How much injustice and oppression must be tolerated before a revolution is justified? In theory, the United States’ political structure, by design, makes the question of revolution obsolete: by putting political power into the hands of the people via democratic mechanisms such as voting, the division of power among separate branches of government, and representative influence and control, there should be no need for revolution because everything the government does either has the consent of the people or is (relatively swiftly) (...) checked by their dissent. In practice, the United States’ political structure has failed to bring about such democratic justice. Given structural, systemic failures of justice (which promise to be ongoing), it is worth asking when, if ever, a revolution in the United States would be justified. To begin answering this question, we first turn to three traditional theories of revolution prominent in Western political theory, all of which have serious theoretical and practical problems, many of which are exacerbated by the contemporary American context in which our discussion is situated. We conclude that, if the aim of revolution is to bring about justice more equally enjoyed by all, then classic Western justifications of revolution are deeply flawed and possibly untenable. We propose a Confucian-inspired account of revolution, which promises to provide criteria for engaging in revolution that are neither solely directly democratic nor completely rights-based. This relational, virtue-theoretic account of revolution enables us to take into consideration not only the role of government, the nature of the ruler, and the nature of the governed, but also the nature of the relationship between the ruler and the governed. We contend that our proposal provides more, and better, resources for thinking through when, and under what conditions, a revolution would be justified in the contemporary United States. (shrink)

Recent events have directed public attention to the issue of whether there should be so-called “statutes of limitations” on oppressive transgressions committed in the past. We ask: in such cases, is sociopolitical forgiveness (or “forgetfulness”) owed to transgressors? We detail two moral-political narratives that might help address this issue: one constructed around the values and perspectives of justice, rights, and autonomy-based views (the JRA approach), and another oriented around the values and perspectives of care ethics, virtue ethics, and relationality, drawing (...) additionally on several non-Western traditions including Buddhist and Confucian thought (the CVR approach). We maintain that while each approach has strengths, their essential tenets lead to serious shortcomings, such that neither is able to provide a wholly satisfactory solution to this pressing sociopolitical question. The resulting stalemate should be taken as a call to action for new theorizing by social and political theorists. How should we, as a society, handle the fact that people can do oppressive things at one age and then either forget about them or sincerely regret them at another age? Is there another approach out there that might solve this problem? (shrink)

Court D. Lewis, author of Repentance and the Right to Forgiveness, presents a rights-based theory of ethics grounded in eirenéism, a needs-based theory of rights (inspired by Nicholas Wolterstorff) that seeks peaceful flourishing for all moral agents. This approach creates a moral relationship between victims and wrongdoers such that wrongdoers owe victims compensatory obligations. However, one further result is that wrongdoers may be owed forgiveness by victims. This leads to the “repugnant implication” that victims may be wrongdoers who do (...) not forgive. Author Lewis addresses the “repugnant implication” by showing that victims are obligated to work toward forgiveness, if not forgiveness itself. Critic Gregory L. Bock argues that victims are not the only ones who can forgive, that the personal dimensions of forgiveness are overlooked, and that the force of the “repugnancy implication” may be questioned. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock supports a virtue ethics framework. Instead of rights-based eirenéism, Bock encourages virtue ethics. Critic David Boersema raises questions about the binding nature of relationships, the dependency of flourishing upon forgiveness, and the nature of needs or rights. Boersema also questions the wisdom of a rights-based approach to forgiveness. Critic Jennifer Kling asks whether a rights-based approach is necessary to ground obligations to meet the needs of others: why not an ethics of care? If a rights-based approach is taken, perhaps a wrongdoer is obligated to not make forgiveness a life good. By disengaging this obligation, we avoid constraining a victim’s work toward forgiveness, especially when the wrongdoing is oppressive. Author Lewis responds to these objections. (shrink)

