In recent years, campaigns across the globe have called for the removal of objects symbolic of white supremacy. This paper examines the ethics of altering or removing such objects. Do these strategies sanitize history, destroy heritage and suppress freedom of speech? Or are they important steps towards justice? Does removing monuments and renaming schools reflect a lack of parity and unfairly erase local identities? Or can it sometimes be morally required, as an expression of respect for the memories of people (...) who endured past injustices; a recognition of this history's ongoing legacies; and a repudiation of unjust social hierarchies? (shrink)

The scientific community, we hold, often provides society with knowledge—that the HIV virus causes AIDS, that anthropogenic climate change is underway, that the MMR vaccine is safe. Some deny that we have this knowledge, however, and work to undermine it in others. It has been common to refer to such agents as “denialists”. At first glance, then, denialism appears to be a form of skepticism. But while we know that various denialist strategies for suppressing belief are generally effective, little is (...) known about which strategies are most effective. We see this as an important first step toward their remediation. This paper leverages the approximate comparison to various forms of philosophical skepticism to design an experimental test of the efficacy of four broad strategies of denial at suppressing belief in specific scientific claims. Our results suggest that assertive strategies are more effective at suppressing belief than questioning strategies. (shrink)

It is often alleged that Cantor’s views about how the set theoretic universe as a whole should be considered are fundamentally unclear. In this article we argue that Cantor’s views on this subject, at least up until around 1896, are relatively clear, coherent, and interesting. We then go on to argue that Cantor’s views about the set theoretic universe as a whole have implications for theology that have hitherto not been sufficiently recognised. However, the theological implications in question, at least (...) as articulated here, would not have satisfied Cantor himself. (shrink)

A child’s objection, refusal and dissent regarding participation in non-beneficial biomedical research must be respected, even when the parents or legal representatives have given their permission. There is, however, no consensus on the definition and criteria of a meaningful and valid child’s objection. The aim of this article is to clarify this issue. In the first part we describe the problems of a child’s assent in research. In the second part we distinguish and analyze two models of a child’s objection (...) to research: the capacity-based model and the distress-based model. In the last part we present arguments for a broader and unified understanding of a child’s objection within regulations and practices. This will strengthen children’s rights and facilitate the entire process of assessment of research protocols. (shrink)

Drawing on findings from the study of prejudice and prejudice reduction, we identify a number of mechanisms through which religious communities may influence the intergroup attitudes of their members. We hypothesize that religious participation could in principle either reduce or promote prejudice with respect to any given target group. A religious community’s influence on intergroup attitudes will depend upon the specific beliefs, attitudes, and practices found within the community, as well as on interactions between the religious community and the larger (...) social environment in which it is embedded. Basing our proposals on findings from the literature on prejudice formation and prejudice reduction allows us to outline useful directions for future studies of religion and prejudice. (shrink)

We present a relational proof system in the style of dual tableaux for a multimodal propositional logic for order of magnitude qualitative reasoning to deal with relations of negligibility, non-closeness, and distance. This logic enables us to introduce the operation of qualitative sum for some classes of numbers. A relational formalization of the modal logic in question is introduced in this paper, i.e., we show how to construct a relational logic associated with the logic for order-of-magnitude reasoning and its dual (...) tableau system which is a validity checker for the modal logic. For that purpose, we define a validity preserving translation of the modal language into relational language. Then we prove that the system is sound and complete with respect to the relational logic defined as well as with respect to the logic for order of magnitude reasoning. Finally, we show that in fact relational dual tableau does more. It can be used for performing the four major reasoning tasks: verification of validity, proving entailment of a formula from a finite set of formulas, model checking, and verification of satisfaction of a formula in a finite model by a given object. (shrink)

Artykuł analizuje krytycznie pewne linie argumentacji stosowane przez wielu badaczy Nowego Testamentu na poparcie negatywnej oceny przekazów na temat wypowiedzi Jezusa i wydarzeń w Ewangeliach synoptycznych.

We study a new formal logic LD introduced by Prof. Grzegorczyk. The logic is based on so-called descriptive equivalence, corresponding to the idea of shared meaning rather than shared truth value. We construct a semantics for LD based on a new type of algebras and prove its soundness and completeness. We further show several examples of classical laws that hold for LD as well as laws that fail. Finally, we list a number of open problems. -/- .

