It has often been argued that Humean accounts of natural law cannot account for the role played by laws in scientific explanations. Loewer (Philosophical Studies 2012) has offered a new reply to this argument on behalf of Humean accounts—a reply that distinguishes between grounding (which Loewer portrays as underwriting a kind of metaphysical explanation) and scientific explanation. I will argue that Loewer’s reply fails because it cannot accommodate the relation between metaphysical and scientific explanation. This relation also resolves a puzzle (...) about scientific explanation that Hempel and Oppenheim (Philosophy of Science 15:135–75, 1948) encountered. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 99, Issue 3, Page 714-719, November 2019.

Many philosophers argue that explanatoriness plays no special role in confirmation – that “inference to the best explanation” (IBE) incorrectly demands giving hypotheses extra credit for their potential explanatory qualities beyond the credit they already deserve for their predictive successes. This paper argues against one common strategy for responding to this thought – that is, for trying to fit IBE within a Bayesian framework. That strategy argues that a hypothesis’ explanatory quality (its “loveliness”) contributes either to its prior probability or (...) to its likelihood. This paper argues that this strategy fails because it must give different treatments to two hypotheses that are unlovely for the very same reason. The strategy therefore loses the insight into scientific reasoning that its reconstruction in terms of IBE is supposed to provide. The paper then provides a Bayesian account of the confirmatory role of explanatoriness that represents explanatory quality as having an impact in the same place for two hypotheses that are unlovely for the very same reason. This approach works by “putting explanation back into IBE” – that is, by invoking hypotheses that refer explicitly to scientific explanation and by invoking the agent's background opinions regarding the kind of explanation that the evidence is liable to have. On this approach, there is no list of “explanatory virtues” the possession of which always helps to make an explanation better. Rather, for different facts, there are different characteristics that our background knowledge of other explanations gives us some reason to expect the given fact's explanation to possess. (shrink)

Ceteris-paribus clauses are nothing to worry about; aceteris-paribus qualifier is not poisonously indeterminate in meaning. Ceteris-paribus laws teach us that a law need not be associated straightforwardly with a regularity in the manner demanded by regularity analyses of law and analyses of laws as relations among universals. This lesson enables us to understand the sense in which the laws of nature would have been no different under various counterfactual suppositions — a feature even of those laws that involve no ceteris-paribus (...) qualification and are actually associated with exceptionless regularities. Ceteris-paribus generalizations of an‘inexact science’ qualify as laws of that science in virtue of their distinctive relation to counterfactuals: they form a set that is stable for the purposes of that field. (Though an accident may possess tremendous resilience under counterfactual suppositions, the laws are sharply distinguished from the accidents in that the laws are collectively as resilient as they could logically possibly be.) The stability of an inexact science's laws may involve their remaining reliable even under certain counterfactual suppositions violating fundamental laws of physics. The ceteris-paribus laws of an inexact science may thus possess a kind of necessity lacking in the fundamental laws of physics. A nomological explanation supplied by an inexact science would then be irreducible to an explanation of the same phenomenon at the level of fundamental physics. Island biogeography is used to illustrate how a special science could be autonomous in this manner. (shrink)

Unlike explanation in science, explanation in mathematics has received relatively scant attention from philosophers. Whereas there are canonical examples of scientific explanations, there are few examples that have become widely accepted as exhibiting the distinction between mathematical proofs that explain why some mathematical theorem holds and proofs that merely prove that the theorem holds without revealing the reason why it holds. This essay offers some examples of proofs that mathematicians have considered explanatory, and it argues that these examples suggest a (...) particular account of explanation in mathematics. The essay compares its account to Steiner's and Kitcher's. Among the topics that arise are proofs that exploit symmetries, mathematical coincidences, brute-force proofs, simplicity in mathematics, merely clever proofs, and proofs that unify what other proofs treat as separate cases. (shrink)

