This article seeks to develop the Marxist conception of social structure by incorporating developments within critical realist philosophy. It rejects forms of economic determinism such as the base-superstructure model and those reconstructions—like Cohen’s—that attribute primacy to productive forces in explaining history and society. It argues instead that society is the product of complex, often contradictory combinations of many different structures and mechanisms. They form a structural ensemble, hierarchically arranged, but where each element has its own dynamics and emergent powers. It (...) concludes that society is best understood through critical realist conceptions of stratification, emergence, transformation, and overdetermination. (shrink)

This article investigates the semantics of sentences that express numerical averages, focusing initially on cases such as 'The average American has 2.3 children'. Such sentences have been used both by linguists and philosophers to argue for a disjuncture between semantics and ontology. For example, Noam Chomsky and Norbert Hornstein have used them to provide evidence against the hypothesis that natural language semantics includes a reference relation holding between words and objects in the world, whereas metaphysicians such as Joseph Melia (...) and Stephen Yablo have used them to provide evidence that apparent singular reference need not be taken as ontologically committing. We develop a fully general and independently justified compositional semantics in which such constructions are assigned truth conditions that are not ontologically problematic, and show that our analysis is superior to all extant rivals. Our analysis provides evidence that a good semantics yields a sensible ontology. It also reveals that natural language contains genuine singular terms that refer to numbers. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Invention of Greek Ethnography from Homer to Herodotusby Joseph E. SkinnerRebecca F. KennedyJ osephE. S kinner. The Invention of Greek Ethnography from Homer to Herodotus. Greeks Overseas. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. xii + 343 pp. Numerous black-and-white figs. Cloth, $85.In his welcome book on the invention of ethnography, Skinner challenges the focus in mainstream scholarship on the Greek prose genre that was first defined by (...) Jacoby in his influential Die Fragmente der griechischen Historiker(discussed in detail, 30–34) and on a notion that the “Greekness” the genre embodies was [End Page 287]supposedly invented in the fifth century as a response to the Persian wars. Skinner also advocates a break from the structuralist frameworks favored by scholars such as F. Hartog and E. Hall. Thus, the book has two distinct focuses. First, Skinner seeks to demonstrate that the origins of the prose genre can be found in other literary genres, sub-literary engagements, and material artifacts that should be considered as part of the “thought-world from which the early prose accounts emerged” (17). Second, Skinner shows that structuralist binaries are not the best method for understanding ethnographic thinking and frames his study instead with the discourse theories found in the works of historian J. Clifford and anthropologist/sociologist P. Bourdieu that emphasize “practice” and process. Skinner argues that the genre of Greek ethnography is not synonymous with the practice of Greek identity nor can any functional, homogenous Greek identity claim to be embedded within the genre (18). Rather, he emphasizes the “ethnographic concerns” of the Greeks and attempts to contextualize the emergence of the prose genre by exploring evidence of ethnographic “practice” in the material of everyday life. Ethnographic thought is further defined as positioning in relation to both non-Greeks and other Greeks. Although the title of the book suggests that the timeframe of the study includes evidence from Homer down to the time of Herodotus’ Histories(ca. 430 b.c.e.), most of the evidence he musters comes from the archaic period with occasional recourse to Pindar and the historical fragments of the post–Persian war period. This fits in with a secondary aim of the book to show that the Persian wars did not serve as the impetus for ethnographic thinking or for the emergence of a notion of “Greekness,” a position emphasized most vigorously by J. Hall.Chapter 1 is a long and dense explanation of Skinner’s theoretical approach and the debates among which Skinner situates his study. Despite a number of scholarly efforts over the last decade or so in rethinking identity and ethnicity in antiquity, it is still necessary to combat the ghosts of Jacoby and the structuralists, and Skinner musters a theoretically equipped army for the battle. He finds inherently problematic Jacoby’s “invention” of genres and our adherence to them (a legacy from the earlier academic enterprise, especially in Germany, of prioritizing and ranking ancient cultures based on their “firsts”). Structuralist views are represented by Edith Hall’s Inventing the Barbarian(Oxford 1989), one of the most influential voices in the study of ancient ethnicity. Although she is prominent throughout the book, Skinner ironically never addresses the fact that Hall’s own evidence is the performative, public practice of Athenian drama. Hall herself, although a structuralist, reflects in choice of evidence the type of discursive practice Skinner himself wishes to invoke (in fact, he entirely excludes drama from his evidence). Skinner’s theoretical apparatus is complex and rarely appears explicitly in later chapters (except in the conclusion).In “Populating the Imaginaire” (chap. 2), Skinner catalogues some foreign and/or mythical peoples whom the Greeks deployed in their texts and art as part of their process of self-identification. The peoples discussed are, as Skinner admits, selective, but I could not find a principle behind the selection. The discussion of the Cyclopes is restricted to Homer, and the Arimaspians make a brief appearance. [End Page 288]The Scythians, Amazons, Lydians, Egyptians, and Ethiopians receive extensive treatment in text and iconography (although his presentation of Archaic literary representations of Thrace is slightly abbreviated). Also included are the Pelasgians and peoples of... (shrink)