“I would prefer not”HERMAN MELVILLE, BARTLEBY THE SCRIVENER: A STORY OF WALL STREET (1853), reprinted in THE PIAZZA TALES 32, 48 (London, Sampson Low, Son & Co. 1856). Scholars have recently challenged the claim in classical deterrence theory that law influences behavior only through the expected sanction imposed. Some go further and argue that law may also “shape preferences,” changing people’s wants and values. In this Article, we analyze existing claims that criminal and civil law alter preferences and conclude that (...) none suggest that the law shapes preferences. We first clarify this preference-shaping claim by elaborating the structure of rational choice theory generally and “preference” in particular. We then investigate three mechanisms of legal influence suggested by the preference-shaping literature: (1) the “serious harm” mechanism; (2) the “social norm” mechanism; and (3) the “self-improvement” mechanism. We then show that each of these mechanisms operates by changing the agent’s beliefs about the attributes or consequences of her choice options rather than by changing her preferences. (shrink)

Contemporary arguments about private paramilitary organizations often focus on the threat of physical violence that they pose to the state: if such organizations garner enough physical power, then they can overtake the state via violent coup. Inspired by the legalist scholar Han Feizi’s position, we contend that such organizations also represent a sociopolitical, existential threat to the state. Specifically, their tendency for ideological expansion and subsequent gathering of political influence undermines state institutions, even without the use of overt physical force. (...) Consequently, the sociopolitical enterprise of having a unified, stable state is incompatible with the existence of, and public political support for, private paramilitary organizations, regardless of their actual or potential physical power. This argument succeeds regardless of the moral status of such paramilitary groups. Such groups, when they match the essential components of the description Han Feizi provides, are practically and politically antithetical to the integrity of the state. (shrink)

Current approaches to contemporary political philosophy are disproportionately western, and the need for more diverse and global perspectives is urgent. To address this imbalance Colin J. Lewis and Jennifer Kling take up a series of contemporary topics in political philosophy and consider how the application of classical Chinese thought can engender new insights and enable progress on some of the thorniest sociopolitical issues. They argue that classical Chinese political theories and views have much to say that is relevant (...) to our contemporary life, and buttress their argument with case studies. Each chapter takes up a particular contemporary sociopolitical issue, describes standard Western approaches to it, and then applies classical Chinese thought to the task of either re-framing it, or suggesting a novel solution. -/- The book engages with and makes progress on several current sociopolitical issues, including the construction and deconstruction of political narratives, the legal standing of robots, the relationships between people, communities, and the environment, the funding (or defunding) of police, the status of private militias, and the question of justified revolution in liberal democracies, among others. While classical Chinese philosophy has been previously dismissed in some circles as inaccessible or banal, Lewis and Kling argue that, to the contrary, it is a powerful lens through which to view and dissect today's challenges. (shrink)

Including more than 150 color images—several rarely seen before—drawn from the Royal Collection and the J. Paul Getty Museum, this volume accompanies an exhibition of the same name, on view at the J. Paul Getty Museum from February 4 to ...

Throughout the biological and biomedical sciences there is a growing need for, prescriptive ‘minimum information’ (MI) checklists specifying the key information to include when reporting experimental results are beginning to find favor with experimentalists, analysts, publishers and funders alike. Such checklists aim to ensure that methods, data, analyses and results are described to a level sufficient to support the unambiguous interpretation, sophisticated search, reanalysis and experimental corroboration and reuse of data sets, facilitating the extraction of maximum value from data sets (...) them. However, such ‘minimum information’ MI checklists are usually developed independently by groups working within representatives of particular biologically- or technologically-delineated domains. Consequently, an overview of the full range of checklists can be difficult to establish without intensive searching, and even tracking thetheir individual evolution of single checklists may be a non-trivial exercise. Checklists are also inevitably partially redundant when measured one against another, and where they overlap is far from straightforward. Furthermore, conflicts in scope and arbitrary decisions on wording and sub-structuring make integration difficult. This presents inhibit their use in combination. Overall, these issues present significant difficulties for the users of checklists, especially those in areas such as systems biology, who routinely combine information from multiple biological domains and technology platforms. To address all of the above, we present MIBBI (Minimum Information for Biological and Biomedical Investigations); a web-based communal resource for such checklists, designed to act as a ‘one-stop shop’ for those exploring the range of extant checklist projects, and to foster collaborative, integrative development and ultimately promote gradual integration of checklists. (shrink)

The editors of the JRE solicited short essays on the COVID‐19 pandemic from a group of scholars of religious ethics that reflected on how the field might help them make sense of the complex religious, cultural, ethical, and political implications of the pandemic, and on how the pandemic might shape the future of religious ethics.

