A resolution of the quantum measurement problem would require one to explain how it is that we end up with determinate records at the end of our measurements. Metaphysical commitments typically do real work in such an explanation. Indeed, one should not be satisfied with one's metaphysical commitments unless one can provide some account of determinate measurement records. I will explain some of the problems in getting determinate records in relativistic quantum field theory and pay particular attention to the relationship (...) between the measurement problem and a generalized version of Malament's theorem. (shrink)

Deflationsism about truth is a pot-pourri, variously claiming that truth is redundant, or is constituted by the totality of 'T-sentences', or is a purely logical device (required solely for disquotational purposes or for re-expressing finitarily infinite conjunctions and/or disjunctions). In 1980, Hartry Field proposed what might be called a 'deflationary theory of mathematics', in which it is alleged that all uses of mathematics within science are dispensable. Field's criterion for the dispensability of mathematics turns on a property of theories, called (...) conservativeness. I present some technical results, some of which may be found in Tarski (1936), concerning the logical properties of truth theories; in particular, concerning the conservativeness of adding a truth theory for an object level language to any theory expressed in it. It transpires that various deflationary truth theories behave somewhat differently from the standard Tarskian truth theory. These results suggest that Tarskian theories of truth are not redundant or dispensable. Finally, I hint at an analogy between the behaviour of mathematical theories and of standard (Tarskian) theories of truth with respect to their indispensability to, as Quine would put, our 'scientific world-view'. (shrink)

This article considers how a generalized signalling game may self-assemble as the saliences of the agents evolve by reinforcement on those sources of information that in fact lead to successful action. On the present account, generalized signalling games self-assemble even as the agents co-evolve meaningful representations and successful dispositions for using those representations. We will see how reinforcement on successful information sources also provides a mechanism whereby simpler games might compose to form more complex games. Along the way, I consider (...) how an old game might be appropriated to a new context by reinforcement on successful associations between old and new saliences. (shrink)

Ryan Tonkens has issued a seemingly impossible challenge, to articulate a comprehensive ethical framework within which artificial moral agents satisfy a Kantian inspired recipe—"rational" and "free"—while also satisfying perceived prerogatives of machine ethicists to facilitate the creation of AMAs that are perfectly and not merely reliably ethical. This series of papers meets this challenge by landscaping traditional moral theory in resolution of a comprehensive account of moral agency. The first paper established the challenge and set out autonomy in Aristotelian terms. (...) The present paper interprets Kantian moral theory on the basis of the preceding introduction, argues contra Tonkens that an engineer does not violate the categorical imperative in creating Kantian AMAs, and proposes that a Kantian AMA is not only a possible goal for Machine ethics research, but a necessary one. (shrink)

To commemorate 40 years since the founding of the Journal of Business Ethics, the editors in chief of the journal have invited the editors to provide commentaries on the future of business ethics. This essay comprises a selection of commentaries aimed at creating dialogue around the theme Business versus Ethics?. The authors of these commentaries seek to transcend the age-old separation fallacy :409–421, 1994) that juxtaposes business and ethics/society, posing a forced choice or trade off. Providing a contemporary take on (...) the classical question “if it’s legal is it ethical?”, David Hess explores the role of the law in promoting or hindering stakeholder-oriented purpose and governance structure. Jeffrey Harrison encourages scholars to move beyond the presupposition that businesses are either strategic or ethical and explore important questions at the intersection of strategy and ethics. The proposition that business models might be inherently ethical or inherently unethical in their design is developed by Sheila Killian, who examines business systems, their morality, and who they serve. However, the conundrum that entrepreneurs are either lauded for their self-belief and risk-taking, or loathed for their self-belief and risk-taking, is discussed by M. Tina Dacin and Julia Roloff using the metaphor of taboos and totems. These commentaries seek to explore positions that advocate multiplicity and tensions in which business ethics is not either/or but both. (shrink)

Discussion of, and reference to, properties pervades contemporary metaphysics, physics (e.g., the electron has charge), and ordinary language (the lion is sublime). But only a specialized group of a few hundred philosophers discuss the very specific details of what is involved in..

We are concerned here with explaining how successful rule-following behavior might evolve and how an old evolved rule might come to be successfully used in a new context. Such rule-following behavior is illustrated in the transitive judgments of pinyon and scrub-jays (Bond et al., Anim Behav 65:479–487, 2003). We begin by considering how successful transitive rule-following behavior might evolve in the context of Skyrms–Lewis sender–receiver games (Lewis, Convention. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1969; Skyrms, Philos Sci 75:489–500, 2006). We then consider (...) two ways that an agent might come to use an old evolved rule in a new context. The first involves the agent evolving successful dispositions for one concrete type of experience, then associating a new type of experience with the old evolved dispositions. The second involves the agent evolving dispositions that represent a general inferential schema, then composing these dispositions with others in a way that allows the agent to make inferences concerning a new concrete type of experience. (shrink)

Nearly 30 years ago, Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons published a now- popular article that combines Hilary Putnam’s Twin Earth scenario with G.E. Moore’s open question argument in an effort to show that moral naturalism – the view that moral facts are at bottom ordinary, natural facts of some sort – is probably false. Responses to Horgan and Timmons’s “revised open question argument” have been legion, but surprisingly, no one has attempted to test the core assumption upon which the argument (...) is based; namely, that competent language users univocally treat natural kind-terms as rigid designators. Here, I present evidence that the intuitions of competent English speakers are not as univocal as Horgan and Timmons need them to be to ground their argument against moral naturalism. I also briefly sketch a way that the moral naturalist can respond even if competent language speakers do treat natural-kind terms in the way that Horgan and Timmons suggest. (shrink)

Any (1-)consistent and sufficiently strong system of first-order formal arithmetic fails to decide some independent Gödel sentence. We examine consistent first-order extensions of such systems. Our purpose is to discover what is minimally required by way of such extension in order to be able to prove the Gödel sentence in a nontrivial fashion. The extended methods of formal proof must capture the essentials of the so-called 'semantical argument' for the truth of the Gödel sentence. We are concerned to show that (...) the deflationist has at his disposal such extended methods--methods which make no use or mention of a truth-predicate. (edited). (shrink)

water paradox has long served as an argument against the Principle of Indifference. A solution to the paradox is proposed, with a view toward resolving general difficulties in applying the principle.

