Deleuze and jurisdiction : expressionism in jurisprudence -- Personal jurisdiction : the "method of dramatization" in the law of persons -- Minority and personal jurisdiction : judging sex in re alex -- Persons of animal law -- Deleuze, the law of things and subject-matter jurisdiction -- To put to flight : the right of possession -- The activity of judgment : law of actions and the procedural genre of jurisprudence -- Jurisdiction of control : judgment (...) and procedural forms in Thomas v Mowbray -- The locality of law : jurisdiction in Deleuze. (shrink)

Is it possible for the state simultaneously to respect deep cultural differences and to protect the hard-won citizenship rights of vulnerable group members, particularly women? This 2001 book argues that it is not only theoretically needed, but also institutionally feasible. Rejecting prevalent normative and legal solutions to this 'paradox of multicultural vulnerability', Multicultural Jurisdictions develops a powerful argument for enhancement of the jurisdictional autonomy of religious and cultural minorities while at the same time providing viable legal-institutional solutions to the problem (...) of sanctioned intra-group rights violation. This new 'joint governance' approach is guided by an innovative principle that strives for the reduction of injustice between minority groups and the wider society, together with the enhancement of justice within them. This book will interest students of political and social theory, law, religion, institutional design, as well as cultural and gender studies. (shrink)

Although sovereign jurisdictional authority is not itself a kind of property right for Hobbes, it is the object of the sovereign’s proprietary rights. Jurisdictional authority for Hobbes is foundationally over persons rather than territory, so that the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction is parasitic on jurisdiction over persons. Territory nevertheless plays a significant role in determining subjects’ political obligations because the sovereign’s ability to protect subjects is necessary for such obligations, and control over space is necessary to protect subjects. Yet (...) Hobbes shows why the modern ideology of the state does not univocally posit the state as an intrinsically territorial entity. There are two traditions here: The Lockean one that, in grounding jurisdictional authority in private dominion over things, portrays the state as intrinsically territorial, and the Hobbesian one that, in deriving property rights from jurisdictional authority, does not. (shrink)

People can be autonomous, if they are subject to authority. In particular, they can be autonomous if they are subject to the authority of law. I defend the first claim through a study of Joseph Raz's compelling account of authority; I claim that his work leads to the conclusion that autonomous judgment is needed to determine the jurisdiction of an authority, and to interpret its directives. I defend the second claim by arguing that law does not claim unlimited (...) class='Hi'>jurisdiction, and need not claim unlimited scope for its directives. But the requirements of the rule of law create a standing risk that the law will not adequately recognize the autonomy of its subjects, because of its artificial techniques for controlling its own jurisdiction and for controlling the scope of its own directives. (shrink)

Questions of jurisdiction -- The metaphysics of jurisdiction -- On the founding of law's jurisdiction and the politics of sexual difference : the case of Roman law -- Guantanamo Bay, abandoned being and the constitution of jurisdiction -- Conjuring Palestine : the jurisdiction of dispossession -- Jurisdiction and nation-building : tall tales in nineteenth-century Aotearoa/New Zealand -- The suppression of state interests in international litigation -- Mapping territories -- Placing jurisdiction -- A (...) class='Hi'>jurisdiction of body and desire : exploring the boundaries of bodily control in prostitution law -- Subjects of jurisdiction : the dying, Northern Territory, Australia, 1995-1997 -- Embracing jurisdiction : John Ford's The man who shot Liberty Valance -- Jurisdiction and the colonisation of sublime enjoyment. (shrink)

Book Information Multicultural Jurisdictions: Cultural Differences and Women's Rights. By Ayelet Shachar. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge. 2001. Pp. xiv + 193. Hardback, Aus.$140. Paperback, $48.95.

