acting organism and its environment. Further, this view holds that organisms do not passively receive information from this environment, they rather selectively create this environment by engaging in interaction with the world. Radical Enactivism adds that basic cognition does so without entertaining representations and hence that representations are not an essential constituent of cognition. Some proponents think that getting rid of representations amounts to a revolutionary (...) alternative to standard views about cognition. To emphasize the impact, they claim that this ‘radicalization’ should be applied to all enactivist friendly views, including, another current and potentially revolutionary approach to cognition: predictive processing. In this paper, we will show that this is not the case. After introducing the problem, we will argue that ‘radicalizing’ predictive processing does not add any value to this approach. After this, we will analyze whether or not radical Enactivism can count as a revolution within cognitive science at all and conclude that it cannot. Finally, in section 5 we will claim that cognitive science is better off when embracing heterogeneity. (shrink)

In recent years we have seen the rise of a new framework within the study of the mind, namely Predictive Processing. This framework essentially holds that the brain is a prediction machine constantly postulating perceptual models which are tested against incoming information. At the same time, the notion of the minimal or core self has become very influential as a way of explaining, or explaining away, pre-reflective self-awareness. The four most widely discussed alternatives for thinking through the metaphysical implications the (...) pre-reflective sense of self are the standard phenomenological view, the substance view, the no-self view and by now the relational view. In this paper, it is our objective to rethink the notion of the sense of self in the context of PP. Now, PP is often held to be a unifying framework that offers a new integrated account of perception, cognition, imagination, and indeed the pre-reflective sense of self. We will show, however, that PP has been taken to endorse rather too many different metaphysical accounts of self: that is, views about how we should regard the ultimate nature of self. What we need to do, if possible, is to use PP to constrain the theories on offer. Here we focus upon two central constraints that we think PP implies. These are, the mutability constraint and the multi-layereredness constraint. We argue that self-views laid out in terms of the PP framework are usually – to some degree – located within the four standard metaphysical accounts of self. However, we think that realist versions of self-accounts seem to have more trouble in respecting the PP constraints or requirements. The reason, or so we believe, is PP’s mutability constraint. This does not have to be the case and we, therefore, propose an alternative realist view – namely the pre-reflective situational self view – which is more adequate to fit the PP framework. (shrink)

We are living through a new phase in human development where much of everyday life – at least in the most technologically developed parts of the world – has come to depend upon our interaction with “smart” artefacts. Alongside this increasing adoption and ever-deepening reliance on intelligent machines, important changes have been taking place, often in the background, as to how we think of ourselves and how we conceptualize our relationship with technology. As we design, create and learn to live (...) with a new order of artefacts which exhibit behavior that, were it to be carried out by human beings would be seen as intelligent, the ways in which we conceptualize intelligence, minds, reasoning and related notions such as self and agency are undergoing profound shifts. We argue that the basic background assumptions informing our concepts of mind, and the underlying conceptual scheme structuring our reasoning about minds has recently been transformed in the process. This shift has changed the nature and quality of both our folk understanding of mind, our scientific psychology, and the philosophical problems that the interaction of these realms produce. Many of the traditional problems in the philosophy of mind have become reconfigured in the process. This introduction sets the scene for our book that treats this reconfiguration of our concepts of mind and of technology, and the new casting of philosophical problems this reconfiguration engenders. (shrink)

Human severe combined immune deficiency (SCID) is the most serious inherited immunological deficit. Recent work has revealed defects in the predominant pathway for double‐strand break repair called nonhomologous DNA end joining, or NHEJ. Progress in the biochemistry and genetics of NHEJ and of human SCID has proven to be synergistic between these two fields in a manner that covers the range from biochemical etiology to considerations about possible gene therapy for the B− SCID patients. BioEssays 25:1061–1070, 2003. © 2003 Wiley (...) Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

This study tests the hypothesis that the perception of philosophy as a male-oriented discipline contributes to the pronounced gender disparity within the field. To assess the hypothesis, we determined the extent to which individuals view philosophy as masculine, and whether individual differences in this correspond with greater identification with philosophy. We also tested whether identification with philosophy correlated to interest in it. We discovered, first, that the more women view philosophy as masculine, the less they identify with it, and second, (...) that the less women identify with philosophy, the less they want to major in it. Interestingly, this result does not hold for men—their viewing philosophy as masculine does not correspond to their identification with it, nor does it correlate with their likelihood of majoring in it. We also discovered that the typical student does not have a preconceived notion of philosophy as masculine; this suggests that they come to view philosophy as masculine the more they do it, which in turn supports the possibility that teaching the discipline differently may prevent students from conceiving of philosophy as masculine, thus allowing a path to reducing the gender disparity. (shrink)

