In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:One to NGirard's Philosophy of InnovationJohnathan Bi (bio)What does a theorist of imitation have to teach us about innovation? What could a thinker focused on the distant past have to offer us in building the immediate future? The answer to both questions, I hope to show, is a significant amount. I aim to rescue and develop a neglected strand of Girardian thought from one of his overlooked essays on (...) a topic seemingly antithetical to imitation: innovation. This task proceeds in five steps. First, I articulate two contemporary perspectives on innovation, one dominant and one in the minority. Second, I reconstruct Girard's historical argument from "Innovation and Repetition" in favor of the minority view and, third, his psychological argument against the dominant view. Fourth, I show how Girard's philosophy of innovation sublates crucial features of both poles and provides an alternative mode for conceiving the future.1 Lastly, I wrestle with an immanent objection that threatens the prescriptive force of his entire argument and, even when reconciled, leads me to depart from Girard's conclusions, albeit in the most Girardian of ways. [End Page 71]INNOVATION AND IMITATIONThe dominant view of innovation is that it is opposed to imitation. The foundational type of opposition between the two is metaphysical: imitation and innovation are actions different in kind and must be conceived of as such. Peter Thiel's famous formulation is representative: certain actions, companies, and countries are innovative, going from "zero to one," while others are imitative, going from "one to N."2 This distinction is mostly accepted without question in the social sciences, underpinning entire disciplines such as innovation studies.3 This near-universal consensus, however, is a modern phenomenon. The Latin innovatio, for example, described innovation as being inseparable from the imitation of the past: the Jews returning to Jerusalem, Job having his wealth restored, or the rebirth of a phoenix.4 The word itself reveals as much. Innovatio is derived by appending the prefix in- (within, from inside) to novitas (novelty). It meant novelty that preceded from within, or renewal. Under this view, innovation was not about breaking free or starting from a blank slate, zero to one, but rather rescuing and developing an already formed foundation, one to N. Innovation was identical with the imitation and adaptation of that which is essential but has been obscured. Only beginning in the twentieth century has imitation been so strongly demarcated from innovation.5Built on top of this metaphysical opposition is a practical opposition. Not only are the two actions distinct, they are incompatible: the more one imitates, the more one risks eroding one's ability to innovate. This stronger form of opposition is exemplified by the idea of the "untutored genius" whose source of creativity is solely internal: a fully formed natural endowment not requiring learning nor external inspiration from divinity or nature. This idea gained ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and proponents believed that imitation of tradition impeded the expression of one's own innate genius.6 If one wants to write a great book, this idea goes, one ought not read great books for fear that they will crowd out one's original ideas. Even in the twentieth century, Wittgenstein expressed this exact sentiment when he proudly claimed not to have read any Aristotle or engaged deeply with the history of philosophy and considered those who have "academic and therefore unauthentic philosophers."7 Of course, not all modern thinkers see innovation and imitation as practically opposed in such a strong way.8 But even for most who treat the two as harmonious, imitation tends to be relegated to a secondary afterthought as the mere mechanism by which innovation, the primary source of value creation, spreads. This, then, is the third form of opposition drawn out [End Page 72] between the two concepts: a normative one. Imitation is, at best, of secondary value when compared to acts of innovation.The practical and, to a lesser degree, normative oppositions appear so unsound as to not warrant serious engagement, and already contested by theorists who study innovation as to not require another rebuttal. What makes Girard's response to them... (shrink)

Imagine that Ann, asked to name her favorite treat, answers: 1. Licorice is tasty Imagine that Ben, having hidden some licorice in the cupboard, whispers to Ann: 2. There might be licorice in the cupboard. What if any role is played by perspective—whom the licorice is tasty to, whose evidence allows for licorice in the cupboard—in the semantics of such sentences?