: This paper presents a method of moral problem solving in clinical practice that is inspired by the philosophy of John Dewey. This method, called "clinical pragmatism," integrates clinical and ethical decision making. Clinical pragmatism focuses on the interpersonal processes of assessment and consensus formation as well as the ethical analysis of relevant moral considerations. The steps in this method are delineated and then illustrated through a detailed case study. The implications of clinical pragmatism for the use of principles in (...) moral problem solving are discussed. (shrink)

Like any philosophically interesting health care practice, ethical analysis of Pre-implantation Genetic Diagnosis has produced a wide range of moral positions. For example, one might contrast David King's view that warns PGD should be strictly limited and regulated because it will soon result in the expansion of a troubling "laissez-faire eugenics" with Julian Savulescu's argument for the "principle of procreative beneficence" morally requiring parents to use information attained through PGD to select the "best child". That is, these authors represent two (...) poles of a sort of moral spectrum regarding PGD. At one end, we have a deep suspicion of the technology as directly leading to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal 10.1 (2000) 103-108 [Access article in PDF] Letters "Small Sacrifices" in Stem Cell Research Madam: I agree with Professors McGee and Caplan (in their article "The Ethics and Politics of Small Sacrifices in Stem Cell Research," KIEJ, June 1999) that the question of the nature and status of the source of stem cells must be addressed. However, in their eagerness to convince us (...) of the smallness of the sacrifices, I think the authors use some unfortunate rhetorical devices and move much too quickly over some necessary distinctions.The rhetorical display is unfortunate if the article is intended to be a fair and rational development of an argument--e.g., those who hold a position in opposition to the authors do not argue they "inveigh." The section on the political area of the controversy seems particularly dismissive of other's positions.However, I will focus on just two areas where I think a more nuanced consideration would make the question of the moral legitimacy of the "small sacrifices" of embryos less obvious than the authors' rhetoric would suggest.First, they claim that opponents of such research assume some sort of "super status" for an embryo. The rights generally conceded to born human beings may not be as "weak" as they characterize. But even considering only the "negative right against unwarranted violence," I think the authors misdescribe the situation. Contrary to their assertion, I do not know when "adults and even children are... forced to give life... in the defense or at least interest of the community's highest ideals and most pressing interests" (p. 153). Could they be speaking of capital punishment, justified in the name of protecting the community? But then why mention children?It is true that not everyone can be guaranteed every means to preserving and enhancing life. But this limitation on positive rights is not a "forced giving." Adults may be compelled to risk life--e.g. in a draft for the sake of a war. But, again, the more or less justifiable imposition of a risk is not the same as selecting out one particular individual or class to be directly killed. Neither adults nor born children are compelled to be killed for the sake of organ "donation," even if a greater number might be saved. If one grants equivalent status to the embryo (as the authors seem to do here for the sake of argument), opponents do not have to claim a "super status" for embryos, just the ordinary human right not to be killed even for "compassionate" motives.A second area where I think the authors move too quickly is in their impoverished definition of the essential humanity of the early embryo as exhaustively represented by the physical structure of its DNA. The authors seem to recognize [End Page 103] that, ordinarily, there is more to personhood than sheer physical structure. For example, they mention memories and habits (p. 154). They could also speak of relationships, attitudes, and the like. Since an early embryo has no such components of personality as we experience it, the authors hold that its identity could only be contained in its DNA. Since this DNA is preserved, even spread far and wide, by the use of stem cells, it almost seems as if we are doing the early embryo a favor by breaking it up.However, just because the embryo does not have any conscious memories or other attributes of character or personality, that does not mean its identity is constituted only by its physical structure described statically. The early embryo is not just a bundle of discrete structures, and its DNA is not just an inert lump made up of certain smaller lumps. Both the embryo and its DNA are active. Thus the identity of even an early embryo includes both its current processes and the innate potential for further activity and development. Although lacking a conscious will, the early embryo is already in a sense an agent, already doing things--growing, changing, and heading toward something that... (shrink)