Empirical evidence suggests that mindfulness, psychological flexibility, and addiction are interrelated in decision making. In our study, we investigated the relationship of the behavioral profile, composed of mindfulness and psychological flexibility, and smoking status on delay and probability discounting. We demonstrated the interaction of the behavioral profile of mindfulness and psychological flexibility and smoking status on delay discounting. We found that individuals who smoked and displayed higher mindfulness and psychological flexibility devalued rewards at a slower rate, compared to smokers with (...) a lower profile. Importantly, in those with a higher profile, smokers discounted rewards no differently than nonsmokers. Smokers with a lower profile did display, however, increased impulsivity, compared to nonsmokers. These results suggest that behavioral interventions aiming to modify the behavioral profile with regard to mindfulness and psychological flexibility can indeed support the regulation of elevated impulsivity in smokers to equate with that of nonsmokers. In probability discounting, we observed that individuals with a higher profile displayed lower discounting rates, i.e., were less risk-averse, with no other significant main effect or interaction. (shrink)

Some current environmental problems are global and have public good elements that raise, in an acute form, the question of how the costs of a collective effort from which the world as a whole will benefit should be shared out among poor and rich countries. This chapter discusses how far theories of justice provide guidance to this question. It argues that the answer seems to be ‘very little’ and that, in order to arrive at some ground rules for allocating the (...) burden of global environmental protection between countries—as between generations—we are forced back on humanitarian principles of concern for the poor. (shrink)

Although there are many theories of justice, one crucial feature of those that are most widely accepted is that they lay down principles that determine the allocation of rights and obligations in society. They do not eliminate conflicts of interest between different groups but, by specifying such principles, they are designed to enable conflicting interests to be resolved in a peaceful and harmonious manner. But insofar as future generations cannot be said to have any rights, their interests cannot be protected (...) within the framework of any theory of intergenerational justice. This chapter discusses the general relationship between ‘rights’ and ‘justice’, and the obstacles to any theory of intergenerational justice. (shrink)

Generations are not homogeneous entities and are composed of individuals and nations that have conflicting interests in the way in which resources are allocated among competing uses. This chapter discusses whether ‘the environment’, or ‘nature’, should enjoy special status in any allocation; whether the economist's approach is too anthropocentric; the concept of ‘intrinsic’ values; and the application of these concepts to environmental valuation. It is argued that while many environmental assets are ‘public goods’, so that the free market is unlikely (...) to supply the socially optimal amount, the same applies to many other things, such as public health or education services or the arts, not to mention the fact that most people in the world are, anyway, in dire need of a simple increase in their ability to buy simple basic private goods. This means that the allocation of resources to environmental objectives ought to take into account some form of cost‐benefit analysis. (shrink)

This article is an attempt to shortly outline the approaches to the mind-body problem that are currently discussed within psychology. In the introduction the attitude of a contemporary psychologist to the mind-body problem is assessed. It seems that due to the functional approach, that for the last 50 years prevailed (especially in cognitive psychology), the mind-body issue is not central to psychological thinking, and in the investigation of many problems researchers can abstract away from it. Next, three approaches to the (...) mind-body problem viewed from a perspective of the embodiment of a symbolic (and/or symbolically described) mind are briefly sketched. The already "traditional", symbolic information-processing approach in contrasted with 1) an approach that accepts both symbolic and dynamic description of mind, analyzes their relation, and advocates the indispensability of symbols; and 2) an approach that agrees that brain is a dynamical device but still cannot see the possibility of the same level description for the brain and its emergent properties. Neither approach, of course, offers a definitive solution to the mind-body problem. What they try to do is take away some of the "formal", "digital", "syntactic" properties of symbols, make them more "semantic" and "embodied", and show how they relate to the dynamics of the cognitive system. In conclusion of the article a supposition is made that the growing acknowledgement of the role of semantics and embodiment in description of symbolic systems (which means abandoning functionalist assumption), may result in a greater involvement in the mind/body problem even in those areas of psychology, in which previously scientists could just turn their back on it. (shrink)

Because of its elegant simplicity, the Arabidopsis root has become a model for studying plant organogenesis. In this review we focus on recent results indicating the importance of signaling in root development. A role for positional information in root cell specification has been demonstrated by ablation analyses. Through mutational analysis, genes have been identified that play a role in radial pattern formation. The embryonic phenotypes of these mutants raised the possibility that division patterns in post‐embryonic roots are dependent on signaling (...) that originates during embryonic development. Analysis of expression of the SCARECROW gene indicates that it may play a role in this ‘top‐down’ signaling process. Characterization of root epidermis development has led to the identification of negative regulators of root‐hair formation. These appear to set up a prepattern which is reinforced by signaling by plant hormones. (shrink)

Arguments favoring the existence of extraterrestrial intelligence nearly always contain an overt appeal to big numbers, often combined with a covert reliance on generalization from a single instance. In this paper I examine both motifs, and consider whether big numbers might actually make palatable otherwise implausible single-case inductions. In the end, the dispute between believers and skeptics is seen to boil down to a conflict of intuitions which can barely be engaged, let alone resolved, given our present state of knowledge.