The increasing use of pharmacotherapy raises specific ethical concerns for psychologists working with vulnerable populations. Due to a shortage of trained specialists, professionals without training in mental health, such as primary care providers, are increasingly prescribing and monitoring psychotropic medications. Vulnerable populations face additional barriers to mental health treatment and are at heightened risk when these factors intersect. Hence, these patients experience unique barriers to receiving optimal psychopharmacological care and are differentially vulnerable to deleterious outcomes associated with misdiagnosis and overmedication. (...) Taken together, these factors fuel inequities in the access, quality, and utilization of mental health care. Psychologists working with these patients are ethically mandated to protect patients from harm and ensure equitable care across patient populations. Specifically, psychologists must respond to the dilemma of how to effectively treat patients within these vulnerable populations who have been misdiagnosed or poorly medicated while remaining within the bounds of their competence. This article recommends pathways to address these dilemmas through education, training, research, and advocacy. (shrink)

Actualist counterpart theory replaces David Lewis’s concrete possible worlds and individuals with ersatz worlds and individuals, but retains counterpart theory about de re modality. While intuitively attractive, this view has been rejected for two main reasons: the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. I argue that in insisting that ersatz individuals play the same role as Lewisian individuals, actualists commit the particularist fallacy. The actualist should not require stand-ins for every Lewisian individual. Ersatz individuals should instead be construed (...) as representations of actually existing qualitative ways for individuals to be, or qualitative properties individuals can instantiate. This necessitates changes elsewhere. Non-instrumental uses of Kripke semantics and standard counterpart semantics also require stand-ins for particular non-actual individuals. I argue that the actualist should instead adopt a non-standard counterpart semantics that more clearly illuminates the role that actual properties and relations play in explaining de re possibilities and necessities. The result is an intuitive and forceful reply to both the problem of indiscernibles and the Humphrey objection. (shrink)

Disturbances of consciousness, including fluctuations in attention and awareness, are a common and clinically important symptom in dementia with Lewy bodies. In the present study we investigate potential mechanisms of such disturbances of consciousness in a clinicopathological study evaluating specific components of the cholinergic system. [3H]Epibatidine binding to the high-affinity nicotinic receptor in the temporal cortex differentiated DLB cases with and without DOC, being 62–66% higher in those with DOC. The were no differences between DLB patients with or without DOC (...) in 125I-labeled α-bungaratoxin binding to the low-affinity nicotinic receptor, [3H]pirenzepine binding to the muscarinic M1 receptor, or in choline acetyltransferase activity. These findings provide support for the hypothesis that cholinergic activity is an important neural correlate if consciousness and suggest a mechanism of DOC in DLB involving alterations in the nicotinic receptor, composed of predominantly α4 and β2 subunits. (shrink)

In her highly thought-provoking article, “The End of Personhood,” Jennifer Blumenthal-Barby (2024) presents a number of reasons why bioethics should “… end talk about personhood.” Some of these rea...

In this introduction to a special section on the philosophy of Bat-Ami Bar On, guest editor Court Lewis introduces Jennifer Kling’s article on equitable resettlement of refugees, Wim Laven’s article on meaningful political citizenship, and his own work on the analysis of the violent threat of citizen culture-warriors.

Ginger Hoffman and Jennifer Hansen’s study of gender dynamics in psychiatric disability memoirs makes several fruitful moves for the study of psychic diversity. Perhaps the most important is that the article encourages analytic philosophers to contribute to understanding how individual mental life is affected by the larger cultural context—which we can think of as the “mind/culture” problem. This is an important move because, for the most part, analytic philosophers have paid more attention to the mind/body problem than they have (...) to the mind/culture problem. Hoffman and Hansen are right that it would be valuable for analytic philosophy to join in the study of this equally complicated conceptual problem.... (shrink)

Jennifer Hawkins (2024) offers two cases that challenge traditional accounts of decision-making capacity, according to which respect for a medical decision turns on an individual’s cognitive capacities at the time the decision is made (Hawkins 2024; Appelbaum and Grisso 1988). In each of her described cases (involving anorexia nervosa and grief, respectively), a patient makes a decision that—although instrumentally rational at the time—does not reflect the patient’s longer-term values due to being in a particular psychological state. Importantly, this state (...) does not impair the patient’s cognition, but rather predisposes them to make a decision that conflicts with their own broader values, beliefs, or desires. (shrink)