Kaum einer hat die offene Gesellschaft in der politischen Philosophie des 20. Jahrhunderts so leidenschaftlich verteidigt wie Karl Popper. Sein Demokratieverstandnis ist eng gekoppelt an seine Wissenschaftstheorie und die Kritik an Platon, Hegel, Marx. Als Liberaler und sozialer Reformist wird er parteiubergreifend zum Stichwortgeber bundesdeutscher Politik seit den 70er Jahren. Popper-Rezeptionen finden sich bis in die Staatsrechtslehre (namentlich Peter Haberle) und das Bundesverfassungsgericht hinein. Noch heute lasst sich mit Popper gegen Diktaturen wie uberhaupt gegen Konzepte von "Gemeinschaft" Position beziehen - (...) aber auch gegen einen pseudo-liberalen, gnadenlosen Kapitalismus der "Ich-AGs". Mit Beitragen von Dorothea Frede, Peter Haberle, Herbert Keuth, Hubert Kiesewetter, Martin H. W. Mollers, Jurgen Nordmann, Harald Stelzer, Robert Chr. van Ooyen, Robert Zimmer. (shrink)

In recent years, the idea of mind uploading has left the genre of science fiction. Uploading our minds as a form of immortality, or so it has been argued, is now within our reach. Of course, this depends on the assumption that our mind is nothing more than some sort of computer software running on the brain as hardware paving the way for a standard procedure of mind uploading, namely instantaneous destructive uploading – where the brain is simulated on a (...) computer - or gradual destructive uploading – where brain regions are gradually replaced by micro-chips. Lately, however, there has been sustained doubts that things are so simple. In this volume alone Susan Schneider & Joe Corabi and Gualtiero Piccinini argue that a person cannot survive standard procedures of mind uploading. The main reasons are that the uploading process violates identity criteria for the person and that it is unclear that conscious mental states can be uploaded. In this article, we argue that while the sceptics about the standard methods of uploading are probably right, there are more options to be evaluated. We introduce what we call slow continuous mind uploading as an alternative procedure. Slow continuous uploading is based on the extended mind thesis which claims that artefacts can under specific circumstances come to count as part of the realization basis for an individual’s mind. In this context, we explore a form of mind uploading which may already be being innovated today through our deep reliance upon cognitive incorporation of “smart” internet technologies. We will argue that this process may give us the right kind of tools to survive mind uploading, or more minimally, to create an agent that can be considered a psychological continuity of an individual. We think that, at least, the objections so far developed in the literature do not rule this out. (shrink)

Over the last decades, Interdisciplinarity (ID) has become one of the leading research practices. Traditionally, cognitive science is considered one of the most prominent examples of ID research by including disciplines such as philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence (AI), neuroscience, anthropology and linguistics. Recently, however the ID character of cognitive science has become under pressure. According to a study by Leydesdorff and Goldstone (2013), research in this domain gets more and more absorbed by cognitive psychology and the interdisciplinary character of cognitive (...) science is steadily fading away. In this paper, we will examine this claim and argue that its conclusion is premature. We will show that there are reasons to think that the interdisciplinary character of cognitive science is more robust and that the configuration of ID relations may be more dynamic than portrayed by ID skeptics. The reason, or so we will argue, is that ID research is a consequence of the theoretical framework(s) in place, i.e. it is in the nature of ID that fluctuations occur depending on what is held to be the nature of cognition. Our findings are twofold. On the one hand, we will show that the reintegration of cognitive science into cognitive psychology – and with it an approximation towards biology and neuroscience – is, as a matter of fact, the fruit of past ID research. On the other hand, we will demonstrate that novel conceptual frameworks open the possibility for restoring ID relations and foster new ID research. (shrink)

This edited book deepens the engagement between 21st century philosophy of mind and the emerging technologies which are transforming our environment. Many new technologies appear to have important implications for the human mind, the nature of our cognition, our sense of identity and even perhaps what we think human beings are. They prompt questions such as: Would an uploaded mind be 'me'? Does our reliance on smart phones, or wearable gadgets enhance or diminish the human mind? and: How does our (...) deep reliance upon ambient artificial intelligence change the shape of the human mind? Readers will discover the best philosophical analysis of what current and near future 21st technology means for the metaphysics of mind. Important questions are addressed on matters relating to the extended mind and the distributed self. Expert authors explore the role that the ubiquitous smart phone might have in creating new forms of self-knowledge. They consider machine consciousness, brain enhancement and smart ambient technology, and what they can tell us about phenomenal consciousness. While ideas of artificial general intelligence, cognitive enhancements and the smart environment are widely commented on, serious analysis of their philosophical implications is only getting started. These contributions from top scholars are therefore very timely, and are of particular relevance to students and scholars of the philosophy of mind, philosophy of technology, computer science and psychology. (shrink)

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Providing the most thorough coverage available in one volume, this comprehensive, broadly based collection offers a wide variety of selections in four major genres, and also includes a section on film. Each of the five sections contains a detailed critical introduction to each form, brief biographies of the authors, and a clear, concise editorial apparatus. Updated and revised throughout, the new Fourth Edition adds essays by Margaret Mead, Russell Baker, Joan Didion, Annie Dillard, and Alice Walker; fiction by Nathaniel Hawthorne, (...) Ursula K. LeGuin, Anton Chekov, James Joyce, Katherine Mansfield, F. Scott Fitzgerald, William Faulkner, Alice Walker, Louise Erdrich, Donald Barthelme, and James McPherson; poems by John Donne, Robert Browning, Walt Whitman, Edwin Arlington Robinson, e.e. cummings, Langston Hughes, W.H. Auden, Philip Levine, and Louise Gluck; and plays by August Wilson, Marsha Norman, Wendy Wasserstein, and Vaclav Havel. The chapter devoted to film examines the relation of film to literature and gives the complete screenplay for Citizen Kane plus close analysis of a scene from the film. With its innovative structure, comprehensive coverage, and insightful and stimulating presentation of all kinds of literature, this is an anthology readers will turn to again and again. (shrink)