The face is the first thing that others notice and remember about a person. This is true for the severely facially burned patient, with disfigurement, impaired self-esteem and body image. They and others suffer from chronic devastating facial sequelae resulting from tumors, burns, or congenital malformations and trauma, e.g. ballistic injury to the face. Face transplantation is considered a way to restore eating, swallowing, and speech, and to reestablish esthetics.Alongside these vital bodily functions, the face plays a remarkable role in (...) a person’s identity. Societies place a high value on the face and this gives... (shrink)

I am honored to pay tribute to Dr. Pellegrino and a bit humbled as there are so many others who would want to have this opportunity and who knew Dr. Pellegrino better than I. Tom Beauchamp suggested that I might place Dr. Pellegrino into the broader context of the history of medicine. He wrote Thaddeus Pope:Without being disrespectful of the many celebrated figures from Hippocrates to Percival, my view is that no physician has been more productive in the field or (...) made a greater contribution than Ed. I would like to see someone address this question.1And then he suggested my name. So here I am, an improbable choice because I wasn’t from the Kennedy Institute. I am a Hastings Center guy, two perennial teams, always .. (shrink)

: This response to Lynn Jansen's critique of clinical pragmatism concentrates on two themes: (1) contrasting approaches to moral epistemology and (2) the connection between theory and practice in clinical ethics. Particular attention is paid to the status of principles and the role of consensus, with some closing speculations on how Dewey might view the current state of bioethics.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Minding Brain Injury, Consciousness, and Ethics: Discourse and DeliberationsJoseph J. Fins (bio) and James Giordano (bio)The annual John Collins Harvey Lecture at the Georgetown University’s Pellegrino Center for Clinical Bioethics is a forum for addressing contemporary topics at the intersection of medicine and bioethics. This year, in marking the decadal anniversary of the launch of the Brain Research through Advancing Innovative Neurotechnology (BRAIN) Initiative, the Harvey Lecture provided an (...) interactive discussion with renowned clinician, researcher, scholar, and author, Joseph J. Fins, MD—who is the E. William Davis, Jr., MD Professor of Medical Ethics, Chief of the Division of Medical Ethics, and a Professor of Medicine at Weill Cornell Medical College—conducted by James Giordano, PhD, MPhil—who is a Professor of Neurology and Biochemistry, and Chief of the Pellegrino Center’s Neuroethics Studies Program at the Georgetown University Medical Center. The discourse focused upon the topic of covert consciousness, and the ways in which current and developing brain science technologies, together with revised practices of medicine, in general, may afford new opportunities in patient care, but may also give rise to issues, questions, challenges, and opportunities for neuroethics.Prof. James GIORDANO:Prof. Fins, your most recent book, Rights Come to Mind: Brain Injury, Ethics, and the Struggle for Consciousness (Fins 2015), addresses your ongoing work to employ current and emerging neurological approaches to reveal conscious functions in patients with profound brain injury and disease. To be sure, the destination—if you will—is to talk about covert consciousness. But in commencing this discussion, I’d like to propose a route, which traces your professional journey to this point in your career, and how it led you on your search to reveal consciousness in those patients who lack expressive capability. You went into palliative care first, and that brought you to where you are today. [End Page 227]Prof. Joseph J. FINS:First, let me thank you and the Pellegrino Center for the honor of giving the John Harvey Collins Lecture in such an interactive manner. The forefront of neurological care—and the neuroethical issues and methods focal to such practice—wasn’t what I initially intended to do professionally, but I think that therein is a good lesson for young people’s career aspirations. Simply put, one doesn’t always know where they’ll end up at the beginning of the journey, and as Kierkegaard said, life is lived forward, but is understood backwards (Kierkegaard 1843).In the nineties and the early 2000s, I was trying to help improve the quality of care of people at the end of life, and I wrote a book, entitled The Palliative Ethic of Care: Clinical Wisdom at Life’s End (Fins 2006), in which I addressed notions of phronesis—practical wisdom—in integrating theory and practice toward improving how people die. I became interested in the Quinlan case (Quinlan 1976), and the right to die, and around the same time, I ran into a colleague of mine at Cornell: Dr. Nicholas D. Schiff. Dr. Schiff is a neurologist, who was a protégé of Fred Plum, who was the originator of the concept of the vegetative state with Bryan Jennett, back in 1972. Fred was both of our teachers here at Cornell. Niko (Dr. Schiff) was interested in patients with disorders of consciousness, and was beginning to envision doing work—that ultimately, we did—using deep brain stimulation (DBS) to try to treat patients in the minimally conscious state, a category that was subsequently codified in 2002.I realized that a whole population of people—with these disorders of consciousness—had been somewhat marginalized, and their neglect essentially devolves back to the considerations of the right to die. The right to die was established in the Quinlan case because Judge Hughes—the presiding chief judge of the New Jersey Supreme Court—talked about Ms. Quinlan’s loss of a cognitive, sapient state as being the moral warrant for her right to die, given the fact that it was viewed as a futile situation. I recognized, over the ensuing years—from my background in palliative and end-of-life care—[1] that we had over-generalized notions of futility... (shrink)

