It is quite obvious why the antireductionist picture of mental causation that rests on supervenience is an attractive theory. On the one hand, it secures uniqueness of the mental; on the other hand, it tries to place the mental in our world in a way that is compatible with the physicalist view. However, Kim reminds us that anti-reductionists face the following dilemma: either mental properties have causal powers or they do not. If they have them, we risk a violation of (...) the causal closure of the physical domain; if they do not have them, we embrace epiphenomenalism, which denies any sort of causal powers to the mental. So, either we violate the causal closure of physics, or we end up with epiphenomenalism. The first two sections of the article describe the problem of causal exclusion and Kim’s causal dilemma. The last two introduce Horgan’s antireductionist answer and my objection to that answer. (shrink)

Contemporary post-aesthetic art implies an expanded concept of the work of art that also includes political functions. Beuys’s concept of social sculpture and Marcuse’s idea of society as a work of art can be complemented by Abreu’s project of a musical orchestra as a social ideal and the Neue Slowenische Kunst transnational state formed from the core of art. These concepts are close to the views of Hakim Bey, with D’Annunzio also touching upon them with his State of Fiume, for (...) which he wrote the constitution and defined music as its central governing principle. Although the art state is a utopian project, art can serve a variety of emancipatory functions even in the dystopian present to intervene in and change the political. In this article, we also discuss the case of art activism in Slovenia, where culture has become a central part of civil society oriented towards social change. Art activism contributes to an expanded concept of the political, which includes new subjects and new forms of antagonisms. Likewise, such repurposing of art emphasises its role in research. (shrink)

Neurophysiological research suggests our mental life is related to the cellular processes of particular nerves. In the spirit of Occam’s razor, some authors take these connections as reductions of psychological terms and kinds to molecular- biological mechanisms and patterns. Bickle’s ‘intervene cellularly/molecularly and track behaviourally’ reduction is one example of this. Here the mental is being reduced to the physical in two steps. The first is, through genetically altered mammals, to causally alter activity of particular nerve cells, i.e. neurons, at (...) the molecular level and then, under controlled experimental conditions, to use generally-accepted rules of behaviour within psychology to monitor the results of these manipulations. In this article, we argue that Bickle’s case example for molecular reduction, i.e. the reduction of long-term memory to its cellular-molecular mechanisms, cannot support his claims, because it turns out that his chosen molecular pathway is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for the memory consolidation switch, and thus, instead of rejecting the multiple realization argument, Bickle’s argument actually speaks in favour of it. Therefore the idea of reductive connections between our mental life and the activity of particular nerves is, at present, still more fiction than reality. (shrink)

Il est évident pourquoi l`image antiréductionniste de la causalité mentale, selon laquelle les phénomènes mentaux sont considérés comme des causes efficientes est si attirante : elle préserve la nature unique du mental , tout en essayant d`assurer la place pour le mental dans notre monde, ce qui est compatible à l`idéologie physicaliste . Mais le soi disant argument de Kim provenant de la survenance nous rappelle le dilemme auquel nous devons faire face lorsque nous favorisons les solutions antiréductionnistes de la (...) causalité mentale, qui pourraient nous forcer à les abandonner et en chercher d`autres plus plausibles. La difficulté est la suivante: les propriétés mentales ont des pouvoirs causals ou non. Si elles en ont, nous violons alors le principe de la conclusion causale, ce qui est la négation du physicalisme. Si ce n`est pas le cas, nous acceptons l`épiphénoménalisme qui conteste les pouvoirs mentaux causals de toutes sortes. Ainsi, soit on renonce au physicalisme, soit on accepte l`épiphénoménalisme. Puisque, dans les deux cas, l`antiréductionnisme est perdant, aucune des deux options ne présente une vraie alternative pour ses tenants. Pour cette raison-là certains auteurs pensent que nous devons nous adresser au réductionnisme afin d`expliquer la causalité mentale d`une manière plus satisfaisante. Pourtant, ce n`est pas le modèle traditionnel de réduction de Nagel qui est ici en jeu, mais il s`agit plutôt d`autres modèles plus sophistiqués. La première partie de cet article présente les raisons pour que soit abandonnée la réduction classique, la deuxième décrit le modèle fonctionnel de réduction de Kim, qui en est un successeur potentiel, alors que la fin traite les raisons de son échec. (shrink)