Several foundational documents of bioethics mention the special obligation researchers have to vulnerable research participants. However, the treatment of vulnerability offered by these documents often relies on enumeration of vulnerable groups rather than an analysis of the features that make such groups vulnerable. Recent attempts in the scholarly literature to lend philosophical weight to the concept of vulnerability are offered by Luna and Hurst. Luna suggests that vulnerability is irreducibly contextual and that Institutional Review Boards (Research Ethics Committees) can only (...) identify vulnerable participants by carefully examining the details of the proposed research. Hurst, in contrast, defines the vulnerable as those especially at risk of incurring the wrongs to which all research ethics participants are exposed. We offer a more substantive conception of vulnerability than Luna but one that gives rise to a different rubric of responsibilities from Hurst's. While we understand vulnerability to be an ontological condition of human existence, in the context of research ethics, we take the vulnerable to be research subjects who are especially prone to harm or exploitation. Our analysis rests on developing a typology of sources of vulnerability and showing how distinct sources generate distinct obligations on the part of the researcher. Our account emphasizes that the researcher's first obligation is not to make the research participant even more vulnerable than they already are. To illustrate our framework, we consider two cases: that of a vulnerable population involved in international research and that of a domestic population of people with diminished capacity. (shrink)

Batterman and Rice offer an account of “minimal model explanations” and argue against “common features accounts” of those explanations. This paper offers some objections to their proposals and arguments. It argues that their proposal cannot account for the apparent explanatory asymmetry of minimal model explanations. It argues that their account threatens ultimately to collapse into a “common features account.” Finally, it argues against their motivation for thinking that an explanation appealing to “common features” would have to explain the common features’ (...) own prevalence. (shrink)

Para o “descanço dos Mestres, e utilidade dos Discipulos”: direções para a educação dos infantis no manual pedagógico Nova Escola de Meninos (Portugal, século XVIII) Resumo: O presente estudo, de natureza historiográfica e filosófica, pretende desenvolver uma análise dos discursos relativos à boa educação de sujeitos infantis que estão presentes na obra Nova escola de meninos [...]. Publicado em Coimbra no ano de 1784. O impresso de autoria do presbítero português Manoel Dias de Sousa (1753-1823) tinha como principal objetivo apresentar (...) um método pedagógico, proporcionado à primeira infância, para a aprendizagem da leitura, da escrita e das principais operações aritméticas, bem como instruir os meninos portugueses nos princípios da religião e da civilidade. Fundamentado na categoria conceitual governamentalidade, o estudo defende que a relação discursiva estabelecida por Sousa estabeleceu um conjunto de enunciados e de normativas sobre valores ético-religiosos, a conservação da saúde e adiantamento nos estudos. Entende-se, assim, que tais elementos enunciados na obra podem ter atuado na constituição discursiva acerca de modelos específicos de educação, buscando garantir a produção de um específico tipo de sujeito infantil masculino. Palavras-chave: História da Educação; Infância; Meninos; Portugal; Século XVIII. For the “rest of the teachers and usefulness of the disciples”: guidelines for educating childhood in the pedagogical manual Nova Escola de Meninos (Portugal, 18th century) Abstract: The present study, of historiographical and philosophical nature, aims to develop an analysis of the discourses related to the good education of children's subjects that are present in the work Nova Escola de Meninos(...) [New Boys School (…)]. Published in Coimbra in 1784, the form authored by the priest Portuguese Manoel Dias de Sousa (1753-1823) had as main objective to present a pedagogical method, provided to early childhood, for the learning of reading, writing and the main arithmetic operations, as well as instructing Portuguese boys in the principles of religion and civility. Based on the conceptual category governmentality, the study argues that the discursive relationship established by Sousa established a set of utterances and norms on ethical-religious values, health conservation and advances in studies. It is understood, therefore, that these elements enunciated in the work may have acted in the discursive constitution about specific models of education, seeking to guarantee the production of a specific type of male infant subject. Keywords: History of Education; Childhood; Boys; Portugal; 18th Century. Para el “resto de los profesores y utilidad de los discípulos”: pautas para educar la infância en el manual pedagógico Nova Escola de Meninos (Portugal, siglo XVIII) Resumen: El presente estudio, de carácter historiográfico y filosófico, tiene como objetivo desarrollar um análisis de los discursos relacionados com la buena educación de los sujetos infantiles que están presentes em la obra Nova escola de meninos(...) [Nueva escuela de niños (...)]. Publicada en Coimbra en 1784, la forma del sacerdote portugués Manoel Dias de Sousa (1753-1823) tenía como objetivo principal presentar un método pedagógico, proporcionado a la primera infancia, para el aprendizaje de la lectura, la escritura y las principales operaciones aritméticas, así como la instrusción de los niños portugueses em los principios de religión y civilidad. Sobre la base de la gubernamentalidad de la categoría conceptual, el estudio argumenta que la relación discursiva establecida por Sousa estableció un conjunto de expresiones y normas sobre valores ético-religiosos, conservación de la salud y avances em los estudios. Se entiende, por lo tanto, que estos elementos enunciados en la obra pueden haber actuado en la constitución discursiva sobre modelos específicos de educación, buscando garantizar la producción de un tipo específico de sujeto infantil masculino. Palabras clave: Historia de la Educación; Infancia; Niños; Portugal; Siglo XVIII. Data de registro: 18/05/2020 Data de aceite: 05/10/2020. (shrink)