Bioethics has been an interdisciplinary field since its inception. From the founding of the Hastings Center in 1969 and the Kennedy Institute of Ethics in 1971, scholars from many disciplines have come together to create a field of study strengthened by its interdisciplinarity. In this special issue of Perspectives in Biology and Medicine, we celebrate the interdisciplinary character of bioethics by means of essays by eight distinguished bioethics scholars hailing from backgrounds in philosophy, law, medicine, nursing, public health, history, (...) sociology, and narrative methods. Each contributor offers a personal perspective on their journey into bioethics from a particular disciplinary background... (shrink)

: This essay considers the implications of President George W. Bush's proposal for human embryonic stem cell research. Through the perspective of patent law, privacy, and informed consent, we elucidate the ongoing controversy about the moral standing of human embryonic stem cells and their derivatives and consider how the inconsistencies in the president's proposal will affect clinical practice and research.

It is widely assumed that disability is typically a bad thing for those who are disabled. Our purpose in this essay is to critique this view and defend a more nuanced picture of the relationship between disability and well-being. We first examine four interpretations of the above view and argue that it is false on each interpretation. We then ask whether disability is thereby a neutral trait. Our view is that most disabilities are neutral in one sense, though we cannot (...) make simple generalizations about disability's relationship to well-being in other important senses. After defending this view, we discuss its practical implications for selective abortion for disability, nondisabled people's interactions with disabled people, and the use of QALYs in health policy. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Aelius Théon: ProgymnasmataGeorge A. KennedyMichel Patillon, ed., avec l'assistance pour l'Arménien de Giancarlo Bolognesi. Aelius Théon: Progymnasmata. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997. clvii + 229 pp. ( 1-120 double). Price not stated. (Editions Budé)Progymnasmata, handbooks of preliminary exercises in composition, are important sources for understanding Greek and Roman education and rhetoric and equally important in that the exercises they describe, including narrative, [End Page 476]fable, chria, encomium, ekphrasis, (...) synkrisis, prosopopoeia, and others, provided topics for literary genres in prose and poetry. Of the four surviving Greek treatises on progymnasmata, by or attributed to Theon, Hermogenes, Aphthonius, and Nicolaus, Pseudo-Hermogenes and Aphthonius were the most influential. There are good editions of them by Hugo Rabe and of Nicolaus by Joseph Felton, all in the Teubner series. Theon's work is the earliest treatment and in some ways the most interesting, for it shows the system of rhetorical education in a developing stage and, since it is addressed to teachers rather than to students, it has much to say about pedagogical method. It has, however, been available only in reprints of Leonard Spengel's Rhetores Graeci(II 59-130), originally published in 1854, and in copies of a dissertation by James R. Butts (Claremont Graduate School, 1986). The new Budé Theon, with its lengthy introduction, French translation, and extensive learned notes, at last makes the work accessible to scholars in its full form.The Greek manuscripts of Theon's treatise break off abruptly in the discussion of the exercise for and against a law and lack chapters at the end where Theon discussed reading aloud, listening, paraphrase, elaboration, and contradiction. In addition, the original order of chapters was altered by some editor in late antiquity to conform better to what is found in Pseudo-Hermogenes