The article critically examines Jaegwon Kim’s book Physicalism, or Something Near Enough (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005). It recognizes the »near enough type of physicalism« involving functional reduction and covering the relational properties of qualia. Its intrinsic qualites are left out, but since it is qualia’s differences and similarities that matter, i.e. which affect our cognition and behaviour, this is, according to Kim, “no big loss”. While appreciating the book’s effort to offer an intelligible physicalistic theory of the world, the (...) paper concludes that it fails to do so. (shrink)

Whereas mainstream theories of environmental art and sustainable development consider art as a domain suitable for the application of environmentally friendly procedures, such as the circular economy, trash management and digitization, this research article focuses on the internal development of the autopoetic and self-referential art machine, which generates an art-specific sustainability. The circular environmental economy coexists with the circular art economy, which implies changes in the aesthetics and poetics of the artwork; it deploys upcycling to use art trash in creating (...) a new, higher value object. Art-specific sustainability contributes to the power and complexity of the art machine with new conceptual interventions and devices. These devices allow art to resist threats from other fields and to redefine itself. As sustainable development agendas of international organizations take into account the social, political, and economic initiatives that promote ethics, inclusion, and tolerance, this article discusses the contributions of contemporary environmental art to expanded concepts of the political and science. In particular, art activism, in cooperation with civil society, can be an important driver in areas that parliamentary politics overlooks. (shrink)

The anti-reductionist who wants to preserve the causal efficacy of mental phenomena faces several problems in regard to mental causation, i.e. mental events which cause other events, arising from her desire to accept the ontological primacy of the physical and at the same time save the special character of the mental. Psychology tries to persuade us of the former, appealing thereby to the results of experiments carried out in neurology; the latter is, however, deeply rooted in our everyday actions and (...) beliefs and despite the constant opposition of science still very much alive. Difficulties, however, arise from a combination of two claims that are widely accepted in philosophy of mind, namely, physical monism and mental realism, the acceptance of which leads us to the greatest problem of mental causation: the problem of causal exclusion. Since physical causes alone are always sufficient for physical effects mental properties are excluded from causal explanations of our behaviour, which makes them “epiphenomenal”. The article introduces Van Gulick’s solution to the exclusion problem which tries to prove that physical properties, in contrast to mental properties, do not have as much of a privileged status with respect to event causation as usually ascribed. Therefore, it makes no sense to say that physical properties are causally relevant whereas mental properties are not. This is followed by my objection to his argument for levelling mental and physical properties with respect to causation of events. I try to show that Van Gulick’s argument rests on a premise that no serious physicalist can accept. (shrink)

Contemporary art based on new media is situated at the intersection of art-as-we-know-it, smart technologies, digital and algorithmic culture, networked economy, politics, as well as bio and techno sciences. Contemporary art enters into intense relations with these fields, including interactions, adoption of methodological devices and approaches, changes of the areas of activity, hybridization and amalgamation. This text explores those features of contemporary life and culture which are affected by digital art and the recombination, appropriation, remediation, reusing, repurposing, and transfer of (...) artistic procedures/tools from one context or field to another. (shrink)

Today we come across new media art projects as post-industrial art services that occur at the intersection of contemporary art, new economy, post-political politics (activism, hacktivism), technosciences and techno lifestyles. The artwork is not a stable object anymore, it is a process, an artistic software, an experience, a service devoted to solving a particular (cultural and non-cultural) problem, a research, an interface which demands from its user also the ability for associative selection, algorithmic (logical) thinking and for procedures pertaining to (...) DJ and VJ culture, such as mixing, cutting, sampling and recombination. The art service is not so much the manufacturing of things as it is a process of reshaping the thing, moving it, repurposing it, connecting it and incorporating it into new contexts and relations. The service presupposes a problem, a challenge or an order to be solved or carried out. The performer of the service is always faced with a certain task, challenged to solve it in a sequence of steps, chosen as economically as possible. The service therefore ends with a solution of the problem (or its removal) and not with the manufacturing of a finished object. The service always implies an algorithmic procedure that has to be as rational as possible, economical, divided into phases, steps, instructions needed for it to be carried out. By defining the new media art in terms of post-industrial service activity, the traditional concepts of aesthetic and autonomous art are left behind and replaced with novel theoretical devices, e.g. software, repurposing, remixing, recombination, rewriting and hybridization. (shrink)