Jurisdiction, Scale and Governance: Chronotopes of Law develops a post-metaphysical framework for analyzing the spatio-temporal workings of law and other forms of governance. In this regard, it does not seek merely to combine analyses of legal temporality carried out by anthropologists with analyses of law and space carried out by geographers and socio-legal scholars. Adding two metaphysical abstractions together does not produce anything but somewhat more complex, but equally metaphysical, abstractions. After Kant, 'time' and 'space' are simply categories of (...) human understanding, not metaphysical entities. And, in this book Mariana Valverde develops an anti-metaphysical theoretical approach to law that aims not to theorize the world in general, but rather to be useful to researchers who seek to shed light on the actual workings of law and other forms of governance. Written by one of the foremost theorists in the area, this theoretically innovative work constitutes a major contribution to contemporary studies in law and society. (shrink)

Positivists and interpretivists (Dworkinians) might accept that conceptual facts about the law—facts about the content of the concept of law—can obtain in the absence of communities with law practices. But they would deny that legal facts can obtain in such communities’ absence. Under the moral impact theory, by contrast, legal facts can precede all communities with law practices. I identify a set of legal facts in private international law—the law of jurisdiction—that concerns when a community's law practices can, and (...) cannot, have the legal effects that the practices claim to have. This law is noncommunitarian, in the sense that it precedes the communities to which it applies. In this law's light, the legal effects of communities’ law practices are legally coordinated (or, at the very least, can be shown to legally conflict). Although interest in, and even commitment to, a noncommunitarian law of jurisdiction has receded among private international law theorists, I argue that some well-placed questions can elicit from all of us a commitment to this law. And this commitment is a reason to believe that the moral impact theory is correct. (shrink)

From the point of the EU law, the CJEU has the exclusive competence to interpret the EU legal norms and decide upon validity of the legal acts adopted by the EU institutions because it is the most effective method to ensure the unilateral interpretation of the EU law and to prevent its fragmentation. Thus, it can be presumed that all disputes between the Member States regarding the EU law must be solved by the CJEU. The paper aims at finding the (...) answer to the question whether international courts under the international law must refuse their jurisdiction in cases where disputes of the Member States relate with the EU law. With the view of this aim, arguments arising from the international law (for instance, prohibition of intervening into affairs of another legal system, prohibition of abuse of laws), on the basis of which an international court should decline its jurisdiction, and applicability of such arguments to the situation discussed is assessed and an independent approach is formulated. (shrink)

Although sovereign jurisdictional authority is not itself a kind of property right for Hobbes, it is the object of the sovereign’s (not the state’s) proprietary rights. Jurisdictional authority for Hobbes is foundationally over persons rather than territory, so that the sovereign’s territorial jurisdiction is parasitic on jurisdiction over persons. Territory nevertheless plays a significant role in determining subjects’ political obligations because the sovereign’s ability to protect subjects is necessary for such obligations, and control over space is necessary to (...) protect subjects. Yet Hobbes shows why the modern ideology of the state does not univocally posit the state as an intrinsically territorial entity. There are two traditions here: The Lockean one that, in grounding jurisdictional authority in private dominion over things, portrays the state as intrinsically territorial, and the Hobbesian one that, in deriving property rights from jurisdictional authority, does not. (shrink)

This article analyses jurisdiction regarding administrative proceedings (lawsuits) in Jordan and France. Moreover, it also discusses the fact that jurisdiction regulates two matters of the utmost importance: the distribution of jurisdiction between ordinary and administrative jurisdictions and the distribution of jurisdiction between administrative jurisdictions themselves in States whose jurisdiction in administrative proceedings is distributed to more than one administrative organ. Moving on, this research was conducted using several research approaches such as, the comparative and analytical (...) approach. The research concluded with a number of conclusions and recommendations, the most important of which was the establishment of an Administrative Proceedings Management Service (APMS), as did the French Administrative Judicial Code, in which attendance was compulsory. To add on, the office of the Administrative Proceedings Administration must have a judge of its own, which corresponds to the post of the judge in the French Administrative Court. The judge will handle the completion of the data regarding both lawsuit parties, and request the documents needed for the case at hand. With that being said, the Jordanian Constitutional Court must reverse its interpretative decision, stating that the administrative justice is part of the ordinary judiciary—in referral to The Constitutional Court’s interpretation of the provisions of the Constitution, which considered the administrative judiciary as an integral part of the ordinary judiciary. Lastly, the research concluded that The French Administrative Judiciary must be taken into consideration regarding the establishment of an administrative judiciary independent from all aspects of the ordinary judiciary, and the explicit introduction of the dual judicial system. (shrink)

