Antonino Saliba, a sixteenth century cartographer hailing from the Maltese island of Gozo, published a map in 1582 espousing his cosmology. Its popularity at the time is attested via the multiple editions and copies that were produced in Europe. Numerous sky phenomena, amongst them comets, are portrayed in the map. This study presents a detailed analysis of Saliba's treatment of these phenomena, following the first comprehensive translation of the map's text to English. It elucidates the sources that Saliba used, clarifying (...) and shedding further light on the views he held. Where possible, the comets mentioned by Saliba are identified and explained. Besides showing how Saliba wholly conformed to the Aristotelian and Ptolemaic representation of the world, in which respect he was quite orthodox, it is also shown for the first time that his work is significantly derived from previous and contemporary sources. (shrink)

PHOTO ID 121339257© Designer491| Dreamstime.com ABSTRACT When physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be apparent conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters future physicians’ commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. We use an ethical dilemma that was presented to a group of third-year medical students to examine how ethics education might be causing (...) them to give undue deference to autonomy, thereby undermining their commitment to beneficence. INTRODUCTION The right of patients to choose which treatments they prefer is rooted in today’s social mores and taught as a principle of medical ethics as respect for autonomy. Yet, when physicians use their clinical knowledge and skills to advance the well-being of their patients, there may be a conflict between patient autonomy and physician beneficence. We are skeptical that today’s medical ethics education adequately fosters a commitment to beneficence, which is both rationally defensible and fundamentally consistent with patient autonomy. I. An Ethical Dilemma The impetus for this paper arose when students who were completing their third clinical year discussed a real-life ethical dilemma. A middle-aged man developed a pulmonary hemorrhage while on blood thinners for a recently placed coronary stent. The bleeding was felt to be reversible, but the patient needed immediate intubation or he would die. The cardiologist was told that the patient previously expressed to other physicians that he never wanted to be intubated. However, the cardiologist made the decision to intubate the patient anyway, and the patient eventually recovered.[1] Students were asked if they believed that the cardiologist had acted ethically. Their overwhelming response was, “No, the patient should have been allowed to die.” We looked into how students applied ethical reasoning to conclude that this outcome was ethically preferred. To explore how the third-year clinical experience might have formed the students’ judgment, we presented the same case to students who were just beginning their third year. Their responses were essentially uniform in recommending intubation. While there is likely more than one reasonable view in this case, we agree with the physician and the younger medical students that intubation was the ethically appropriate decision and will present an argument for it. But first, we explain the reasoning behind the more advanced medical students’ decision to choose patient autonomy at the expense of beneficence. II. Medical Ethics Education and the Priority of Autonomy Beauchamp and Childress’s Principles of Biomedical Ethics, first published in 1979 and now in its 8th edition, is a significant part of the formal ethics education in medical school.[2] Students learn an ethical decision-making approach based on respect for four ethical principles: autonomy, beneficence, nonmaleficence, and justice. While Beauchamp and Childress officially afford no prima facie superiority to any principle, the importance of respect for patient autonomy has increased through the editions of their book. For example, early editions of their book opposed the legalization of physician-assisted death compared to recent editions that defended it.[3] As another example, Beauchamp and Childress make paternalism harder to justify by adding an autonomy-protecting condition to the list of conditions for acceptable paternalism.[4] Authority, they contend, need not conflict with autonomy—provided the authority is autonomously chosen.[5] “The main requirement,” they write, “is to respect a particular patient’s or subject’s autonomous choices, whatever they may be.[6] In the principlism of Beauchamp and Childress, autonomy now seems to have a kind of default priority.[7] However, the bioethics discourse has strong counternarratives, noting some movement to elevate the role of beneficence and to respect the input of stakeholders, including the family and the healthcare team. Ethics education achieves particular relevance in the third clinical year when students become embedded in the care of patients and learn from what has been called the informal curriculum. They observe how attending physicians approach day-to-day ethical problems at the patient’s bedside. In this context, students observe the importance of informed consent for serious treatments or invasive procedures, a practice that highlights the principle of patient autonomy. In both the formal and informal curriculum, medical students observe how, in the words of Paul Wolpe, “patient autonomy has become the central and most powerful principle in ethical decision-making in American medicine.”