Properties seem to play an important role in causal relations. But philosophers disagree over whether or not properties play their causal or nomic roles essentially. Causal essentialists say that they do, while quidditists deny it. This article surveys these two views, as well as views that try to find a middle ground.

Public recognition of the fragility of the natural systems on which present and future generations depend has prompted calls for the practice of environmental stewardship —calls widely criticised in the environmental ethics literature. Some argue that stewardship 's historical associations entail that it is inherently sexist, speciesist and/or anthropocentric. Others argue that absent belief in a creator to appoint us as stewards and hold us accountable, talk of 'environmental stewardship ' is empty. I review the concept's recent evolution and provide (...) a tentative definition. I argue that so defined, it is not vulnerable to standard criticisms, but is instead a promising way of construing morally decent conduct towards the environment. (shrink)

Proponents of “the affective appeal” :787–812, 2014; Zagzebski in Philos Phenomenol Res 66:104–124, 2003) argue that we can make progress in the longstanding debate about the nature of moral motivation by appealing to the affective dimension of affective episodes such as emotions, which allegedly play either a causal or constitutive role in moral judgements. Specifically, they claim that appealing to affect vindicates a version of Motivational Internalism—roughly, the view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgment and motivation—that is (...) both more empirically respectable and less theoretically controversial than non-affective versions. We here argue that the affective appeal fails: versions of Internalism which appeal to affect are neither more empirically supported, nor clearly less controversial, than versions of Internalism which make no such appeal. Although affect doubtless has an important role to play in explaining moral motivation, we are sceptical that establishing any such role advances the debate. (shrink)

Political corporate social responsibility (PCSR) calls for firms to implement and engage in deliberative democracy processes and structures, addressing governance gaps where governments are unwilling or unable to do so. However, an underlying assumption that the implementation of PCSR will enrich democratic processes in society has been exposed and challenged. In this conceptual article, we explore this challenge by developing a framework to reveal the dynamics of firms’ deliberative democratic processes and structures (meso level), and those at nation state (macro (...) level). Using existing cases as illustrative examples, we demonstrate that despite the public good premise of PCSR theory toward thickening the overall democracy in a society, corporate democratization at meso level can have the opposite effect and may actually erode macro-level democratic control of society and the economy. These findings imply a need for multilevel analysis in PCSR research and greater consideration of state-level public institutions and the responsibilities of business firms toward those institutions. Furthermore, we contribute to the PCSR literature by identifying the disruptive mechanisms associated with these dynamics and outline two alternative perspectives to allow firms to continue to take on political responsibilities. (shrink)

Book synopsis: The book illustrates the concept of action in three different contexts - the justification of actions, people's life history, and pragmatism. The special feature of this book is that a comprehensive view of this kind marks a departure from the atomistic approach of action theory, which in itself raises a number of questions. If actions are not justified by mental states, how can persons then act for reasons? How can persons' actions over time be described, and what is (...) the connection with the question of personal identity? If there is to be a unified understanding of the person, does the practical have to take precedence over the theoretical, and what does this mean for epistemology, for example? The ten contributors to this volume engage in an instructive manner with these and similar questions in the three sections of the book. (shrink)

Categorical perception (CP) refers to how similar things look different depending on whether they are classified as the same category. Many studies demonstrate that adult humans show CP for human emotional faces. It is widely debated whether the effect can be accounted for solely by perceptual differences (structural differences among emotional faces) or whether additional perceiver-based conceptual knowledge is required. In this review, I discuss the phenomenon of CP and key studies showing CP for emotional faces. I then discuss a (...) new model of emotion which highlights how perceptual and conceptual knowledge interact to explain how people see discrete emotions in others’ faces. In doing so, I discuss how language (emotion words included in the paradigm) contribute to CP. (shrink)

Commentators often claim that medical research subjects are coerced into participating in clinical studies. In recent years, such claims have appeared especially frequently in ethical discussions of research in developing countries. Medical research ethics is more important than ever as we move into the 21st century because worldwide the pharmaceutical industry has grown so much and shows no sign of slowing its growth. This means that more people are involved in medical research today than ever before, and in the future (...) even more will be involved. However, despite the pressing need for reflection on research ethics, it is important to carefully identify the concerns we have about research. Otherwise we run the risk that the moral language we use, and which we hear other people use, may do our moral thinking for us. We argue that many recent claims about the occurrence of coercion in medical research are misguided and misuse the word "coercion." We try to identify the real problems, and urge people to attend carefully to the implications of their descriptions of moral problems in research. (shrink)

