Klaus Peter Mortensen; The Double Call: on Bildung in a Literary and Reflective Perspective, Journal of Philosophy of Education, Volume 36, Issue 3, 16 December.

In _The Idealism of Freedom_, Klaus Vieweg argues for a Hegelian turn in philosophy: Hegel’s idealism of freedom contains a number of epoch-making ideas that articulate a new understanding of freedom, which still shape contemporary philosophy.

In his commentary on Aristotle’s Peri hermeneias,1 Abelard distinguishes the form of an expression2 (oratio) from what it says, that is, its content. The content of an expression is its understanding (intellectus). This distinction is surely the most well-known and central idea in Abelard’s commentary. It provides him with the opportunity to distinguish statements (enuntiationes) from other kinds of expressions without implying a diference in their content, since the ability of a statement to signify something true or false (verum vel (...) falsum)3 cannot be found in its content. More precisely, Abelard distinguishes statements both from complete expressions (orationes perfectae) that are not statements but rather questions, requests, commands, etc. and from incomplete expressions, that is, mere word strings (orationes imperfectae), such as homo albus. These kinds of expressions, according to Abelard, do not differ in the understanding they present but in the way they present it. (shrink)

In diesem Buch erscheint Kants Moralphilosophie in neuem Licht. Kants Bestimmung und Begründung des Moralprinzips wird gegen das Gros der bisherigen Forschung als konsistente Argumentation auf hohem Niveau aufgeschlüsselt. Das gut lesbare Buch klärt die Grundbegriffe von Kants Moralphilosophie und lässt sich als Kommentar zu deren als besonders schwierig empfundenen Teilen benutzen.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Heraklit, Parmenides und der Anfang von Philosophie und Wissenschaft" verfügbar.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "Die ontologische Option" verfügbar.

Die Mensch-Maschine-Schnittstelle ermöglicht die Kontrolle und Bedienung einer Maschine. Da die ›klassische‹ MMS des vorinformatischen Zeitalters vom Einsatz informatischer Systeme dominiert wird, wird auch allgemeiner von Mensch-System-Schnittstelle oder Mensch-Computer-Schnittstelle gesprochen. Sie soll so gestaltet sein, dass sie möglichst einfach und intuitiv bedienbar ist, ein Feedback gibt und an kulturelle Bedürfnisse und Gewohnheiten sowie an körperliche Dispositionen und an die Einsatzfelder angepasst ist.

This book focuses on the gradual formation of the concept of ‘light quanta’ or ‘photons’, as they have usually been called in English since 1926. The great number of synonyms that have been used by physicists to denote this concept indicates that there are many different mental models of what ‘light quanta’ are: simply finite, ‘quantized packages of energy’ or ‘bullets of light’? ‘Atoms of light’ or ‘molecules of light’? ‘Light corpuscles’ or ‘quantized waves’? Singularities of the field or spatially (...) extended structures able to interfere? ‘Photons’ in G.N. Lewis’s sense, or as defined by QED, i.e. virtual exchange particles transmitting the electromagnetic force? The term ‘light quantum’ made its first appearance in Albert Einstein’s 1905 paper on a “heuristic point of view” to cope with the photoelectric effect and other forms of interaction of light and matter, but the mental model associated with it has a rich history both before and after 1905. Some of its semantic layers go as far back as Newton and Kepler, some are only fully expressed several decades later, while others initially increased in importance then diminished and finally vanished. In conjunction with these various terms, several mental models of light quanta were developed—six of them are explored more closely in this book. It discusses two historiographic approaches to the problem of concept formation: the author’s own model of conceptual development as a series of semantic accretions and Mark Turner’s model of ‘conceptual blending’. Both of these models are shown to be useful and should be explored further. This is the first historiographically sophisticated history of the fully fledged concept and all of its twelve semantic layers. It systematically combines the history of science with the history of terms and a philosophically inspired history of ideas in conjunction with insights from cognitive science. (shrink)

Proceedings of a conference held Sept. 2010 in Jena, Germany.

Can one speak philosophically of a justified limitation of freedom? Hegel’s logically founded definition of free will and his understanding of right and duty can contribute to a clarification of the concept of freedom. Important is a precise differentiation between freedom and caprice (Willkür) – the latter being a necessary but one-sided element of the free will. In caprice, the will is not yet in the form of reason. Rational rights and duties are not a restriction of freedom. Insofar as (...) individual rights can collide (e. g. in emergency situations), there can be a temporary and proportionate restriction of certain rights in favour of higher rights, such as the right to life. Dictatorships are instances of capricious rule which restrict freedom; the rationally designed state, by contrast, restricts only caprice. What is tobe defined are the duties and the rights of the state and the duties and the rights of the citizens. (shrink)

Dieses Buch ist in kritischer Abgrenzung zu anderen Bemühungen um Hegels System der bislang entschiedenste Versuch, diese Philosophie als eine ontologische Option aus nicht-metaphysischer Sicht zu interpretieren. Hegels Wissenschaft der Logik wird gedeutet als dialektische Entwicklung jener Kategorien des Denkens, die zugleich Seinskategorien sind. Der Autor versteht die Hegelsche Logik als eine Theorie, die die Wahrheitsfähigkeit des Denkens nachweisen will, sofern dieses Anspruch auf Wirklichkeitserkenntnis erhebt. Hartmanns opus posthumum bietet darüber hinaus einen konstitutiv-kritischen Kommentar zu einem der schwierigsten und bis (...) heute nicht vollständig erschlossenen Werk der Philosophie. (shrink)

In as far as every philosophy appears at a certain point in time it later inevitably becomes a historical fact. If its content is then to be recognizable, if it is to be reclaimed as philosophy in the present, then we ourselves must have a philosophical conception of history and, furthermore, a conception of philosophy's own historicity. Only since Kant has modern metaphysics expressly and methodically developed such a conception within its systematic claim to truth. Moreover, for the presentday philosophy (...) and its relationship to a completed metaphysics such a conception is indispensable - under the presupposition that the history of philosophy is to be taken seriously as philosophy. (shrink)