[8] In short, students appear to learn a deference for patient autonomy. This curricular shift in favor of autonomy coincides with legal developments that protect patients’ rights and decision-making with respect to their healthcare choices. The priority of autonomy in medicine benefits patients by reflecting their choices and, in some cases, their fundamental liberty. III. The Practice of Medicine and the Commitment to Beneficence There are many critiques of the dominant place that autonomy has in biomedical ethics,[9] especially considering that autonomy seems to be biased toward individualistic, Western, and somewhat American culture-driven values.[10] In addition, many bioethical dilemmas are cast as a conflict between autonomy and beneficence. Our point is that medical students bring to their study of medicine a commitment to beneficence that seems to be suppressed by practical ethics education. We think this commitment is rationally defensible and should be nurtured. It is striking that young medical students have a pre-reflective commitment to beneficence at all. For, as we mentioned, it is not just medicine but Western culture generally that prioritizes autonomy in settling ethical dilemmas. In wanting to act for the good of others (rather than simply agreeing to what others want), physicians are already swimming somewhat against the cultural tide.[11] However, doing so makes sense, given the nature of medicine and the profession of healing. When prospective medical students are asked why they wish to become physicians, the usual answer is some variation on caring for the sick and preventing disease. It is unlikely that a reason to become a physician is to respect a patient’s autonomy. It would be easy to dismiss medical students’ commitment to beneficence as a mere intuition and contrary to a more reasoned and deliberative approach. Beauchamp and Childress seem to minimize the value of physician intuition, stating that justifications for certain procedures are “…supported by good reasons. They need not rest merely in intuition or feeling.”[12] Henry Richardson writes that “situational or perceptive intuition…leaves the reasons for decision unarticulated.”[13] We think this is a crude and rather thin way of understanding intuition. Some bioethicists have defended intuition as essential to the practice of medicine and not something opposed to reason.[14] In the case we describe, we believe the ethical justifications s for the patient’s intubation are fundamentally sound: the patient did not have a “do not intubate” order written in the chart, the emergency intubation had not been foreseen, so the patient did not have the opportunity to consent to or reject intubation; the patient had consented to the treatment for his cardiac disease so his consent for intubation could have been assumed;[15] and the consequences of respecting his autonomy did not justify allowing him to die.[16] While it is possible to have more than one reasonable view on this case, we think the case for beneficence is strong and certainly should not be dismissed out of hand. We do not deny that if a patient makes a clearly documented, well-informed decision to forgo intubation that this decision ought to be respected by the physician (even if the physician disagrees with the patient’s decision). But, in this situation, as in many others in the practice of medicine, the patient’s real wishes and preferences are not well-articulated in advance. There are many cases where a physician acts based on what she believes the patient, or the surrogate, would want, sometimes in situations that do not allow much time for reflection. An example might be resuscitation of a newborn at the borderline of viability. In their ethics education, beneficence would mean acting first to save a life. If the patient or surrogate makes an informed decision to the contrary, a beneficent physician respects that autonomous decision. In the case presented, the patient expressed gratitude to the cardiologist when extubated. But what if he had expressed anger at the physician for violating his autonomy? There are those who could argue that not only was intubation ethically wrong but that the cardiologist put himself in legal jeopardy by his actions (especially if there had been a written refusal applicable to the specific situation). In the example we use, we point out that the cardiologist may not have escaped a lawsuit if the patient had died without intubation. His family, when hearing the circumstances, may have sued for failure to act and dereliction of the cardiologist’s duty to save him. Beyond a potential legal challenge for either action or inaction, there is an overriding ethical question the cardiologist had to address: what course would be most satisfying to his conscience? Would he rather allow a patient to die for fear of recrimination, or act to save his life, regardless of the personal consequences? In the absence of real knowledge about the patient’s considered wishes, it is most reasonable to err on the side of promoting patient well-being. A physician’s commitment to beneficence is not necessarily a way of undermining a patient’s autonomy. In acting for the patient's good, physicians are also acting on what it is reasonable to believe a patient (or most patients, perhaps) would want, which is obviously connected to what a patient does want. Pellegrino and Thomasma argue that beneficence includes respect for a patient’s autonomy since “the best interests of the patient are intimately linked with their preferences.”