The methods of intellectual history have not yet been applied to studying the invention of technology for printing texts and images ca. 1375–ca. 1450. One of the several conceptual developments in this period reflecting the possibility of mechanical replication is a view of the relationship of eternity to durational time based on Gregory of Nyssa’s philosophy of time and William of Ockham’s. The article considers how changes in these ideas helped enable the conceptual possibilities of the dissemination of ideas. It (...) describes a direct connection of human perceptual knowledge to divine knowledge that enhanced the authority of printed production to transfer and reproduce the true and the good. (shrink)

I am very grateful to Stephan Leuenberger, Erica Shumener and Naomi Thompson for their excellent and thoughtful commentaries on Making Things Up. I have learned a lot from thinking through their replies. As it happens, they focus on pretty disparate aspects of the book: necessitation, relative fundamentality, and what builds the building facts, respectively. I will thus engage with their remarks separately.

Bioethicists criticize Jürgen Habermas’s argument against “liberal eugenics” for many reasons. This essay examines one particular critique, according to which Habermas misunderstands the implications of human evolution. In adopting Hannah Arendt’s concept of “natality,” Habermas seems to fear that genetically modified children will lose the contingency of their births, which would impair their capacity for political action; but according to evolutionary theory, bioethicists argue, this fear is unfounded. I explore this objection by entertaining the hypothesis that Habermas’s argument assumes Arendt’s (...) interpretation of Darwinian evolution in addition to her conception of natality, and then I answer it by contrasting the conceptions of evolution held by Habermas, by Arendt, and by Habermas’s critics. Les bioéthiciens critiquent l’argument de Jürgen Habermas contre « l’eugénisme libéral » pour de nombreuses raisons. Cet essai examine une critique en particulier, selon laquelle Habermas comprend mal les implications de l’évolution humaine : en adoptant le concept de la « natalité » de Hannah Arendt, Habermas semble craindre que les enfants soumis à une modification génétique ne perdent la contingence propre à leur naissance, une perte qui diminuerait leur capacité pour l’action politique, mais selon la théorie de l’évolution, les bioéthiciens soutiennent que cette peur est sans fondement. J’explore cette objection à Habermas en considérant l’hypothèse que, en plus du concept de la natalité, Habermas suppose aussi l’interprétation arendtienne de l’évolution biologique de Darwin, et j’y répond en confrontant cette conception de l’évolution avec la conception propre à Habermas et avec celle des bioéthiciens qui lui ont répondu. (shrink)

This paper considers how to frame different kinds of ontology, in the broader concept of the different dimensions of models in general. A key motivating factor has been to cut across conversations...

This paper argues that a liberal state is justified in promoting relationships of conjugal love – the form of relationship that is the basis of the institution of marriage – on the grounds that they are essential to the development and maintenance of autonomy. A deep human need is that the detail of our lives be recognized (accepted, affirmed, granted importance) by others (or by an other). Autonomy can be compromised when this need is not met. So a state concerned (...) with autonomy ought to be concerned with relationships in which people can be given recognition. This argument justifies support for friendship as well as conjugal love; why is the latter particularly special? The answer is that in conjugal love partners value each other exclusively (i.e., in a way they do not value anyone else). Conjugal relations therefore recognise the uniqueness and individual value of a person's life in away that friendship does not. (shrink)

Aim To examine the contribution of programme year and demographic factors to medical students’ perceptions of evidence-based classification categories of professional misconduct. Methods Students at an Irish medical school were administered a cross-sectional survey comprising 31 vignettes of professional misconduct, which mapped onto a 12-category classification system. Students scored each item using a 5-point Likert scale, where 1 represents the least severe form of misconduct and 5 the most severe. Results Of the 1012 eligible respondents, 561 students completed the survey, (...) providing a response rate of 55%. Items pertaining to disclosure of conflict of interest were ranked as the least severe examples of professional misconduct, and this perception was highest among finalyear students. While ratings of severity declined for items related to ‘inappropriate conduct not in relation to patient’ and ‘inappropriate use of social media’ between years 1 and 3, ratings for both categories increased again among clinical cycle students. Conclusions Increased clinical exposure during years 4 and 5 of the undergraduate programme was associated with better recognition of the importance of selected professional domains. Disclosure of conflict of interest is identified as an area of medical professionalism that requires greater emphasis for students who are at the point of transition from student to doctor. (shrink)

We study the effects of homeschool background and time use on academic performance among students at Patrick Henry College, a private religious institution with a 63-credit core classical liberal arts curriculum. Using ordinary least squares regression analysis, we examine four research questions: Does time use influence academic performance? Do homeschooled students perform differently than traditionally schooled students? Does parental education moderate the impact of homeschooling on academic performance? Does homeschooling moderate the impact of ACT scores on academic performance?

It is now 10 years since the disease we now know as SARS—severe acute respiratory syndrome—caused more than 700 deaths around the world and made more than 8,000 people ill. More recently, in 2009 the global community experienced the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century—the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic. This paper analyses the major developments in international public health law relating to infectious diseases in the period since SARS and considers their implications for pandemic planning.