This volume argues that educational problems have their basis in an ideology of binary opposites often referred to as dualism, and that it is partly because mainstream schooling incorporates dualism that it is unable to facilitate the thinking skills, dispositions and understandings necessary for autonomy, democratic citizenship and leading a meaningful life. Bleazby proposes an approach to schooling termed social reconstruction learning, in which students engage in philosophical inquiries with members of their community in order to reconstruct real social problems, (...) arguing that this pedagogy can better facilitate independent thinking, imaginativeness, emotional intelligence, autonomy, and active citizenship. (shrink)

Returning to John P. Reeder's 1978 essay on “Religious Ethics as a Field and Discipline,” this essay explores debates surrounding the original intentions for the Journal of Religious Ethics (JRE) and for the field of religious ethics, as these have played out over the decades among an influential group of scholars involved with the JRE since its inception: Arthur Dyck, Ronald Green, Stanley Hauerwas, and Jeffrey Stout. While the JRE and its founding mission are in need of ongoing critique and (...) transformation, we might well still affirm the journal's ongoing importance as a site for the negotiation of a commons, the identification of possibilities for shared life, imagined beyond exclusion and domination. (shrink)

Businesses often attempt to demonstrate their commitment to diversity, equity, and inclusion (DEI) by showcasing women in their leadership ranks, most of whom are white. Yet research has shown that organizations confer status and power to women who engage in sexist behavior, which undermines DEI efforts. We sought to examine whether women who engage in racist behavior are also conferred relative status at work. Drawing on theory and research on organizational culture and intersectionality, we predicted that a white woman who (...) expresses anti-Black racism is conferred more status in the workplace than a white woman who does not. A pilot study (N = 30) confirmed that making an anti-Black racist comment at work was judged to be more offensive than making no comment, but only for a white man, not a white woman. Study 1 (N = 330) found that a white woman who made an anti-Black racist comment at work was conferred higher status than a white woman who did not, whereas the opposite held true for a white man, with perceived offensiveness mediating these effects. Study 2 (N = 235) revealed that a white woman who made an anti-racist/pro-Black Lives Matter comment was conferred lower status than a white woman who did not, whereas the opposite held true for a white man. Finally, Study 3 (N = 295) showed that people who endorse racist and sexist beliefs confer more status to a white man than to a white woman regardless of speech, but that people low in racism and sexism confer the highest status to a white woman who engages in anti-Black racist speech. These studies suggest that white women are rewarded for expressing support for beliefs that mirror systemic inequality in the corporate world. We discuss implications for business ethics and directions for future research. (shrink)

Can we extend accuracy-based epistemic utility theory to imprecise credences? There's no obvious way of proceeding: some stipulations will be necessary for either (i) the notion of accuracy or (ii) the epistemic decision rule. With some prima facie plausible stipulations, imprecise credences are always required. With others, they’re always impermissible. Care is needed to reach the familiar evidential view of imprecise credence: that whether precise or imprecise credences are required depends on the character of one's evidence. I propose an epistemic (...) utility theoretic defense of a common view about how evidence places demands on imprecise credence: that your spread of credence should cover the range of chance hypotheses left open by your evidence. I argue that objections to the form of epistemic utility theoretic argument that I use will extend to the standard motivation for epistemically mandatory imprecise credences. (shrink)

Numerous laws have passed to move away from criminalising youth who trade sex. Specialised courts have also been established to support youth. Despite proponents' contention that specialised, trauma-informed courts are less punitive than typical interventions, research is limited. This article explores one specialised dependency court's efforts to assist youth ‘at risk’. Drawing on interviews and ethnographic observations, I argue that laws and trauma-informed court interventions intensify the supervision of youth and families while inadvertently concealing the gendered-racialised effects of child welfare (...) system involvement. Ethnographic findings contribute to sociolegal and anti-carceral feminist research on carceral control beyond the criminal legal system. This work also explores the ethics of carceral-trauma entanglements that accompany decriminalisation’s afterlife. (shrink)