Explanation in mathematics has recently attracted increased attention from philosophers. The central issue is taken to be how to distinguish between two types of mathematical proofs: those that explain why what they prove is true and those that merely prove theorems without explaining why they are true. This way of framing the issue neglects the possibility of mathematical explanations that are not proofs at all. This paper addresses what it would take for a non-proof to explain. The paper focuses on (...) a particular example of an explanatory non-proof: an argument that mathematicians regard as explaining why a given theorem holds regarding the derivative of an infinite sum of differentiable functions. The paper contrasts this explanatory non-proof with various non-explanatory proofs of the same theorem. The paper offers an account of what makes the given non-proof explanatory. This account is motivated by investigating the difficulties that arise when we try to extend Mark Steiner’s influential account of explanatory proofs to cover this explanatory non-proof. (shrink)

Some mathematical proofs explain why the theorems they prove hold. This paper identifies several challenges for any counterfactual account of explanation in mathematics (that is, any account according to which an explanatory proof reveals how the explanandum would have been different, had facts in the explanans been different). The paper presumes that countermathematicals can be nontrivial. It argues that nevertheless, a counterfactual account portrays explanatory power as too easy to achieve, does not capture explanatory asymmetry, and fails to specify why (...) certain proofs are explanatory and others are not. Greater informativeness about counterfactual dependence can even yield less explanatory power. (shrink)

In “Tense and Reality”, Kit Fine () proposed a novel way to think about realism about tense in the metaphysics of time. In particular, he explored two non-standard forms of realism about tense, arguing that they are to be preferred over standard forms of realism. In the process of defending his own preferred view, fragmentalism, he proposed a fragmentalist interpretation of the special theory of relativity, which will be our focus in this paper. After presenting Fine's position, we will raise (...) a problem for his fragmentalist interpretation of STR. We will argue that Fine's view is in tension with the proper explanation of why various facts obtain. We will then consider whether similar considerations also speak against fragmentalism in domains other than STR, notably fragmentalism about tense. (shrink)

We investigated the accuracy of gender stereotypes regarding digital game genre preferences. In Study 1, 484 female and male participants rated their preference for 17 game genres (gender differences). In Study 2, another sample of 226 participants rated the extent to which the same genres were presumably preferred by women or men (gender stereotypes). We then compared the results of both studies in order to determine the accuracy of the gender stereotypes. Study 1 revealed actual gender differences for most genres—mostly (...) of moderate size. Study 2 revealed substantial gender stereotypes about genre preferences. When comparing the results from both studies, we found that gender stereotypes were accurate in direction for most genres. However, they were, to some degree, inaccurate in size: For most genres, gender stereotypes overestimated the actual gender difference with a moderate mean effect size. (shrink)