Rather than focus on effects, the isolatable and measureable outcomes of events and interventions, the papers assembled here offer different perspectives on the affective dimension of the meaning and politics of human/non-human relations. The authors begin by drawing attention to the constructed discontinuity between humans and non-humans, and to the kinds of knowledge and socialities that this discontinuity sustains, including those underpinned by nature-culture, subject-object, body-mind, individual-society polarities. The articles presented track human/non-human relations through different domains, including: humans/non-humans in history (...) and animal welfare science (Fudge and Buller); the relationship between the way we live, the effects on our natural environment and contested knowledges about ‘nature’ (Whatmore); choreographies of everyday life and everyday science practices with non-human animals such as horses, meerkats, mice, and wolves (Latimer, Candea, Davies, Despret). Each paper also goes on to offer different perspectives on the human/non-human not just as division, or even as an asymmetrical relation, but as relations that are mutually affective, however invisible and inexpressible in the domain of science. Thus the collection contributes to new epistemologies/ontologies that undercut the usual ordering of relations and their dichotomies, particularly in that dominant domain of contemporary culture that we call science. Indeed, in their impetus to capture ‘affect’, the collection goes beyond the usual turn towards a more inclusive ontology, and contributes to the radical shift in the epistemology and philosophy of science’s terms of engagement. (shrink)

Joanna Demers argues that Houellebecqs apocalypse can be understood as a system analogous to Hegels, and interrogates the ethics of such a system.

The current academic discipline of philosophy frequently emphasizes historical aspects of philosophy. Many writers claim that the history of philosophy is indispensable to philosophy. Of the three sorts of reasons for this indispensability - pragmatic, homely, and farfetched - only the third sort holds up. Even the homely reasons point only to the usefulness of the study of the history of philosophy to the practice of philosophy, not its indispensability. The main pragmatic reason for studying the history of philosophy is (...) that most philosophical scholars are also studying it. This is not an enduring reason. The chief farfetched reason for studying philosophy historically involves seeing the philosophical activity as one possessing the characteristics of a self on which psychoanalysis can operate. Thus history serves to summon up "repressed" events in philosophy's past. The analogy here is strained and the goal obscure. Homely reasons are that history provides contemporary philosophers with role models and inspiration, as well as warnings of the pitfalls of trains of thought. The history of philosophy is not unimportant for philosophy, just overemphasized. The implications of this conclusion for the academic practice and teaching of philosophy is substantial. (shrink)

Each year thousands of individuals enrol in clinical trials as healthy volunteers to earn money. Some of them pursue research participation as a full-time or at least a part-time job. They call themselves professional or semiprofessional guinea pigs. The practice of paying healthy volunteers raises numerous ethical concerns. Different payment models have been discussed in literature. Dickert and Grady argue for a wage-payment model. This model gives research subjects a standardised hourly wage, and it is based on an assumption that (...) research participation is morally indistinguishable from other forms of unskilled labour. In this paper, I will challenge this assumption. I will argue that human guinea pigging has particular characteristics which taken together make it significantly different from other forms of labour. Participation in research is skill-independent. Healthy volunteers are valuable not because they are skilful persons, but because they are human bodies. The role of research volunteers is mainly passive. They are not asked to produce goods or deliver services. They are paid for enduring unpleasant, painful and risky interventions performed by investigators. Research volunteering involves inherent risks and uncertainties, and subjects have little or no control over their minimisation and materialisation. I conclude that participation in clinical research is a specific kind of activity. It is more like renting out one’s body to strangers, than working. Thus, research participation should not be treated on par with other forms of employment. (shrink)