David Rosenthal's higher-order thought theory is one of the most widely argued for of the higher-order accounts of consciousness. I argue that Rosenthal vacillates between two models of the HOT theory. First, I argue that these models employ different concepts of 'state consciousness'; the two concepts each refer to mental state tokens, but in virtue of different properties. In one model, the concept of 'state consciousness' is more consistent with how the term is typically used, both by philosophers and scientists, (...) and in commonsense usage. This model, however, also has its problems. In the second part of the paper, I develop a modified version of Rosenthal's transitivity principle, thereby avoiding some complications that stem from the original transitivity principle. I suggest that Rosenthal occasionally employs this modified model himself, and that the inconsistency identified in the first section of this paper might really reflect Rosenthal's vacillation between these two versions of the transitivity principle. I offer one explanation for how this equivocation may have occurred. These two versions would result if articulations of the transitivity principle employed the term 'mental state' inconsistently, to refer on some occasions merely to mental state types, and on others, to tokened mental states. I conclude by arguing, contrary to Rosenthal and others, that the theory is not incompatible with view that conscious states are uniquely casual efficacious. (shrink)

Psychiatric ethics spans several overlapping domains, including the guidelines for ethical research in psychiatry, the professional ethics required in the practice of psychiatry, and a broader set of moral and ethical problems and dilemmas distinctive to, or at least magnified by, the mental health care setting. Reviewed here are selected issues arising in the last two domains, some seemingly inevitable components of mental disorder and its cultural history and others resultant from recent changes and discoveries. Even as science explains and (...) demystifies mental disorder, it is concluded, new ethical problems will continue to arise in psychiatry and certain recalcitrant problems will likely persist. (shrink)

In this introduction to the edited volume, we briefly describe some of the current challenges faced by public mental health initiatives, at both the national and global level. We also include several general remarks on interdisciplinary methodology in public mental health ethics, followed by short descriptions of the chapters included in the volume.

Whether the food movement is most likely to transform the food system through ‘alternative’ or ‘oppositional’ initiatives has been the focus of considerable scholarly debate. Alternative initiatives are widespread but risk reinforcing the conventional food system by supporting neoliberal discourse and governance mechanisms, including localism, consumer choice, entrepreneurialism and self-help. While oppositional initiatives such as political advocacy have the potential for system-wide change, the current neoliberal political and ideological context dominant in Canada poses difficulties for initiatives that explicitly oppose the (...) conventional food system. As such, some argue that the food movement requires convergence between alternative and oppositional initiatives. In this paper, we investigate convergence using survey results from 143 food movement organizations in four Canadian provinces. Results based on cluster analysis and descriptive statistics on organizational discourse, activities and visions of sustainable food systems demonstrate convergence around neoliberal discourse and governance mechanisms. Localism and consumer education characteristics are particularly prominent, with a majority of respondents describing their organizations as ‘local’, engaging in consumer education activities, and stating the importance of consumer education activities, indicating convergence around alternative, rather than oppositional, initiatives. While convergence around these discourse and strategies may limit the transformative potential of the food system when interpreted as neoliberalisation of the movement, such a reading does not demonstrate their full potential, as survey results also indicate trends of transformative visions of change and political engagement, particularly at the municipal level. This research demonstrates that the movement can work simultaneously within, and opposed to, the conventional food system, and provides understanding of both neoliberal leanings and the politics of the possible of the food movement. (shrink)

Timothy Murphy argues in his article “In Defense of Irreligious Bioethics” (2012) that the role of religion in normative bioethics should be limited and that a viable means for limiting its role (o...

There is reason for genuine puzzlement about Hume's aim in ‘The Natural History of Religion’. Some commentators take the work to be merely a causal investigation into the psychological processes and environmental conditions that are likely to give rise to the first religions, an investigation that has no significant or straightforward implications for the rationality or justification of religious belief. Others take the work to constitute an attack on the rationality and justification of religious belief in general. In contrast to (...) these views, I argue that Hume aims to establish two important claims in ‘The Natural History of Religion’. First, almost all popular religions, including popular monotheism, are deeply superstitious. Second, superstitious monotheism is incompatible with the variety of theism supported by the argument from design. This incompatibility puts significant pressure on the rational acceptability of popular religions. (shrink)