In a notable article entitled “What is the Theory of Relativity?” written at the request of The Times and published in its November 28, 1919 edition, Albert Einstein famously distinguished “theories of principle” from “constructive theories.” Einstein placed relativity theory among the principle theories. His distinction has recently received increased attention, especially as it relates to scientific explanation. In particular, there has been considerable discussion of how to explain why there obtain the Lorentz transformations as well as of how to (...) account for the Lorentz covariance of the dynamical laws. Some .. (shrink)

Roche and Sober have offered a new argument for the view that a hypothesis H is not confirmed by its capacity to explain some observation O. Their argument purports to work by showing that O screens H off from the fact that H would explain O. This paper offers several objections to this argument. Firstly, the screening-off test cannot identify whatever evidential contribution Hs explanatoriness may make. Secondly, that H would explain O may be logically necessary, eluding the screening-off test. (...) Thirdly, the test cannot detect an important difference that Hs explanatoriness often makes to Hs confirmation. (shrink)

. A typical textbook explanation of a rocket’s motion when its engine is fired appeals to momentum conservation: the rocket accelerates forward because its exhaust accelerates rearward and the system’s momentum must be conserved. This paper examines how this explanation works, considering three challenges it faces. First, the explanation does not proceed by describing the forces causing the rocket’s motion. Second, the rocket’s motion has a causal-mechanical explanation involving those forces. Third, if momentum conservation and the rearward motion of the (...) rocket’s exhaust explain why the rocket accelerates forward, then presumably momentum conservation and the rocket’s forward motion likewise explain why the rocket emits exhaust rearward. Explanatory circularity threatens to follow from this pair of explanations. This paper examines how the conservation-law explanation works and how it is compatible with the causal-mechanical explanation. The paper argues that these two explanations do not explain precisely the same fact relative to the same contrast class. The paper interprets the two conservation-law explanations as non-causal and argues that they yield no explanatory circularity. (shrink)

The merits of David Lewis’s Best System Account of natural law are frequently debated. But to my knowledge, the prospects for extending the BSA to cover meta-laws have never been examined. I shall identify two obstacles facing the most natural way of extending the BSA to cover meta-laws. The BSA’s fans should consider how these obstacles are to be overcome. Meta-laws are laws about laws. For example, Einstein’s special theory of relativity incorporates a meta-law: The content of the [special] relativity (...) theory can … be summarized in one sentence: all natural laws must be so conditioned that they are covariant with respect to Lorentz transformations. [The special theory of relativity] is not a theory in the usual sense but is better regarded as a second-level theory, or a theory of theories that constrains first-level theories. The principle of relativity is an example of a symmetry principle: a principle requiring that the first-order laws be unchanged under a given transformation. Long before Einstein proposed the principle of relativity, other spacetime symmetries were widely believed to be meta-laws: that the first-order laws are covariant under arbitrary spatial displacements, temporal displacements and spatial rotations. These spacetime symmetries require the laws to treat all spatial locations and directions alike and all moments alike. For instance, symmetry under temporal displacements rules out a fundamental force law specifying that a given force declines with the inverse-square of the distance before a given moment but with the inverse-cube of the distance at and after that moment. Wigner characterizes such a symmetry principle as ‘a superprinciple which is in …. (shrink)

Scientific realism is the view that one can be justified in believing, of some theory about unobservable entities, that the entities it posits are real and accurately described by the theory, in the same sense as one can be justified in believing that the theory’s empirical predictions are accurate, and that so to believe is what it means for a scientist to “accept” that theory, because the goal of science is to describe reality, even its unobservable features. The first part (...) is an epistemic claim, whereas the second concerns the rational reconstruction of scientific practice. Together they suggest that evidence justifying scientific acceptance of a theory justifies belief that the unobservable entities it posits are real and as the theory purports them to be. Anti-realism denies ; it holds that claims about unobservables are either unjustified or justified in a different sense from predictions of observations. It also denies ; it maintains that in her scientific work, as rationally reconstructed, a scientist who accepts a claim about unobservables believes that it yields accurate predictions of observables, not that it describes unobservables. (shrink)