Neither any technological development nor any institutional mechanisms (economical, legal, political etc.) can compensate the lack of ethical persons. Reaching sustainable development and life of quality is possible only on the basis of view which is not trapped, flat and reducing, on the basis of an effort, which ca - founded on temperance and humility (in relation to the nature, self, others and (O)other) - (co)create cooperation, higher order synthesis and synergy of the crafts that are the conditio sine qua (...) non of survival, harmonious world and (decent) existence of a human (as a human) in it. Professor Janez Juhant, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology, the Head of Chair of Philosophy Bojan Zalec, Senior Research Associate, the Head of Institute of Philosophy and Social Ethics, University of Ljubljana, Faculty of Theology. (shrink)

We establish the thesis that in moral education, particularly in the first years of the child’s development, unreflexive acts or unreflexiveness in certain behaviours of adults is a condition for the development of the personality structure and virtues that enable autonomous ethical reflection and a relation to the Other. With the notion of unreflexiveness we refer to resolvedness in the response of adults when it is necessary to establish a limit, or cut, in the child’s demand for pleasure, as well (...) as to resolvedness as one of the structurally essential elements in behaviours with which the adult subordinates the child to the symbolic order or language. In philosophy, a symptomatic position in this context is represented by Kant’s theory of education. On the basis of the “traditional” concept of “negative education”, and through Freud’s and Lacan’s psychoanalytic concepts, we identify two principles that should, in contemporary times, be an essential part of the moral educational behaviours of adults: the principle of a delimited response to the child’s demand for the satisfaction of pleasure, and the principle of reasoned, reflected, but nevertheless certain, persevering, resolved unreflexiveness in the subordination of the child’s desire to the symbolic order . On the basis of the preceding analysis, we highlight certain consequences of this structure of the subject for the contexts of particular theoretical discussions and for school practice. (shrink)

Ricœur stellt eine interessante Definition der Utopie und Ideologie auf. Jede Gesellschaft, die mehr oder weniger stabil sein will, sollte zwischen den beiden ein Gleichgewicht suchen. Mithilfe seiner Definition versuchen wir, auch das „schulische“ Verstehen der Globalisierung einzuordnen. Es wird die Antwort auf die Frage gesucht, ob es mehr um einen ideologischen oder eher einen utopischen Zutritt bei den gegenwärtigen Schulpolitiken geht. Von besonderem Interesse ist für uns aber die Frage, in wessen Interesse die immer stärkere Unifizierung des Schulwesens ist, (...) wenn man das Beispiel der Reform von Bologna unter die Lupe nimmt. Geht es um ein Geflecht von wirtschaftlichen Interessen oder um das Bedürfnis des Menschen als Wesens im Sinne eines Individuums und seiner Rechte, wenn wir im Bildungsprozess die Durchgängigkeit, Einigkeit, Vergleichbarkeit und die Kompetenz betonen. Ist die Globalisierung im Schulbereich nur eine Herausforderung der Zeit, oder aber werden Bedürfnisse bestimmter Wirtschaftsinteressen eines komplizierten Kapitalsystems befriedigt? Es scheint, dass wir wieder zwischen der Utopie der Erwartung einer universalen Brüderlichkeit und der Ideologie der Rechtfertigung der Interessen einzelner Gruppen gespannt sind. (shrink)

Das Bedürfnis nach Narration schuf nicht lediglich epische Gedichte und ungezählte Mythologien, sondern repräsentiert P. Ricoeur zufolge den wahren Kern der Wissensbildung über das Selbst. Der Identifikationsprozess durch das Erzählen lenkt uns nicht zum Fokus auf unsere eigene Narration. Andauernd wählen wir zunächst Erzählungen anderer Menschen aus und setzen erst hinterher mit eigener Lebensgeschichte ein. Durch den Prozess der Nachahmung, Mimesis – wie von Ricoeur angesehen – sind wir imstande, zeitgleich sowohl Ethik als auch Moral zu erlernen. Die globale Welt (...) mit ihren simplifizierten Narrationen des Marktes neigt dazu, bei der ersten und zweiten Mimesis zu verharren und ist außerstande, zur dritten überzuwechseln, wo erst die Rede von der Kreativität anfangen kann. Der Autor parallelisiert Ricoeurs philosophischen Identitätsbegriff mit Frischs literarischem Experiment im Roman Stiller. Beide sind Exempel hermeneutischer Verflechtung, die zur natürlichen Identität führt. In diesem hermeneutischen Ablauf vermögen wir, uns selbst wieder zu entdecken in einer Welt, in welcher wir unsere eigene Identität achten, indem wir ihren ideenreichen Umformungen aufgeschlossen gegenüberstehen. (shrink)