Reigning regulatory frameworks for biomedical research impose on researchers and research ethics committees an obligation to protect research participants from risks that are unnecessary, disproportionate to potential research benefits, and non-minimized. Where the research has no potential to produce results of direct benefit to the subjects and the subjects are unable to give consent, these requirements are strengthened by an additional condition, that risks should not exceed a certain minimal threshold. In this article, I address the question of whether there (...) should be limits of permissible risks in non-therapeutic research involving competent and healthy subjects. Some commentators argue that competent and informed individuals should have a right to participate even in extremely risky research and that research ethics committees should never reject studies because they are too dangerous. To use David Shaw's expression, competent volunteers should have ‘a right to participate in high-risk research’. I argue that this idea is ill-founded, as it does not take into account the social mission and complex collaborative nature of research practice as well as the inequity of power between researchers and subjects. Imposition of limits on permissible risks for healthy volunteers is justified by the need to protect research enterprise and the need to protect the weaker party, namely the subjects. Also, I suggest that the best way to set boundaries on research risks is to leave the judgment of risk acceptability to research ethics committees. (shrink)

The author illustrates, with the aid of case studies, the content of a social and moral curriculum, the role of the teacher and the children.

The David Lewis’s article concerns the issue of penal substitution in the dual context of the contemporary system of criminal law, in which punishment does not perform a compensatory function, and in the context of the Christian interpretation of Christ’s death as Atonement. It may seem that we do not believe in penal substitution, but in fact we do believe in it selectively. There are Christians who believe that Christ’s death is a payment of the debt of punishment owed by (...) the sinners, but do not believe that a murderer’s friend can serve on his behalf a death sentence. Most of us believe in penal substitution with reference to fines but not other kinds of punishment. In both cases the beliefs concerning penal substitution are clearly inconsistent. However, if selective acceptance of penal substitution is so common, perhaps it makes sense after all. (shrink)

Paying research subjects for their participation in biomedical studies is an increasingly common and acceptable practice. Nevertheless, it continues to raise numerous conceptual, ethical, and pract...

The question of whether AI systems such as robots can or should be afforded moral agency or patiency is not one amenable either to discovery or simple reasoning, because we as societies constantly reconstruct our artefacts, including our ethical systems. Consequently, the place of AI systems in society is a matter of normative, not descriptive ethics. Here I start from a functionalist assumption, that ethics is the set of behaviour that maintains a society. This assumption allows me to exploit the (...) theoretical biology of sociality and autonomy to explain our moral intuitions. From this grounding I extend to consider possible ethics for maintaining either human- or of artefact-centred societies. I conclude that while constructing AI systems as either moral agents or patients is possible, neither is desirable. In particular, I argue that we are unlikely to construct a coherent ethics in which it it is ethical to afford AI moral subjectivity. We are therefore obliged not to build AI we are obliged to. (shrink)

Knowledge about aspects that influence recovery and adaptation in the postacute phase of disabling health events is key to understanding how best to provide appropriate rehabilitation and health services. Qualitative longitudinal research makes it possible to look for patterns, key time points and critical moments that could be vital for interventions and supports. However, strategies that support robust data management and analysis for longitudinal qualitative research in health‐care are not well documented in the literature. This article reviews three challenges encountered (...) in a large longitudinal qualitative descriptive study about experiences of recovery and adaptation after traumatic brain injury in New Zealand, and the strategies and technologies used to address them. These were (i) tracking coding and analysis decisions during an extended analysis period; (ii) navigating interpretations over time and in response to new data; and (iii) exploiting data volume and complexity. Concept mapping during coding review, a considered combination of information technologies, employing both cross‐sectional and narrative analysis, and an expectation that subanalyses would be required for key topics helped us manage the study in a way that facilitated useful and novel insights. These strategies could be applied in other qualitative longitudinal studies in healthcare inquiry to optimise data analysis and stimulate important insights. (shrink)

Contemporary debate suggests that the new genetics may be changing ideas about the body and what it is to be human. Specifically, there are notions that the new genetics seems to erode the ideas that underpin modernity, such as the figure of the integrated, discrete, conscious individual body-self. Holding these ideas against the practices of genetic medicine, however, this article suggests a quite different picture; one that does not erase, but helps to keep in play, some crucial tenets of humanism. (...) The article examines how the genetic clinic constructs clinical pictures as new forms of portraiture: assemblages in which multiple and heterogeneous images of bodies and their parts are juxtaposed. Rather than these portraits just making the distributed and hybrid nature of personhood explicit, shifts in ground mean that what is being portrayed is the possibility of a ‘syndrome–genotype’ relation. At first sight this appears as a straightforward geneticization of the body and the unravelling of the figure of the individual. But the article illustrates how, at the same time as the portraits of syndrome–genotypes are made up of many heterogeneous parts, the clinic still keeps in play an idea of persons that remains, unlike their bodies, much more than the sum of their parts. All the parts that make up the body of the person can still, at moments, be transcended, to refigure the human: the complex individual of humanist thought. (shrink)

Unprecedented advances in medicine, genetic engineering, and demographic forecasting raise new questions that strain the categories and assumptions of traditional ethical theories. Heyd's approach resolves many paradoxes in intergenerational justice, while offering a major test case for the profound problems of the limits of ethics and the nature of value.