[17] Instead of conceptualizing ethical dilemmas in medicine as conflicts between autonomy and beneficence, it is possible that medical schools could teach students that truly practicing beneficence is a way of valuing patient autonomy, especially when the patient’s wishes are not specific to the situation and are not clearly expressed. CONCLUSION It is important for students and practicing physicians to understand the principle of respect for patient autonomy in a pluralistic society that demands personal self-determination. However, the role of the physician as a beneficent healer should not be diminished by this respect for autonomy. Respecting a patient’s autonomy is grounded in and manifested by physician beneficence.[18] That is, seeking what is good for the patient can only be good if it respects their personhood and dignity. We propose that a commitment to beneficence, incipient in young medical students, should be developed over time with their other clinical reasoning skills. Such a commitment need not be sacrificed on the altar of patient autonomy. Beneficence needs greater relative moral weight with students as they proceed in their ethics education. - [1] S. Jauhar, “When Doctors Need to Lie,” New York Times, February 22, 2014, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/23/opinion/sunday/when-doctors-need-to-lie.html. [2] T. L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019). [3] Louise A. Mitchell, “Major Changes in Principles of Biomedical Ethics,” The National Catholic Bioethics Quarterly 14, no. 3 (2014): 459–75, https://doi.org/10.5840/ncbq20141438. [4] Tom L. Beauchamp and James F. Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 8th ed. (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 238. [5] Beauchamp and Childress, 103. [6] Beauchamp and Childress, p. 108. [7] For other accounts that prioritize autonomy, see e.g. Allen E. Buchanan and Dan W. Brock, Deciding for Others: The Ethics of Surrogate Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 1989), 38–39; R Gillon, “Ethics Needs Principles—Four Can Encompass the Rest—and Respect for Autonomy Should Be ‘First among Equals,’” Journal of Medical Ethics 29, no. 5 (October 2003): 307–12, https://doi.org/10.1136/jme.29.5.307. For examples of critiques of these accounts, see footnote 9. [8] P. R. Wolpe, “The Triumph of Autonomy in American Bioethics: A Sociological View,” in Bioethics and Society: Constructing the Ethical Enterprise, p. 43. [9] V. A. Entwistle et al., “Supporting Patient Autonomy: The Importance of Clinician-Patient Relationships,” Journal of General Internal Medicine 25, no. 7 (July 2010): 741–45; C. Foster, Choosing Life, Choosing Death: The Tyranny of Autonomy in Medical Ethics and Law, 1st ed. (Oxford ; Hart Publishing, 2009); O. O’Neill, Autonomy and Trust in Bioethics, The Gifford Lectures, University of Edinburgh 2001 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). [10] P. Marshall and B. Koenig, “Accounting for Culture in a Globalized Bioethics,” The Journal of Law, Medicine & Ethics: A Journal of the American Society of Law, Medicine & Ethics 32, no. 2 (2004): 252–66; R. Fan, “Self-Determination vs. Family-Determination: Two Incommensurable Principles of Autonomy,” Bioethics 11, no. 3–4 (1997): 309–22. [11] Arguments stressing the importance of beneficence, as ours does here, certainly approach paternalistic arguments. We set aside the complex issue of paternalism for purposes of this paper and simply note that the principle of beneficence as such does not say anything specifically about acting against the patient’s will. In the case study that focuses this paper, we do not believe the patient’s will or wishes were clearly indicated. [12] Beauchamp and Childress, Principles of Biomedical Ethics, p. 20, see note 2 above. [13] H. S. Richardson, “Specifying, Balancing, and Interpreting Bioethical Principles,” The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy: A Forum for Bioethics and Philosophy of Medicine 25, no. 3 (January 1, 2000): 285–307, p. 287. [14] H. D. Braude, Intuition in Medicine a Philosophical Defense of Clinical Reasoning (Chicago ; University of Chicago Press, 2012). [15] R. Kukla, “Conscientious Autonomy: Displacing Decisions in Health Care,” The Hastings Center Report 35, no. 2 (2005): 34–44. [16] M. Schermer, The Different Faces of Autonomy: Patient Autonomy in Ethical Theory and Hospital Practice, vol. 13, Library of Ethics and Applied Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2002). [17] E. D. Pellegrino and D. C. Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good - the Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 29. [18] Pellegrino and Thomasma, For the Patient’s Good. 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Joseph Wood Krutch's seminal philosophical work.