A primary intention of our original manuscript was to provide examples of both harmful and helpful influences of one cultural artifact—depression memoirs—on who female readers take their selves to be, and who they may actually end up being. Bradley Lewis beautifully articulated our strategy as “chart[ing] out … conflicting vectors” : that is, delineating select examples of how certain outer narratives conveyed in depression memoirs may kindle sexist and sanist modes of being. Our hope was that making these vectors (...) explicit could ultimately be liberating for some individuals by “opening up... (shrink)

Derek Parfit's “reductionist” account of personal identity (including the rejection of anything like a soul) is coupled with the rejection of a commonsensical intuition of essential self-unity, as in his defense of the counter-intuitive claim that “identity does not matter.” His argument for this claim is based on reflection on the possibility of personal fission. To the contrary, Simon Blackburn claims that the “unity reaction” to fission has an absolute grip on practical reasoning. Now David Lewis denied Parfit's claim (...) that reductionism contravenes common sense, so I revisit the debate between Parfit and Lewis, showing why Parfit wins it. Is reductionism about persons then inherently at odds with the unity reaction? Not necessarily; David Velleman presents a reductionist theory according to which fission does not conflict with the unity reaction. Nonetheless, relying on the distinction between person level descriptions of first-person states and the first-person perspective itself, I argue that Velleman's theory does not eliminate fission-based conflict with the unity reaction. Footnotesa * Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the philosophy departments at Rutgers University and Bowling Green State University. I am indebted to many members of these audiences, and to the other contributors to this volume, for their comments—especially Frank Arntzenius, Michael Bradie, David Copp, John Finnis, Jerry Fodor, Brian Loar, Barry Loewer, Colin McGinn, Fred Miller, Mark Moyer, David Oderberg, Marya Schechtman, David Schmidtz, David Sobel, and Sara Worley. Special thanks to David Sanford. I am also grateful to graduate students in my seminar at Bowling Green during the spring of 2003, for urging me to take seriously the grip of the unity reaction; I am especially grateful for the comments of Nico Maloberti, Jonathan Miller, John Milliken, Robyn Peabody, Jennifer Sproul, Jessica Teaman, and Sherisse Webb. (shrink)

A characteristically Humean pattern of explanation starts by claiming that we have a certain kind of feeling in response to some objects and then takes our having such feelings to provide an explanation of how we come to think of those objects as having some feature that we would not otherwise be able to think of them as having. This core pattern of explanation is what leads Simon Blackburn to dub Hume ‘the first great projectivist.’ This paper critically examines the (...) philosophical and textual basis for interpreting Hume as a causal projectivist. I argue that projectivist interpretations of Hume's account of causation are motivated by two convictions: that beliefs about causation, according to Hume, are not just beliefs about regularity relations and that believing that two events are necessarily connected, according to Hume, is not merely having a belief about something that occurs in one's mind. I suggest that the latter conviction is worth revisiting, both for textual and philosophical reasons. (shrink)

The focus of this paper will be to examine the implications that a “practical” approach to conceptual engineering might have for the “traditional” conception of philosophy as uncovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest. In doing so, I will be building on the ideas of a figure that many take to be the first major philosopher to write on conceptual engineering: Rudolf Carnap. Though the current wave of interest in conceptual engineering goes back less than a decade, many conceptual engineers (...) have found precedent for their views in Carnap’s characterization of what he called “explication.” Interestingly, however, not nearly as much attention has been paid to another Carnapian thesis which seems to me to have deep relevance to methodological questions about conceptual engineering. I have in mind here the distinction between internal and external questions proposed in “Empiricism, Semantics and Ontology” (1950b) and the accompanying claim that external questions lack cognitive content and can be cogently approached only as a matter of pragmatic decision-making. This is the aspect of Carnap’s views upon which I propose to build. I'll first make the case that there is a suggestive similarity between Carnap’s claim that external questions are matters of pragmatic choice and the practical conceptual engineer’s claim that engineering success should be characterized in terms of suitability to a function or purpose. After that, I'll look at potential worries about the Carnapian distinction—including, e.g., the concern that it relies on the analytic/synthetic distinction. Finally, I will propose a somewhat modified and expanded version of the distinction and examine its consequences for the thesis that philosophy aims at discovering truths about phenomena of philosophical interest. (shrink)