With the rise and public accessibility of AI-enabled decision-support systems, individuals outsource increasingly more of their decisions, even those that carry ethical dimensions. Considering this trend, scholars have highlighted that uncritical deference to these systems would be problematic and consequently called for investigations of the impact of pertinent technology on humans’ ethical decision-making. To this end, this article conducts a systematic review of existing scholarship and derives an integrated framework that demonstrates how intelligent decision-support systems (IDSSs) shape humans’ ethical decision-making. (...) In particular, we identify resulting consequences on an individual level (i.e., deliberation enhancement, motivation enhancement, autonomy enhancement and action enhancement) and on a societal level (i.e., moral deskilling, restricted moral progress and moral responsibility gaps). We carve out two distinct methods/operation types (i.e., processoriented and outcome-oriented navigation) that decision-support systems can deploy and postulate that these determine to what extent the previously stated consequences materialize. Overall, this study holds important theoretical and practical implications by establishing clarity in the conceptions, underlying mechanisms and (directions of) influences that can be expected when using particular IDSSs for ethical decisions. (shrink)

A long lasting debate in the field of implicit learning is whether participants can learn without acquiring conscious knowledge. One crucial problem is that no clear criterion exists allowing to identify participants who possess explicit knowledge. Here, we propose a method to diagnose during a serial reaction time task those participants who acquire conscious knowledge. We first validated this method by using Stroop-like material during training. Then we assessed participants’ knowledge with the Inclusion/Exclusion task and the wagering task . Both (...) experiments confirmed that for participants diagnosed as having acquired conscious knowledge about the underlying sequence the Stroop congruency effect disappeared, whereas for participants not diagnosed as possessing conscious knowledge it only slightly decreased. In addition, both experiments revealed that only participants diagnosed as conscious were able to strategically use their acquired knowledge. Thus, our method allows to reliably distinguish between participants with and without conscious knowledge. (shrink)

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 99, Issue 3, Page 739-748, November 2019.

"If event E had occurred, someone would know of documentary evidence for E; someone does not know of documentary evidence for E; therefore, E did not occur." The conditional in this model of arguments from silence is probabalistic if its consequent is not deducible from the antecedent, relevant conditions, and laws. In interesting cases arguments from silence are rarely rationally, and never logically, conclusive. Specific instances of the argument must be evaluated individually, their persuasiveness depending mainly on the likelihood of (...) documents being available in a given type of case. (shrink)

Building on our diverse research traditions in the study of reasoning, language and communication, the Polish School of Argumentation integrates various disciplines and institutions across Poland in which scholars are dedicated to understanding the phenomenon of the force of argument. Our primary goal is to craft a methodological programme and establish organisational infrastructure: this is the first key step in facilitating and fostering our research movement, which joins people with a common research focus, complementary skills and an enthusiasm to work (...) together. This statement—the Manifesto—lays the foundations for the research programme of the Polish School of Argumentation. (shrink)

ABSTRACTSpatial cueing paradigms are popular tools to assess human attention to emotional stimuli, but different variants of these paradigms differ in what participants’ primary task is. In one variant, participants indicate the location of the target, whereas in the other they indicate the shape of the target. In the present paper we test the idea that although these two variants produce seemingly comparable cue validity effects on response times, they rest on different underlying processes. Across four studies using both variants (...) and manipulating the motivational relevance of cue content, diffusion model analyses revealed that cue validity effects in location tasks are primarily driven by response biases, whereas the same effect rests on delay due to attention to the cue in identification tasks. Based on this, we predict and empirically support that a symmetrical distribution of valid and invalid cues would reduce cue validity... (shrink)