One important way in which neuroscience, particularly neuroanatomy, contributes to cognitive science is by providing a model of the brain's architecture, which, in turn, can be utilized as a guide to the architecture of cognition. This project assumes commitment to a view, now well established, that different mental processes, such as perceiving and remembering, employ different parts of the brain (where part is loosely construed so as not to exclude entities which may themselves be composite). These parts may differ according (...) to their internal organizational structure, information processing capacities, and degree of informational connectivity with other parts. Later I will present an example of research in visual processing where researchers are currently attempting to realize the heuristic potential of the brain's architecture in order to understand cognitive organization. Of prior importance, however, is an understanding of how neuroscientists decipher the architecture of the brain itself. This task of mapping the brain, of carving it up into distinct areas, is not as straightforward as one might think. There are, for example, several different criteria by which one might fix a given boundary between brain regions. Below, I not only highlight some of the more interesting facets of brain mapping research but also elaborate on why such research is of interest to cognitive scientists. (shrink)

Ecumenical views in metaethics hold that normative utterances express hybrid mental states, states which include both a cognitive and a conative component. The ecumenicist can have her cake and eat it too: the view reaps the benefits of both cognitivist and non-cognitivist theories of normative judgement. The conative component of normative judgements accounts for their necessary link with motivation and rational action. The cognitive component makes it possible for the ecumenicist to endorse expressivism without facing the most difficult Frege-Geach challenges. (...) Ridge (2014) provides a defence of ecumenical expressivism about practical normativity that is both ambitious and compelling. I discuss and try to challenge two (unrelated) parts of the view. In the first section, I’ll raise a question for Ridge’s strategy for addressing the Frege-Geach problem, and in particular his proposed recipe for how to interpret normative assertions of arbitrary logical complexity. Then I discuss Ridge’s defence of cognitivism about rationality. I try to highlight some considerations that make expressivism about theoretical and practical rationality attractive. (shrink)

Scholars and practitioners have wondered and debated over the participation of business organizations in the corporate social environment as well as argued over the successes or limitations of such participation. The authors examined six firms' corporate social responsibility activities within the beer industry in an effort to identify and compare these firms' stakeholder relations. The results have implications in our understanding and assessment of corporate social responsibility practices both within and across business industry groups.

In 2000, researchers from the Human Genome Project proclaimed that the initial sequencing of the human genome definitively proved, among other things, that there was no genetic basis for race. The genetic fact that most humans were 99.9% the same at the level of their DNA was widely heralded and circulated in the English-speaking press, especially in the United States. This pronouncement seemed proof that long-term antiracist efforts to de-biologize race were legitimized by scientific findings. Yet, despite the seemingly widespread (...) acceptance of the social construction of race, post-HGP genetic science has seen a substantial shift toward the use of race variables in genetic research and, according to a number of prominent scholars, is re-invoking the specter of earlier forms of racial science in some rather discomfiting ways. During the past seven years, the main thrust of human genetic research, especially in the realm of biomedicine, has shifted from a concern with the 99.9% of the shared genome — what is thought to make humans alike — towards an explicit focus on the 0.1% that constitutes human genetic variation. Here I briefly explore some of the potential implications of the conceptualization and practice of early 21st century genetic variation research, especially as it relates to questions of race. (shrink)

Rohwer and Marris’s exploration of grounds for a prima facie duty to preserve the genetic integrity of wild species makes two important contributions to the environmental ethics literature. While n...

Social psychologists have found that stereotypes correlate with moral judgments about agents and actions. The most commonly studied stereotypes are race/ethnicity and gender. But atheists compose another stereotype, one with its own ignominious history in the Western world, and yet, one about which very little is known. This project endeavored to further our understanding of atheism as a social stereotype. Specifically, we tested whether people with non-religious commitments were stereotypically viewed as less moral than people with religious commitments. We found (...) that participants’ moral appraisals of atheists were more negative than those of Christians who performed the same moral and immoral actions. They also reported immoral behavior as more consistent for atheists, and moral behavior more consistent for Christians. The results contribute to research at the intersection of moral theory, moral psychology, and psychology of religion. (shrink)