​This book is the first sustained scholarly account of women and goddesses in presocratic philosophy. It approaches the origin of western philosophy via Nietzsche, Feminism, and Embodied Cognition in order to argue that the presocratics were reviving, within the largely patriarchal and death-glorifying culture of archaic Greece, a paleo/neolithic goddess-centered religiosity that affirmed life and rebirth. By taking readers from prehistoric Europe to classical Athens, Joseph I. Breidenstein Jr. provides a novel narrative of the dawn of western philosophy which (...) is more comprehensive than traditional accounts and which helps us address contemporary problems—the patriarchal attitudes and ideas that continue to corrupt academic-philosophical culture; the fascist-dominator lifestyle that continues to threaten western democracy and which is encouraged by the patriarchal aspects of academia; and the consumerism that continues to result from a materialistic-secular paradigm that is being increasingly recognized as both intellectually untenable and socially unsustainable. (shrink)

In this profound and subtle study, a practising psychoanalyst explores the dynamics of the interaction between the patient and the analyst. Michael Feldman draws the reader into experiencing how the clinical interaction unfolds within a session. In doing so, he develops some of the implications of the important pioneering work of such analysts as Klein, Rosenfeld and Joseph, showing in fine detail some of the ways in which the patient feels driven to communicate to the analyst, not only in (...) order to be understood by him, but also in order to affect him. The author's detailed descriptions of the clinical process allow the reader to follow the actual process that enables the patient to get into contact with thoughts and feelings of which he or she was previously unconscious or only vaguely aware. Feldman makes the reader aware of the constant dynamic interaction between the patient and the analyst, each affecting the other. He shows how the analyst has to find a balance between doubt, uncertainty and confusion in himself and through this process may arrive at an understanding of what is happening, and by formulating this understanding the analyst can make a significant contribution to the process of psychic change. This collection of essays not only throws light on fascinating questions of technique, but also reflects on elements that are fundamental to psychoanalytic work. It is essential reading for practising psychoanalysts and those in training, as well as anyone with a general interest in the psychoanalytic relationship between the client and the therapist in the consulting room. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Catullus: The Shorter PoemsJoseph B. SolodowJohn Godwin, ed. Catullus: The Shorter Poems. Ed. with intro., trans., and comm. Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1999. xii + 223 pp. Cloth, $59.95; paper, $28.Godwin's volume joins two other recent ones that also offer a text and English translation of the poet, along with introduction and notes: G. P. Goold, Catullus: Edited with Introduction, Translation, and Notes, 2d ed. (London 1989; 1st (...) ed., 1983), and Guy Lee, Catullus: Edited with a Translation and Brief Notes (Oxford 1990). The proportion of commentary varies considerably among the three editions. Goold's notes are very brief, occupying less than one-sixth the number of the pages of the text plus translation; they identify references mostly, or sketch a background, either historical or personal. Lee's notes, somewhat more devoted to language and interpretation, amount to one-fourth. In Godwin's book the commentary equals the text and translation. This, clearly, is intended to be the author's chief contribution, and indeed it is easily the most valuable part. (In the same format he dealt with the longer poems, 61-68, in a volume published in 1995.) Rather than an editor or translator, Godwin is an interpreter of literature.Most parts of the introduction are reliable. "Catullus' Life and Times" balances familiar scholarly positions with criticism. Against Ross's view (originating with Reitzenstein, actually) that the poet applied the language of politics to love, he cites Lyne's, that poet and politician alike used the language of the governing class. He is skeptical of identifying Lesbia with Clodia Metelli. The next section describes the performance of poetry, an important subject, if less obvious. The discussion of poets' financial rewards here would be less neat had the instructive researches of Peter White been taken into account (JRS 64 [1974]: 40-61; HSCP 79 [1975]: 265-300; JRS 68 [1978]: 74-92). Godwin afterward sets forth well first the poetic standards and strivings of Catullus and his fellow-neoterics, then the major interpretative strategies practiced by literary critics: biography, New Criticism, New Historicism, and attention to intertextuality, to the arrangement of poems, to their closure (but not structuralism or deconstruction). His own stance is characterized by a keen awareness of the literary artifact, and this will make for some fine, persuasive interpretations.The section on meter, however, is seriously defective. Addressed to the rank beginner, who is taught when syllables are long, when short, what elision is, and which patterns of longs and shorts constitute the various meters, it is bound to mislead in important ways. It ignores prodelision (which Goold, for the sake of correct reading, represents in his text: gratumst, for example). Nowhere does it say that the fifth foot of a hexameter is regularly a dactyl, much less that the substitution of a spondee there is a neoteric affectation (see Cic. Att. 7.2.1). It claims that "the second half of the pentameter is in the overwhelming majority of cases dactylic" (17, my emphasis). For iambic senarii and choliambics it fails to mention the caesura. Lack of attention to meter probably explains why Godwin prints vehemens (rather than vemens) at 50.21 and vastasque paludesque at 115.5 (no other verse among the elegiacs is hypermetric, though 64.298 is), and also why in the commentary on poem 4 he does not draw attention to Catullus' tour [End Page 283] de force in writing pure iambics; this would have strengthened his point that the verse gives "the movement of the poem a swift impetus appropriate to the movement of the yacht" (117). The last part of the introduction is a concise statement of how the text has been transmitted.The text here printed is Godwin's own. Let it be compared with Goold's, which is, in my opinion, the truest ever produced--comprehensive in understanding the sources, fearless in replacing manuscript nonsensicalities with Catullan sense and elegance, from start to finish marked by sound judgment. As a sample I chose 49 poems, the verses of which represent 57 percent of the total number in Godwin's volume. Of the divergences from Goold's text in the sample, about two... (shrink)