Good people often die badly, and, sometimes, bad people die well. Both are true for complex reasons. We worry that the tropic formulation trades on a simplistic anthropology that belies the complexities of how persons operate in the world. In this essay, we are interested in these complexities and a better theological acknowledgement of them, not least because the fantasy of the good death ill prepares one for real death. We argue that valorizing pious religious death and profane ugly death (...) loses sight of these complexities, which we think should comprise any account Christians give about what persons are and are in their dying—an account that often goes by the name “theological anthropology.” It is the simplistic theological anthropology more than the tropic formulation—the anthropology the trope smuggles in—that concerns us. Our argument proceeds by first examining the fantasy of the good death, measuring it against a historical record with an examination of the Ars Moriendi tradition, and then thinking more broadly about what motivates it. Along the way, we consider a recent film, The Farewell, where good-death fantasies comically run up against death’s reality and where goodness, truth, and beauty show up anyhow. (shrink)

This paper aims to reframe disability through John Dewey’s transactional theory of culture to indicate how disability is not located in the biological organization of the individual nor in the organization of culture, but in the transactions between the two. This paper will apply Dewey’s theory of culture to disability studies and philosophy of disability and then to ADHD to make clear the benefits of a transactional model of disability.

Striking Beauty: A Philosophical Look at the Asian Martial Arts by Barry Allen is the first English-language book to engage in a systematic investigation of the philosophical underpinnings of the Asian martial arts. In doing so, it aims to construct the Asian martial arts, specifically the Chinese martial traditions, as a field for comparative philosophy, wherein the investigation of Chinese philosophy through the martial traditions can provide illumination into Western questions of aesthetics, ethics, self-hood, and intentionality. Barry Allen's own devotion (...) to the study of the martial arts informs his philosophical investigations: rather than treat the Chinese martial and philosophical traditions as valuable only... (shrink)

Bloodbending is sometimes referred to as the “puppetmaster technique” because it is the only bending art whose focus is on the direct manipulation and control of a target. Incarcerated in a maximum‐security prison designed specifically to hold waterbenders, Hama was powerless to resist her captors due to their restriction of any liquid that could be used to bend. The bending styles in Avatar: The Last Airbender draw their inspiration from real‐world Chinese martial arts. Karl Friday describes satsujinken in a more (...) complicated way: “when a combatant uses force of will to overpower, immobilize, and strike down an opponent before he can react, this is called ‘setsunin‐to’”. It could be a perfect description of bloodbending as practiced by Hama: a use of already established and morally neutral techniques for the domination and overpowering of a person for egoistic aims. (shrink)

This paper argues that the field of philosophy, and bioethics spe­cifically, engages in a series of speech acts that identify scholarship advocating for increased philosophical engagement with the experiences of disability as “activism.” In doing so, the field of philosophy treats these calls as not worthy of consideration, and therefore, to be ignored in “serious scholarship.” Further, this paper makes clear the ways that philosophy relies upon ableism through what Peter Railton calls the “culture of smartness,” which serves as a (...) form of ableist apologia as defined by Jay Dolmage. The paper concludes by using the example of ADHD to indicate how the prevalence of this “culture of smartness” serves to exclude disabled philosophers within the field. (shrink)

Abstract:This essay applies lessons from John Dewey’s theory of democracy and democratic education to the modern development of information communications technologies and the assertion that the development of such technologies will lead to a more open, more democratic society. Given the continuity of the technology and its applications with structures of oppression within modern society, any attempt to resolve or democratize technology through skills-based training is bound to fail, as this does not resolve the cultural habits that enable oppression through (...) technology. To this end, what is necessary is democratic education that recognizes the unique contexts in which students become individuals and furnishes flexible habits of transaction. (shrink)