and Aphthonius. Forty years ago Italo Lana projected a new edition, restoring the original sequence, and published a valuable study of the Greek textual tradition (Turin 1959), but he never completed the edition. The probable reason is that about that time the existence of a full translation of the work into classical Armenian had come to be known from two manuscripts in the State Library in Erivan, Armenia. Butts was aware of the existence of the Armenian translation but had no direct access to the contents.The Armenian translation was made from a Greek text before the rearrangement of the chapters and before the loss of the concluding pedagogical chapters. Patillon, in collaboration with Bolognesi, has reconstructed the Greek text on which the translation was based. It was so literal as to be almost incomprehensible in itself, but by comparison with the Greek in the large part of the work where both survive it has proved possible to reconstruct the Greek original with some probability. Patillon makes much use of this reconstruction throughout his text and apparatus and prints the Armenian text of the otherwise lost chapters, with French translation but without the Greek reconstruction.On the basis of a notice in the SoudaTheon is probably to be identified with Aelius Theon of Alexandria. There is reference in a newly discovered part of the text (Patillon, p. 106) to Dionysius of Halicarnassus, which gives us a date after the first century B.C., and a possible reference to Theon in Quintilian (9.3.76), suggesting Theon may have been writing in the first century after Christ. The name Aelius might indicate a Hadrianic date but probably came into use in Egypt after the prefecture of Aelius Gallus in the Augustan period. [End Page 477]In any event, the work is clearly the earliest of the four major progymnasmatic treatises and has similarities to the Latin discussions of the exercises by Quintilian (1.9) and in Suetonius' De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus.Although there is much that deserves attention in the introduction and notes of this edition, readers will perhaps most want to know about passages where new readings in the Greek make a difference to the meaning and interpretation of passages, and also about the contents of the chapters that survive only in Armenian, here published for the first time. References are to page and line... (shrink)

Patient noncompliance with physician prescriptions, especially in nonsymptomatic chronic diseases, is frequently characterized in the literature as harmful and economically costly (Miller 1997).1 Nancy Houston Miller views patient noncompliance as harmful because noncompliance can result in continued or new health problems leading to hospital admissions. Further, she places the annual monetary cost of noncompliance at $100 billion.Patient noncompliance with prescribed treatment is considered the least understood form of health behavior (Coons 2001). Despite the plethora of attention in journal articles, the (...) issue of noncompliance remains unresolved even in terms of understanding the main correlates to .. (shrink)

"I'll furnish the war" : the making of a media myth -- Fright beyond measure? : the myth of the war of the worlds -- Murrow vs. McCarthy : timing makes the myth -- TV viewers, radio listeners, and the myth of the first Kennedy-Nixon debate -- The Bay of Pigs-New York Times suppression myth -- Debunking the "Cronkite moment" -- The nuanced myth : bra burning at Atlantic City -- Picture power? : confronting the myths of the "napalm (...) girl" photograph -- It's all about the media : Watergate's heroic-journalist myth -- The "fantasy panic" : the news media and the "crack-baby" myth -- "She was fighting to the death" : mythmaking in Iraq -- Hurricane Katrina and the myth of superlative reporting -- Counterfeit quotations : swelling with a digital tide. (shrink)