In the late 1990s, when otherwise healthy women in Aotearoa New Zealand started to die as a result of venous thrombosis attributed to third generation oral contraceptive pills, this contraceptive technology became the subject of media scrutiny and professional re-investigation. This research utilizes a qualitative methodology to explore the accounts of a small selection of contraceptive consumers. Many of this study’s consumers constructed an alternative framing of the 3GOC controversy, which accessed official information (such as medical statistics) but critically framed (...) these facts by grounding them in relation to how their bodies reacted to pharmaceuticals. Bricolage is used as a metaphor for thinking about the ways that women engage in decision-making by creating ‘toolboxes’ from a multitude of readily available material and information. Lévi-Strauss’s original formulation of bricolage, in particular the claim that bricoleurs do not create ‘new knowledge’, is critiqued. (shrink)

Annette Baier is my philosophical foremother. This paper examines Baier’s views on such topics as personal identity and philosophical methodology. It also examines the idea of motherhood, and the various forms that it takes.

RÉSUMÉ : J’affirme que les normes sémantiques, y compris les normes mathématiques pour l’addition, sont réelles. Ces normes sont régies par des pratiques sociales d’attribuer aux autres et d’entreprendre soi-même la signification, et cet aspect sociale obscurci l’objectivité des normes. L’attribution par Kripke d’un paradoxe sceptique, quant à la possibilité de suivre une règle, relève d’une conception de la normativité selon laquelle les pratiques sociales sont insuffisantes pour autoriser les normes sémantiques. Or, une conception de la normativité qui prend comme (...) point de départ que les êtres humains font partie du monde, détrône cette idée fausse ainsi que le scepticisme sémantique qu’elle soutien. (shrink)

ABSTRACT In considering the hopeful rhetoric that pervades the “nothing but” psychopharmacological approaches to depression—a contemporary version of what William James calls medical materialism—this article argues that only a thorough-going pluralist account of hope is a hope worth wanting. Medical materialist hope is better conceptualized as a variation of optimism, which assumes a single universe that is already the best of all possible universes, and thereby only promotes optimization of the status quo, rather than encourage a wider undertaking of a (...) variety of experiments in living. A pluralist hope, as opposed to optimism, cannot logically infer what the future will bring from a reigning scientific model of the brain. Rather, a pluralist hope is a passionate belief that a not-yet unimagined, and therefore indeterminate, future will meliorate current human ills should humans strenuously work toward achieving it. (shrink)

Economists often consult multiple models in order to combat model uncertainty in the face of misspecification. By examining modeling practices at the Bank of England, this paper identifies an important, but underappreciated modeling procedure. Sometimes an idealized model is manipulated to reproduce the results from another distinct auxiliary model, ones which it could not produce on its own. However, this procedure does not involve making the original model “more realistic,” insofar as this means adding in additional causal factors. This suggests (...) that there are ways to make models more representationally adequate that do not involve de-idealization in the straightforward sense. (shrink)

The Coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic is affecting many areas of life and has led to major changes in undergraduate medical education. Even before the COVID-19 pandemic, high mental burden of medical students has frequently been reported in the literature. Additional pandemic-specific stressors could exacerbate this situation. This study aimed to assess mental health outcomes among medical students during the first semester after the COVID-19 outbreak and perception of the students on how the learning environment has changed. In May 2020, we (...) conducted a cross-sectional survey among undergraduate medical students at a large medical school in Germany. The survey included validated mental health instruments and self-developed items to examine the perception of the study situation during the COVID-19 pandemic. Open-ended questions were analyzed by conventional content analyses. The response rate was 59.2%. Overall, 61.9% of the students reported distress levels above the cutoff. Year 1 students reported significantly higher levels of distress, anxiety and depression than students during their second to fourth year of studies. 48.3% of the students indicated a decrease in their study motivation since the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic with significant differences between study years. The binary logistic regression model showed that male gender, being in study year 2, higher distress scores and higher symptoms of depression were significantly associated with a higher likelihood for experiencing serious worries. In the open-ended questions on current concerns related to the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on their studies, students most frequently reported concerns about missing relevant practical learning experience, difficulties with self-regulated learning and self motivation as well as study-related worries. Year 4 students reported significantly more worries about the lack of practical training than students from study years 1 to 3. Analysis of gender differences showed that female students reported more frequently diverse worries. In contrast, female students shared more frequently helpful strategies in all the categories compared to male students. Our findings suggest that medical students experience significant levels of distress and mental burden during the COVID-19 pandemic and highlight the need for ongoing psychological and educational support for medical students during the COVID-19 pandemic and after. (shrink)