This essay offers a new interpretation of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri’s landmark work of critical social theory Empire. It develops an account of the politics of exile by situating this political strategy in terms of Hardt and Negri’s claim that it is no longer feasible to confront capitalist power head-on. It attends closely to Hardt and Negri’s account of Empire’s pyramidal structure, and the problems that this structure creates for the multitude’s passage from virtuality to actuality. It criticizes the (...) authors’ assertion that, under Empire, the institutions associated with modernity have become indistinguishable from one another in ‘society of control.’ This essay concludes by theorizing the historicity and power of the university, in an attempt to specify what the democratic self-organization of the multitude, together with its exodus from Empire, might look like. Accordingly, it contends that the production of knowledge and higher education depend upon an idea of absolute value which outstrips the commodity-form, and in so doing, provides an intimation of the multitude passing to the exterior of Empire. (shrink)

The invention of development as public discourse began with US President Truman’s 1949 speech that trumped up an illusion of global material prosperity based on a total restructuring of the ‘developing’ world on the model of development and material achievement of the West. Truman argued that this painful process was the only recipe for world prosperity. After decades of serious engagement on development discourse and multiple implementations of successive theories, the situation of the developing countries has not improved as rapidly (...) as expected. At the same time, the developed countries are experiencing various forms of financial crises. This article acknowledges the professionalisation of development discourse, and proposes humanising development discourse in Africa in the light of Christian anthropology. This vision of integral development promotes the common good on the basis of God’s love and respect for the uniqueness of the human person. (shrink)