Large data-intensive health research programmes benefit from collaboration amongst researchers who may be located in different institutions and international contexts. However, complexities in navigating privacy frameworks and data protection laws across various jurisdictions pose significant challenges to researchers seeking to share or transfer data outside of institutional boundaries. Research on the awareness of data protection and privacy laws amongst stakeholders is limited. Our qualitative study, drawn from a larger project in Singapore, revealed insights into stakeholders’ perceptions of the role of (...) law in cross-national health data research. Stakeholders in our study demonstrated a range of perceptions regarding the role of data protection law in governing the collection and transfer of health data for research. The main criticisms included inadequate legal protection to data and lack of uniformed data protection standards. Despite these criticisms, participants recognised the importance of data protection law in supporting cross-border data transfers and proposed measures to improve perceived limitations of existing laws. These measures include strengthening existing legal framework, establishing contractual agreements and imposing severe punishments for data misuse. (shrink)

Although the Lisbon Treaty maintained the general exclusion of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) matters from ECJ jurisdiction, it introduced a number of changes into this area, including an explicit statement that the Court is competent to review the legality of the Council decisions imposing restraining measures on persons. The article analyzes the nature and origin of those changes and considers the legal implications for the level of the protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. For this (...) purpose the author firstly considers the context of the exclusion of CFSP matters from the ECJ jurisdiction, including discussions on the issue at the European Convention, and, secondly, takes a closer look at the separate heads of jurisdiction over which the Court is competent to act after the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty. A conclusion is made that the Lisbon Treaty did not introduce significant changes to ECJ jurisdiction. Similarly to the pattern of previous amendment treaties, the Lisbon Treaty again gave recognition to the practice of the ECJ on relevant questions. Nonetheless, the amendments made by the Lisbon Treaty should be welcome for introducing more clarity into the legal regulation of the matter, thus boosting the legal certainty and protection of fundamental rights in the European Union. (shrink)

This paper investigates the state of the law in Canada in regards to a public health emergency, and in particular the jurisdictional logic that might come into effect were a public health emergency to occur. Although there has yet to be a national public health emergency in Canada, threats of such crises are likely to arise in the future. It is therefore recognised as necessary to address Canada’s legal preparedness for a public health emergency and evaluate proposed reforms to the (...) legal structure that could facilitate response. This paper contributes to this goal by identifying multiple jurisdictional factors that could inform legal interpretations in a public health emergency. It considers how the legal system and the courts are dealing with public health as a national security issue while taking into account s. 7 of the Canadian Charter. It also looks at the power of the government defined in the Emergencies Act [1985, c. 22] and a proposed legal reform that would make it easier for the government to act unilaterally in a public health emergency. The paper draws on the legal theory of Robert Cover to analyse the hermeneutics of jurisdiction that characterise legal interpretations of public health in Canada, as well as the relationship between jurisdiction and legal violence that these hermeneutics imply. It then develops a case study of the use of medical triage in a public health emergency to explore the possibility of holding the state liable under private law for harm caused to individuals by public health decisions. The paper concludes by suggesting that the state’s public health power can be conceptualised as a form of legal violence and that the courts in Canada should adopt a jurisgenerative approach to legal interpretation in the area of public health. (shrink)

Functionalists hold that the territorial rights of states are grounded solely in their successful performance of their morally mandated functions. In this paper, I defend a distinctive functionalist view of the right of territorial jurisdiction. I develop this view over the course of considering a variety of objections to functionalism that arise from reflection on cases of non- violent and otherwise rights-respecting annexation. Functionalism’s critics argue that it is committed to counterintuitive implications in these cases, as it is unable (...) to explain why the usurper states do not gain rights over the territory they take over. Against these critics, I argue that functionalism can in fact deliver intuitively plausible verdicts regarding: (a) the territorial rights of unsuccessful states; (b) the morality of military occupation; and (c) the appropriate response to past territorial injustices. (shrink)

In international human rights law ‘jurisdiction’ is the centre of the debate on extraterritorial obligations. The purpose of the present paper is to a) analyse how facts and principles contribute t...