Climate risks are growing. Research is increasingly important to inform the design of risk-management strategies. Assessing such strategies necessarily brings values into research. But the values assumed within research (often only implicitly) may not align with those of stakeholders and decision makers. These misalignments are often invisible to researchers and can severely limit research relevance or lead to inappropriate policy advice. Aligning strategy assessments with stakeholders' values requires a holistic approach to research design that is oriented around those values from (...) the start. Integrating values into research in this way requires collaboration with stakeholders, integration across disciplines, and attention to all aspects of research design. Here we describe and demonstrate a qualitative conceptual tool called a values-informed mental model (ViMM) to support such values-centered research design. ViMMs map stakeholders' values onto a conceptual model of a study system to visualize the intersection of those values with coupled natural-human system dynamics. Through this mapping, ViMMs integrate inputs from diverse collaborators to support the design of research that assesses risk-management strategies in light of stakeholders' values. We define a visual language for ViMMs, describe accompanying practices and workflows, and present an illustrative application to the case of flood-risk management in a small community along the Susquehanna river in the Northeast United States. (shrink)

Convergence research is driven by specific and compelling problems and requires deep integration across disciplines. The potential of convergence research is widely recognized, but questions remain about how to design, facilitate, and assess such research. Here we analyze a seven-year, twelve-million-dollar convergence project on sustainable climate risk management to answer two questions. First, what is the impact of a project-level emphasis on the values that motivate and tie convergence research to the compelling problems? Second, how does participation in convergence projects (...) shape the research of postdoctoral scholars who are still in the process of establishing themselves professionally? We use an interview-based approach to characterize what the project specifically enabled in each participant’s research. We find that (a) the project pushed participants’ research into better alignment with the motivating concept of convergence research and that this effect was stronger for postdoctoral scholars than for more senior faculty. (b) Postdocs’ self-assessed understanding of key project themes, however, appears unconnected to metrics of project participation, raising questions about training and integration. Regarding values, (c) the project enabled heightened attention to values in the research of a large minority of participants. (d) Participants strongly believe in the importance of explicitly reflecting on values that motivate and pervade scientific research, but they question their own understanding of how to put value-focused science into practice. This mismatch of perceived importance with poor understanding highlights an unmet need in the practice of convergence science. (shrink)

Der vorliegende Band umfasst Beitrage zu einem zentralen Thema bei Platon: 'Physis' kann bei Platon im naturwissenschaftlichen Sinne als physische, biologische, materielle Natur oder im ubertragenen Sinne als eigenes Wesen, etwa hinsichtlich Seele, Kosmos oder Gottlichem, verstanden werden. So werden in diesem Band medizinische, biologische und kosmologische Ansatze ebenso wie ontologische, epistemologische und padagogische Themen zu Platons 'Physis'-Konzept fokussiert. Die zeitgenossische Nomos-Physis-Diskussion Platons mit den Sophisten sowie seine sprach- und kulturphilosophischen Uberlegungen spielen hier eine wichtige Rolle. Die anspruchsvolle literarische Gestaltung (...) der Platonischen Dialoge ist fur die genannten Fragestellungen hochst relevant, ebenso die Auseinandersetzung spaterer platonischer Philosophen mit Platons Physis-Konzept. Mit Beitragen von:Michele Abbate, Christian Brockmann, Ramon Cornavaca, Diego De Brasi, Pantelis Golitsis, Julia Knauss, Dietmar Koch, Mai Oki-Suga, Irmgard Mannlein-Robert, Oliver Primavesi, Mario Regali, Carlos Steel, Angela Ulacco. (shrink)

Traditional eschatology clashes with the theory of entropy. Trying to bridge the gap, Robert John Russell assumes that theology and science are based on contradictory, yet equally valid, metaphysical assumptions, each one capable of questioning and impacting the other. The author doubts that Russell's proposal will convince empirically oriented scientists and attempts to provide a viable alternative. Historical‐critical analysis suggests that biblical future expectations were redemptive responses to changing human needs. Apocalyptic visions were occasioned by heavy suffering in postexilic (...) times. Interpreted in realistic terms, they have since proved to be untenable. The expectation of a new creation without evil, suffering, and death is not constitutive for the substantive content of the biblical message as such. Biblical future expectations must be reconceptualized in terms of best contemporary insight and in line with a dynamic reading of the biblical witness as God's vision of comprehensive optimal well‐being that operates like a shifting horizon and opens up ever new vistas, challenges, and opportunities. (shrink)