Recently debates about the worth of “ideal theory” have directed attention to the functions that an account of a perfectly just society can serve. One function is that of “reconciliation”: learning that a seemingly undesirable feature of the social world would exist even in the perfectly just society can show us the value that it has in the present as well. John Rawls has emphasized reconciliation as among the roles of political philosophy. For instance, Rawls claims that his theory of (...) justice can reconcile us to the pluralism of liberal democracies. In this essay, I argue that Rawls’s political theory also can reconcile the inhabitants of liberal democratic societies to the fact that such societies may be cognitively confusing on account of their complexity. Then I contend that Rawls’s work offers valuable theoretical resources for analysing a society’s transparency or lack thereof. (shrink)

Much previous study has been done on the degree spectra of prime models of a complete atomic decidable theory. Here we study the analogous questions for homogeneous models. We say a countable model A has a d-basis if the types realized in A are all computable and the Turing degree d can list $\Delta _{0}^{0}$ -indices for all types realized in A. We say A has a d-decidable copy if there exists a model B ≅ A such that the elementary (...) diagram of B is d-computable. Goncharov, Millar, and Peretyat'kin independently showed there exists a homogeneous A with a 0-basis but no decidable copy. We prove that any homogeneous A with a 0'-basis has a low decidable copy. This implies Csima's analogous result for prime models. In the case where all types of the theory T are computable and A is a homogeneous model with a 0-basis, we show A has copies decidable in every nonzero degree. A degree d is 0-homogeneous bounding if any automorphically nontrivial homogeneous A with a 0-basis has a d-decidable copy. We show that the nonlow₂ $\Delta _{2}^{0}$ degrees are 0-homogeneous bounding. (shrink)

The paper defines focus games for satisfiability of linear time temporal logic with past operators. The games are defined in such a way that a complete axiomatisation can easily be obtained from the game rules.

The compelling story of the collaboration of the most important husband-and-wife team in the history of photography; a lavishly illustrated critical assessment of their lifelong project of documenting the industrial landscape of the twentieth century.

O presente estudo tem por objetivo compartilhar fragmentos de uma experiência com Oficina de Escrita, que foi desenvolvida com crianças que estudam em escolas públicas, e estudar a relação dessa prática com a educação. Considerando alguns aspectos da literatura e da teoria da psicanálise (baseada nos autores Sigmund Freud e Jacques Lacan), o estudo aqui apresentado tem o propósito de aproximar ambas: leitura e escrita, a fim de examinar a noção de endereçamento implicada nos processos de escrita e nos processos (...) de aprendizagem. Além disso, este artigo procura mostrar alguns dos efeitos do processo de escrita naquele que escreve. (shrink)

Doebler's small oil portrait of Kant from the year 1791 ist the most important contemporary image that we have of him. The original was preserved by the Order of the Skull and Phoenix in Köngsberg. Various copies of it hung in the Kant-Museum and were held privately in Köngisberg: Stobbe , Petzenburg or Pützenburger and Jacobson , as well as two live-size copies, one that has been called “contemporary” and one from an unknown painter commissioned by the Immanuel Order , (...) although the latter two may stem from the same artist. The Kant-Museum also exhibited a Kant portrait by Heydeck based on Doebler's original, on loan from the art collection of Königsberger Castle. All of these works were destroyed in World War II or have gone missing since 1945. This essay discusses the two Kant portraits sold in auction in 1963 and 2000 and held by the Museum of the City of Königsberg in Duisburg, neither of which copies had been made. The author argues that the former painting is not so much a second work made by Doebler around 1791 as it is a contemporary copy made of it by another artist for the Kant pupil Kiesewetter in Berlin. The second is shown to be an original by Heydeck in 1872, made by observation of Doebler's work. Additionally, the author provides further details of the biographies of Doebler and Heydeck. (shrink)