Das heftig diskutierte Werk Joseph Beuys? ist eines der einflussreichsten des 20. Jahrhunderts. Sein schöpferischer Reichtum umfasst bildnerische, philosophische und politische Aspekte. Die Aufzeichnungen, Gespräche und Vorträge von Joseph Beuys gehören zu seinem Werk wie seine Zeichnungen, Installationen und Aktionen. Sein bildnerisches Werk konfrontiert mit Rätseln, die nach dem Menschen fragen. Durch deren Aufschlüsseln sucht er ein Denken zu provozieren, das in Intuition umschlägt. Sie setzt kreative Kräfte frei, eine innere Freiheit, durch die der Einzelne auf eine Transformation (...) der Gesellschaft einwirken kann: 'Die einzig revolutionäre Kraft ist die Kraft der menschlichen Kreativität.' Diese Transformation ist die Aufgabe, die Beuys mit dem erweiterten Kunstbegriff gestellt hat.0Mit Aufzeichnungen von 1961, als Beuys Professor an der Kunstakademie wird, beginnt die Chronologie dieser Sammlung. Sie setzt sich fort mit Gesprächen, die durch die politischen Auseinandersetzungen der sechziger und siebziger Jahre führen und Antworten auf seine Arbeiten geben. Mit Beuys' Spürsinn, sich auf sein Gegenüber einzulassen, werden die Gespräche Aktion und bewahren durch ihre Lebendigkeit und Provokation ihre Gegenwart. Der Band erscheint anlässlich des 100. Geburtstags von Joseph Beuys am 12. Mai 2021. (shrink)

This epic piece of storytelling brings the world of fifteenth-century Italy to life as it traces Machiavelli's rise from young boy to controversial political thinker. The often-vilified Renaissance politico and author of The Prince comes to life as a diabolically clever, yet mild mannered and conscientious civil servant. Author Joseph Markulin presents Machiavelli's life as a true adventure story, replete with violence, treachery, heroism, betrayal, sex, bad popes, noble outlaws, deformed kings, menacing Turks, even more menacing Lutherans, unscrupulous astrologers, (...) untrustworthy dentists--and, of course, forbidden love. While sharing the stage with Florence's Medici family, the nefarious and perhaps incestuous Borgias, the artists Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo, and the doomed prophet Savonarola, Machiavelli is imprisoned, tortured, and ultimately abandoned. Nevertheless, he remains the sworn enemy of tyranny and a tireless champion of freedom and the republican form of government. Out of the cesspool that was Florentine Renaissance politics, only one name is still uttered today--that of Niccolo Machiavelli. This mesmerizing, vividly told story will show you why his fame endures. (shrink)

The classic guide to tapping the practical benefits of an age-old book of wisdom--revised to captivate today's spiritual seekersBased on the revered Chinese philosophy with a 5,000-year-old tradition, the I Ching, or Book of Changes, is rich in revelations. An eminent expert on the powers of the subconscious, Dr. Joseph Murphy opens the guiding force of this ancient text to anyone with an appreciation of the possibilities. With the help of three coins--ordinary pennies will do-- readers will learn to (...) apply their intuitive abilities to receive the I Ching's answers. With a practical outlook, this hands-on guide presents simple techniques for enlisting the I Ching's aid in everyday problem-solving and decision-making. Murphy explains the I Ching hexagram system, revealing its roots in human psychology and the principle of constant change. Demystifying obscure terms and symbols, the author leads the way to consulting the I Ching for clarity and guidance in times of confusion and crisis. By combining basic mathematical formulas with spiritual awareness, readers will realize the miracle-working potential of their own mind and connect with the I Ching's truths. As a result, they'll gain vital insights into questions about career, family, romance, financial security, and life goals. And they'll discover the wonder of genuine peace of mind. SECRETS OF THE I CHING, does not claim to predict the future. But it does provide the tools to mark any future with the promise of greater personal and spiritual fulfillment. (shrink)

Although Shanker & King disregard the behavioral paradigm, their arguments are reminiscent of those in Skinner 's Verbal Behavior. Like S&K, Skinner maintained that communication is not appropriately characterized as the transmission of information between individuals. In contrast to the paradigm advocated by S&K, however, the behavioral paradigm emphasizes prediction and control as important scientific goals.