Incapacitated adults with a legally appointed guardian or conservator may be recruited for or involved with medical, behavioral, or social science research. Much of the research in which such persons participate is aimed at evaluating medical interventions for them, or contributing to general knowledge about disorders from which they may suffer. In this paper we will consider how the appointment of guardians for patients with disorders of consciousness —severe brain injuries that affect a patient’s level of arousal and ability to (...) interact —impacts such patients’ access to research.Such persons may be under guardianship because they have lost decisional capacity (i.e., those in a coma or... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Revisiting the Launching of the Kennedy Institute: Re-visioning the Origins of BioethicsWarren Thomas Reich (bio)Twenty-five years ago, on October 1, 1971, at a press conference held at Georgetown University, the Joseph and Rose Kennedy Institute for the Study of Human Reproduction and Bioethics, later called the Kennedy Institute of Ethics, was officially inaugurated. To revisit that event—and the Institute’s five founding collaborators who spoke at (...) it—provides an opportunity to re-vision some of the most significant intellectual, moral, cultural, and political factors that shaped both this Institute and the then-nascent field of bioethics.Eunice Kennedy Shriver, who spoke at the press conference, was intensely committed to a new sort of philanthropy that would effect socio-political change in favor the dignity and well-being of the mentally disadvantaged. As executive vice-president of the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, she had already applied the Foundation’s vision and resources to the task of harnessing the best of the “biological revolution” of the 1960s to prevent developmental disorders. Prompted by the values at stake in the care of the disadvantaged, she turned the Foundation toward the creation of the Institute in 1971.Just prior to the opening of the Institute, Mrs. Shriver had produced and appeared as introducer in a highly influential film, “Who Shall Survive?”, which dealt with a “mongoloid baby” who was allowed to die in the newborn clinic because of its condition. Showcased at a highly publicized symposium involving 2000 people (Editorial 1971) and widely discussed in the press, the film helped to establish neonatal ethics as paradigmatic for the emerging field of bioethics (Bedeviling Question 1971; Rothman 1991, pp. 190–221). Undoubtedly under the influence of her involvement in the publicizing of those issues, Mrs. Shriver commented at the press conference that she hoped the Institute would re-emphasize the value of children in face of the widespread feeling that children are a burden (Kennedys 1971, p. 19).At the press conference, then president of Georgetown University, Robert J. Henle, S.J., announced the Kennedy Foundation’s grant of $1.35 million to establish the Institute. Henle was undoubtedly alert to the fact that certain issues, such as abortion and terminating the lives of infants, would be perceived [End Page 323] as highly controversial when raised at a Catholic university. Not surprisingly, reporters at the press conference raised provocative questions about how Georgetown University would reconcile Catholic moral doctrine with the Institute’s broadly-based inquiries. Henle replied tersely that the Institute “will be a ‘truly ecumenical and catholic effort,’ defining catholic in its classical meaning of universal” (Helping 1971). The reporters might have found it quite ironic that within a few years Georgetown’s ecumenical vision had provided the intellectual environment that permitted the Institute to become famous for development of the first systematic, secular (principle-based) approach to bioethics (Reich 1995).Father Henle was probably also aware that by launching the Kennedy Institute he was creating the first institute principally devoted to ethics research ever established at a university. It took a special sort of university to take this first step into bioethics research and policymaking. In 1971, ethics was regarded as belonging to religion, and religion was generally regarded as suspect academically. While it was difficult, in that atmosphere, for a nonreligious university to take such a bold step, Henle’s Georgetown University offered a promising setting that could scarcely have been found in any other university. It departed from the common mold of Catholic-college-as-indoctrination-center, yet it had an explicit and unashamed commitment to the investigation of religious and secular values in an environment of academic freedom. It was an increasingly cosmopolitan university, committed to developing the best of secular scholarship. Furthermore, Henle was willing to experiment with as-yet unproven interdisciplinary studies.Sargent Shriver—god-father of the Kennedy Institute, chairman of its first Advisory Board, and a constant dialogue partner of his friend and the Institute’s founding director, Dr. André Hellegers—was intensely interested in linking scientific progress with religious belief, unfettered moral debate, and commitment to disadvantaged humans.At the inaugural event, the new Institute was described as... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:A Theory of Bioethics by David DeGrazia and Joseph MillumColin Hoy (bio) and Winston Chiong (bio)Review of David DeGrazia and Joseph Millum, A Theory of Bioethics (Cambridge University Press, 2021)David DeGrazia and Joseph Millum’s A Theory of Bioethics 2021 arrives at a curious time for an ambitious effort at systematic theory construction, seemingly out of step with bioethical fashion. At the same time, a prominent (...) group of philosophical bioethicists authored an article, possibly with a touch of defensiveness, to “make the case that philosophy and philosophers still have a very important and meaningful role to play in contemporary bioethics” (Blumenthal-Barby et al. 2021). Meanwhile, the annual meeting of the American Society for Bioethics and Humanities included several expressions of impatience with the historical privileging of philosophy over more empirical, situated, and community-oriented approaches to moral problems in health.DeGrazia and Millum’s work itself reflects the current state of bioethics and how it has changed since the heyday of grand bioethical theory construction in the late twentieth century. To apply Parfit’s philosophical taxonomy (1984), the general frameworks promulgated by theorists like Veatch, Engelhardt, and Gert, as well as Beauchamp and Childress, were by necessity revisionary. These bioethical theories were whole-cloth alternatives to a conventional and paternalistic medical ethos that was already widely acknowledged as unsatisfactory. Today, however, bioethics is a mature and institutionalized field, with well-established practices and a corpus of accepted tenets (alongside matters of ongoing but generally demarcated controversy). A plausible and fruitful contemporary theory of bioethics must be largely descriptive, in Parfit’s sense, providing an intellectual framework that gives coherence and sense to existing practice, while at the same time clarifying matters of confusion.In contemporary bioethics, a central component of this practice is the application of the four principles of biomedical ethics—non-maleficence, beneficence, justice and autonomy—not merely as originally proposed by Beauchamp and Childress (2019), but in their refined form, following decades of exchange, critique, and revision. DeGrazia and Millum’s theory begins with two core values: well-being and respect for rights holders. [End Page 321] The bulk of the book then applies the method of reflective equilibrium to specify these two values in terms of the canonical four principles, here treated as “mid-level” constructs with readier application to specific cases than the two core values. Experienced bioethicists may have an uncanny sense of setting off from a new trailhead, and yet, eventually finding themselves still walking a familiar path. However, this way of introducing and explicating the four principles will likely be more accessible to a wider audience, including high-level undergraduates and graduate students not already versed in the revisions, refinements, and compromises embedded in Beauchamp and Childress’s discussions.Two other features recommend this book as a resource for trainees and interested non-experts seeking to deepen their understanding of bioethics. First, the clarity of its style and organizational approach provides a welcome orientation for non-specialists. The chapters are structured so that major contending perspectives are outlined before the authors develop arguments for their own positions in that context. Each chapter proceeds by considering applications of the broader theory, showing how it can illuminate potential candidate approaches or policies, as well as demonstrating how to use the tools of ethical analysis to evaluate these proposals in both ideal and non-ideal cases. This didactic approach to the relationship between conceptual argument and practice will be accessible to many who are initially unfamiliar with or intimidated by theory. Second the commendable decision to make the book electronically available and accessible also has the potential to broaden the reach of the work, and in particular, to engage parties in under-resourced settings, which have so often been overlooked in bioethical discourse.As noted above, while the authors’ approach is descriptive in Parfit’s sense, it is not necessarily conservative. In many places, the authors highlight how their theory includes elements or renders conclusions that are not broadly accepted, and following the method of reflective equilibrium, they advocate for these positions both in terms of broad principles and particular judgments about cases. This begins with their dual-value... (shrink)