Mono no Aware and Gender as Affect in Japanese Aesthetics and American Pragmatism argues that gender is best understood as a felt sense of the organization of the human body. Through Japanese aesthetics and American pragmatism, this book argues that re-understanding gender as an affect, or a feeling, can expand the ways that gender is understood, enacted, and theorized in experience.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guest Editors' NoteKevin Taylor (bio) and Johnathan Flowers (bio)Welcome to this special fall 2021 issue of Education & Culture. we are pleased to bring you the second installment of this special three-part issue on Deweyan approaches to contemporary issues at the intersection of data and technology.In his extensive writings on philosophy and technology, Luciano Floridi has argued that "the time has come to translate environmental ethics into terms (...) of infosphere and informational entities, for the land we now inhabit is not just the earth."1 This may be appropriate from a Deweyan perspective as Dewey's approach to aesthetic experience focuses on the living organism within its environment and we have become digital humans in digital environments. Our digital world feels unstable because it is in constant change, but Dewey reminds us that "all interactions that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is ebb and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change."2 The rhythms of our digital world pervade all experience in what he termed "doing and undergoing." We are swimming in a sea of data and leaving behind what investigative reporter Julia Angwin terms data pollution.3 But in the data-driven world, that data pollution is collected, analyzed, and monetized by big data tech firms in a kind of societal harm that threatens digital democracy.Whereas part one saw contributions from five scholars throwing curriculum and technology into sharp relief, this issue asks questions such as "Where ought we to begin?", "What does feminist pragmatism have to tell us about the pandemic and online teaching and learning?", and "Do the aims and means of data and technology align with human experience?"John Machielsen's "Responsible Imagineering: John Dewey's Pluralistic Ethics and Technological Innovation" seems like a good place to begin. Machielsen argues for placing Dewey's ethics at the starting point from which technological innovation can flourish. Driven by Deweyan concepts of intelligence, education, and imagination, Machielsen explores, among other themes, socially disruptive technology from the perspective of pragmatists who constantly reconstruct concepts and values through the process of Deweyan inquiry. Human beings are imaginative and plastic with regard to problem solving, and what is needed here is to keep the barriers between technology and everyday life porous so that we do not risk compartmentalizing them as distinctly different realms.In the next two essays, we turn our attention to the growing concerns surrounding intelligent technology in online educational environments. Great strides have been made in the field of artificial intelligence, and intelligent technology has inserted itself into various aspects of data and technology, such as machine learning that creates personalized learning paths for students. Whether these technologies fall under the [End Page 1] category of algorithms, machine learning, or artificial intelligence, they raise questions about their potential impact on teaching and learning.Olivier Del Fabbro is also suspicious of the current state of intelligent technology in his article, "How to Teach Machines in Artificial Intelligence: Technical Education in John Dewey, Gilbert Simondon, and Machine Learning." Citing the Google machine learning model that classified African Americans as gorillas, Del Fabbro utilizes Dewey and Gilbert Simondon to argue that the human–machine relationship is still immature and at risk of creating an alienated situation out of undesirable bad habits. Intelligent technology requires constant care by engineers and programmers to form good habits and adapt to social life if their aims are to align with Deweyan pedagogy.As Del Fabbro focuses on intelligent technology, the human dimension of online learning comes under scrutiny in two articles that adopt feminist pragmatist methods. Krissah Marga B. Taganas's article, "Feminist-Pragmatist Perspectives on Online Education: Challenging and Changing Online Educational Conversation," rightfully acknowledges how the pandemic has magnified existing inequalities in society. The rapid migration to online learning was necessarily expedited in the face of uncertainties surrounding public health, but how do educators migrate classes that were not designed with online learning in mind to begin with? Dewey emphasized schools as sites and tools for change, but how does online education provide an optimal social environment for learning? Taganas utilizes feminist pragmatism as an important philosophical resource to... (shrink)

Carl J. Friedrich (1901?1984) defined constitutionalism as something more than can be expressed by the dominant behavioralist paradigm of modern political science and the typical academic focus on law and courts. A leading but now neglected post-WWII authority on constitutionalism, Friedrich argued that it should be understood as an institutionally-based, interactive system for deliberating the meaning and legal application of the norms of a political community. His approach shares much with the contemporary ?historical institutionalist? call to situate law and courts (...) within a broader, more normative, and more interactive conception of constitutionalism. Accordingly, a reconsideration of Friedrich's work may help current efforts to better articulate the full richness and complexity of constitutionalism as a distinctive way of ordering political life. (shrink)

v. 1. Arabic text -- v. 2. English translation.

v. 1. al-Nuṣūṣ al-manṭiqīyah -- v. 2. al-Shurūḥ al-manṭiqīyah -- al-mujallad 3. al-Shurūḥ ʻalá al-nuṣūṣ al-manṭiqīyah.