Photographic truth has traditionally been theorized on the basis of ‘correctness’, whereby the image’s mechanically produced correspondence to reality guarantees its truth. This article suggests that Christian Patterson’s photobook Redheaded Peckerwood (2011) engages with a notion of photographic truth that can more usefully be understood in relation to Martin Heidegger’s descriptions of truth as aletheia or ‘unconcealing’. By including ambiguity, mystery and fiction in this nonetheless seemingly truthful retelling of historical events, the work suggests that a straightforward notion of the (...) photograph’s transparency to the world is insufficient to explain the truth of photography. (shrink)

This response to Paul Russell looks at how we should understand the moral sentiments and their role in action. I think that there is an important tension in Russell’s interpretation of this role. On the one hand, aspects of Russell’s position commit him to some kind of rationalism about the emotions: for instance, he has argued that P. F. Strawson’s account of the reactive is crudely naturalistic; and he has claimed that emotions are constitutive of our sensitivity to moral reasons. (...) On the other hand, he has explicitly endorsed a Humean view of motivation which, I will argue, is incompatible with these rationalist commitments. As well as pointing out the tension and arguing that it should be resolved in the direction of rationalism, I sketch the kind of rationalism that Russell needs: that reason can, through the autonomous progress of moral inquiry, give rise to new forms of emotion. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of whetherpersonal surveillance on the world wide web isdifferent in nature and intensity from that inthe offline world. The article presents aprofile of the ways in which privacy problemswere framed and addressed in the 1970s and1990s. Based on an analysis of privacy newsstories from 1999–2000, it then presents atypology of the kinds of surveillance practicesthat have emerged as a result of Internetcommunications. Five practices are discussedand illustrated: surveillance by glitch,surveillance by default, surveillance bydesign, surveillance by (...) possession, andsurveillance by subject. The article offerssome tentative conclusions about theprogressive latency of tracking devices, aboutthe complexity created by multi-sourcing, aboutthe robustness of clickstream data, and aboutthe erosion of the distinction between themonitor and the monitored. These trendsemphasize the need to reject analysis thatframes our understanding of Internetsurveillance in terms of its impact onsociety. Rather the Internet should beregarded as a form of life whose evolvingstructure becomes embedded in humanconsciousness and social practice, and whosearchitecture embodies an inherent valence thatis gradually shifting away from the assumptionsof anonymity upon which the Internet wasoriginally designed. (shrink)

“Female sexual dysfunction” is the type of contested disease that has sparked concern about the role of the pharmaceutical industry in medical science. Many policies have been proposed to manage industry influence without carefully evaluating whether the proposed policies would be successful. We consider a proposal for incorporating citizen stakeholders into scientific research and show, via a detailed case study of the pharmaceutical regulation of flibanserin, that such programs can be co-opted. In closing, we use Holman’s asymmetric arms race framework (...) as a tool for evaluating policies in industry-funded science. (shrink)

"Neuroscience and Philosophy" begins with an excerpt from "Philosophical Foundations of Neuroscience," in which Maxwell Bennett and Peter Hacker question the ...

Making Things Up By BennettKarenOxford University Press, 2018. xii + 260 pp.

The author comments on the article “The neurobiology of addiction: Implications for voluntary control of behavior,‘ by S. E. Hyman. Hyman presents that addiction is a brain disease or a moral condition. The authors present that addiction is a strong preference, similar to appetitive preferences. They state that addiction is merely a form of pleasure-seeking. The authors conclude that the problem of addiction is the problem of the management of pleasure, not treatment of a disease. Accession Number: 24077914; Authors: Foddy, (...) Bennett 1; Email Address: bennett@foddy.net Savulescu, Julian 2; Affiliations: 1: University of Melbourne, Monash University, Australia; 2: University of Oxford; Subject: EDITORIALS; Subject: ADDICTIONS; Subject: HYMAN, S. E.; Subject: BRAIN -- Diseases; Subject: PLEASURE; Subject: NEUROBIOLOGY; Subject: BEHAVIOR; Number of Pages: 4p. (shrink)

Abstract:This article brings together considerations from philosophical work on standpoint epistemology, feminist philosophy of science, and epistemic injustice to examine a particular problem facing contemporary psychiatry: the conflict between the conceptual resources of psychiatric medicine and alternative conceptualizations like those of the neurodiversity movement and psychiatric abolitionism. I argue that resistance to fully considering such alternative conceptualizations in processes such as the revision of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders emerges in part from a particular form of epistemic (...) injustice (hermeneutical ignorance) leveled against a particular social group (which I call the "psychopathologized"). Further, insofar as the objectivity which psychiatry should aspire to is a kind of "social objectivity" which requires incorporation of various normative perspectives, this particular form of epistemic injustice threatens to undermine its scientific objectivity. Although many questions regarding implementation remain, this implies that psychiatry must grapple substantively with radical reconceptualizations of its domain if it is to achieve legitimate scientific objectivity. (shrink)