In this issue, our authors examine premodern art and theories of art, which preceded Descartes and the onset of philosophical modernity.

How leaders and managers respond to not knowing is highly relevant given the complex, ambiguous, and chaotic business environment of the twenty-first century. Drawing on the literature from a variety of disciplines, the paper explores the dominant, unfavorable conceptualization of not knowing. The authors present some potential ethical implications of a negative view of not knowing and suggest how organizations would benefit from identifying any unhelpful aspects of the culture that may encourage unethical, undesirable, and/or hasty actions in situations of (...) not knowing. The paper specifically illustrates how patience, courage, honesty, integrity, and humility are integral to negative capability in the contexts of not knowing. Finally, the paper calls for deeper inquiry into the role of virtue ethics in preparing managers and leaders for not knowing and urges organizations to embrace negative capability in not knowing rather than engaging in damaging delusion. (shrink)

Conferring legal personhood on purely synthetic entities is a very real legal possibility, one under consideration presently by the European Union. We show here that such legislative action would be morally unnecessary and legally troublesome. While AI legal personhood may have some emotional or economic appeal, so do many superficially desirable hazards against which the law protects us. We review the utility and history of legal fictions of personhood, discussing salient precedents where such fictions resulted in abuse or incoherence. We (...) conclude that difficulties in holding “electronic persons” accountable when they violate the rights of others outweigh the highly precarious moral interests that AI legal personhood might protect. (shrink)

Hannah Arendt began her scholarly career with an exploration of Saint Augustine's concept of _caritas_, or neighborly love, written under the direction of Karl Jaspers and the influence of Martin Heidegger. After her German academic life came to a halt in 1933, Arendt carried her dissertation into exile in France, and years later took the same battered and stained copy to New York. During the late 1950s and early 1960s, as she was completing or reworking her most influential studies of (...) political life, Arendt was simultaneously annotating and revising her dissertation on Augustine, amplifying its argument with terms and concepts she was using in her political works of the same period. The disseration became a bridge over which Arendt traveled back and forth between 1929 Heidelberg and 1960s New York, carrying with her Augustine's question about the possibility of social life in an age of rapid political and moral change. In _Love and Saint Augustine_, Joanna Vecchiarelli Scott and Judith Chelius Stark make this important early work accessible for the first time. Here is a completely corrected and revised English translation that incorporates Arendt's own substantial revisions and provides additional notes based on letters, contracts, and other documents as well as the recollections of Arendt's friends and colleagues during her later years. (shrink)

This article argues that conscious attention exists not so much for selecting an immediate action as for using the current task to focus specialized learning for the action-selection mechanism and predictive models on tasks and environmental contingencies likely to affect the conscious agent. It is perfectly possible to build this sort of a system into machine intelligence, but it would not be strictly necessary unless the intelligence needs to learn and is resource-bounded with respect to the rate of learning versus (...) the rate of relevant environmental change. Support for this theory is drawn from scientific research and AI simulations. Consequences are discussed with respect to self-consciousness and ethical obligations to and for AI. (shrink)

Life typically becomes an object of reflection when it is seen to be under threat. In particular, humans have a tendency to engage in thinking about life (instead of just continuing to live it) when being confronted with the prospect of death: be it the death of individuals due to illness, accident or old age; the death of whole ethnic or national groups in wars and other forms of armed conflict; but also of whole populations, be they human or nonhuman. (...) Even though Minimal Ethics for the Anthropocene is first and foremost concerned with life--understood as both a biological and social phenomenon--it is the narrative about the impending death of the human population (i.e., about the extinction of the human species), that provides a context for its argument. "Anthropocene" names a geo-historical period in which humans are said to have become the biggest threat to life on earth. However, rather than as a scientific descriptor, the term serves here primarily as an ethical injunction to think critically about human and nonhuman agency in the universe. Restrained in tone yet ambitious in scope, the book takes some steps towards outlining a minimal ethics thought on a universal scale. The task of such minimal ethics is to consider how humans can assume responsibility for various occurrences in the universe, across different scales, and how they can respond to the tangled mesh of connections and relations unfolding in it. Its goal is not so much to tell us how to live but rather to allow us to rethink "life" and what we can do with it, in whatever time we have left. The book embraces a speculative mode of thinking that is more akin to the artist's method; it also includes a photographic project by the author."--Publisher's description. (shrink)