College cheating is prevalent, with rates ranging widely from 9 to 95%. Research has been exclusively conducted with enrolled college students. This study examined the prevalence of cheating in a sample of college alumni, who risk less in disclosing academic dishonesty than current students. A total of 273 alumni reported on their prevalence and perceived severity of 19 cheating behaviors. The vast majority of participants report having engaged in some form of cheating during their undergraduate career. The most common forms (...) of cheating were “copying from another student's assignment” and “allowing others to copy from your assignment.” More students reported cheating in classes for their major than other classes. Males and females cheated at the same rates in classes for their major, and males reported higher rates of cheating than females in nonmajor classes. Respondents reported that their top reasons for cheating were “lack of time” and “to help a friend.”. (shrink)

Analytical study of philosophy; includes comparative study of world-renowned philosophers and their ideologies.

Resumen: Este artículo sostiene que algunas Meta-Picto-Poesías del Paisaje compuestas por el poeta estadounidense Gary Snyder toman como tema la pintura china del paisaje con las características de la antigua poesía china, resplandeciente de incomparable encanto artístico y sustancia cultural. La poesía de este tipo es una combinación perfecta de elementos orientales y occidentales, que integra las culturas, los pensamientos y las artes de ambas partes, cuya apreciación crea una experiencia compleja con un híbrido de formas artísticas y espacios estéticos. (...) Gary Snyder no es sólo un eco-poeta, sino también un estilista y un hombre de práctica. Sus obras poéticas revelan la relación de fomento entre literatura, cultura y naturaleza. El artículo pretende hacer un intento transcultural, interdisciplinar y multidisciplinar en la crítica de Snyder, con métodos analíticos que incluyen culturas orientales y occidentales, visiones antiguas y actuales, así como experiencias dinámicas y estáticas. (shrink)

This article discusses Abū ʽUthmān al-Jāḥiẓ (d. 255/869) (one of the first Muʽtazilī scholars) Allah-world relationship, his understanding of custom, and his view on miracles. The Muʻtazilī thinkers examined the problem of miracles within their concept of prophethood. They divide miracles, which they accept as the only proof of prophethood, into two: those under the power of Allah and under the power of the created. Jāḥiẓ explains these two sorts of miracles with the order in the universe established by Allah (...) and people and expresses this order with the concept of custom (ʻāda). Jāḥiẓ divides custom into three. The first of these is the “qā’im (constant) custom”, which is based on the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr and expresses the general rules that occur as a requirement of the general functioning in the universe. According to Jāḥiẓ “qā’im (constant) custom” is that knowledgeable people are aware of the custom of the universe. This custom is an order created by Allah in the eyes of intelligent and knowledgeable people, which is continuous and therefore cannot be interrupted, and in which there is no chaos. He states that this order is realized through the natures in the objects, which are knowable to everyone. But rarely a nature in this order can be interrupted due to a situation that takes it out of the natural flow and cannot be explained by natural causes. According to him, this is proof that nature, which has the defining feature of the object, is created by the creator, and maintains its continuity based on an arranged program. However, the creator can involve in this order when necessary. In this type of custom, God’s intervention occurs by breaking the qā’im custom that continues on a regular basis. The second of these is the “regional custom”, which is not known to everyone but only known to people living in a certain area. Jāḥiẓ states that the miracle in this type of custom occurred when Allah broke the custom known to the people in the region. The third of these is “social custom” which is established by people. For Jāḥiẓ, the miracles of this kind are under the power of people. He argues that the miracle in this type of custom occurs with sarfa, that is, by God’s intervention with human’s motive or knowledge. In this study, Jāḥiẓ’s view of miracles is discussed together with his theory of nature, his understanding of custom and sarfa. (shrink)