While there is a growing body of work on moral issues and global governance in the fields of global justice and international relations, little work has connected principles of global health justice with those of global health governance for a theory of global health. Such a theory would enable analysis and evaluation of the current global health system and would ethically and empirically ground proposals for reforming it to more closely align with moral values. Global health governance has been framed (...) as an issue of national security, human security, human rights, and global public goods. The global health governance literature is essentially untethered to a theorized framework to illuminate or evaluate governance. This article ties global health justice and ethics to principles for governing the global health realm, developing a theoretical framework for global and domestic institutions and actors. (shrink)

Like more than two hundred thousand other Americans, George Floyd howled horribly for air before his death. But his breathlessness was not born from a virus. He was murdered with the burden of anti...

In this paper, I draw a parallel between the stability of physical systems and that of economic ones, such as the US financial system. I argue that the use of equilibrium assumptions is central to the analysis of dynamic behavior for both kinds of systems, and that we ought to interpret such idealizing strategies as footholds for causal exploration and explanation. Our considerations suggest multi-scale modeling as a natural home for such reasoning strategies, which can provide a backdrop for the (...) assessment and prevention of financial crises. Equilibrium assumptions are critical elements of the epistemic scaffolding that make up multi-scale models, which we should understand as a means of constructing explanations of dynamic behavior. (shrink)

Previous research reveals that when leaders enact environmentally specific transformational leadership, they positively affect corporate environmental responsibility. While this research provides important insights into how leaders create and shape corporate environmental responsibility, confidence in the validity of these findings is limited because the psychometric properties of the measurement of environmentally specific transformational leadership has not yet been assessed. The goal of the current research was to develop and validate a measure of environmentally specific transformational leadership. To this end, four studies (...) were conducted, which together produced a reliable and valid scale from which future research can stem. Theoretical and practical limitations are discussed. (shrink)

Enough is known about pattern formation in development to encourage investigations at the molecular level. A pressing need is to understand the molecular basis of positional value, which is similar to determination. It is suggested here that there is a molecular entity which varies in such a way that it corresponds with cell position. Other problems in pattern formation include thresholds, identification of morphogens, and the origin of handedness.

Medical interpreters are indispensable in healthcare, breaking down language barriers to restore autonomy to patients with Limited English Proficiency (LEP). By facilitating clear communication, they enable these patients to understand and make informed choices about their treatment options. However, their role extends beyond translation; medical interpreters also advocate for LEP patients within a healthcare system that can often be unjust. This advocacy can expose interpreters to the very inequities and challenges they strive to overcome on behalf of LEP patients, adversely (...) affecting their own health and well-being. The narratives explored here shed light on these experiences, highlighting the need for systemic changes. By understanding these stories, we can better advocate for reforms that support and value medical interpreters, ultimately improving the health and well-being of both interpreters and the communities they serve. (shrink)

Materializing absence, Jenny Hockey, Carol Komaromy and Kate Woodthorpe -- Never say die: CPR in hospital space, Susie Page -- Making hospice space, Ken Worpole -- Dying spaces in dying places, Carol Komaromy -- The materialities of absence after stillbirth: historical perspectives, Jan Bleyen -- Distributed personhood and the transformation of agency: an anthropological perspective on inquests, Susan Langer -- Behind closed doors? corpses and mourners in English and American funeral premises, Sheila Harper -- Private grief in public spaces: interpreting (...) memorialisation in the contemporary cemetary, Kate Woodthorpe -- Wandering lines and cul-de-sacs: trajectories of ashes in the United Kingdom, Leonie Kellaher, Jenny Hockey and David Prendergast -- Natural burial: the de-materialising of death?, Andy Clayden, Jenny Hockey and Mark Powell -- What will the neighbours say? reactions to field and garden burial, Tony Walter and Clare Gittings -- Memorialising the suicide victim: "walking the walk," Caroline Simone -- Potent reminders: an examination of responses to roadside memorials in Ireland, Una McConville and Regina McQuillan -- Geographies of the spirit world, Douglas J. Davies -- Recovering presence, Jenny Hockey, Carol Komaromy and Kate Woodthorpe. (shrink)