Abstract

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:One to NGirard's Philosophy of InnovationJohnathan Bi (bio)What does a theorist of imitation have to teach us about innovation? What could a thinker focused on the distant past have to offer us in building the immediate future? The answer to both questions, I hope to show, is a significant amount. I aim to rescue and develop a neglected strand of Girardian thought from one of his overlooked essays on a topic seemingly antithetical to imitation: innovation. This task proceeds in five steps. First, I articulate two contemporary perspectives on innovation, one dominant and one in the minority. Second, I reconstruct Girard's historical argument from "Innovation and Repetition" in favor of the minority view and, third, his psychological argument against the dominant view. Fourth, I show how Girard's philosophy of innovation sublates crucial features of both poles and provides an alternative mode for conceiving the future.1 Lastly, I wrestle with an immanent objection that threatens the prescriptive force of his entire argument and, even when reconciled, leads me to depart from Girard's conclusions, albeit in the most Girardian of ways. [End Page 71]INNOVATION AND IMITATIONThe dominant view of innovation is that it is opposed to imitation. The foundational type of opposition between the two is metaphysical: imitation and innovation are actions different in kind and must be conceived of as such. Peter Thiel's famous formulation is representative: certain actions, companies, and countries are innovative, going from "zero to one," while others are imitative, going from "one to N."2 This distinction is mostly accepted without question in the social sciences, underpinning entire disciplines such as innovation studies.3 This near-universal consensus, however, is a modern phenomenon. The Latin innovatio, for example, described innovation as being inseparable from the imitation of the past: the Jews returning to Jerusalem, Job having his wealth restored, or the rebirth of a phoenix.4 The word itself reveals as much. Innovatio is derived by appending the prefix in- (within, from inside) to novitas (novelty). It meant novelty that preceded from within, or renewal. Under this view, innovation was not about breaking free or starting from a blank slate, zero to one, but rather rescuing and developing an already formed foundation, one to N. Innovation was identical with the imitation and adaptation of that which is essential but has been obscured. Only beginning in the twentieth century has imitation been so strongly demarcated from innovation.5Built on top of this metaphysical opposition is a practical opposition. Not only are the two actions distinct, they are incompatible: the more one imitates, the more one risks eroding one's ability to innovate. This stronger form of opposition is exemplified by the idea of the "untutored genius" whose source of creativity is solely internal: a fully formed natural endowment not requiring learning nor external inspiration from divinity or nature. This idea gained ascendancy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and proponents believed that imitation of tradition impeded the expression of one's own innate genius.6 If one wants to write a great book, this idea goes, one ought not read great books for fear that they will crowd out one's original ideas. Even in the twentieth century, Wittgenstein expressed this exact sentiment when he proudly claimed not to have read any Aristotle or engaged deeply with the history of philosophy and considered those who have "academic and therefore unauthentic philosophers."7 Of course, not all modern thinkers see innovation and imitation as practically opposed in such a strong way.8 But even for most who treat the two as harmonious, imitation tends to be relegated to a secondary afterthought as the mere mechanism by which innovation, the primary source of value creation, spreads. This, then, is the third form of opposition drawn out [End Page 72] between the two concepts: a normative one. Imitation is, at best, of secondary value when compared to acts of innovation.The practical and, to a lesser degree, normative oppositions appear so unsound as to not warrant serious engagement, and already contested by theorists who study innovation as to not require another rebuttal. What makes Girard's response to them...