The significance of political-economic context for scientific citizenship is argued through an analysis of New Zealand’s Royal Commission on Genetic Modification. My intention is not to provide an account of why the commission came to the decisions it did but to illustrate how the political-economic context and the culture of regulatory science both exacerbate public concerns about unacknowledged uncertainty and commercial influence and make it difficult for those concerns to influence the outcomes of public dialogues. The discursive flexibility of science (...) as alternately predictive and provisional silences concerns about uncertainty, while a further interpretive choice of science as the autonomous activities of individuals unconstrained by political-economic context occludes the nature of concerns about commercial influence. Rather than the increasingly prevalent focus on processes of engagement, I argue that it is essential that researchers in this area attend to how public dialogue is placed in relation to the cultures and structures of regulatory science and neoliberalism. (shrink)

In contrast to most publications on the ethics of paying research subjects, which start by identifying and analyzing major ethical concerns raised by the practice (in particular, risks of undue inducement and exploitation) and end with a set of—more or less well-justified—ethical recommendations for using payment schemes immune to these problems, this paper offers a systematic, principle-based ethical analysis of the practice. It argues that researchers have aprima faciemoral obligation to offer payment to research subjects, which stems from the principle (...) of social beneficence. This principle constitutes an ethical “spine” of the practice. Other ethical principles of research ethics (respect for autonomy, individual beneficence, and justice/fairness) make up an ethical “skeleton” of morally sound payment schemes by providing additional moral reasons for offering participants (1) recompense for reasonable expenses; and (2a) remuneration conceptualized as a reward for their valuable contribution, provided (i) it meets standards of equality, adequacy and non-exploitation, and (ii) it is not overly attractive (i.e., it does not constitute undue inducement for participation or retention, and does not encourage deceptive behaviors); or (2b) remuneration conceptualized as a market-driven price, provided (i) it is necessary and designed to help the study achieve its social and scientific goals, (ii) it does not reinforce wider social injustices and inequalities; (iii) it meets the requirement of non-exploitation; and (iv) it is not overly attractive. The principle of justice provides a strong ethical reason for not offering recompenses for lost wages (or loss of other reasonably expected profits). (shrink)

Health research ethics training is highly variable, with some researchers receiving little to none, which is why ethical frameworks represent critical tools for ethical deliberation and guiding responsible practice. However, these documents' voluntary and abstract nature can leave health researchers seeking more operationalised guidance, such as in the form of checklists, even though this approach does not support reflection on the meaning of principles nor their implications. In search of more reflective and participatory practices in a pandemic context with distance (...) learning, this study explored whether co-design could support engagement and reflection on ethical principles amongst early-stage health researchers. In a pilot test using the Swiss Personalized Health Network's ethical framework for Responsible Usage of Personal Data in Health Research as a case study, we engaged health researchers to design visuals of four ethical principles. In two online workshops, participants (N = 10, N = 8) completed activities such as individual reflection, collaborative ideation, sketching, prototyping, discussion, and feedback. Our analysis shows that the co-design process helped foster in-depth engagement and reflection on the meaning and relevance of the SPHN ethical principles. Participants reported enjoying the experience, and most felt that visuals could motivate engagement with ethical frameworks. This study demonstrates the feasibility of a participatory, design-oriented approach to promote engagement with research ethics among early-career health researchers and highlights key challenges and lessons learned. In doing so, it lays the foundation for future research to investigate the impact of design-oriented, participatory learning to foster reflection and deliberation in ethics education. (shrink)

A CHOICE Outstanding Academic Title 2012! Contemporary picturebooks open up spaces for philosophical dialogues between people of all ages. As works of art, picturebooks offer unique opportunities to explore ideas and to create meaning collaboratively. This book considers censorship of certain well-known picturebooks, challenging the assumptions on which this censorship is based. Through a lively exploration of children's responses to these same picturebooks the authors paint a way of working philosophically based on respectful listening and creative and authentic interactions, rather (...) than scripted lessons. This dialogical process challenges much current practice in education. The authors propose that a courageous and critical practice of listening is central to the facilitation of mutually educative dialogue. This book will be of interest to scholars and students of education studies, philosophy of education, literacy teaching and learning, children's literature, childhood and pedagogy. (shrink)

A blueprint for social change showing how we can reverse the destructive attitudes that threaten our world.