The proposed reflection intends to present the problem of judicial adjudication as a substantially-axiologically founded autonomous moment on the practical realization of law, and to explore this understanding in confrontation with external exigencies, mostly teleologically determined—hence, beyond strict deductive application, as a syllogistic reference of facts to norms, and finalistically determined decision, as an option among possible alternatives to achieve specific aims. The main objective is to enter into a discussion on the methodological meaning of “integrity”, “hard cases” and “right (...) answer”, as presented by Ronald Dworkin, and a critical reflection on the criticism of that approach levelled by Neil MacCormick, so as to confront the relevance of principle and policy arguments, in order to bring about a different methodological approach, an alternative jurisprudentialist conception of adjudication, incorporating a practical-normative constitutive dialectics between legal controversy and legal system, such as that presented by Castanheira Neves. The focus will, then, be the legitimacy of the connection of arguments of principle and consequentialist arguments in adjudication, its selection and its justification, stating, therefore, a specifically assumed judicium, a judicative decision, having the legal system as its horizon of normative reference and of substantial and institutional autonomy. (shrink)

Universal jurisdiction has entered upon a dramatic and turbulent period of its long and generally stable history. Once associated primarily with prosecution for piracy or slave trading, it now figures in state-court prosecution of persons accused of international crimes that have been incorporated into state law, particularly genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. This new direction has generated serious interstate conflicts, particularly when the acts for which defendants are charged are viewed by some states or regions as criminal (...) and by others as heroic and when the actual or proposed defendants are citizens of a major power. The critical current task is to engage in broad public discussion of these issues in order to build some consensus among many states about the legitimate uses and potential abuses of universal jurisdiction. (shrink)

The emergence of the new information economy hascomplicated jurisdictional issues in commerce andcrime. Many of these difficulties are simplyextensions of problems that arose due to other media.Telephones and fax machines had already complicatedjurists'' determinations of applicable laws. Evenbefore the Internet, contracts were often negotiatedwithout any face-to-face contact – entirely bytelephone and fax. Where is such a contractnegotiated? The answer to this question is critical toany litigation that may arise over such contracts. Thelaws of contract are often quite different from onejurisdiction (...) to the next.The Internet has brought with it new forms ofcommunication which make determining the loci of actseven more complicated. Where are contracts negotiatedwhen they are negotiated in cyberspace? Business isbeing conducted in chat rooms, on web sites, andthrough e-mail. Each of these is technically distinctfrom telephones and fax machines. More importantly,these tools seem ontologically different, in varyingdegrees, from traditional methods of communication.The question is, are these ontological differencessufficient to warrant new legal notions ofjurisdiction in cyberspace?Only a thorough ontological analysis of the parts ofcyberspace and acts ``in'''' it can reveal the answers tothe legal questions posed by this new medium.Traditional legal analyses have relied, in part, on acrude legal ontology. That is, courts have grappledwith notions of the topology and mereology of theworld and legal objects when considering questions ofjurisdiction. There is a simpler, theoretically soundmethod for determining legal jurisdiction which isbased upon the notion of ``purposeful direction,'''' andwhich treats computer-mediated transactions as justanother form of communication. I will explore thatmethod below. (shrink)

The reform of rape law remains a vexed enterprise. The wager of this article is that the plural traditions and technologies of criminal law can provide the resources for a radical rethinking of rape law. Parts 1 and 2 return to the historical and structural forms of rape law reform in Australia. These forms of reform illustrate a variety of criminal jurisdictions, and a transformation in the way in which rape law reform is conducted now. Against this transformation, Part 3 (...) takes up the technology of classification in rape law in order to generate a radical legal definition of rape—one which responds to the pain and suffering of the survivor of rape, at the same time as it holds the legal institution before the law. This has important implications, it is suggested, not only for domestic legal systems but also the jurisprudence of rape in international criminal law. (shrink)