During the past twenty years there has been a growing interest in monastic education within the larger field of Buddhist studies. Within the last ten years in particular, a number of monographs and articles examining the training and education of monks in Korea, Tibet/India, Thailand/Laos, and Sri Lanka, have been published. Many of those works have paid particular attention to the texts used in monastic training, as well as to how the information contained in those very texts is imparted to (...) and embodied by monks and novices. While the growing attention to Buddhist education and training texts certainly provides us with a more considerable understanding of monastic culture, focusing exclusively on the contents of texts and handbooks used in the training of monks and novices neglects other forms of monastic learning. Indeed, several scholars have recently begun to explore more diffuse ways in which monastic ideals become transmitted to newcomers to the sangha as well as to examine how learning in monasteries generates monastic identities. (shrink)

On Bohm's formulation of quantum mechanics particles always have determinate positions and follow continuous trajectories. Bohm's theory, however, requires a postulate that says that particles are initially distributed in a special way: particles are randomly distributed so that the probability of their positions being represented by a point in any regionR in configuration space is equal to the square of the wave-function integrated overR. If the distribution postulate were false, then the theory would generally fail to make the right statistical (...) predictions. Further, if it were false, then there would at least in principle be situations where a particle would approach an eigenstate of having one position but in fact always be somewhere very different. Indeed, we will see how this might happen even if the distribution postulate were true. This will help to show how loose the connection is between the wave-function and the positions of particles in Bohm's theory and what the precise role of the distribution postulate is. Finally, we will briefly consider two attempts to formulate a version of Bohm's theory without the distribution postulate. (shrink)

The approach to decision theory floated in my 1965 book is reviewed (I), challenged in various related ways (II–V) and defended, firstad hoc (II–IV) and then by a general argument of Ellery Ells's (VI). Finally, causal decision theory (in a version sketched in VII) is exhibited as a special case of my 1965 theory, according to the Eellsian argument.

In his rich and engaging essay, Professor Garber asks most centrally, “…what was the relation between Leibniz’s metaphysical project as set out in the so-called ‘Monadologie’ and the more theological project in the Essais de Théodicée?” His answer is, in short, that there isn’t much of a relationship between these two great works. Furthermore, he takes this result to be evidence of Leibniz’s not being a systematic philosopher in the spirit of Descartes or Spinoza. In these brief comments, I revisit (...) Garber’s two central questions in turn and offer some moderating resistance to both of his conclusions. (shrink)

A juvenile. Not unique, but a rarity for a university press. The publisher characterizes Skammy (about Skamandrios) as: an exciting story of adventure and mighty deeds, Skammy...struggles with great questions of life, death, and immortality. It offers models of human thought, behavior, and morality ranging from heroism, courage, integrity, and endurance to cowardice and treachery.".

My dissertation is concerned with Epicurus' attempt to reconcile libertarianism and atomism. I begin by offering my solution to 'the problem of the swerve,' arguing that Lucretius is claiming that swerves cause volitions 'from the bottom up' and that the attempts of scholars to construct a better position for Epicurus to have held were doomed to fail, since this is the only position open to the libertarian atomist. ;I also examine the swerve's role in cosmogony, arguing that 'the cosmogonic argument' (...) for the swerve is an afterthought, 'the libertarian argument' being Epicurus' chief argument for the swerve. ;I discuss the physics of the swerve as a minimal, oblique deviation of an atom from its course. And I explore its implications: atoms move at a speed greater than one minimal unit of distance per minimal unit of time, and there are no minimal units of space. ;Returning to the question of the swerve's role in action, I argue that a typical action involves a series of volitions each caused by a plurality of swerves by atoms of the mind's 'fourth nature.' And I argue that one's power to move at will is directly sensed, though also known through one's innate $\pi\rho\acute{o}\lambda\eta\psi\iota\varsigma$ of one's freedom. ;In the second half of my dissertation, I turn to the question of responsibility. I examine Epicurus' remarks about 'what is due to us' . I examine Epicurus' argument that Democriteans are self-refuting in espousing determinism and 'eliminative materialism.' I explain that Epicurus rejects only Democritus' ontology, not his epistemology . I examine Epicurus' discussion in On Nature of our 'notion of responsibility' , our responsibility as $\alpha\pi o\gamma\varepsilon\gamma\varepsilon\nu\nu\eta\mu\acute \varepsilon\nu\alpha$ , and our responsibility for our thoughts of the $\tau\acute\varepsilon\lambda o\varsigma$ and 'the criterion' . I explain what Epicurus means by the $\tau\acute\varepsilon\lambda o\varsigma$: pleasure, "katastematic" and "kinetic" . And finally, I argue that Epicurus fails to meet the challenge of 'psychological determinism'. (shrink)

This book investigates the chaotic end of the Bronze Age in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean through the lens of Homeric poetry, with an emphasis on the description of piratical activities described in the Odyssey’s “Second Cretan Lie,” and on the impact of revolutionary seafaring technology in this watershed period in Mediterranean history.