L’absurdité du monde et l’inquiétude face au sens de l’existence semblent être des affects négatifs. Par un dialogue entre Albert Camus et Jacques Lavigne, nous tenterons d’explorer le caractère créatif de ces affects. Camus et Lavigne partent d’une critique du matérialisme et de l’idéalisme afin d’ancrer leur théorie dans l’existence , en pensant conjointement les idées et la matérialité. Ils découvrent le rôle précieux de l’absurde et de l’inquiétude. Ces affects agissent comme vecteurs de l’action humaine et (...) permettent d’initier le sujet à la solidarité. Néanmoins, la société est organisée de telle manière que le sujet doit constamment s’opposer à la possibilité d’une neutralisation de ses affects. En ce sens, rester inquiet et conscient de l’absurdité de l’existence appelle une résistance du sujet. (shrink)

A recent paper has given a lucid treatment of Bell’s notion of local causality within the framework of the relational interpretation of quantum mechanics. However, the authors went on to conclude that the quantum violation of Bell’s notion of local causality is no more surprising than a common cause. Here, I argue that this conclusion is unwarranted by the authors’ own analysis. On the contrary, within the framework outlined by the authors, I argue that far from saving the notion of (...) ‘locality’ from the grip of Bell’s theorem, the authors have deprived it of a meaningful definition. (shrink)

This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be (...) preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. To ensure a quality reading experience, this work has been proofread and republished using a format that seamlessly blends the original graphical elements with text in an easy-to-read typeface. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

We apply Benacerraf’s distinction between mathematical ontology and mathematical practice to examine contrasting interpretations of infinitesimal mathematics of the seventeenth and eighteenth century, in the work of Bos, Ferraro, Laugwitz, and others. We detect Weierstrass’s ghost behind some of the received historiography on Euler’s infinitesimal mathematics, as when Ferraro proposes to understand Euler in terms of a Weierstrassian notion of limit and Fraser declares classical analysis to be a “primary point of reference for understanding the eighteenth-century theories.” Meanwhile, scholars like (...) Bos and Laugwitz seek to explore Eulerian methodology, practice, and procedures in a way more faithful to Euler’s own. Euler’s use of infinite integers and the associated infinite products are analyzed in the context of his infinite product decomposition for the sine function. Euler’s principle of cancellation is compared to the Leibnizian transcendental law of homogeneity. The Leibnizian law of continuity similarly finds echoes in Euler. We argue that Ferraro’s assumption that Euler worked with a classical notion of quantity is symptomatic of a post-Weierstrassian placement of Euler in the Archimedean track for the development of analysis, as well as a blurring of the distinction between the dual tracks noted by Bos. Interpreting Euler in an Archimedean conceptual framework obscures important aspects of Euler’s work. Such a framework is profitably replaced by a syntactically more versatile modern infinitesimal framework that provides better proxies for his inferential moves. (shrink)

"The cinema is, as a photographic medium, an art form of light. But the mastery of lightning and the 'dark' side of his rhizomatic, interactive net have led very early to the configuration of shade and shadow and refer, ergo, to something which is perpetually related to all forms of figurative art. To film, 'night' means, however, something different, as it brings the configuration of the skies in a state of darkness with it. This is in disagreement with his usual (...) depiction. It entails embarking on a singular figurative project, which approximates a contradiction in itself. This project demonstrates the autonomy of the configuration process precisely through this contradiction.". (shrink)

Le philosophe, quand il parle ou écrit, suscite une œuvre philosophique. Ce que Souriau se plaît à nommer le philosophème paraît aux yeux de plusieurs fort ambigu, et dans sa nature, et dans son langage. On ne cesse de répéter que la philosophie traverse actuellement une de ses crises graves. Déjà certains proclament l'illégitimité de la discipline philosophique. D'autres s'interrogent sur le statut possible de la philosophie; J.-C. Piguet est de ceux-ci. Selon lui, l'ambiguïté de l'œuvre philosophique provient du fait (...) que cette œuvre occupe le milieu entre l'œuvre de science et l'œuvre d'art. A ce compte, la discipline philosophique tiendrait à la fois de l'esthétique et de l'épistémologie scientifique. Ces assertions, Piguet les fonde sur une analyse du langage. (shrink)

A certain number of cases suggest that our willingness to ascribe “knowledge” can be influenced by practical factors. For revisionary proposals, they indicate that the truth‐values of “knowledge” ascriptions vary with practical factors. For conservative proposals, on the contrary, nothing surprising is happening. Standard pragmatic approaches appeal to pragmatic implicatures and psychological approaches to the idea that belief formation is influenced by practical factors. Conservative proposals have not yet offered a fully satisfactory explanation, though. In this article, I introduce and (...) defend a third conservative proposal which I call “Refined Invariantism”. The two main claims of this proposal are that (1) we should distinguish between high stakes cases in which the subject does not believe (that he knows) the target proposition and those in which he believes (that he knows) the target proposition and that (2) we should adopt a psychological treatment for the first kind of case and a pragmatic treatment based on the epistemic standards for appropriate assertion and action for the second kind of case. I argue that this new combined approach avoids the main pitfalls of its two conservative rivals and that it gives new life to the generality objection levelled against revisionary views. (shrink)