Davidovic asks what gives the international community the authority to punish some crimes? On one prominent view some crimes (genome, torture) are so heinous that the international community, so long as its procedures are fair, is justified in prosecuting them. Another view contends that heinousness alone is not enough to justify international prosecution: what is needed is an account of why the international community, in particular, has standing to hold the perpetrators to account. Davidovic raises concerns about both of these (...) views and then defends her own account. On her view, the heinousness of the crimes is relevant, but what makes these crimes the business of the international community is that the community in fact recognizes certain norms against especially heinous crimes. If the international community fails to prosecute and punish those who perpetrate these crimes, this impunity undermines the rule of law, and thereby hinders the maintenance of peace the the protection of human rights. (shrink)

(1998). Coherence and the jurisdictions of the tribunal of reason. Social Epistemology: Vol. 12, Real Knowing: Situating Social Epistemology, pp. 227-239.

The High Court continues to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to make declarations about interventions into the lives of situationally vulnerable adults with mental capacity. In light of protective responses of health care providers and the courts to decision-making situations involving capacitous vulnerable adults, this paper has two aims. The first is diagnostic. The second is normative. The first aim is to identify the harms to a capacitous vulnerable adult’s autonomy that arise on the basis of the characterisation of situational (...) vulnerability and autonomy as fundamentally opposed concepts or the failure to adequately acknowledge the conceptual relationship between them at common law. The second part of this aim is to draw upon developments in analytic feminist philosophy to illustrate how standard approaches to autonomy are ill-equipped to capture the autonomy issues of capacitous vulnerable adults when their decisions regarding care and treatment are at stake. The second (normative) aim is to develop an account of self-authorised, intersubjective autonomy on the basis of analytic feminist insights into the relational practices of recognition. This account not only attempts to capture the autonomy of capacitous vulnerable adults and account for the necessary harms to their autonomy that arise from standard common law responses to their situational vulnerability, it is also predicated on the distinctions between mental capacity, the satisfaction of conditions for informed consent and the exercise of autonomy, meaning that it is better placed to fulfil the primary aim of the inherent jurisdiction – to facilitate the autonomy of vulnerable adults with capacity. (shrink)

L’émergence des marchés en Europe de l’Est, en Asie et celle du cyber-espace ne se fait pas avec la rapidité que beaucoup d’observateurs voudraient. La lenteur de ce développement provient de l’environnement institutionnel : les systèmes législatifs ne soutiennent pas les droits de propriété privée et ne font pas plus respecter les contrats. Ainsi, beaucoup soutiennent que les Etats doivent intensifier leurs efforts pour établir un droit commercial. En réalité, il faut réclamer un désengagement de l’Etat dans le droit commercial. (...) Tout au long de l’histoire, le recours efficace de l’activité commerciale est toujours provenu d’un système polycentrique de droit coutumier avec des querelles résolues par le biais de cours de commerce ou d’arbitrage eux-mêmes appuyés par des sanctions d’ostracisme imposées de façon privée, et il en est de même pour le droit commercial international aujourd’hui. Nous proposons une description des institutions et des processus du droit commercial international, suivie de discutions sur la nécessité d’un droit polycentrique et des caractéristiques du droit coutumier. Finalement, nous expliquons pourquoi nous devrions compter sur un système de droit coutumier polycentrique sans Etat pour l’émergence récente des marchés.The emergence of markets in Eastern Europe, Asia, and cyberspace is no occurring as rapidly as many observers would like. Slow development is a function of the institutional environment: legal systems do not support private property rights or enforce contracts. Thus, many contend that states must step up their efforts to establish commercial law. In reality, less state involvement in commercial law is called for. Throughout history effective recourse for commercial activity has been produced through a polycentric system of customary law with disputes resolved through merchant courts or arbitration backed by privately imposed ostracism sanctions, and the same is true for international commercial law today. A description of the institutions and processes of international commercial law is provided, followed by discussions of the desirability of polycentric law and the characteristics of customary law. Finally, an explanation is provided for why a stateless system of polycentric customary law should be relied upon in modern emerging markets. (shrink)