Until Joseph Heath came along, philosophical business ethics was in a bad way. To the extent it’s still in a bad way, perhaps it’s because Heath has had insufficient influence. Before Heath, much of the debate in the field was between two major theories—stockholder and stakeholder theory. Both of these theories are either false, or vacuous and empty, depending on the interpretation. Heath has to some degree rescued the field by providing what is perhaps the only good general theory (...) of business ethics, which Heath calls the Market Failures Approach. (To be clear, there is some good casuistical work in business ethics, but the Market Failures Approach is perhaps the only good general theory of.. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work. This work is in the public domain (...) in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Provides a set of normative measure sto assess the value of nature and proposes the new discipline of foundational ecology as a response to environmental crisis.

A thesis familiar by being as often disputed as defended has it that intentional action is action for a reason. The present paper contributes to the defence of a weaker version of it, namely: Acting with an intention or a purpose is acting (as things appear to one) for a reason.

The author identifies the major micro-, meso-, and macro-level financial risk shifting factors that contributed to the Great Global Recession and how the absence of a compelling moral vision of responsible financial risk management perpetuated the economic crisis and undermined the recovery by blind reliance upon insufficiently accountable bailouts. The author offers a new theoretical model of Sustainable Stakeholder Capitalism by exercising moral imagination which inclusively and moderately balances four multi-level factors: types of capitalism, moral theories, human nature drives, and (...) credit risk profiles. Finally, the author recommends micro-, meso-, and macro-level practical reforms to prevent a recurrence of the current economic freefall, to re-create systemic global financial institution integrity, and to promote responsible risk management for sustainable global prosperity for current and future generations. (shrink)

Most causal discovery algorithms in the literature exploit an assumption usually referred to as the Causal Faithfulness or Stability Condition. In this paper, we highlight two components of the condition used in constraint-based algorithms, which we call “Adjacency-Faithfulness” and “Orientation- Faithfulness.” We point out that assuming Adjacency-Faithfulness is true, it is possible to test the validity of Orientation- Faithfulness. Motivated by this observation, we explore the consequence of making only the Adjacency-Faithfulness assumption. We show that the familiar PC algorithm has (...) to be modified to be correct under the weaker, Adjacency-Faithfulness assumption. The modified algorithm, called Conservative PC (CPC), checks whether Orientation- Faithfulness holds in the orientation phase, and if not, avoids drawing certain causal conclusions the PC algorithm would draw. Howtion: ever, if the stronger, standard causal Faith-. (shrink)

Parkinson, Joseph Bioethics at the bedside looks different from bioethics in the classroom, because the patient in the bed is a person with their own particular history, a unique experience of illness, and an unrepeatable future. In the context of Christian faith, bioethics must include far more than mere clinical data and academic prowess: there must be a central role for the God who is mystery. This article reflects on the rich perspective of leading American paediatrician and ethicist, Bioethics (...) has never been an exact science. Even when it strives for absolute objectivity by the application of the most rigorous philosophical discipline, clinical situations often escape our capacity to arrive at certain judgement. This should not surprise us, of course, since clinical situations are often extremely complex human dramas, and in such matters, as Aristotle reminds us, we should never expect greater certainty than our subject matter allows. (shrink)

This is a copy of the Proceedings version of a paper presented at the Workshop on Computational Intelligence and Semiotics, organized by João Queiroz and Ricardo Gudwin, held at Itaú Cultural, São Paulo, Brazil, on 8-9 October, 2002. (This version contains material not actually delivered at the conference.) Queiroz and Gudwin will be releasing the Proceedings volume on a..

Joseph Raz addresses one of the most basic philosophical questions: how to explain normativity in its many guises. His value-based account is brought to bear on many aspects of the lives of rational beings and their agency, such as their ability to maintain relationships, and to live their lives as social beings with a sense of their identity.

Arthur Fine has recently argued that standard realist and anti-realist interpretations of science should be replaced by "natural ontological attitude" (NOA). I ask whether Fine's own justification for NOA can meet the standards of argument that underlie his criticisms of realism and anti-realism. Fine vacillates between two different ways of advocating NOA. The more minimalist defense ("why not try NOA?") begs the question against both realists and antirealists. A stronger program, based on Fine's arguments for a "no-theory" of truth, has (...) promise, but the arguments must be developed in a stronger, more general form if they are to justify NOA. (shrink)