The inscription edited in this paper is the third bilingual Chinese-Sogdian epitaph to be made known, following that of Wirkakk and Wiyusi and that of Nanai-vande and Kekan, published in 2005 and 2017 respectively. The new epitaph is that of a Sogdian lady who died in 736 CE. Apart from its linguistic interest, it is important as attesting the conversion of a Sogdian lady to the “heretical” Buddhist Sanjie or “Three levels” movement, which remained popular despite being officially suppressed under (...) the Tang. (shrink)

This article discusses Abū Isḥāq al-Naẓẓām’s (d. 231/845) (one of the first Muʽtazilī thinkers); understanding of Allah-world relationship, his theory of nature (tab‘) and his view on miracles. In a proposal form, Muʽtazilī scholars accept that the miracle, which is the actual confirmation, must occur, since it is not possible for Allah to confirm His messenger (prophet) in a way that everyone can hear and in a direct word. Since the Prophet's message can be authenticated only by a miracle, Muʽtazilī (...) thinkers paid great attention to this issue, organized and formed natural theories about the universe in a way that miracles can occur. Naẓẓām explains a kind of miracle that occurs under the power of Allah, by his theory of nature called latency and occurrence (kumūn-ẓuhūr). His view of miracles is rooted in the Muʽtazilī classification of miracles. Naẓẓām argues that in the theory of nature, things are infinitely divided. He also argues that all qualities considered accident (aʽrāḍ) by other Muslim theologians are different objects as only motion and rest are the only accidents. According to him, the universe consists of objects and accidents of motion only. In each object in the universe, an unlimited number of opposing objects (sub-components) that have different effects on each other is located in the same space. Those objects in the same space are intervened (tadākhul) with each other. Kumūn refers to sub-components that are located inside the object in a state of passing into each other, and a state of balancing each other through the push-pull motion (i‘timād). Ẓuhūr is an outward movement of the sub-component from where it is located when an impact imposed outside the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in it. Naẓẓām says that too many opposing sub-components, such as heaviness-lightness, heat-coldness contained in the object, form an internal dynamic by providing balancing each other through inside the object with the push-pull motion. The state of balance inside the object is disrupted by an external factor affecting one of the sub-components. An external thing approaching the object interacts with one of the sub-components contained in the object. Then, the affected sub-component moves out of the object and thus the state of balance inside the object is disrupted. According to the theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, change in objects occurs when the balance within the object is disturbed. The change in the balance also occurs not by the direct intervention of Allah and the creation of accidents, but by the disruption in the balance of natures within the object. Naẓẓām, who advocates the intrinsic natures in things, has been criticized for not leaving any room for Allah’s influence on objects at least through miracles. This criticism is not correct. Naẓẓām says that the nature of objects depends on God, and it is possible for God to intervene in them at any time. According to him, Allah can force opposing objects into a union that is not in their natures. In their natures, unification can separate those by applying pull and push. In this way, Naẓẓām sees the intervention of Allah as possible in the occurrence of a situation that is the opposite of what is present in the nature of objects. In Naẓẓām's theory of kumūn-ẓuhūr, there are suppressed natures and sub-components that are in a weak state inside the actual object. Furthermore, they cannot go out in any way from the actual object. One of these suppressed natures found in the object is removed from the nature of the object by the intervention of Allah when a miracle occurs in the hands of theProphet. In this case, the miracle is not something new that Allah has created, but that Allah has disclosed a hidden sub-component that is hidden in that thing that has never appeared before. Naẓẓām’s view of miracle is something occurring under the power of the created, which Muʽtazilī scholars accept in the classification of miracles in relation to, the theory of sarfa. He suggests that the Qur'an, which he accepts under the power of the created, would not be a miracle, if the Arabs could dispute it. However, according to him, the Qur'an is a miracle because Allah prevents them from the dispute. In his understanding of sarfa, the miracles occur directly as an act of God’s divine intervention with human beings. This study investigates Naẓẓām’s view of miracles along with his theory of nature and his understanding of sarfa. (shrink)