Reasons : Explanatory and normative

In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New essays on the explanation of action. New York: Palgrave-Macmillan (2009)
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Abstract

A thesis familiar by being as often disputed as defended has it that intentional action is action for a reason. The present paper contributes to the defence of a weaker version of it, namely: Acting with an intention or a purpose is acting (as things appear to one) for a reason.

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Joseph Raz
Columbia University

Citations of this work

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