Auf dem Weg des Textverstehens bedient sich die Hermeneutik Ricœurs der sog. Distanzierung, die miteinbezieht, dass das Subjekt des Verstehens über das Lesen, das Hören, das Sehen aus sich selbst austritt, und fordert notwendigerweise eine Art von Andersheit. In dieser Andersheit könnte man auch Derridas „differAnce” erkennen, die in ihren Folgen in eine völlig andere Richtung führt als Ricœurs Begriff der Distanzierung. Die beiden Autoren können besonders auf dem gemeinsamen Feld der Metapherforschung verglichen werden. Ist für Ricśur die wahre Metapher (...) nur die lebendige, diejenige, die neue Bedeutungen schafft und von ihm aus den gegenwärtigen Theorien Blacks und Richards abgeleitet wird, so ist für Derrida in Die weiße Mythologie die ganze Philosophie nur vergessene Metaphorik, die zunächst zum eigenen Tode und danach noch mittelbar zum Tode der Philosophie führt. In dieser immer mehr globalisierten Welt, wo sich auf der einen Seite alle Grenzen und Unterschiede verwischen, tauchen auf der anderen Seite Fundamentalismen auf, die um jeden Preis die Unüberwindlichkeit dieser Unterschiede zu zeigen versuchen. In dem gegenwärtigen europäischem Vereinigungskonzept wie bei jedem anderen Erwachsenwerden haben Erziehung und Ausbildung eine wichtige Rolle bei der Bewahrung der eigenen Identität und der Vorbereitung auf das Verstehen der anderen und auf das gemeinsame Handeln. Es scheint, man könnte mit Hilfe von Ricœurs Begriff der Distanzierung diese zweifache Forderung vereinen. Da aber diese Ansicht über das Erziehungs- und Ausbildungsgebiet wieder in eine „neue Mythologie” geraten könnte, die man als Grundlage der fundamentalistischen Abkapselung versteht, ist es notwendig, diesen Prozess mit Derridas Kritik zu verfolgen. (shrink)

A person as an ethical being establishes herself/himself through dialogue with others. Dialogue is also an anthropological basis of a woman/man and of her/his growth as a person. The first years of life are particularly decisive. In these years, a young person assimilates the codes necessary to perceive the self, others, and, through them, the whole world. Dialogue is a basic task by which one's personal life is organized and how one acts in a human way. The emotional dimension is (...) more important than the grammatical-symbolic one. Yet, a one-sided socio-cultural development hinders such personal dialogue. This is the very case in totalitarian systems, as well as in the consumer-society. Because of such obstacles, the global society needs a global dialogue to secure the life for future generations. This book examines the challenges of a dialogical development in a global society. (Series: Philosophy of Religion Forum / Forum Religionsphilosophie - Vol. 32). (shrink)

In this paper, we present and test a theory of how political connectedness affects corporate governance and productive efficiency of firms. Our model predicts that underdeveloped democratic institutions that do not punish political corruption result in political connectedness of firms that in turn has a negative effect on performance. We test this prediction on an almost complete population of Slovenian joint-stock companies with 100 or more employees. Using the data on supervisory board structure, together with balance sheet and income statement (...) data for 2000–2010, we show that a higher share of politically connected supervisory board members leads to lower productivity. (shrink)

In his recent paper on the meta-problem of consciousness, Chalmers :6–66, 2018) claims that illusionism is one of the best reductionist theories available and that it is not incoherent, even if it is implausible and empirically false. Our paper argues against this: strong illusionism is poorly established. The first part presents the reasoning leading to strong illusionism; i.e., it describes the initial conditions and relations among them for its establishment. The second part of the paper argues that strong illusionism is (...) not constructed in a satisfactory way and calls the flaw in establishing it the pre-illusion problem. The third part demonstrates that the existing defense of strong illusionism does not save it from the pre-illusion problem, while the fourth part of the paper outlines two strategies to fight the pre-illusion problem, concluding, however, that they fail to do so, and indicates one possible way in which illusionism might be, nevertheless, coherently established. (shrink)