The traditional view in epistemology has it that knowledge is insensitive to the practical stakes. More recently, some philosophers have argued that knowledge is sufficient for rational action: if you know p, then p is a reason you have (epistemically speaking). Many epistemologists contend that these two claims stand in tension with one another. In support of this, they ask us to start with a low stakes case where, intuitively, a subject knows that p and appropriately acts on p. Then, (...) they ask us to consider a high stakes version of the case where, intuitively, this subject does not know that p and could not appropriately act on p without double-checking. Finally, they suggest that the best explanation for our shifty intuitions is that p is a reason the subject has in the low stakes case but not in the high stakes case. In short, according to this explanation, having a reason (in the epistemic sense) is sensitive to the stakes. If so, either knowledge is sensitive to the stakes or else you can know that p even if p is not a reason you have (in the epistemic sense). In this paper, I consider more closely the relation between having a reason (in the epistemic sense) and having a reason to check. I argue that the supposition that if one has p as a reason (in the epistemic sense) then one has a reason not to check whether p, or no reason to check whether p, is highly doubtful. On the contrary, I suggest, it is plausible that, given our fallibility, one always has an epistemic reason to check whether p, whether or not p is a reason one has (in the epistemic sense). On the basis of this observation, I show that one can offer a new way of explaining the cases in question, allowing us to reconcile the traditional view about knowledge and the sufficiency of knowledge for rational action. (shrink)

La vie la mort est l'un des séminaires les plus féconds de Jacques Derrida. En jeu : penser la vie et la mort en vertu d'une logique qui ne poserait pas la mort comme l'opposé de la vie. La pureté de la vie n'est-elle pas, par essence, contaminée par la possibilité même de la mort, puisque seul un vivant peut mourir? interroge d'emblée le philosophe. En renversant la perspective classique, Derrida entreprend d'enseigner à ses étudiants que c'est la mort, (...) au contraire, qui rend la vie possible. En quatorze séances érudites et palpitantes délivrées au cours de l'année 1975-1976, Derrida déconstruit l'opposition traditionnelle entre la vie et la mort à travers des lectures multiples et délibérément pluridisciplinaires, élaborant sa pensée aussi bien au contact de la philosophie (Hegel, Nietzsche, Heidegger) et de l'épistémologie des sciences (Georges Canguilhem) que dans la confrontation à la génétique contemporaine (François Jacob) et à la psychanalyse (catégories freudiennes de pulsions de vie et de mort)."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

Un siècle avant la parution posthume du Cours de linguistique générale de Ferdinand de Saussure, la linguistique moderne a émergé en Allemagne avec les études de Wilhelm von Humboldt pour la linguistique générale et (entre autres) de Franz Bopp, Jacob Grimm, August Schleicher et Karl Brugmann pour la grammaire historico-comparative des langues indo-européennes. Dès les années 1830, les instituts allemands de philologie et de linguistique ont attiré nombre de jeunes chercheurs de Scandinavie, de France, de Suisse, de Pologne, des USA, (...) etc. Et avec la diffusion de la nouvelle "Science allemande" à l'étranger des échanges intenses se sont épanouis tout au long du XIXe siècle. Ce volume collectif, riche de neuf contributions d'historiens de la linguistique de France, d'Allemagne, de Suisse et des Pays-Bas, vise à retracer certains de ces échanges parmi les plus instructifs, notamment entre Franz Bopp et Michel Bréal, Max Müller et William Whitney, le psychologue Wilhelm Wundt et Albert Sechehaye ou Georg von der Gabelentz et Antoine Meillet. Des voies fécondes étaient ainsi ouvertes à la linguistique du XXe siècle en Europe et en Amérique. (shrink)

The head and the stomach January 1996 -- Borges in Sarajevo March 1996 -- Fin de siècle and new millenarium May 1996 -- Cold racism July 1996 -- The last enemy November 1996 -- The grounded plane January 1997 -- Dialectic in the dialectic August 1997 -- Voyage to the country of the last sociologists November 1997 -- Justice in the past April 1998 -- The crisis of art or a crisis of thought July 1998 -- Is cinema to blame (...) March 1999? -- The nameless war May 1999 -- One image right can sweep away another October 1999 -- The syllogism of corruption October 2000 -- Voici/voila : the destiny of images January 2001 -- From facts to interpretations : the new quarrel over the holocaust April 2001 -- From one torture to another June 2001 -- The filmmaker, the people and the government August 2001 -- Time, words, war November 2001 -- Philosophy in the bathroom January 2002 -- Prisoners of the infinite march 2002 -- From one month of May to another June 2002 -- Victor Hugo : the ambiguities of a bicentenary August 2002 -- The machine and the foetus January 2003 -- Death of the author or all too living artist April 2003 -- Logic of amnesia June 2003 -- The principle of insecurity September 2003 -- The new fictions of evil November 2003 -- Criminal democracy March 2004 -- The difficult heritage of Michel Foucault June 2004 -- The new reasons for the lie A\august 2004 -- Beyond art October 2004 -- The politics of images February 2005 -- Democracy and its doctors May 2005. (shrink)