Dans cet article, j'envisagerai quelques voies par lesquelles des sociétés dites primitives surent éviter et la soumission à l'État et la guerre généralisée.On comprend que pour opposer un front commun à leurs ennemis, des hommes soient amenés à s'allier et, pour ce faire, échangent de bons precédés, des biens et des femmes. Ainsi, les nécessités de la guerre entraîneraient la formation d'alliances.

Psychobiography has been a topical area and an applied research specialty in psychology since Freud’s (1910/1989) influential psychoanalytic psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci. Throughout the last century, psychobiographers have emphasized the importance of anchoring interpretations of life histories in established psychological theories and rigorous historiographic research methods. One topical area receiving less attention in psychobiography is the critical relationship between the psychobiographer and her or his subject as it relates to the process of psychobiographical writing. The present article explores the (...) phenomenology and challenges of this relationship in order to ultimately propose practical strategies for navigating countertransference issues throughout the subject selection, research and publication phases of psychobiography. Freud’s psychobiography of Leonardo da Vinci is used as a model of the stages of psychobiography, the evolution of the psychobiographer-subject relationship, and the challenges of countertransference. (shrink)

Philosophy of science may indeed perform a valuable normative function through historical analyses of characteristic errors, as Bechtel argues. But considerations of the two types of errors elected for this role, and harder looks at some of the historical examples prosecuted for these errors, disclose few helpful hints beyond the wisdom provided in Chapter I of freshman science texts coupled to a clear view of the future. To avoid churlishly spurning at first glance this offer of assistance, however, let us (...) look in turn at the two candidates with their supporting examples. (shrink)

Many scientists proclaim that consciousness is an illusion, a mere byproduct of chemical activity in the brain. In the computer age, scholars have further conceptualized consciousness as the software that regulates human functions, reducing our foibles and feats to complex but ultimately predictable robotics.

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and (...) made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

Joseph Carens argues that Michael Walzer's account of the moral autonomy of political communities is not true to our shared understanding of justice. Drawing upon a wide range of cross‐cultural examples, he argues that our understanding of justice requires us sometimes to criticize institutions and policies of political communities that are culturally different to our own communities. Focusing on issues of gender and democracy, he also argues that the ‘we’ who make these judgements does not always correspond to the (...) members of a political community but can be either wider or narrower. (shrink)

Critique of the writings of Aurobindo Ghose, 1872-1950.

Authorship is a complicated subject in Kierkegaard's work, which he surely recognized, given his late attempts to explain himself in On My Work as an Author. From the use of multiple pseudonyms and antonyms, to contributions across a spectrum of media and genres, issues of authorship abound. Why did Kierkegaard write in the ways he did? Before we assess Kierkegaard's famous thoughts on faith or love, or the relationship between 'the aesthetic,' 'the ethical,' and 'the religious,' we must approach how (...) he expressed them. Given the multi-authored nature of his works, can we find a view or voice that is definitively Kierkegaard's own? Can entries in his unpublished journals and notebooks tell us what Kierkegaard himself thought? How should contemporary readers understand inconsistencies or contradictions between differently named authors? We cannot make definitive claims about Kierkegaard's work as a thinker without understanding Kierkegaard's work as an author. This collection, by leading contemporary Kierkegaard scholars, is the first to systematically examine the divisive question and practice of authorship in Kierkegaard from philosophical, literary and theological perspectives. (shrink)