John Cooper and Pierre Hadot suggest that contemporary philosophy can no longer be regarded as a way of life as it has become an academic discipline of study that is theoretical and abstract. According to them, for philosophy to be considered a way of life, it has to be able to shape one’s understanding of the world, guide how one should respond from moment to moment, and reach an existential level in defining one’s being. In this article, I discuss how (...) Jean-Paul Sartre’s existentialist philosophy is a way of life that has been overlooked by Cooper and Hadot. I show that Sartre’s existentialism presents an interconnected perspective of human existence and human development in history, is able to guide our philosophical reasoning about our everyday decisions, and offers a practical guide to living an authentic life through assuming responsibility for our life choices and engaging with our situations. (shrink)

This paper examines four interpretations of the observation that humanitarian intervention might be used ‘selectively’ or ‘inconsistently’ in order to elucidate the normative commitments of the deliberative process in international relations. The paper argues that there are several types of concerns that are implicit in the accusation of inconsistency, and only some of them amount to objections to humanitarian intervention as a whole. The paradox of humanitarian intervention is that intervention is prohibited except where the intervention is humanitarian, yet humanitarian (...) reasons never exist in isolation, and it is nearly impossible to determine the real reason for intervention (or any other collective action) in the international arena. The problems revealed by an examination of inconsistency in the example of humanitarian intervention turn out to be general problems with applying the norms of practical reasoning to moral questions dealing with collective agents. (shrink)

As Japan marks the 75th anniversary of World War II in 2020, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe did not offer a fresh apology and maintained that future generations should not have to keep apologizing for past mistakes. This paper uses the unresolved war issue of the military comfort women system as a context to discuss what it means for political apologies to be more than mere political gestures founded on political interests and discusses what it takes to facilitate forgiveness. It will (...) examine the features of a repentant wrongdoer who deserves forgiveness based on how one relates to one’s past wrongdoing in order to distinguish political apologies that are genuine from those that are mere gestures aimed at hasty reconciliation. This will be discussed through the works of Jacques Derrida and Vladimir Jankélévitch. Next, through Jankélévitch’s and Paul Ricoeur’s ideas of forgiveness, it will be discussed how matters of justice and forgiveness should be understood as well as how the history of past wrongs and injustice is necessary for a genuine apology and makes forgiveness possible. It is also a moral responsibility for both perpetrators and victims to remember history in order to achieve personal forgiveness as well as begin social and political reconciliation. (shrink)

Most Sartrean scholarship attributed Sartre’s ontology of hostile intersubjectivity to Hegel’s theory of recognition, and a Sartrean politics of violence to Hegel’s master-slave dyad. This article sets out to examine Sartre and Hegel in three areas of their work: first, a reassessment of Sartre’s ontology which was commonly thought to be founded on Hegel’s thymos; second, a reconsideration of Fukuyama’s conceptualisation of democracy as the end of Hegel’s historical progress and Sartre’s critique of democracy based on a humanist version of (...) Marxism as philosophy of our time; and finally, a re-evaluation of the conceptualisation of freedom through Hegel’s universal will and Sartre’s principle of universal fraternity. (shrink)

Simone de Beauvoir's philosophical views arguably have more in common with those of Maurice Merleau‐Ponty than of any other philosopher and vice versa. And yet, resonances and dissonances between their oeuvres remain underexplored in the scholarly literature, especially in regard to the content of their respective ontologies. This chapter addresses this gap by developing an ontological interpretation of Beauvoir's concept of flesh as she employs it in The Second Sex. Following a metaphysical line of thinking from their early publications to (...) their later work, it is suggested that Beauvoir's ontological notion of flesh is markedly akin to the one proposed by Merleau‐Ponty in The Visible and the Invisible. (shrink)

Instead of considering the question of the role of Christian women in ministry by providing a new exegesis of contested passages it is helpful to provide a new approach to the matter. This new approach is to explore the nature of New Testament prophecy. The line drawn between prophecy and teaching is not as clear as some conservatives contend, since both make use of Scripture. Women are named as prophets in the Bible and some female prophets have had their words (...) recorded as Scripture. Paul ranks prophets more highly than teachers in 1 Cor. 12.28. Therefore, if women can prophesy they can also teach. This approach provides a way of biblically affirming the full ministry of women within the Christian Church. (shrink)