Es incuestionable el hecho de la evolución, así como la admisión de una realidad previa de la cual partir, sea creada o no. Pero luce cuestionable el mecanismo de la evolución en clave de “selección natural” cuando se la entiende como netamente naturalista. El evolucionismo darwinista no tiene fundamento suficiente para afirmar que las especies evolucionan de modo totalmente aleatorio y sin finalidad definida. Los más recientes descubrimientos socavan los cimientos del darwinismo (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), y nos hablan de un (...) Diseñador creando el universo de la nada en un tiempo finito y aceptando la evidencia del Big-Bang (William Lane Craig). Otros tipos de evolucionismo, aunque rechazan la teleología, admiten sin embargo, la teleonomía, que no es incompatible con la tesis agustiniana del “creacionismo evolutivo”. En estos tipos de evolucionismo sí cabe una tendencialidad antrópica como la defendida por Agustín, a través de sus razones seminales-causales y de los distintos modos de creación derivados de aquel “simul et in ictu” creacional. Las distintas creaciones virtuales, también simultáneas y derivadas de la creación propia “ex nihilo”, no implican que sean efectivas “simul” también las especies o prototipos. Una cosa es el hecho de la creación simultánea y otro el de su real y existencial efecto en el tiempo. En esta idea encontramos la fundamentación para defender un creacionismo evolutivo a lo agustiniano, que podría sintonizar con otros evolucionismos al estilo de X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Palabras clave: creacionismo; creacionismo evolutivo; creación virtual; evolucionismo; razón seminal; fixismo (o fijismo); principio o sentido antrópico. Saint Augustine versus Darwin: Evolutionary Creacionism of ‘Seminal Reasons’Evolution is an unquestionable fact, and so is the admission of a previous reality from which to start up, whether created or not. But the mechanism of evolution in terms of “natural selection” does look questionable, when the latter is understood as entirely naturalistic. Darwinist evolutionism has no sufficient grounds to assert that species evolve in a totally random way, without a defined end. The most recent discoveries undermine the foundations of Darwinism (J. Enrique Cáceres-Arrieta), and tell us about a Designer creating the universe out of nothing in a finite time, accepting the big bang theory (William Lane Craig). Other types of evolutionism, while rejecting teleology, do admit teleonomy, which is not incompatible with the Augustinian thesis of “evolutionary creationism”. In these kinds of evolutionism it is indeed possible to speak of anthropic tendencies, as was defended by Augustine by means of his seminal-causal reasons and the different modes of creation derived from that creational “simul et in ictu”. The different virtual creations, simultaneous as well and derived from the “ex nihilo” creation, do not entail that the species or prototypes should also be effective “simul”. One thing is the fact of simultaneous creation; a different one is its real and existential effect over time. In this idea we find the grounds on which to defend an Augustinian-like evolutionary creationism, which might be compatible with other types of evolutionism like those of X. Zubiri, K. Rahner, Pedro Laín Entralgo,… Keywords : Creationism;Evolutionary Creationism; Virtual Creation; Evolutionism; Seminal Reason; Fixism; Anthropic Sense or Principle. (shrink)

This paper aims to explore the notion of algorithmic culture in relation to new media and electronic literature. Such a culture considers human as being immersed in smart technology, which with its code and algorithms defines individual’s behaviour and decision-making, modes of socializing and participation, experiencing and perception. The following lines unveil the paradigm shift that involves semiotic crossings between human and machine languages. In order to do so, it addresses some crucial particularities of the emerging field of electronic literature.