The article aims at resolving the issue whether the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) has an exclusive jurisdiction under Article 344 of the Treaty on Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) to resolve disputes between Member States, stemming from provisions of an international treaty, a party to which is the EU. This problem is especially relevant in cases when a mixed international agreement envisages independent institutions of dispute resolution. The position of the CJEU is expressed in (...) the case of Mox Plant. The European Commission applied to the CJEU against Ireland, because it considered that Ireland, which started an arbitration procedure against United Kingdom under the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, has infringed the exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU under Article 344 of the TFEU. The EU is also a Contracting Party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. Therefore according to the consistence case practice of the Court, the provisions of the Convention that fall under the competence of the Union constitute an indivisible part of the EU legal system. Only in such case when a provision of a treaty is attributed to exclusive competence of the Member States, the jurisdiction of the CJEU regarding that provision can be negated. Thus, when deciding on the issue of exclusive jurisdiction of the CJEU in principle, a problem of attribution of the EU and Member States’ competences arises. (shrink)

In “Ethics and the Underpinnings of Policy in Biodefense and Emergency Preparedness,” Lisa Eckenwiler advances discussion about emergency preparedness by exploring ethical commitments that shape healthcare and defense policy in an age of terrorism. Eckenwiler rightly discerns that policymakers' assumptions about controlling and containing hostile malefactors and the need for public consent regarding security measures are part of an epistemic framework that orders the current response to terrorism. Again rightly, she suggests that citizens ought to have a say in shaping (...) and interpreting such fundamental assumptions, a reductive medical model that focuses on mitigation and the management of casualties is insufficient for understanding and responding to the complex social, political, and economic factors that precipitate terrorist attacks, and there is in emergency preparedness an ethically problematic disproportion between the demands society places on public health/medical professionals and the resources society provides for them to meet these demands. She is also probably correct in claiming that, properly understood, the ethical underpinnings of public health policy are teleological in nature. (shrink)

According to Joseph Raz's sources thesis, the existence and content of authoritative directives must be identifiable by resort to the social fact of their provenance from a de facto authority, without regard to any of the normative considerations that the authority in question is supposed to rely on in its judgment. This article argues that the sources thesis fails to account for the role of jurisdictional considerations (namely, considerations about the scope of a de facto authority's power) in the identification (...) of valid law. It examines a legal system with a legislature and courts and a practice of constitutional review of legislation by the courts for its conformity with fundamental rights and argues that the special normative status of (at least some) authoritative directives in this legal system depends on respect for jurisdiction. An assessment of whether an authority has stayed intra vires involves recourse to the normative considerations that it is the authority's job to weigh up. This criticism of the sources thesis highlights the importance of incorporating jurisdiction into our philosophical accounts of legal authority. (shrink)

A prominent approach in the debate on territorial rights claims that a group may have jurisdictional rights over a particular land if that land has become a repository of value for the group. This justification relies on a premise which has remained largely unsubstantiated, namely that having jurisdictional rights should be our preferred means for ensuring the group’s retaining of the land’s embedded value. This article discusses a recent attempt to fill this gap. David Miller acknowledges that the value could (...) be retained by the group if it has private property rights. However, he argues that because such rights can be changed at will by the holder of jurisdictional rights the group’s retaining of value is unacceptably insecure. I argue that this attempt fails. Miller’s argument is briefly stated so I start with some reconstructive work. Most importantly, I suggest that the argument relies on a descriptive claim about empirical probabilities, namely that the group’s having jurisdictional rights (in international law) provides the largest feasible reduction of insecurity. I then provide some tentative suggestions about expected state behavior which challenge the validity of that descriptive claim; I argue that a reform of international law which confers internationally enforced property rights on the relevant groups—rather than jurisdiction—may provide a similar (or even relatively larger) reduction of insecurity. My tentative conclusion is that Miller’s appeal to insecurity fails to provide the “embedded value” approach (favored by him and others) with the needed bridge from property rights to rights of jurisdiction. (shrink)

In this essay I suggest that the bioethics profession’s jurisdiction over healthcare ethics consultation is in need of reinforcement. I argue that as the profession becomes more successful, competitors will challenge the profession to justify its ethical claims and ask whose ethics the profession represents. This challenge will come more quickly as the profession tries to influence the ethics of healthcare organizations. I propose a method of bolstering jurisdiction that will make the profession less vulnerable to challenge in (...) the future. (shrink)