This essay attempts to assess whether the perceptual issues posed by the contemporary interface culture, and the constant attitude shift demanded by the new media between the “natural” and the “as if” modes, might be considered a significant challenge for phenomenological aesthetics as understood in terms of Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology of perception. To demonstrate how the use of a particular interface profoundly shapes the form and structure of an activity as well as enabling perception of a particular kind, the author does (...) not focus directly on the state-of-the-art smart interfaces, but describes the experience of cycling in a large city, with the interface in the form of the bicycle upgraded with an imagined ride simulator. While the former enables a very particular entrance into the world of perception, shaped by its moderate speed and detachment from the ground, the latter enables techno-shaped perception in the “as if” screenic mode. The experience described raises questions concerning the kinaesthetic, proprioceptive and motor features contributing to the cyclist’s mobile perception, as well as pointing to issues related to the reading of the city’s network as a particular spatial configuration generated by the cyclist’s realtime activity. This is the space-time-event-ridescape maintained and modified by the corporeal act of cycling. The spatiality of such a ride does not presume the notion of a space that contains the cyclist, but builds on notions of being-in-the-ridescape (as a kind of cityscape), in terms not only of full corporeal and mental engagement, but also of bodily literacy. The reading of the cityscape enabled by the combination of two interfaces, the bicycle and the ride simulator, is discussed in relation to de Certeau’s account of pedestrian (walking) experience in a big city, his distinction between strategies and tactics, and the notion that each cyclist contributes a novel story to ridetext, which is viewed not as an aesthetic object but as the production of puzzles for the rider to solve. The paper cocludes by questioning the capacity of phenomenology to accommodate the contemporary phenomenon of a “mixed” or “augmented reality” either in concept or in relation to the demands of the phenomenological reduction and the ends of the epoché. Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology, Volume 10, Edition 2, October 2010: 61-71. (shrink)

How do schools change? What do we know about the change process? Does the individual school have the capacity to change - and under what conditions? This book, based on research carried out at the Oslo-based international school improvement programme, IMTEC, poses, debates and answers all these questions. It promotes the Institutional Development Programme (IDP) - tested for over 15 years in several countries - which is a revolutionary change strategy for schools. Dalin examines thoroughly how it can be adapted (...) in creative ways, with insight, to the particular needs of the school context. (shrink)

The article is a brief response to Jacob Blair’s critique of David Rodin’s argument in War and Self-Defense that there are circumstances in which war conceivably could be justified not as self-defence, but as law enforcement or punishment. It argues that while Rodin’s position potentially is less dilemmatic than Blair suggests, Blair nevertheless usefully highlights tensions within it. Blair’s own argument in favour of ar as law-enforcement is suggestive, but in no way conclusive.

This article contends that an ethics of care has a particular moral ontology that makes it suitable to argue for the normative significance of relational responsibilities within professional health care. This ontology is relational. It means that moral choices always have to account for the web of relationships, the relational networks and responsibilities that are an essential part of particular moral circumstances. Given this ontology, the article investigates the conditions for health care professionals to be partial and to act on (...) the basis of particular responsibilities to their patients. We will argue that priorities could be partial in three ways: first, because there may be exceptional circumstances that allow for giving priority to one patient over another; second, because the integrity of the patient and a health care worker may be connected in special ways; and, finally, even if impartiality is essential, the institutional basis of health care must always give ample space for an ethically qualified individual and personal care for patients. Even if difficult priorities may be necessary, the conditions of institutional health care should always seek to create the prerequisites for nurses and doctors to administer proper care. (shrink)

The concept of ‘empowerment’ is used frequently in a number of professional areas, from psychotherapy to social work. But even if the same term is used, it is not always clear if the concept denotes the same goals or the same practice in these various fields. The purpose of this paper is to clarify the discussion and to find a plausible and useful definition of the concept that is suitable for work in various professions. Several suggestions are discussed in the (...) paper, for example control over life or health, autonomy, ability, self-efficacy, self-esteem, and freedom, and it is concluded that there are two plausible complementary uses, one as a goal and one as a process or approach. Empowerment as a goal is to have control over the determinants of one’s quality of life, and empowerment as a process is to create a professional relation where the client or community takes control over the change process, determining both the goals of this process and the means to use. (shrink)

In this article, we defend two claims about the precautionary principle. The first is that there is no ‘core’ precautionary principle that unifies all its different versions. It is more plausible to think of the different versions as being related to each other by way of family resemblances. So although precautionary principle x may have much in common with precautionary principle y, and y with z, there is no set of necessary and sufficient conditions that unify all versions of the (...) principle. Our second claim is that it is sometimes appropriate to think of the precautionary principle as a midlevel principle in the sense proposed by Beauchamp and Childress in their Principles of Biomedical Ethics, i.e. as a non-rigid moral principle. We argue that if the precautionary principle is conceived as a non-rigid principle that needs to be balanced against other principles before a moral verdict can be reached, then this enables us to address some standard objections to the principle. (shrink)